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Introduction: Informal Life 
Politics in Northeast Asia
Tessa Morris-Suzuki
Liberating Politics
A group of prewar Hokkaido farmers creating their own experiment in 
communal living; a Chinese village where artists and locals come together 
to reinvent tradition; fishermen in mercury-polluted Minamata creating 
a new philosophy of nature; two grieving fathers walking across South 
Korea in remembrance of children killed in an avoidable disaster; North 
Koreans setting up a market in the streets of their town, in defiance of 
official regulations. These are some of the people you will encounter in the 
pages that follow. None of these people is behaving in an overtly ‘political’ 
way, but the argument of this book is that their actions are part of an 
invisible politics that is quietly transforming aspects of life in Northeast 
Asia today. Understanding the emergence and nature of this invisible 
politics is important in order to make sense of contemporary Northeast 
Asia. Beyond that, it is important because these small experiments in 
‘politics from below’ shed light on some fundamental global dilemmas 
of 21st-century political life.
‘Politics’ is constantly defined and redefined. A broadly recognisable 
definition, though, might be this, which draws on (but slightly rewords) 
the writings of British political scientist David Runciman: politics is 
about the collective choices that shape the way people live, and about 
the nature of the human interrelationships through which those choices 
are made.1 In everyday speech we equate politics with the formal 
mechanisms of government: national constitutions, parliaments, cabinets, 
1  David Runciman, Politics: Ideas in Profile (London: Profile Books, 2014).
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prime ministers or presidents, elections, party platforms. We include local 
institutions like city councils, and international bodies like the United 
Nations. We also sometimes consider the actions of lobby groups and of 
organised protest movements. But the activities of such formal and semi-
formal political institutions are only a small corner of politics in the full 
meaning of the word. 
For many people, none of the formal institutions of politics—whether 
local, national or international—seems able or willing to address the life 
crises that they face, or to assist them in making meaningful choices. 
In  response, these people try to act out aspects of the change they 
seek in their everyday lives, through autonomous collective responses. 
The  responses may be enacted by the local community of a village or 
urban area, but may also be enacted by networks dispersed across the 
boundaries of region or nation. This is ‘informal life politics’: an act of 
collected self-protection in the face of the profound deficits of institutional 
politics. Often, though not always, informal life politics is truly ‘survival 
politics’—an act of desperation in response to direct threats to the physical 
survival of individuals or the social survival of communities.
This book sets out to explore examples of informal life politics in 
Northeast Asia, building on the work of scholars like James C. Scott and 
Benedict Tria Kerkvliet, who have charted and made visible forms of 
political action embedded in everyday life.2 Such forms of politics have a 
long history, but there are impasses in the world of formal governmental 
politics today that make it particularly important to reconsider the past, 
present and possibilities of this less visible political realm. How  can 
we reconceive politics to include that realm, and how might our 
understanding  of politics in all its dimensions change if we broaden 
our vision in this way?
2  See, for example, James C. Scott, ‘Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance’, in James C. Scott and 
Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet eds, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia (London: Frank 
Cass, 1986), 5–35; Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants 
Transformed National Policy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005).
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Northeast Asia and the Crisis of Democracy
Northeast Asia is a region in the throes of enormous and unsettling change. 
The opening of the Chinese economy and its subsequent phenomenal 
growth have brought prosperity, but also massive environmental and 
social disruption. Japan, following a quarter of a century of economic 
stagnation, faces profound problems of ageing and population decline, 
aggravated by the trauma of the 2011 triple disaster and its aftermath. 
North Korea, in the midst of one of the world’s most prosperous regions, 
remains one of the world’s poorest countries; and in South Korea, visions 
of democratisation and national reunification that captured the popular 
imagination in the 1990s and early 21st century seem to have given way 
to a deep sense of social malaise (vividly depicted by Cho (Han) Haejoang 
in Chapter Seven of this book).
If we take a global perspective, Northeast Asia may indeed be seen as 
encapsulating profound challenges at the heart of the political order 
worldwide. The region contains countries that share long-term historical 
and cultural traditions, but whose modern history has led them in 
radically divergent directions. Japan became an imperial power, but was 
then stripped of its colonies and democratised following wartime defeat 
in 1945. China pursued a path of revolution, becoming a crucible of 
communist experimentation and social engineering, but has since—
without ever formally repudiating its communist past—been transformed 
into a powerhouse of global capitalism. Taiwan and South Korea both 
moved from an era of authoritarian dictatorship to democracy, while 
Hong  Kong evolved from colony to ‘special administrative region’: 
a  precarious hybrid of authoritarian and quasi-democratic political 
forms. North Korea, meanwhile, is the one communist country that 
has resisted  the global transition towards ‘post-socialism’, remaining 
trapped in its own distinctive Chuch’e variant of communism. This is 
therefore a  region that spans an unusually wide spectrum of political 
forms, and, for this very reason, is a region where the nature of the global 
‘post-democracy’ becomes particularly visible.3 
3  See Obsolete Capitalism Collective ed., The Birth of Digital Populism: Crowd, Power and 
Postdemocracy in the Twenty-First Century (Rome and London: Obsolete Capitalism Free Press, 2014); 
Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy, (London: Wiley, 2004).
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The end of the Cold War in Europe, coinciding roughly with 
democratisation of a number of formerly authoritarian states (including 
the Philippines and South Korea) and the collapse of South African 
apartheid, promoted a widespread belief that liberal democracy had 
triumphed worldwide. As Francis Fukuyama proclaimed in the late 
1980s, ‘a remarkable consensus concerning liberal democracy as a form of 
government had emerged throughout the world’. Democracy (according 
to this view) had ‘conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, 
fascism, and most recently communism’. Fukuyama famously went on 
to predict that, since liberal democracy was free from the ‘grave defects 
and irrationalities’ that marred other regimes of power, its triumph would 
mark ‘the endpoint of man’s ideological evolution’ and therefore also 
‘the end of history’.4 The Arab Spring of 2011 prompted a revival and 
reassessment of these ideas by those who argued that Fukuyama had been 
right to foresee the irreversible victory of democracy, even if he was wrong 
in failing to foresee how prolonged and complex the road to this victory 
would be.5 
But by the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, the state of 
the world was starting to look very different. It is now clear that neither 
the collapse of communism nor the Arab Spring has ushered in universal 
liberal democracy. In many former Soviet republics and satellites, the end 
of communism merely paved the way to new forms of authoritarianism 
that proved very capable of coexisting with the rapid marketisation of 
the economy. In China, a fundamentally unreformed once-communist 
political system has proved be a comfortable bedfellow of globalised 
capitalism. Meanwhile, in many countries (both longstanding and newer 
democratic polities), democracy itself, as Indian novelist and activist 
Arudhati Roy argues, is being ‘hollowed out and emptied of meaning’.6 
Italian economist Lapo Berti, who also speaks of the ‘emptying’ of 
democracy, sees a core problem as lying in the deepening power of the 
globalised corporate system and the intermeshing of economic power and 
politics elites, which renders politics divorced from the everyday concerns 
4  Francis Fukuyama, ‘By Way of Introduction’, in Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and 
the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006), xi; see also Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, 
The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 3–18.
5  For example, Ewen Harrison and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, The Triumph of Democracy and the 
Eclipse of the West (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).




of citizens and ‘entirely self-referential’. One result is the estrangement of 
ordinary people from a voting system ‘that is more and more perceived 
as useless, if not ridiculous’:
When people start voting at random because there is no longer any hope 
of making your voice heard, something is irrevocably broken in the 
mechanism of representation. And when … abstention reaches nearly half 
of those entitled to vote, the fracture is serious and it is very unlikely to be 
reversible in the short term.7
Berti is writing of Italian politics, but his words resonate powerfully in 
Northeast Asia, where all the main democracies have experienced sharply 
falling voting rates and growing voter cynicism in the past two decades. 
In  South Korea, the voter turnout in the first democratic presidential 
election of 1992 was over 70 per cent, but it fell below 50 per cent in 
2008, recovering only slightly to 54 per cent in 2012.8 In Taiwan, more 
than 80 per cent of the electorate voted in the presidential elections of 
2000 and 2004, but only 62 per cent in the 2016 election.9 In Japan, 
where turnout in the three general elections of the 1980s averaged 
69  per  cent, and in 1990 reached 73 per cent, less than 53 per cent 
of voters participated  in the 2014 election—the lowest level since the 
Pacific War.10 
Voter estrangement from the political process goes hand-in-hand with 
populism, which (as Lapo Berti argues) emerges when: 
citizens lose their hopes of being the protagonists in democratic life, and 
therefore search for a surrogate who can represent their aspirations. This 
person is usually seen as a saviour, a character who imposes himself/herself 
through his/her communicative skills, which are very often enhanced or 
made up by the media.11 
Populist elements have long existed in democratic politics everywhere, 
but populism in Berti’s sense of the word has become an increasingly 
conspicuous part of political life in Northeast Asia (and elsewhere) since 
7  Lapo Berti, ‘On Micro-Fascism’, in Obsolete Capitalism Collective ed., The Birth of Digital 
Populism, 45.
8  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, ‘Voter Turnout Data for Korea, 
Republic of ’, www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/163/40.
9  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, ‘Voter Turnout Data for Taiwan’, 
www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/290/40.
10  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, ‘Voter Turnout Data for Japan’, 
www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/155/40.
11  Lapo Berti, ‘On Micro-Fascism’, in Obsolete Capitalism Collective ed., The Birth of Digital 
Populism, 45.
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the end of the 20th century.12 This populism combines an emphasis on 
personalities and slogans with nationalism, anti-intellectualism, and 
‘anti-political politics’: its practitioners ‘claim to represent the democratic 
sovereign … the united people … as against the parties or factions that 
divide it’.13 Populist leaders, as self-defined saviours and representatives of 
the democratic sovereign, are typically impatient with the constitutional 
restraints of traditional liberal democracy. This personalised emphasis on 
the leader—who is presented as being in direct communication with a 
homogeneous mass nation—creates elements of convergence between the 
political styles of democracies like Japan and South Korea (on the one 
hand) and post-communist (or quasi-post-communist) states like Russia 
and China (on the other).
Because it privileges media presence and headline-grabbing phrases over 
policy expertise and the disciplines of democratic process, populism 
often fails to deliver when confronted with practical crises that affect 
the everyday lives of citizens. This inherent flaw can create a spiral of 
disaffection, where one section of the population becomes ever more 
alienated from the political process, while another redoubles its attempt 
to find salvation from crisis though identification with the images 
of strength projected by the populist leader. So populism, despite its 
rhetoric of a united and homogenous national community, is commonly 
accompanied by bitter and deepening social antagonisms and competitive 
narratives of victimhood. These crises of politics in Northeast Asia are 
particularly clearly illustrated by the cases explored in Chapters Six and 
Seven of this book.
But if one response to estrangement from politics is a search for the leader 
as surrogate and saviour, another very different response lies in the search 
for autonomous and locally generated practical responses to crises. It is 
this response that we focus on in the pages that follow. The examples 
discussed in these pages are only tiny fragments of the immensely complex 
landscape of informal life politics in Northeast Asia today. It is important 
to emphasise, too, that these examples are not being put forward here as 
all-encompassing solutions to the profound crises of politics outlined in 
the previous paragraphs. The crises, of course, need to be addressed at 
multiple levels—through formal political processes at local, national and 
international level as well as through the informal politics of everyday life. 
12  See Pasuk Phongpaichit and Kosuke Mizuno eds, Populism in Asia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009).
13  Margaret Canavan, quoted in Pasuk Phongpaichit and Kosuke Mizuno eds, Populism in Asia, 4.
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But a focus on the world of informal life politics can, we suggest, enrich 
our vision of the possibilities of political action, and challenges us to 
rethink some preconceptions about the very nature of ‘the political’ itself.
Mixed Economies, Mixed Polities
One challenge posed by informal life politics is that it impels us 
to reconsider the boundaries that we conventionally draw between 
‘the political’ and ‘the economic’. In all the stories explored in this book, 
the economic and the political are inextricably intertwined; all actions 
are inescapably both political and economic. But over the past 50 years, 
while corporate capitalism and state power have become ever more 
deeply entangled with one another, the intellectual worlds of politics 
and economics have bifurcated. Integrated notions of political economy 
have dissolved, and are replaced by two distinct, specialised realms called 
‘political science’ and ‘economics’, each working according to its own 
sets of rules. This intellectual bifurcation has given us an economics that 
rarely addresses underlying questions about the nature and purpose of our 
economic systems, and a politics incapable of confronting the political 
problems posed by global corporate capitalism.
In public discourse, ‘the economy’ is now commonly taken to mean ‘the 
corporate market’, and ‘politics’ is commonly taken to mean the actions 
of formal governmental institutions and the politicians and bureaucrats 
who run them. But in fact (as Thomas Picketty observes), ‘we live in 
a mixed economy, different to be sure from the mixed economies that 
people envisioned after World War II but nonetheless quite real’.14 
Substantial sections of the economy in most countries are operated by 
non-profit organisations, charitable foundations, household enterprises, 
and other institutions that work on principles very different from those of 
the capitalist corporation. A multitude of cooperatives, community and 
household enterprises, local non-commercial exchange networks and so 
14  Thomas Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014).
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on play vital economic roles, particularly in the ‘majority world’ (that is, 
in the world inhabited by the 85 per cent of the global population who 
live in low-income countries).15
And we all inhabit not just mixed economies, but also mixed polities. 
Our world is not neatly divisible into good constitutional democracies 
and bad dictatorships. Though configured in very many differing ways, 
every country in the world today contains at least some corners where 
ordinary people make their own collective choices through reasoned 
debate, and every country contains at least some corners where power is 
arbitrary and unaccountable. The differences lie in relative weights of both 
ends of the spectrum, and in the diverse ways in which democratic and 
the authoritarian elements are configured. We need analytical approaches 
that do not simply treat the political systems of nations as single totalities: 
well-oiled machines whose parts all work in unison. Instead, we need to 
become more aware of the great diversity that exists within each mixed 
polity. It is important to understand the very varied ways in which 
collective choices that shape life are made, and the very varied human 
interrelationships through which those choices are made. This book seeks 
to contribute to an understanding of that diversity.
As we explore the examples discussed in this volume, we become more 
aware of the intimate interweaving of the political and the economic. 
Attempts to restructure village life in Hokkaido, the mountains of Honshu 
or rural China (see Chapters One, Two and Three) are inescapably both 
economic and political. Responses to environmental crisis in Minamata, 
Fukushima and beyond ineluctably weave together the political and the 
economic, as do responses to disasters like the Sewol ferry tragedy in 
South Korea (Chapters Four, Six and Seven). 
In many of these cases a key underlying issue is the expansionary nature of 
the power of the corporate economy (which is itself inseparably intertwined 
with the power of the state). As Hannah Arendt observed in the 1950s, 
modernity is based on endless economic expansion: ‘what the modern 
age so heatedly defended was never property as such but the unhampered 
pursuit of more property or of accumulation’.16 Or (to borrow Ellen 
15  J. K. Gibson-Graham, Jenny Cameron and Stephen Healy, Take Back the Economy: An Ethical 
Guide for Transforming our Communities (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2013); see also Shahidul Alam, ‘Majority World’ 2015 (website), www.shahidulalam.
com/#pi=38&p=-1&a=0&at=0.
16  Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 110.
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Meiskins Wood’s words) modern capitalism is characterised by ‘its unique 
capacity as well as its unique need for constant self-expansion’.17 But the 
attempt to treat all things as potentially profit-generating commodities is 
doomed to disaster. If everything were a commodity:
human beings would perish from the effect of social exposure; they would 
die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime 
and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighbourhoods 
and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardised, the 
power to produce food and raw materials destroyed.18 
A conscious or unconscious urge to ‘push-back’ against this encroaching 
commodification of life lies at the heart of many of the stories we shall 
explore here (and this is a point to which we will return in the epilogue). 
These stories help us to see commonalities and differences between 
informal life politics in various parts of East Asia, and to glimpse the 
possibilities and limitations, the creativity and the challenges, which drive 
diverse practices of informal politics in everyday life.
Old and New Informal Life Politics
From the 1970s onwards, grassroots political activism generated much 
interest and debate around the world. The rise of environmentalism, 
feminism, alternative lifestyle movements, indigenous and minority rights 
movements, lesbian, gay and transgender activism and many other forms 
of ‘lifestyle politics’ (as they are often termed) has given rise to theories 
that have expanded the boundaries of traditional political research. 
Influential scholars like Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck identified the 
rise of this new activism as a symptom of a new, reflexive, ‘post materialist’ 
world, transcending the old class-based politics that had been centred on 
questions of the distribution of material wealth.19
This book begins by digging deeper into the past; emphasising the 
historical roots of the forms of living politics that we are studying. 
Informal life politics is often (though not always) a politics of the poor. 
17  Ellen Meiskins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (London: Verso, 2002), 193.
18  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001, original published in 
1944), 76.
19  Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1994); Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998); Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
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Rather than simply emerging when societies reach a stage of development 
that transcends materialism, it has a history that stretches back at least 
to the start of East Asian industrialisation in the early 20th century. 
The cross-border links between cooperatist thought and action in Japan 
and Russia—carefully traced by Sho Konishi in Chapter One—are a 
reminder of this long history of grassroots efforts to create new social forms 
in response to the challenges of rapid, state-imposed industrialisation and 
modernisation. Small-scale local attempts to create ‘another modernity’ 
were inspired by the spread of ideas across the borders of nations and 
continents. Russian cooperatist anarchism, British and French utopian 
socialism, and non-Darwinian accounts of natural evolution were among 
the forces that shaped such social experiments in early 20th-century 
Japan, and indeed in many other parts of the world.
Chapters Two and Three show how these ideas and social experiments 
have crossed spatial and temporal boundaries. Ou Ning, himself actively 
involved in a village revival movement in China, traces the flow of ideas 
through which prewar Japanese images of the ‘New Village’ (themselves 
inspired by concepts imported from Russia and elsewhere) were in turn 
taken up and reworked in Republican China, where they played a part 
in shaping the rural reconstruction movement. This tradition has been 
rediscovered in China since the 1990s, providing inspiration for new 
efforts to reconstruct rural life from below. In Japan meanwhile, the same 
stream of ideas continues to feed informal life politics actions in rural 
areas affected by depopulation and ageing (see Chapter Three).
Informal life politics in Northeast Asia today draws on this long lineage of 
ideas and experiences, but reinterprets them in the light of a rapidly and 
radically changing world. By the 1970s, new currents of environmental 
thought were added to the mix of ideas. In Chapter Four, Simon Avenell 
explores the neglected way in which exchanges of environmental ideas 
in the 1970s and 1980s helped to extend ‘translocal’ links between the 
grassroots actions of communities in various parts of Asia threatened by 
industrial pollution. The creative intermingling of old and new ideas of 
nature and humanity is illustrated in Chapter Five by Shoko Yoneyama’s 
study of living politics in two areas devastated by environmental disaster: 
the Minamata region and the areas affected by the 2011 tsunami and 
nuclear meltdown. Other variants of that intermingling and reworking 
emerge in the critical rethinking of ‘development’ that followed the 
Sewol disaster in South Korea (Chapter Seven), and in the community 




While most of the chapters in this book look at specific local responses to 
crisis in particular countries of the region, Chapter Ten offers a broader 
comparative perspective on grassroots action in Asia from the perspective 
of the concept of social innovation. This final chapter draws on a large-
scale study by Seoul-based The Hope Institute, which aims to encourage 
bottom-up sustainable approaches to addressing social problems. 
The Hope Institute’s work highlights some common threads in emerging 
forms of Asian grassroots social innovation, and extends the story to 
encompass cases from South and Southeast as well as Northeast Asia.
Common Themes in the Politics 
of Improvisation
When we place the diverse stories in this book together, connecting 
themes emerge. Fundamental to all of these grassroots experiments is an 
unease at the way that the modern corporate growth economy defines 
and shapes human beings and the natural world. The first chapters of 
the book trace a long history of critiques of the mechanised separation 
of humans from nature, the erosion of community cooperation by the 
pressures of economic competition, and the devaluing of spiritual and 
creative capabilities that cannot readily be turned into financial profit. 
Miyamoto Kenichi, whose work inspires the Miyamoto School (discussed 
in Chapter Three), reinterprets Marx’s notion of ‘immiseration’. In Marx’s 
day, immiseration meant sheer material poverty. Today (Miyamoto 
suggests) it means phenomena like pollution, urban congestion and 
rural depopulation, the displacement of people and the destruction of 
social support systems etc., produced both by the rampant profit seeking 
of corporations and by state policies imposed from above to support 
this profit seeking.20 Though the terms they use may vary, most of the 
grassroots groups discussed in this book share a critical perspective on 
the human and environmental burdens imposed by the ever-expanding 
global corporate economy.
The response to this immiseration involves efforts to revive local 
livelihoods and to find support and recompense for people whose lives 
have been disrupted by environmental damage or failed state policies; 
20  Miyamoto Kenichi, Gendai shihonshugi to kokka [Contemporary Capitalism and the State] 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981), 135–42.
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but it also goes further than this. Many of the groups discussed in this 
book are engaged in a search for ways to reconceptualise the relationship 
between humans and nature, and to redefine notions of ‘development’, 
‘prosperity’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘community’. One theme that repeatedly 
emerges is a re-evaluation of the significance of the human spirit. 
In  conventional models of democratic state politics, formal religions 
often play an important role (since many political parties have explicit 
or implicit religious links), but the notion of individual spirituality tends 
to be treated with caution and even suspicion, as something likely to lead 
into the murky quicksands of superstition and irrationality. By contrast, 
several of the experiments in living politics discussed in this book challenge 
that approach by bringing notions of spirituality and ritual into the light 
of day. We find this in the ritual practices developed by cooperative 
farmers in prewar Hokkaido (Chapter One), in Japanese re-evaluations of 
animism following the Minamata and Fukushima disasters (Chapter Five) 
and in the use of shamanic and other religious rituals by the families of 
Sewol ferry victims (Chapter Seven).
At the same time, though, the actions discussed in this book cannot be 
slotted into any single clearly defined ideological framework. Rather, they 
challenge us to reconsider the very notion of ‘ideology’ itself. The classic 
18th- and 19th-century political philosophies that still influence our 
understandings of politics were commonly based on visions of the social 
world as a closed system whose rules were derived from a foundational 
first principle, often seen as lying in the original state of nature. Such 
images of society provide fertile ground for ideological certainties about 
the solutions to our present-day human predicaments. But as philosopher 
William Connolly suggests, in our complex contemporary age it may 
make more sense to see the world as a multitude of coexisting partially 
open systems in a state of becoming; and if we do so, the ideological 
certainties dissolve. We are in the midst of an immensely complicated and 
changing nexus of existence, in which relatively small events may trigger 
large and unpredictable changes. There are no iron laws of historical 
evolution, and there is no pure unsullied nature into which utopians can 
withdraw to build ideal communities. We have to start from where we are, 
and this means that ‘when a new crisis of possibility emerges, you must 
often experiment to ascertain where and how to engage it’.21




Some of the forms of living politics that we explore in this book arise 
from  relatively well-articulated politico-social philosophies. But many 
begin as experiments in response to crisis—environmental crisis, 
the drastic restructuring of the social landscape or the failures of state 
policy. The participants in these projects, rather than starting out with 
clearly defined philosophies, grope their way gradually towards a deeper 
understanding of the forces behind the particular crisis that they are 
trying to address. Their lack of firm ideological framework may be seen 
as a liability and a source of vulnerability. But it can also be a source of 
flexibility and dynamism. The world of living politics—small in scale, 
grounded in everyday life, protean and often ephemeral—provides scope 
for a wide diversity of experiments. It allows for the multiplicity of ideas 
and practices that is lacking in the mental monocultures of institutional 
politics. And, even more importantly perhaps, it allows room for failure 
without triggering catastrophe. Informal life politics is a space for the 
action that Brian Massumi sees as central to biological and social becoming: 
improvisation—the ‘margin of manoeuvre’, the ‘power of variation’.22 
It allows groups of people, in responding to profound politico-economic 
challenges to try, and see what happens.
Informal life politics also impels us to think again about the notion of 
‘community’. The term ‘community’ recurs in many of the chapters that 
follow. People in Bishan and Mochizuki, Minamata and Ansan, Yau 
Ma Tei and Wonju try to restore and re-create community connections 
eroded by rapid social and economic change. But it is important to 
emphasise that none of these communities is a self-contained or closed 
entity. In fact, a clear common theme of the stories in this book is the 
crucial importance of interaction between insiders and outsiders—
between those who have spent all their lives in a particular location, and 
those who have arrived recently, bringing new ideas and experiences with 
them. These communities are therefore very different from the Weberian 
notion of Gemeinschaft. They are networks, linking people in diverse social 
situations and spatial locations, and sometimes linking people across 
the boundaries of the nation. The dynamics of interaction within these 
networks is a particularly important topic for future study as we explore 
the evolving world of living politics in East Asia.
22  Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach us about Politics (Durham, NC, and London: Duke 
University Press, 2014), 12–13.
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North Korea seems the outlier: the ‘outsider’ to all political and economic 
analyses of East Asia. It is certainly important to recognise the peculiarities 
that make North Korean political circumstances different from those of 
neighbouring countries. But although North Korea has absolutely no 
visible ‘civil society’ or independent ‘social movements’, Eun Jeong Soh’s 
analysis in Chapter Nine suggests that even in North Korea, types of 
informal life politics are quietly changing the way people make collective 
decisions that shape their futures, and interpret the decisions that they 
have made. Soh shows that networks linking traders to one another 
and to local officials become a vital part of informal livelihood creation, 
and state notions both of autonomy and collective effort are reinterpreted 
to justify the rise of survival strategies from below.
A New Beginning
The chapters in this book do not, of course, speak in unison. They are 
written by historians, anthropologists and sociologists, by scholars and by 
those directly engaged in living politics actions in the region. The diversity 
of approaches adopted by the grassroots movements explored in the book 
is matched by the diversity of approaches taken by those who write about 
them. But, by placing these accounts side by side, we hope that we can 
create space for a conversation about previously neglected dimensions of 
the political life of Northeast Asia, and contribute to a wider discussion 
about the role of informal life politics in the 21st-century world.
If, as we have suggested earlier, all polities are mixed polities, then informal 
life politics is only one dimension of the mix. But it is an important, 
complex, and insufficiently understood dimension. The stories told in the 
following pages offer no conclusions, but we believe that they do offer 
starting points on a journey to a deeper understanding of the many ways 
in which people around Northeast Asia are (to borrow Davina Cooper’s 
words) ‘creating the change they wish to encounter, building and forging 
new ways of experiencing social and political life’.23
23  Davina Cooper, Everyday Utopias: The Conceptual Life of Promising Spaces (Durham, NC, and 
London: Duke University Press, 2014), 2.
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Provincialising the State: 
Symbiotic Nature and Survival 
Politics in Post-World War 
Zero Japan
Sho Konishi
This chapter explores the idea and practice of what I have called elsewhere 
‘cooperatist anarchist modernity’. It looks at one particular moment in 
the long historical development of this vision and practice of progress, the 
period following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, when an anarchist 
scientific turn occurred. Some historians have called this war ‘World War 
Zero’, in reference to its status as the first of the modern, all-encompassing 
global wars of the 20th century.1 The scientific turn in the wake of the 
war was integral to the dynamic development of anarchism in Japan and 
would in turn generate a wave of innovative thought and cultural practices. 
By introducing the popularised notion of symbiotic nature as the driver 
of evolution and civilisational progress2 and its temporality in post Russo-
Japanese War Japan, this chapter demonstrates the cooperatist anarchist 
cultural overturning of the idea and practice of progress fashioned after 
1  John Steinberg, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David Wolff, and 
Shinji Yokote eds, The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 
349–64.
2  The notion of ‘symbiotic nature’ contrasted with the Darwinist notion of competition as the 
source of progress and natural evolution.
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the West that provincialised the state.3 This historic overcoming of 
Western modernity served as the epistemological and cultural foundation 
of survival politics of the everyday, an understanding from which 
contemporary informal life politics may be meaningfully discussed and 
discerned. The chapter reveals not what ordinary people did on the main 
floor of shops and institutions during the day, but what they did upstairs 
at night. We will visit public intellectuals not at their imperial universities, 
but when they gathered in the evenings on the second floor of a sweet shop 
or a people’s hospital after closing time. Then I would like to introduce a 
place 50 miles from nowhere on the northernmost island of Hokkaido in 
order to talk about ordinary farmers who, I argue, consciously adopted and 
put into practice the concept of cooperatist anarchist progress and thereby 
conceived of themselves as standing at the forefront of modern progress 
and civilisation. In doing so, these former tenant farmers, overcoming 
tremendous fear, managed to survive liberation from tenancy in the most 
severe living conditions.
In 1906, less than a year after the Portsmouth Treaty that ended the Russo-
Japanese War, two of the most popular writers in late Meiji-Taisho Japan, 
Tokutomi Roka and Arishima Takeo (who was then in America), made 
separate pilgrimages to the homes of figures that they saw as symbols 
of international peace, civilisation and progress. Both traced the major 
sites of inspiration for human civilisational development, and culminated 
their respective travels at the homes of Russian anarchist thinkers, Peter 
Kropotkin and Lev Tolstoy. It was in the immediate post-war period that 
the faces of Tolstoy and Kropotkin, symbols of the Japanese Nonwar 
Movement in the Russo-Japanese War, appeared arm-in-arm on the 
Japanese cultural scene, to the point that we might call it a phenomenon of 
Tolstoy-Kropotkinism. It would be difficult to read the public prominence 
of these particular figures without an understanding of anarchism and its 
provincialising of the nation-state in early 20th-century Japan. 
After winning the Russo-Japanese War, people in Japan had an 
unprecedented opportunity to engage with the wider world afresh. And 
the ‘world’ was watching with great anticipation to see what the people 
of Japan would bring to the world. It is hardly a coincidence that some 
3  This anarchist notion of ‘provincialising the state’ may be contrasted with that of Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s ‘provincialising Europe’, which focuses on indigenous sources of modern state- and 
nation-building. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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historians begin the history of decolonisation movements from 1905 
because of the perceived significance of the war for the colonised world. 
Our historiography has given only one historical meaning to this war for 
Japanese history in the wider world: Japan’s entry into the group of elite 
civilised sovereign nation-states and its embarkation onto the path of 
Western modernity. At the time, however, a number of people in fact came 
to share a very different view of the war, that it represented a retrogression 
of  human progress. Their view of world order was also ideologically 
opposed to the most basic assumptions of the rising decolonisation 
movements. Decolonisation movements were political movements that 
sought to liberate the nation from imperialism, by transferring power to 
indigenous hands in order to found a sovereign nation-state modelled after 
the West.4 Yet in the Japanese Nonwar Movement’s imagination of free 
transnational, non-state relations among ‘people’ around the world was 
an ideology of emancipation from that very territorial utopia of Western 
modernity founded on the modern nation-state.
I suggest that the war served as a pivotal experience that made salient 
a deep conflict between competing visions of human progress and 
civilisation. The view of the Nonwar Movement, probably the most 
successful peace movement in a time of war in modern history as scholar 
Hyman Kublin has suggested,5 sharply contrasted with the ideology of 
Western modernity that sanctioned, if not celebrated, Japan’s entry into 
the community of nation-states as a result of its victory in war and empire 
building. The experience of the war only helped to solidify a cooperatist 
anarchist historical consciousness that would take the form of social action. 
Historians have long overlooked this vision and corresponding practices, 
which did not fit the narrative of Western modernity (‘History’). ‘History’ 
has been that familiar narrative of the rise and development of the nation-
state toward a Western modern form of political and economic liberty, 
or Hegelian Reason. Japan has been narrated according to this History 
as ‘late’.6
4  Prasenjit Duara, ‘Introduction: The Decolonisation of Asia and Africa in the Twentieth Century’, 
in Prasenjit Duara ed., Decolonisation: Perspectives From Now and Then (London: Routledge, 2004), 
1–20. 
5  Hyman Kublin, ‘The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War’, Journal of Modern History 
21 (March–December 1950): 322–39.
6  On the conceptualisation of the war as a retrogression of civilisation and development by 
the Nonwar Movement, see Konishi, ‘The Absence of Portsmouth in an Early Twentieth-Century 
Imagination of Peace’, in Steven J. Ericson, Allen Hockley, The Treaty of Portsmouth and Its Legacies 
(Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2008), 98–105.
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I argue that in the immediate aftermath of the war, what I call a ‘history 
slide’, (rekishi no jisuberi 歴史の地滑り) occurred, a slide of historical 
consciousness that produced a reconceived subjectivity of the present as 
a point of moral action in the here and now to attain that new future. 
Nonwar participants perceived their location in the given space and 
time as backward. The present as a product of Western progress was now 
perceived as behind and no longer morally justifiable. History thus slid 
from narratives of the past to justify the present to a narrated future vision. 
In what would develop into an anarchist theory of social change, the 
‘present’ had become the urgent moment to rectify history for the future. 
As Arishima wrote in 1905, history was to be ‘kiyome tadasu’ (morally 
cleansed and rectified 清め正す). Inferiority was now assigned not to 
a given space but to a belonging to a certain sense of time or temporality.
Certainly, among the supporters of the Nonwar Movement, neither the 
Portsmouth Peace Treaty nor the Nobel Peace Prize consequently awarded 
to Theodore Roosevelt for brokering that treaty was a part of their 
discussions of peace. One could even say that members of the movement 
were completely disinterested in the peacemaking achievements of the 
international community in ending the war between Russia and Japan. 
Despite the participants’ seeming reticence in relation to the international 
community and its territorial utopia of Western modernity, the Nonwar 
Movement’s ideological redrawing of the concept of peace attracted many 
people in Japan.
I chose to translate the term Japanese participants used for their 
movement, hisen undō 非戦運動, as ‘Nonwar Movement’. References to 
the movement have translated hisen undō as ‘Antiwar Movement’, without 
distinguishing it from the more contemporary Japanese term hansen undō 
反戦運動. This translation not only fails to reflect the intellectual universe 
of the movement, but may be misleading, for the term hansen as it has 
been used in the post–Asia-Pacific War period refers to an oppositional 
position against a particular war, as in the Antiwar Movement in America 
during the Vietnam War. At the same time, the hisen undō of the Russo-
Japanese War did not express a philosophical position of pacifism, the total 
negation of violence.
In fact, hisen was a term historically specific to the Russo-Japanese War, 
with the war being the only time that the term would ever be used. 
Inherent  in the language of hisen was a construct of civilisation and 
progress that was distinguished from Western modernity. According 
19
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to their construct, imperialist wars were not a part of that modernity, 
and therefore hi, ‘absent’. We may thereby conceive this movement as 
an intellectual phenomenon for a given understanding of progress and 
civilisation, rather than against a particular war or against violence 
on absolute terms.
Anarchist Science
In this context of wide-ranging questioning of the progressiveness of 
Western modernity following the war, science became the vessel through 
which the ‘true nature’ of human behaviour and society could be discerned. 
In my view, the end of the war simultaneously marked what may be 
called a scientific turn. The anarchist Ōsugi Sakae was emblematic of this 
turn. He developed a deep interest in scientific knowledge of astronomy, 
evolutionary biology and animal behaviour that in turn inspired him to 
realise that he was an ‘anarchist’ at this time. 
Ōsugi made a direct link between human society and the centreless 
nature of the universe and claimed that the interdependent relationship 
between humans and nature was such that it logically followed that 
humans had no choice but to harmonise society with the most advanced 
scientific knowledge of space matter and the natural world. This devotion 
to scientific knowledge that was selectively interpreted by anarchists to 
represent the future of human society is what I call ‘anarchist science’.7 
Ōsugi believed that human subjectivity and social relations ought to 
reflexively mirror scientific findings about the nature and ‘logic’ of 
the physical and natural universe around and within human beings. 
This perspective on the human world rooted in a scientific view of the 
logic and functioning of nature and biological evolution helped inspire a 
new wave of Japanese interest in anarchism after the war. The definitive 
postwar moment of the history slide when anarchist ideas of progress were 
adopted was accompanied by this scientific turn. 
7  Sho Konishi, ‘The Science of Symbiosis and Linguistic Democracy in Early Twentieth-Century 
Japan’, Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems (INDEKS) 13, no. 2 (2015): 299–317. 
See also Sho Konishi, Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations in 
Modern Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), 296–327.
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Ōsugi was certainly not the only one to develop a deep interest in 
natural science immediately following the war. During his transnational 
pilgrimage to Kropotkin’s home, Arishima held on to one book, written by 
the Russian embryologist and microbiologist Ilia Mechnikov, who would 
win the Nobel Prize for his work on micro-organisms and immunity in 
1908.8 It is curious that at this critical moment immediately after the 
war, Arishima chose to read, not revolutionary texts of revolt or texts 
on international relations, but a text by a Russian microbiologist. How 
can one possibly grasp the place of micro-organisms in the embrace of 
anarchism in this period? In the broader context of war and imperialist 
expansion, terrorism and assassination by anarchists worldwide, and 
government persecution of anarchists and socialists, anarchists in Japan 
like Arishima turned to Mechnikov’s universe of bacteria and phagocytes 
and, later, the spiders, dung beetles and wasps of the French entomologist 
Jean Henri Fabre, in their search for answers to the world problems at 
hand. If Theodore Roosevelt and the Nobel Peace Prize of 1906 did not 
represent their idea of peace, then certainly the Nobel Prize in science 
awarded to Mechnikov two years later represented perfectly their idea of 
peace and civilisational progress. 
Kōtoku Shūsui, a theoretical leader of anarchism and the Nonwar 
Movement, echoed the notion of the centreless universe. In his 
introduction to Darwin’s theory that helped popularise ideas of evolution 
in Japan, Kōtoku wrote that after Charles Darwin, ‘there will be no more 
debate about the beginningless and endless composition of nature’.9 
Japanese anarchists embraced what astronomer Mark Davis characterises 
today as ‘negative discovery’, the understanding:
That Earth is not the center of the Universe.
That the Sun is not the center of the Universe.
Our galaxy is not the center of the Universe.
Our type of matter is not the dominant constituent of the Universe 
(dark matter predominates instead).
Our Universe (seen and unseen) is not the only Universe.10
8  On Mechnikov’s work on immunology, see Alfred I. Tauber and Leon Chernyak, Metchnikoff 
and the Origins of Immunology: From Metaphor to Theory (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991).
9  ‘Dāwin to Marukusu’ [Darwin and Marx], Heimin shimbun 47 (2 October 1904): 5.
10  Davis is quoted in Daniel Boorstin, Cleopatra’s Nose: Essays on the Unexpected (New York: Vintage 
Press, 1995), 7.
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The centre of the universe was scattered everywhere and nowhere at the 
same time. Kropotkin expressed this idea in his work Anarchism:
It is to this dust, to these infinitely tiny bodies that dash through space 
in all directions with giddy swiftness, that clash with one another, 
agglomerate, disintegrate, everywhere and always, it is to them that today 
astronomers look for an explanation of the origin of our solar system, the 
movements that animate its parts, and the harmony of their whole … 
Thus the center, the origin of force, formerly transferred from the earth to 
the sun, now turns out to be scattered and disseminated: it is everywhere 
and nowhere. With the astronomer, we perceive that solar systems are 
the work of infinitely small bodies; that the power which was supposed 
to govern the system is itself but the result of the collisions among those 
infinitely tiny clusters of matter, that the harmony of stellar systems is 
harmony only … a resultant of all these numberless movements uniting, 
completing, equilibrating one another.11
Supported by the findings of natural science, Japanese anarchists removed 
the distinction between high and low, subverted the centrality of the state 
for human progress, advocated the multiplicity of ever-changing cultures, 
and promoted voluntary associations for an interdependent world. 
Mechnikov, who suddenly became a topic of discussion among some 
prominent Japanese cultural figures following the Russo-Japanese War, is 
emblematic of the kind of interest in natural science in Japan during this 
time. Mechnikov discovered the symbiotic functions of the natural world 
within the human body itself by examining the symbiotic interdependencies 
of bacteria and other micro-organisms that thrived within the body. 
For Japanese anarchists, the human body discovered by Mechnikov was 
a body functioning in mutual interaction and interdependence with its 
environment from both within and without and was a reflection of the 
cosmological universe. Mechnikov’s understanding of multiple levels of 
‘social’ relations among organisms within and outside the human body 
led him to reflect in his writings on how an understanding of humans’ 
symbiotic relations with the very microbiotic world within themselves can 
prolong individual lives.12 From the perspective of Japanese anarchists, 
11  Peter Kropotkin, Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Free Society, 1898), 
3–4.
12  See Elie Metchnikoff, The Prolongation of Life: Optimistic Studies (London: Heinemann, 1910). 
Ilia Mechnikov’s older brother Lev was a Russian revolutionary and an anarchist who became a well-
recognised scholar of Japanese studies after he travelled to Japan to witness the revolution there in 
the 1870s. See Sho Konishi, ‘Reopening the “Opening of Japan”: A Russian-Japanese Revolutionary 
Encounter and the Vision of Anarchist Progress’, The American Historical Review 112, no. 1 (2007): 
101–30.
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then, interdependent and symbiotic relations from the very internal 
workings of human beings themselves at the smallest microbiotic level 
of life negated Malthusian assumptions about the struggle for survival 
promoted by social Darwinism.
Unlike Freud’s urging of a civilisational departure from nature, Mechnikov 
argued in Nature of Man that the happiness and well-being of man lay in 
his attainment of harmony with the order of nature that lay both within 
his own body and without, in his environment. For man’s adaptation 
to nature and harmony with the environment was far from complete, 
a disjuncture rooted in the profound changes achieved in his evolutionary 
development, Mechnikov observed. He believed that the exact sciences 
should serve to remedy the organic disharmonies within humans, thereby 
offering solutions to the problems of human happiness.13
This would be the intellectual foundation of anarchist science that would 
much later be picked up by the cell biologist Lynn Margulis, one of the 
most influential biologists in contemporary times. Margulis saw the 
evolution of cells through the lens of symbiotic dependencies in a similar 
way to Mechnikov. Prompted by her findings of the symbiotic origins 
of evolution, Margulis codeveloped the theory of global symbiosis called 
‘Gaia’.14 According to this theory, the earth consists of a self-regulating 
biosphere dependent on micro-organisms’ and plants’ unconscious 
maintenance of the environment in a homeostasis favourable for life. 
Similar in style of thought, the anti-capitalist conclusions drawn by 
Margulis herself remind one of the manner in which Japanese anarchists 
of the early 20th century reflected on Mechnikov’s findings about 
micro-organisms to develop their claims of the relevance of anarchism for 
human culture and civilisational progress. The controversy prompted by 
studies of bacteria and other micro-organisms as a dynamic starting point 
for thinking about the nature of evolution—and ‘progress’ itself—was as 
compelling in early 20th-century Japan as it is today.
Through their translations of scientists’ writings, anarchists subsequently 
played a leading role in the popularisation of the natural sciences in Japan 
in the early 20th century at large. State officials felt threatened by the 
massive popularity of anarchist introductions of the biological sciences, 
13  See, for example, Elie Metchnikoff, Nature of Man:  Studies in Optimistic Philosophy, translated 
by Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell (New York:  G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905), 209–15; Metchnikoff, 
‘The Haunting Terror Of All Human Life’, New York Times, 27 February 1910.
14  Lynn Margulis, Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution (New York: Basic Books, 1998).
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and the government banned their translations of Fabre’s entomological 
study of the dung beetle in Konchū Shakai (Insect Society 昆虫社会).15  
Fabre’s observations of the insect world verified a view of nonhierarchical 
nature in which each species or form of creature had its own naturally 
endowed virtue, its own talent, specialised knowledge and ability. Through 
Fabre’s insects, anarchists have helped shape early childhood imagination 
and perceptions of the natural world. Despite (and sometimes because 
of ) the government’s initial ban on translations of Fabre, anarchist 
translations of his studies of insects in the early 1920s came to capture 
the national imagination. Even today, Fabre’s writings continue to be a 
sort of ‘Mother Goose’ of Japan, read by Japanese children as a staple 
of children’s literature and childhood imaginations. The once-banned 
dung beetle has far outlasted any state regimes and ideologies that banned 
it, yet our historiography that has focused on the state has silenced the 
dung beetle from historical memory. If the social knowledge of childhood 
has the power to order imaginations of the future, then the popularity 
of anarchists’ representations and definition of childhood meant that 
anarchists had a powerful hand on future visions in Japan, however 
hidden from history.
The turn to anarchist science on popular grounds interacted discursively 
with the Western modern construct of civilisational progress. When 
stripped down to its most basic intellectual foundations, that construct 
of Western modernity may be most simply understood as a movement 
away from ‘nature’ and toward ‘culture’. Ishikawa Sanshirō, an anarchist 
leader and the founder of the influential women’s journal Sekai Fujin 
世界婦人 with Fukuda Hideko, saw this as the frightening product of 
the conception of nature as the enemy of civilisation and the antithesis 
of human culture. He proposed instead to embrace boundless nature, 
leading to a deep connection of the limited human life to the limitless 
world of nature. If there were to be any progress in his own life, Ishikawa 
wrote, that progress was to aim at that idea of a human civilisation deeply 
interconnected with nature.16
15  In English, see Jean Henri Fabre, The Insect World of J. Henri Fabre, trans. Alexander Teixeira 
De Mattos (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1949).
16  Ishikawa Sanshirō, Hi shinkaron to jinsei [Non-Evolutionary Theory and Human Life] (Tokyo: 
Hakuyōsha Shuppan, 1925).
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Cultural Revolution
Once the concept of nature was redefined, so was the idea of culture. 
In the roughly 20 years following the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese 
cooperatist anarchists overturned the meaning of culture and the cultured. 
By so doing, they provincialised the state to meet the expectations of 
anarchist progress. I call this reconstruction of the concept of culture an 
anarchist cultural revolution. This ‘revolution’ in culture was the product 
of shifts from high culture to popular, state to non-state, institution to 
non-institution, sociolinguistic Darwinism to multiplicity and diversity 
of cultural development, and formal to informal realms of everyday life as 
the sites, times and sources of cultural expression.
The dualism between the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ that fed the 
foundational idea of civilisational progress also disappeared. ‘Culture’ 
became the varied, creative expressions of each individual’s virtue gifted 
from nature. Producers of anarchist forms of culture believed that 
civilisational progress was reliant on these individual expressions for the 
symbiotic process of social improvement. The anarchist concept of culture 
thereby inverted both the modern Western notion of civilisation and the 
ideological foundations of the Japanese imperial state.
A number of distinctive cultural movements and intellectual developments 
followed one after another to constitute the multifaceted conceptual 
turns in culture. Such varied expressions and fields of study in early 20th-
century Japan as religion, primatology, microbiology, literature, theatre, 
popular music, agriculture, language, and children’s art and mingei (民芸) 
folk art responded to the cultural revolution. These cultural expressions 
were in tune with the formulations of multiplicity, democracy, mutual aid, 
and symbiosis in scientific nature. The widely recognised and pioneering 
primatologist Imanishi Kinji, who was fundamentally influenced by 
‘anarchist science’ at this time, developed his influential and radical 
studies of culture in the primate world—culture in nature—that continue 
to orient the work of primatologists around the world today. In religion, 
Tolstoyan anarchist religion was embraced nationwide, leading Tolstoy 
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to become the most translated writer in the modern history of Japan.17 
In folk art, Yanagi Sōetsu, who introduced Mechnikov’s microbiology in 
Japan after the war, would develop the folk art movement called People’s 
Art, Mingei, from this discourse. In 1911, Yanagi had published a well-
known article on Mechnikov, ‘Mechnikov’s Scientific View on Human 
Life’.18 Yanagi was a member of the White Birch Group that was heavily 
inspired by its most senior member, Arishima Takeo. Without a conductor 
to harmonise them, the various cultural expressions nonetheless appeared 
as if they had been orchestrated to overturn the concept of culture.
Culture was reproduced as knowledge that did not flow from the 
classrooms  of state schools and imperial universities to shape the 
popular Japanese mind. The production and circulation of knowledge 
took place instead in unofficial sites of knowledge dissemination and 
production such as local shrines, rural homes that housed poetry reading 
groups, churches, village schools, the second floor of the Nakamuraya 
sweet shop in Tokyo, inns and pubs, the second floor of the Heimin Byōin 
平民病院 hospital, pharmacies, the shops and homes of neighbourhood 
book lenders, dormitories within the imperial universities, and urban 
‘People’s Cafeterias’ (Heimin Shokudō 平民食堂). These cafeterias came to 
be widely known as Taishū Shokudō (mass cafeterias 大衆食堂), referring 
here not to the labouring class of Marxist language, but to the anarchist 
notion of ‘everyone’ regardless of class. It would be this Taishū, inclusive 
of everyone, that the so-called ‘Marxist’ Yamakawa Hitoshi would later 
call for, as ‘Taishū e’ (‘v Narod’ in Russian or ‘Going to the People’), 
using the anarchist concept of the ‘people’ developed in the course of 
the Nonwar Movement. People educated themselves and discussed the 
latest findings in social studies and the natural sciences. Their meetings 
occurred primarily in the evenings. From day to night, from imperial 
university campuses to unofficial sites, the places and times where and 
when the reverse flow of knowledge was developed and disseminated were 
themselves part of the cultural revolution.19
17  For example, Russian scholar Kim Rekho writes, ‘in terms of the breadth and depth of the 
study of Tolstoy’s works, Japan without question occupies a special place among other countries 
… Nowhere, except Russia, have the works of Tolstoy been published as many times as in Japan. 
Nowhere outside Russia have they written about Tolstoy so much as Japan’. Kim Rekho, ‘Lev Tolstoi 
i Vostok’ [Lev Tolstoi and the East], in Kim Rekho ed., Lev Tolstoi i literatury Vostoka [Lev Tolstoi 
and the Literature of the East] (Moscow: IMLI RAN, Nasledie, 2000), 6. Tolstoy’s collected works, 
ranging from 10 to 47 volumes, have been published at least 13 times in Japan.
18  Yanagi Sōetsu, ‘Mechinikofu no kagakuteki jinsei kan’ [Mechnikov’s Scientific View on Life], 
in his Kagaku to jinsei [Science and Life] (Tokyo: Momiyama Shoten, 1911), 133–326.
19  Konishi, ‘Epilogue’, Anarchist Modernity, 331.
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Despite the powerful Western origins of the term ‘democracy’, a notion 
of anarchist democracy developed in this period without reference to 
the nation-state.20 The Japanese imagination of ‘the people’ as heimin, 
without class or national belonging, was the subject for a just democratic 
sociopolitical order that I have described elsewhere as an ‘invention of 
the “people” without the state’. The invention of ‘the people’ as heimin 
may be compared to the invention of ‘the people’ in America, which 
Edmund Morgan demonstrates was integral to American democracy as 
representative government.21 Yet anarchist culture came to define ‘the 
people’s’ practice of everyday democratic life, given expression in such 
phrases as ‘kurashi no chikara 暮らしの力’ (the power of everyday life) 
by the anarchist physician Katō Tokijirō. ‘Democracy’ for cooperatist 
anarchists meant the pursuit of the progressive principle of mutual aid 
in everyday life, a notion outlined by the anarchist Peter Kropotkin in 
his work Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution.22 The promise of anarchist 
democracy, aligned with the notion of progress as ever changing and 
developing human civilisation, drew numerous people to participate in 
the expansion of cooperatist anarchism. Their idea of ‘democracy’ became 
inseparable from active popular practices of mutual aid to overcome 
economic hardship. Anarchist democracy became the practical means 
to solve people’s everyday problems and concretely improve their lives 
in an equitable and mutually beneficial manner through spontaneous 
associations of people to cooperatively solve shared problems through 
mutual aid. In this way, cooperatist anarchism gave ideological shape to 
the development of cooperatist society and sociality, or ‘anarchist civil 
society’ if you like.
Anarchists in Japan gave progressive meaning to the everyday cooperative 
practices of ordinary people, and their corresponding antihierarchical 
relationality and subjectivity. ‘Cooperative living’, ranging from the 
micro-level of everyday life to transnational-scale interdependence 
between peoples of different ethnicities, races and cultural backgrounds, 
was identified as the key to achieving democratic society on a global scale.
20  Sho Konishi, ‘Translingual World Order: Language Without Culture in Post-Russo-Japanese 
War Japan’, Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 1 (February 2013).
21  Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988).
22  Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (London: W.W. Heinemann, 1902).
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Functioning within this intellectual universe, Heimin Igaku 平民医学 
(The  People’s Society for Medical Knowledge), Heimin Shokudō 
(The People’s Cafeteria) and Heimin Byōin (The People’s Hospital) were 
founded and supported as cooperative institutions by anarchists to directly 
address its members’ practical needs for hospital treatment, medical 
knowledge, and meals. In the People’s Cafeteria, for example, cafeteria 
‘regulations’ stated that the cafeteria was a ‘part of the larger project for 
Mutual Aid’. This particular people’s cafeteria drew on average 700–800 
ordinary people every day, with 13,387 people using the cafeteria just in 
the month of March 1918, for example.23 Their spontaneous activities 
from below to solve real everyday problems on the spot were reminiscent 
of the popular phrase ‘Kayui tokoro ni te ga todoku’ (the dexterous hand is 
able to itch just the right spot かゆいところに手が届く).
Ishikawa Sanshirō coined a new term for this democracy as everyday 
practice. He created the term ‘domin seikatsu 土民生活’, or ‘the life 
of people on the soil’. While domin seikatsu stirs up images of farmers 
tending to the soil, Ishikawa was in fact referring to the organic rootedness 
of all people in their God-given nature, or virtue. Ishikawa believed that 
each individual has a will (ishi 意思) or subjectivity/virtue (jitsusei 実性), 
which was uniquely different in each person. This will, or talent, may be 
realised only through hard work and the repeated practice of it. Ishikawa 
called this activity of work and practice ‘nenriki 念力’, which is the energy 
or power everyone has to work on and realise their virtue. He called the 
resulting force that is created in realising one’s virtue ‘katsudō 活動’, 
or active motion in society. ‘Freedom’ (jiyū 自由) was the possibility given 
to each individual to discover and realise his or her own personal God-given 
will and virtue. This freedom was the very source of human development, 
which he called ‘sensa banshu 千差万種’ (one thousand differences, one 
million kinds). This realisation of the plurality of individual development, 
the so-called ‘million ways’ of participation in the human community, 
was what Ishikawa meant when he reinvented democracy as ‘domin 
23  On Katō Tokijiro and the beginnings of these institutions, see Narita Ryūichi, Katō Tokijirō 
(Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1983).
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seikatsu’.24 Ishikawa saw democracy as an expression of what he called 
the ‘new cosmology’ defined by the centreless universe. He described the 
‘unity in multiplicity’ that would lead to independence and equality in 
human society. For Ishikawa, the infinity that characterised our centreless 
universe dictated the absence of an absolute subject of power and the 
limitlessness of possibilities for human interaction and cultural invention.
It was in this context that the Esperanto language was named the biggest 
fad just after the Russo-Japanese War by Asahi newspaper. Once again, the 
near perfect contrast between the popularity of Esperanto on the ground 
and the absence of any discussion of Esperantism in the historiography 
of modern Japan is striking.25 The language was studied and discussed 
by elites and non-elites alike in non-insitutional spaces such as in rural 
homes, coffee shops, and even on the farm (as occurred in the case of 
the renowned novelist and social thinker Miyazawa Kenji), often at night 
when institutions privileged by state and financial power had closed.26 
By looking at these space-times outside the realms of state guidance, we 
become privy to an imagination of peace and world order that operated 
outside the international relations of the nation-state. The  history 
of this cultural-linguistic movement offers us a rare window into a 
popular concept of world order in Asia. By the mid-1920s, Japan had 
the highest number of Esperanto speakers by far of any non-European 
country including the US. Many Esperantists, including leading figures 
in the anarchist cultural revolution like Ōsugi Sakae, believed that the 
language, often called ‘Minsaigo 民際語’, the people’s language on the 
non-state level, in contrast to ‘Kokusaigo 国際語’ (international language 
or, literally, ‘language between states’) as the language of the nation-state 
24  Ishikawa Sanshirō, Kinsei domin tetsugaku [Philosophy of Democracy], in Tsurumi Shunsuke 
ed., Kindai Nihon shisō taikei [Collection of Modern Japanese Thought] 16 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 
1976), 39–111. See also Ishikawa, ‘Nōhonshugi to domin shisō’ [Agrarianism and Democratic 
Life], in Ishikawa Sanshirō chosakushū 3 (Tokyo: Seidōsha, 1978), 96–100; ‘Shakai bigaku toshite no 
museifushugi’ [Anarchism as Social Aesthetics], in Ishikawa Sanshirō chosakushū 3 (Tokyo: Seidōsha, 
1978), 190–206; and ‘Dōtai shakai bigaku toshite no museifushugi’ [Anarchism as Aesthetic 
Dynamic], in Ishikawa Sanshirō chosakushū 3 (Tokyo: Seidōsha, 1978), 207–17. See also Kitazawa 
Fumitake, Ishikawa Sanshirō no shōgai to shisō [The Thought and Life of Ishikawa Sanshirō], 3 vols 
(Tokyo: Hatonomori Shobō, 1974).
25  On the Esperanto movement in the early 20th century as an expression of an understanding 
of what I call ‘translingual world order’, see my article, ‘Translingual World Order’. On the history 
of Esperanto in Japan, see also Ian Rapley, ‘When Global and Local Culture Meet: Esperanto in 
1920s Rural Japan’, Language Problems & Language Planning 37, no. 2 (2013): 179–96. For Rapley’s 
insightful overall treatment of the topic, see his ‘Green Star Japan: Language and Internationalism in 
the Japanese Esperanto Movement, 1905–1944’, (DPhil diss., University of Oxford, 2013).
26  Konishi, ‘The Science of Symbiosis and Linguistic Democracy’.
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and international relations, was designed to promote the multiplicity 
of cultures that interdependently coexist and evolve. This distinguished 
it from the international languages of English or French, for example, 
that essentially belonged to particular culture(s) and, given power in the 
context of civilisation discourse of the time, expanded through political, 
economic and cultural imperialism—‘linguistic Darwinism’.
At the heart of anarchist democracy and the modern progress formulated 
by anarchists were the domestically rooted cooperatist activities found in 
agrarian communities, the most unlikely place for civilisational progress. 
Anarchists like Itō Noe identified the cooperatist practices that she 
observed in her own rural home region to be ‘the reality of anarchism in 
Japan’. Itō saw in those everyday practices a global significance for human 
progress. She concluded that anarchism has been and continues to exist 
in everyday practice, and it was therefore this ‘reality’ that ‘we should 
consciously work on’.27
Cooperative Living in Hokkaido
Let me now turn to the concrete manifestation of these ideas on the 
most unlikely site, Hokkaido, the experimental site for the realisation of 
Western modernity in the late 19th and early 20th century. From the first 
years of the Meiji period, modern agricultural practices were promoted in 
the vast expanses of Hokkaido as a means to achieve Japan’s colonisation 
of its northern territory and, later, its imperialist expansion into other 
territories.  The farm that had belonged to the father of Shirakaba 
(White Birch 白樺) Group activist Arishima Takeo was an embodiment 
of this colonial effort, and Arishima’s inheritance of the farm contradicted 
his anarchist beliefs and practices. He was serving at this time as an 
unusually popular professor at Hokkaido University where he taught 
anarchist values in the heart of Japan’s colonisation efforts. In distinct 
polemic with the Japanese Government’s modern vision of agriculture 
modelled after America, Arishima liberated his tenant farmers in 1921, 
granting them cooperative ownership of the land. He departed from the 
farm and its affairs entirely upon liberation, believing in the farmers’ 
own abilities to democratically run the farm. Arishima’s liberation of 
27  Itō Noe, ‘Museifushugi no jijitsu’ [The Reality of Anarchism], in Itō Noe zenshū [The Complete 
Works of Itō Noe] 2 (Tokyo: Gakugei Shorin, 1970), 222–35.
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his tenant farmers and founding of a farm cooperatively owned by the 
farmers on his former estate in Hokkaido in 1921 became a model and 
symbol of the progressiveness of cooperative practices among rural non-
elites. Named Cooperative Living Farm, and widely known as Arishima 
Farm, the success of the farm was talked about across Hokkaido and well 
beyond, drawing numerous farmers from across northern Japan to apply 
for membership. The farm’s modern, cooperatist anarchist perception of 
the world and its integration into the broader agricultural community of 
Hokkaido suggests that the farm was quite different from the nomadic, 
self-peripheralised fugitive communites that fled the state, featured in 
James Scott’s anarchist history of Southeast Asia.28
The existing view of this famous site of tenant farmer liberation is that 
of a ‘futile utopian project’ that failed with Arishima’s suicide in 1923. 
A frequently used Japanese history textbook epitomised this view by 
describing Arishima’s suicide as having ‘effectively sealed the fate of 
this noble but poorly executed experiment’.29 Arishima himself, in his 
liberation speech to the farmers, warned them of the struggles they would 
face to survive, while ‘surrounded by malevolent capitalism’.30
In contrast, my interviews with former members of the farm reveal that 
the farmers themselves felt not only that they were surviving, but that 
they were at the very forefront of modern progress.31 As one member used 
to say, he felt as if he had ‘climbed atop a mountain of jewels’ when he and 
his family became members of the farm.32 This sense of achievement and 
progress came not from concrete material improvement in their lives, of 
which there was little in the first decades of the farm’s existence, but from 
the shared sense of mutual ownership of the farm and cooperative living 
in the midst of ‘malevolent capitalism’.
28  James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
29  David Lu, Japan: A Documentary History (Armonk, NY and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 
1997), 400. 
30  Arishima Takeo, ‘Kosakunin e no kokubetsu’ [Farewell to Tenants], Izumi 1 (1 October 1 1922): 
43.
31  Sho Konishi, ‘Ordinary Farmers, Competing Time: Arishima Cooperative Farm in Hokkaido, 
1922–1935’, Modern Asian Studies 47, no. 6 (November 2013): 1845–87.
32  A former member of the farm, Kiriyama Katsuo, recalled his father Tokiji saying this to his 
family and neighbours on numerous occasions. Kiriyama Katsuo, interview by author, Niseko, Japan, 
2000.
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As evidenced by the farm’s handbook, members interpreted their 
cooperative farm as the progressive materialisation of anarchist thought 
on nature, even as their practices relied on common-sense rural traditions 
of mutual aid interrupted by the expansion of tenant farming. Every 
member of Cooperative Living Farm carried a copy of the Cooperative 
Living Handbook. It is the only written document we have from that 
period. Arishima’s liberation speech served as the anchoring centrepiece 
of the coop book. ‘Anyone knows that the source of all production, land, 
water, air … should not be owned privately but should be shared and 
used for the mutual benefit of all human beings.’33 Along with Arishima, 
the  anarchists Kropotkin and Tolstoy were specifically mentioned as 
cohorts who shared their ideas of progress based on the principle of Sōgo 
Fujo 相互扶助, Mutual Aid.
The new spaces created by the members of Cooperative Living Farm on 
the one hand, and their new modern subjectivity of cooperative progress 
on the other, emerged in reciprocal relation to each other. New spaces 
created on the farm continuously gave new shape to the community, 
guiding those who conducted everyday life in those spaces. In tandem 
with the growing experience of cooperative community-making, these 
spaces silently gained in sacredness.
The Shintō shrines that dotted the colonial landscape visible atop its 
farms’ highest points have been commonly described as authoritative, 
patriarchal and forbidding. They were a spatial symbol of colonial control 
over the lands, which were laid under the shrine’s gaze. Behind the gaze 
were the landlords who built the shrines with the encouragement of the 
Colonisation Bureau. The shrines represented a masculine patriarchical 
order that was a foundation for the emperor-centred ideology of the 
nation-state. The shrines culturally and religiously authenticated settlers’ 
participation in the national colonisation project in Hokkaido. In contrast, 
Iyateru Shrine of Cooperative Living Farm stood out for its modesty. After 
Arishima inherited the shrine, he physically removed it from its place 
atop the farm’s highest point on Miya Mountain overseeing the colonial 
property, to its current position halfway up a small hill, modestly nestled 
among the other hills of the estate. Following liberation, the shrine 
became a focal point for community activities, where the farm’s annual 
deliberative meetings, festivals and other community gatherings were 
33  Kyōsan nōdan techō [Arishima Cooperative Living Farm Handbook], Arishima Takeo Museum 
and Archive, Niseko, Japan, 8-7-90.
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held. The farmers themselves further added a new sacred meaning of their 
own to the shrine. They installed a hidden back window in the shrine, 
behind which they erected a sacred six-sided stone structure dedicated to 
the goddesses. When the window was opened for annual ceremonies of 
cultivation and harvest, it served as a window to the goddesses.
At first glance, the stone appears to be quite similar to numerous 
pentagonal worship stones erected in the region surrounding the farm to 
honour the Taishō emperor as a part of State-sponsored Shintōist practices. 
Many of the stones were erected in the years immediately following the 
new emperor’s enthronement, in 1914–16.34 However, close comparison 
with the many five-sided jijin at other farms in the region reveals that 
Cooperative Living Farmers erected their stone independently, for the 
added purpose of paying tribute to their liberation and the founding of 
the farm.
Members had added an entirely unique sixth side to the traditional 
five-sided stone of the five goddesses of production. Their hexagonal 
stone was engraved with the date August 1924, to commemorate the 
second anniversary of the liberation of the farm and the establishment 
of their community. The stone thus made it appear as if the emergence 
of Cooperative Living Farm was being embraced by the five goddesses, 
inscribed on the remaining five sides. It seemed the goddesses themselves 
had given birth to Cooperative Living Farm. This was consistent with 
the farm’s shared ideology of the divine nature of the land, which was the 
deities’ ‘gift’ foundational to the emergence of the community in 1922. 
The divine givenness of the soil took away the landlord’s right to the 
land. This sixth side was an invention of the Cooperative Living Farmers, 
who had inserted their realm of cooperative virtue into the sacred realm 
of the goddesses.
The goddesses of production represented a cosmological foundation 
of human relations of interdependency with nature, and with other 
human beings. This most fundamental existence of human beings as they 
understood it, their dependency on nature and on one another for survival, 
provided a foundation for their non-hierarchically constituted practices 
34  See the works by the local history study group of Kutchan, the neighbouring village of Niseko, 
Ishida Suteo, Takei Shizuo, and Ono Taizō, Nono shinbutsu [Gods of the Field] (Kutchan: Kutchan 
Local History Study Group, 1987), and Kutchan chō kyodōbunkazai hozonkai ed., Kutchan no 
jijinsan batōsan [The Jijinsan and Batōsan of Kutchan] (Kutchan: Kutchan Chō Kyodō Bunkazai 
Hozonkai, n.d.).
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of mutual aid. The sacred stone stood at the centre of the farm’s annual 
spring planting and fall harvest festivals, which began with ceremonial 
offerings to the goddesses. The stone thereby further altered the patriarchal 
authority of the shrine, by reconditioning it with a localised folk religion 
of the soil. It was as if ‘State Shintōism’ had never reached here.
Members also erected a water god stone, another unique structure. 
The stone overlooked and made sacred the farm’s dam, which served as 
the centre point for its irrigation system. Together, the worship stones of 
water, soil and air completed and concretised the cooperative imperative 
and delivered the anarchist notion of non-ownership and cooperative 
utilisation of natural resources for mutual benefit. They represented the 
foundational ethic of the farm itself, the imperative of shared cultivation 
and utilisation of the natural resources for the purpose of co-survival with 
nature.
Technology was neither opposed to nor superior to nature in farm 
members’ understanding. It was seen rather to complement and enhance 
the gifts of nature. The farm thus vigorously pursued technological 
advancement. It experimented with some of the latest technological 
advancements necessary to pipe in water for the paddies. They applied new 
techniques for temperature moderation of the icy water tapped from the 
adjacent mountain.35 The conversion to rice promised both material and 
symbolic progress. Back in early Meiji, the Hokkaido Colonisation Office 
had emphasised the importation of large-scale farming with agricultural 
technologies from the West that centred on foods like potatoes, corn, 
beef and dairy. No other farm in the region surrounding Cooperative 
Living Farm had yet experimented with rice cultivation. The shiny white 
rice was thus the taste of cooperative living progress. The rice became a 
part of their identity, as it set the farm apart from the rest of the farms. 
Within a decade or so, bags of their rice decorated with large red labels 
‘Arishima mai’ [Arishima Rice] were found in stores across the region. 
Members were convinced of the progressiveness of their existence as a 
new modern community of mutual aid. Adopting new technologies took 
considerable place in this progressive self-image. The linkage between 
35  Blueprint of the irrigation plan and ‘Request to Begin Construction of Irrigation’, Arishima 
Takeo Museum and Archive, 1-6-101. See also Arishima no sato: Arishima nōjō jidai no seikatsu 
[Arishima’s Homeland: Life in Arishima’s Farming Period] (Hokkaido). Self-publication in the 
Arishima Takeo Museum and Archive, 24–7.
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technology and the advancement of cooperative living may be contrasted 
with surrounding tenant farms, where the benefits of technology were 
hardly returned to the tenant farmer.
According to former farm member Kiriyama Katsuo, another aspect of 
their new life on the farm that members had to work on was gift-giving. 
Kiriyama recalls that members meticulously practised the giving of gifts 
in carefully measured equal number to each member of the farm. The 
practice of gift-giving was constructed to horizontalise relations among 
members of the community. Members consciously contrasted this new 
practice with the old times of tenancy, when the gift was often used in a 
vertical bi-directional manner between managers and the labourers who 
worked for them, functioning to enhance the power relations between 
them. A gift to the landlord or the manager used to grease the machinery 
of the tenant–landlord relationship of dependency. Usually given in a 
single direction to those with power, the gift might anticipate or follow 
a request for a loan, or some other sort of necessity. It might simply put 
the tenant in the landlord’s favour. In turn, gifts or demonstrations of 
favour from the landlord served to concretise the benevolent status of 
the landlord in relation to his tenants.36 On Cooperative Living Farm, 
what might be called the practice of multidirectional gift-giving appears 
to have functioned as the demonstration of mutual interdependency and 
the preservation of the non-hierarchy of members’ recognition and value 
to one other. Overall, it helped to dislodge privilege from community 
relations.
Kiriyama’s distinct recollection of his farm’s gift-giving practices in 
interviews revealed members’ conscious efforts to habitualise the practice 
into a new farm tradition. Each family drew on their own particular 
resources and abilities for simultaneous gift-giving in equal measure. 
Members looked forward to the deliveries of gifts from multiple directions, 
and they knew that no more would be given to any particular member 
36  Nagatsuka Takashi, The Soil: A Portrait of Rural Life in Meiji Japan, trans. Ann Waswo (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1989), gives a realistic account of tenant–landlord relations in the 
early 1900s. On landlord benevolence, see e.g. 39–40. For an anthropological discussion of gift-
giving practices in light of psychology and time, see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 3–8.
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than the other.37 The power once given to the former ‘master’ dissipated 
in the multidirectional material exchange of things. The practice of 
multidirectional gift-giving was now a practice of ‘new’ time.
Interestingly, at a time of mass tenant farmer unrest across the country, the 
All-Hokkaido Agricultural Industrial Cooperative Association also began 
to speak in the language of cooperatist anarchist, rather than Marxist, 
progress in the early 1920s. The association was the representative organ 
for agricultural industrial cooperatives found across Hokkaido, in every 
town and village. In 1926, the cooperative association published the first 
issue of its farming journal Kyōei (共栄 Co-prosperity), which outlined 
the ideals and goals of this large organisation. The journal sought to 
put the ‘world in perspective’, to promote thinking among agricultural 
labourers about world affairs. Situating themselves in a historical time 
of cooperatist progress, the journal stated that while the ‘Great Project’ 
of the Meiji Ishin had fulfilled the political tasks assigned it, the cultural 
resurrection in modern Japan had not yet been achieved. The declaration 
of the Hokkaido-wide cooperative called in essence for a second, cultural 
Ishin, through the ‘cooperatist movement’. Farmers themselves were 
writing history. In accord with the larger History Slide, the cooperative’s 
declaration stated:
In the social life of today’s civilisation, we are trying to conduct a life of 
less anxiety, more pleasure and hope, a life of more creativity, mutual love 
and mutual aid. Relying on Social Darwinism will never lead to making a 
society of peace. It is Kropotkinism or Cooperatism that we believe in. To 
realise this ideal of both the material and spiritual world, sangyō kumiaism 
(industrial cooperativism) is nothing but Kropotkinism.38
Their association represented agricultural practices with anarchist ideas 
of progress in the very space of Hokkaido, the nation’s most intense 
and complete experimental project of Western modernity, most vividly 
symbolised by its vast glittering mechanised farms and farming industries. 
The inversion of Western modernity was now complete.
37  Kiriyama Katsuo, interview by author, Niseko, Japan, 2000. For example, Kiriyama recalled 
that every year, a family receiving persimmons from relatives on Honshu counted the number of 
people in each household on the farm and delivered a single fruit for each person in each household. 
Neighbours came to expect that in the autumn, that household would bring them each a persimmon. 
The fruits were delivered personally, not losing thereby the cooperative meaning of the gift.
38  ‘Sangyō kumiai sengen’ [Industrial Cooperative Declaration], part I, Kyōei: Hokkaido Sangyō 
Kumiai zasshi [Coprosperity: Hokkaido Industrial Association Journal] (June 1929): 6–10.
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Tellingly, many years later during the US Occupation of Japan, when 
American representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP) came to judge whether Arishima Farm’s practices were 
democratic or not, they couldn’t make sense of the farm. This was not 
‘democracy’ as Americans understood it, yet it looked very democratic. 
Nor was it ‘Communist’, yet it looked very communal. Giving up on 
finding a label for it, the Americans left it up to the farmers to decide 
whether their farm community belonged to the new postwar era.
This particular modernity imagined, lived and experienced by cooperatist 
anarchists in Japan uprooted and overturned the very state-centred 
modernity of the West. In this sense, the notions of ‘resistance’ and 
‘being overcome by Western modernity’ were inadequate to describe 
this history. By provincialising the state, cooperatist anarchists also 
naturally provincialised Europe. This was the opposite, I might add, to 
what postcolonial scholars have attempted to achieve through theories 
of so-called hybrid cultures and alternative modernities modelled on 
Western political structures of the state. Even the postcolonial project 
to ‘Provincialise Europe’39 has in a way re-emphasised the centrality of 
Western modernity. In contrast, ‘survival’ in this discourse of cooperatist 
anarchism, and indeed the survival of this discourse, depended on the 
successful liberation in both thought and practice from the temporality 
and the territorial utopia of the modern nation-state of Western modernity.
39  Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.
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Social Change and Rediscovering 
Rural Reconstruction in China1
Ou Ning
The Origins of the Rural 
Reconstruction Movement
Rural reconstruction, one of the most important insurmountable 
problems in China’s relentless pursuit of modernity, has had its ups and 
downs over the last 100 years. It again has emerged as a lens through 
which to examine the role of different political and intellectual forces 
in China’s process of social reform. This chapter explores this historical 
legacy and the recent re-emergence of rural reconstruction as a source 
of inspiration for Chinese social change.
Chinese elites began exploring the concept of rural reform in the late 
Qing dynasty, when Mi Jiansan and his Japan-educated son Mi Digang, 
members of a distinguished local family in the village of Zhaicheng in 
Ding county of Hebei province, experimented with the idea of ‘village 
government’ (cunzhi 村治) in 1902, through literacy campaigns, 
civic  education and local self-government. County magistrate Sun 
Faxu developed their idea further as he took the post of governor in 
neighbouring  Shanxi province, and it was later also embraced by the 
1  This chapter is a revised version of an essay first published in Ou Ning ed., The South of Southern: 
Space, Geography, History and the Biennale (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2014).
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warlord Yan Xishan, who effectively controlled Shanxi in the Republican 
era and turned the province into a model of rural reconstruction. 
The  ‘Village Government Group’ (cunzhipai 村治派) was established 
as a school of thought in 1924, when some north China landed gentry, 
including Wang Hongyi, Mi Digang, Mi Jieping, Peng Yuting, Liang 
Zhonghua, Yi Zhongcai and Wang Yike, launched the Zhonghua Daily 
(Zhonghua  ribao 中华日报) and the Village Government Monthly 
(Cunzhiyuekan 村治月刊). In  1925,  the then four-year-old Chinese 
Communist Party, having realised the importance of farmers to its 
revolution, decided to mobilise support in  the countryside with their 
‘Letter to Farmers’ (gao nongmin shu 告农民书), encouraging the 
establishment of farmers’ unions. The  ensuing class struggles and land 
revolution provoked urban intellectuals into seeking different approaches 
to rural reform. 
The 30 May 1925 shooting of protesters in the Shanghai International 
Settlement sparked a nationwide labour and anti-imperialist movement, 
and many parts of China saw a surge of rural reconstruction experiments. 
By 1934, official statistics show that there were more than 600 rural 
reconstruction groups and over 1,000 experiments across China.2 
Newspapers and magazines were filled with reports, commentaries and 
debates on rural reconstruction. The two most influential experiments 
were those conducted by Liang Shuming’s Rural Reconstruction Institute 
in Zouping county, Shandong province, and Y. C. James Yen’s Mass 
Education Association in Ding county, Hebei province. Liang, inspired 
by the ‘Village Government Group’, developed a Confucianism-based 
philosophy for rural reconstruction and thus was considered a member 
of  the ‘Old Group’ (jiupai 旧派) while Yen, who was Christian and 
received funding from the United States, belonged to the ‘New Group’ 
(xinpai 新派).
The Politics of Rural Reconstruction
In the 13th volume of The Cambridge History of China, historian John K. 
Fairbank devoted a whole section, ‘The Rural Reconstruction Movement’, 
to the massive rural reconstruction campaigns of the time. Fairbank 
2  Zhang Yuanshan and Xu Shilian eds, Xiangcun jianshe shiyan [Experiment of Rural 
Reconstruction] Volume 2, (Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company, 1935), 19.
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identified six types of campaigns: 1) Western-influenced (James Yen); 
2) nativist (the ‘Village Government Group’, Liang Shuming and Tao 
Xingzhi, the founder of the Xiaozhuang Normal College in Nanjing); 
3) educational (James Yen and Tao Xingzhi); 4) military (Peng Yuting, who 
established a local defence regime in Zhenping county, Henan province); 
5) populist (James Yen and Tao Xingzhi); and 6) bureaucratic (the two 
‘experimental counties’ administered by the Nanjing authorities in Lanxi, 
Zhejiang province and Jiangning, Jiangsu province). But Fairbank’s volume 
overlooked several other important experiments—those carried out by Lu 
Zuofu’s Chongqing Beibei Defence Bureau in the Gorges region along the 
Yangtze tributary Jialing River; Gao Jiansi’s Jiangsu Provincial Institute of 
Education in Huangxiang, Wuxi, Jiangsu province; and Huang Yanpei’s 
National Association of Vocational Education of China in Xugongqiao, 
Kunshan, Jiangsu province. 
The Cambridge History of China stated that all rural reconstruction 
experiments were linked inextricably to politics: 
To revitalise the countryside through educational and economic reforms 
meant working out relationships of patronage and protection with 
political authorities. This was surely because any attempt to work with the 
peasantry in an organised project inevitably raised questions of political 
orientation and legitimacy, whether or not the project had any explicitly 
political aims or activities.3
Owing to political uncertainty, these educational, social and economic 
reforms—though not without a local effect—were unable to provide a 
comprehensive solution to China’s rural problems. Politics was not only 
a barrier to China’s rural reconstruction but a key factor contributing 
to its ultimate failure. Yen first claimed that his experiment had nothing 
to do with politics, but had to admit later that ‘given the circumstances, 
we couldn’t keep ourselves away from politics’.4 Liang said that the ‘two 
major difficulties’ he encountered were ‘the inevitable need to rely on the 
3  Philip A. Kuhn, ‘The Rural Reconstruction Movement’, in John K. Fairbank and Albert 
Feuerwerker eds, The Cambridge History of China, vol. 13, Republican China 1912–1949, Part 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 359.
4  Y. C. James Yen, ‘Pingmin jiaoyu yundong de huigu yu qianzhan’ [The Past and Future of the 
Mass Education Movement], in Enrong Song ed., Gaoyu renmin [To the People] (Guilin: Guangxi 
Normal University Press, 2003), 197.
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authorities to push for social reform and farmers’ indifference to the rural 
reconstruction movement’.5 Rural reconstruction was doomed to failure 
if it did not seek ‘a political solution’.6
In fact, the multitude of experiments that focused on local self-
government,  mass education and agricultural development were 
preceded by the brief existence in China of a utopian philosophy called 
‘New  Village-ism’ (xincunzhuyi 新村主义)—a mixture of Japanese 
writer  Mushanokōji Saneatsu’s idea of Atarashiki-mura (New Village, 
新しき村), Peter Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid, and Lev Tolstoy’s 
view of labour and the North American practice of combining studies 
with part-time work. Mushanokōji’s philosophy was part of the ‘White 
Birch Group’ (Shirakaba-ha 白樺派), for the name of the literary 
magazine he founded in 1910, ‘White Birch’ (on this movement see 
also Chapters One and Three). In 1918, in the mountains of Miyazaki 
Prefecture  in Kyushu, members of the White Birch Group carried out 
their plan to build an intentional community without government, 
exploitation or social class and to live an idyllically pastoral life. Chinese 
writer Zhou Zuoren was a long-time subscriber to the commune’s literary 
magazine Atarashiki-mura, expressing his support for the movement in 
his articles ‘Humanist Literature’ (Rende wenxue 人的文学) and ‘Japan’s 
New Village’ (Ribende xincun 日本的新村), published in 1918 and 1919 
in the influential magazine La Jeunesse, during China’s New Culture 
Movement of the 1910s and 1920s. Zhou even visited Miyazaki himself 
and in 1920 founded a branch of the Atarashiki-mura commune in his 
Beijing home, attracting early communist leaders such as Li Dazhao, Mao 
Zedong, Cai Hesen and Yun Daiying. 
The same year, a similar and influential experiment was started in the 
village  of Xiaowuying of Xihua county, Henan province, by Wang 
Gongbi, a member of the former Tongmenghui, a revolutionary alliance 
absorbed by the Kuomintang in 1912. Xiaowuying was soon renamed 
Youth Village (qingniancun 青年村). Mao Zedong was also an admirer 
of ‘New Village-ism’, but chose the path of revolution in the end. It was 
only after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 that 
5  Liang Shuming, Xiangcun jianshe lilun [Rural Reconstruction Theories] (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Century Publishing Group, 2006), 368. 
6  Cao Lixin made an in-depth analysis of the political dilemma faced by the rural reconstruction 
movement in the Republican era in comparison with the rural revolution of the Communist Party of 
China. See Cao Lixin, ‘Zouxiang zhengzhi jiejue de xiangcun jianshe’ [Rural Reconstruction: Toward 
a Political Solution], Twenty-First Century 91 (October 2005).
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Mao would transform this utopian philosophy into people’s communes. 
The idealistic values of ‘New Village-ism’, unlike the pragmatic approach 
of the rural reconstruction movement, soon fell into decline in China. 
In  fact, ‘New Village-ism’ was not only a Japanese import but a 
continuation of ancient Chinese Agrarianism (nongjia 农家), the most 
marginalised and overlooked of all the schools of thought, and one that 
dates back to the golden age of Chinese philosophy from 770 to 221 
BC. Agriculturalism was discussed in a volume (‘Treatise on Literature’, 
yiwenzhi 艺文志) of the Book of Han (hanshu 汉书), a history written in 
the Han dynasty:
The first Agrarianists may have been agriculture officials, who grew different 
kinds of grain and encouraged people to till land and plant mulberry trees 
to produce enough food and clothing. Food is so important that it ranks 
first among the eight major areas of a state’s policy, followed by property. 
The merit of early Agriculturalists is their emphasis on food production, 
which Confucius said should be a priority for any ruler. However, their 
vulgar successors, who believe that a saint-king in the Confucian sense 
would be useless, attempt to disrupt the social hierarchy by calling on 
rulers to plough alongside their people. 
In his book Debt: The First 5000 Years, American anthropologist and 
anarchist David Graeber referred to Agrarianism as an anarchist movement 
in the pre-Qin period.7
Crisis and Revival
The rural reconstruction movement turned out to be short-lived as well. 
Reformers saw their hopes crushed in 1937, when the national crisis 
following Japan’s invasion took precedence over rural impoverishment 
and decline as the most urgent problem faced by the country. Still, had 
the war not broken out, the rural reconstruction movement would have 
eventually failed because of its own limitations. In 1930, Peng Yuting was 
assassinated by a rival faction and Chiang Kai-shek ordered Tao Xingzhi to 
close his Xiaozhuang Normal College. Wang Dazhi, one of Tao’s students, 
7  ‘In China, while many of the founders of the “hundred schools” of philosophy that blossomed 
under the Warring States were wandering sages who spent their days moving from city to city trying 
to catch the ears of princes, others were leaders of social movements from the very start. Some of these 
movements didn’t even have leaders, like the School of the Tillers, an anarchist movement of peasant 
intellectuals who set out to create egalitarian communities in the cracks and fissures between states.’ 
David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years (New York: Melville House, 2012), 237.
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carried on the work of his alma mater after being appointed principal 
of the Xin’an Primary School. He organised the Xin’an Traveling Group 
(xinan luxingtuan 新安旅行团), whose students spent more than 10 years 
visiting different parts of China and calling for resistance to the Japanese 
invasion. As different political forces joined the resistance movement, 
Liang Shuming’s Shandong Rural Reconstruction Institute was disbanded 
and James Yen’s Mass Education Association moved to Chongqing with 
the Kuomintang Government. But Yen did not give up his rural reform 
efforts. In Chongqing, he established the Chinese Institute of Rural 
Reconstruction, which was declared a ‘reactionary organisation’ and taken 
over by the local Military Control Commission in 1950. Nevertheless, 
his International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, founded in 1960 in 
the Philippines, still operates today. Yen dedicated his whole life to rural 
reconstruction.
These reformers were often criticised for their superficial understanding 
of the complexity of Chinese society, especially China’s stubborn social 
problems. In 1936, the New Knowledge Bookstore (Xinzhi Shudian 新
知书店) published Critiques of China’s Rural Reconstruction (Zhongguo 
xiangcun jianshe pipan 中国乡村建设批判), a collection of commentaries 
on Liang’s and Yen’s experiments written by pro-Communist intellectuals 
such as Qian Jiaju and Li Zixiang. Qian pointed out that Yen and his 
associates did not fully understand Chinese society:
They attribute China’s social ills to the ignorance, poverty, weakness 
and selfishness of farmers, who account for over 85 percent of China’s 
population, and believe they need to address those four problems to 
save Chinese society. But they overlook the fact that farmers’ ignorance, 
poverty, weakness and selfishness are only the symptoms of China’s social 
ills. The root cause cannot be removed simply by treating the symptoms.8 
Qian argued that Liang, as a ‘rural philosopher’, had a more in-depth 
understanding of Chinese society than Yen, but offered only an old 
solution repackaged as a new one: 
Mr. Liang’s new approach appears to be a perfect solution that could 
immediately lead people into ‘a kingdom of liberty, equality and 
fraternity’. But that is actually just an old trick invented by Confucius, 
who once said, ‘The people only need to be told what to do but not why 
8  Qian Jiaju, ‘Zhongguo nongcun jianshe zhi lu hezai’ [Where Is the Path to China’s Rural 
Reconstruction?], in Zhongguo xiangcun jianshe pipan [Critiques of China’s Rural Reconstruction] 
(Shanghai: New Knowledge Bookstore, 1936), 101.
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they should do it’. His theories of rural reconstruction, under the new 
disguise of farmer organisations and farmer education, are nothing more 
than a clever redesign of the current social order.9 
These two kinds of experiments, Qian suggested, would lead China astray. 
Although he did not put forward any feasible solution in his articles, 
it can be inferred from his arguments that he advocated anti-imperialist, 
anti-feudal class struggles aimed at subverting the established system. 
The  theory of class struggle also served as the ideological basis for the 
Chinese Communist Party’s revolution.
If the only viable option for the Communist Party at that time was to 
seize power through revolution, what would it do about the unresolved 
issue of rural reconstruction after its revolution succeeded? Shortly 
after the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, private 
ownership was abolished in the countryside through the agricultural 
cooperative movement. People’s communes were introduced in 1958 
as a quintessential example of Mao’s vision of rural reconstruction. 
The concept of people’s communes is a blend of the utopian ‘New Village-
ism’, Liang Shuming’s theory of combining politics with education, and 
Peng Yuting’s military-style management. Land and labour were pooled 
to boost agricultural production so that China could build a communist 
society, in which people would work to their best ability and have all their 
needs satisfied. However, before being gradually dismantled by the new 
market economy created in 1984, the communes did not bring about any 
fundamental improvement in the rural economy or farmers’ lives. Instead, 
they severely damaged Chinese rural society. The concentration of land 
and other means of production disrupted traditional small-scale farming; 
intense class struggles and frequent political movements destroyed the 
family structure and ethics in rural areas; forced labour and egalitarianism 
demoralised farmers.
Thanks to the household responsibility system adopted in 1982, rural 
China was revitalised temporarily. But the fast-growing urbanisation that 
followed has left the countryside increasingly deprived and marginalised 
and has given rise to myriad problems, including agricultural decline, 
the loss of agrarian land, rural emigration, reliance on imported food, 
poor land-use planning (new homes are mostly built on the periphery 
of a village, leaving the centre with abandoned, dilapidated houses), 
9  Qian Jiaju, ‘Zhongguo de qilu’ [China’s Wrong Road], in Zhongguo xiangcun jianshe pipan 
(Critiques of China’s Rural Reconstruction) (Shanghai: New Knowledge Bookstore, 1936), 142.
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insufficient public resources, local gangs, rural–urban imbalance and 
social conflicts, especially the numerous mass protests staged against 
arbitrary land acquisitions by the government. Rural reconstruction has 
re-emerged as a critical issue for China. 
In 2003, researcher Wen Tiejun, who coined the phrase ‘three rural 
problems’ (rural people, rural society and the rural economy, sannong 
wenti 三农问题), founded the James Yen Rural Reconstruction Institute 
at the village of Zhaicheng of Hebei province, where Mi Jiansan, Mi 
Digang and James Yen had done their pioneering work.10 Farmers from 
all parts of China arrived at Zhaicheng to participate in his project, which 
generated significant media coverage. In 2004, Wen was appointed Dean 
of the School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development at 
Remin University in Beijing. He also founded the Liang Shuming Rural 
Reconstruction Center, a branch of which he moved to Renmin in 2005. 
The founding of this research institute with multiple affiliate organisations 
suggested a considerable revival of the rural reconstruction movement of 
the Republican era. The same year, the Fifth Plenum of the 16th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China resolved to create a ‘new 
socialist countryside’ (shehuizhuyixin nongcun 社会主义新农村) to 
address the ‘three rural problems’. As Wen and other intellectuals became 
more involved in rural reconstruction in different parts of the country, 
governments of all levels were ready to implement the Party’s new policy. 
For example, Sichuan province and Chongqing municipality launched 
experimental projects to coordinate rural and urban development. 
The issue of rural reconstruction returned to public view, attracting the 
attention of both the government and civil society.
Wen was sent to live and work in rural Shanxi province during the 
Cultural Revolution. He went to Renmin University to study journalism 
in 1979 and joined the Rural Policy Research Office of the Party’s Central 
Committee in 1985, where he assisted Du Runsheng, an important 
promoter of the household responsibility system, in research and 
fieldwork. Thus he gained first-hand experience of the hardships of rural 
life. Wen studied at the University of Michigan in 1987 and at Columbia 
University in 1991. He visited Cornell University and the University of 
10  All quotations from Wen Tiejun in this chapter are taken from ‘Sannong wenti: shiji mo de 
fansi’ [The Three Rural Problems: Some Reflections at the End of the Twentieth Century], Dushu, 
December 1999. For the longer version of this article, see Tiejun Wen, Sannong wenti yu shiji fansi 
[The Three Rural Problems and Some Reflections at the End of the Twentieth Century] (Beijing: 
Joint Publishing, 2005).
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Southern California as a visiting scholar in 1991. However, compared with 
James Yen, who also received Western academic training and embraced 
an international perspective, Wen has been able to make more insightful 
observations about the ‘three rural problems’ and put forward theories in 
a broader context by using the research methodology he learned from the 
distinguished economist Wu Jinglian. 
Familiar with the philosophy behind the rural reconstruction movement of 
the Republican era and the rural revolution of the Communist Party, Wen 
argues that owing to China’s enormous population and limited available 
land, ‘neither the revolution nor the reform led to anything other than 
“equal” distribution of arable land’. He believes that the main cause of the 
social conflicts in rural areas, unknown to his predecessors, is the excessive 
extraction of agricultural surplus, which undermines ‘the property and 
income distribution system inherent in the small-scale peasant economy’. 
That system, in his opinion, is the norm and a stabilising factor for Chinese 
society, and is ‘naturally resistant to the Western Industrial Revolution 
and the ensuing “social progress” in the capitalist sense’. Wen asserts that 
China, like the West, has been passing on the huge institutional costs of 
industrialisation and urbanisation to its countryside.
He also believes that China’s development strategy, oriented toward 
industrial capital, international trade and economic globalisation, not 
only has imposed an onerous burden on farmers, rural society and 
agriculture but involves significant risk itself because excessive dependence 
on imported food and resources means potential vulnerability to global 
shocks, especially financial crises. Wen often says in self-mockery that 
his attitude toward urbanisation is too ‘conservative’ but, in a country 
obsessed with urban life and high economic growth, his commitment to 
rural reconstruction is more likely to be considered radical. Compared with 
the pioneers in the Republican era, he has accomplished more with fewer 
resources. But he has encountered the same problem as his predecessors—
local authorities shut down the James Yen Rural Reconstruction Institute 
in 2006 on the grounds that it had built an environmentally friendly 
building without official approval, missed the annual inspection by the 
local government and advised farmers on petition matters.
Nevertheless, Wen and his followers are as resilient as James Yen. After 
the institute was closed, Qiu Jiansheng, who had joined the cause of rural 
reconstruction because of Wen, launched new projects in Hainan and 
Fujian provinces. One of Wen’s PhD students, He Huili, continued to 
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work as assistant to the mayor of Kaifeng city, Henan province, and help 
local farmers form cooperatives. The Liang Shuming Rural Reconstruction 
Center is still in operation, encouraging university students to do their 
part for rural reconstruction, though its former director Liu Xiangbo died 
in a car accident in 2011. The Little Donkey Farm in the western suburbs 
of Beijing is working on ecological agriculture and devising new methods 
to provide organic produce for city dwellers. They all have benefitted 
from Wen’s theories and support, sharing resources among themselves.11 
In addition to Wen’s movement, there are other important projects such 
as the ones run by He Xuefeng in Hubei province, Li Changping in 
Henan province and Liao Xiaoyi in Sichuan province. By combining the 
traditional approach to rural reconstruction focused on mass education 
and agriculture with their insights into contemporary problems, these 
people have developed various new programs and concepts such as 
community colleges, community-supported agriculture, ecological 
villages and ‘Workers’ Homes’, programs targeting migrant workers living 
in cities (gongyouzhijia 工友之家). 
Many urban writers and artists have settled in the countryside and 
become involved in the rural reconstruction movement either because 
they have noticed the inextricable link between rural and urban areas or 
because they aspire to rediscover and revive the traditional culture eroded 
by urbanisation. A well-known example is Johnson Chang Tsong-zung 
and Hu Xiangcheng’s project in the small town of Jinze near Shanghai. 
They transformed an abandoned industrial site there into a village 
featuring architecture typical of traditional buildings in the region. 
Their project covers a number of areas, including reviving traditional 
folk arts, developing organic farming (they are running a farm as part of 
the project) and restoring traditional values.12 Other examples include 
writer Ye Fu’s experiment in representative democracy and rural drama 
in Luojiang county, Sichuan province, and Li Yinqiang’s China Rural 
Library, a non-government organisation (NGO) that often invites urban 
writers and intellectuals to give talks to rural children. The strength of 
these projects lies in their ability to leverage the unique cultural resources 
at their disposal.13
11  For more information about the rural reconstruction movement led by Wen Tiejun, see Hong 
Liang, ‘Xingdong zai dadi’ [Action on Land], Chutzpah!, January 2011.
12  Australian writer Tony Perrottet visited and wrote about Jinze. See Tony Perrottet, ‘The Shock of 
the Old’, The Wall Street Journal Magazine, 28 June 2012, online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270
2304765304577482580429791656.html. 
13  For more information about these projects, see ‘Tamen de xiangjian’ [Their Rural Reconstruction], 
in ChinaFortune, November 2011.
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China’s urban–rural relations first came to my attention when I was doing 
research and making documentary film in Guangzhou’s urban village San 
Yuan Li from 2002 to 2003. I realised that urban villages and slums were 
actually rooted in the failure of the rural economy. From then on, I became 
interested in studying rural issues, learned about Wen Tiejun’s theories 
and work, and read the biography of James Yen as well as works on the 
rural reconstruction movement of the Republican era. Before starting my 
own project, the Bishan Commune (Bishan Gongtongti 碧山共同体), in 
the village of Bishan of Yi county, Anhui province, in 2011, I spent years 
studying rural society and social movements. I visited the closed James 
Yen Rural Reconstruction Institute, Qiu Jiansheng’s project in Fujian and 
He Huili’s workplace in Henan. I attended the ‘Ecology and the Revival 
of Rural Culture’ seminar hosted by Wen Tiejun, talked with intellectuals 
engaged in rural movements in Taiwan, and examined the diverse body of 
literature on Chinese rural society. 
I also watched Ogawa Shinsuke’s documentaries about rural Japan, 
visited Thai artists Rirkrit Tiravanija and Kamin Lertchaiprasert’s Land 
Foundation in Chiang Mai, and read about Indian writer Arundhati Roy’s 
criticism of the controversial Narmada Dam project and of the Indian 
Government’s armed actions against the Maoist insurgents supported by 
rural populations. My Bishan Commune thus turned out to be a melting 
pot of fascinating ideas—a mixture of the benevolent society described in 
Peter Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, the concept of ‘direct 
action’ advocated by neo-anarchism, the utopian artist collective Neue 
Slowenische Kunst established by Slovenian artists, the rural reconstruction 
movement of the Republican era, and the vision of contemporary 
reformers like Wen Tiejun.
The Bishan Project
In 2011, Zuo Jing and I purchased two antique Hui-style houses in 
the villages of Bishan and Guanlu of Yi County to start our project. 
We  raised  funds to hold the first Bishan Harvestival (bishan fengnianij 
碧山丰年祭), a cultural feast in the form of a harvest celebration. 
Based on a project called ‘Craftsmanship in Yi County’ (yixian baigong 
黟县百工), the event invited artists, architects and designers from other 
parts of the country to work with local craftsmen and folk artists to create 
modern versions of traditional objects, which were put on display in 
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Bishan’s ancestral halls and old granaries. There were also exhibitions of 
historical documents about Bishan village and the region, performances 
by musicians from other places and local Chinese opera groups, poetry 
classes for local children, the screening of documentary and dramatic 
films about rural China, seminars on rural reconstruction attended by 
participants from both mainland China and Taiwan, and farmers’ fairs.14 
Figure 1: Schematic image of Bishan community.
Source: Ou Ning .
14  For details about the Bishan Harvestival, see Zhao Qian’s report in the October 2011 issue of Leap.
49
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As the first step of our plan, the Bishan Harvestival (a portmanteau of the 
words ‘harvest’ and ‘festival’) aimed at reinvigorating public life in rural 
areas. We believed that reviving traditional folk arts was, at that stage, the 
only way to transform our cultural resources into job opportunities and 
tangible economic benefits for farmers because, although Bishan attracts 
many tourists every year thanks to its proximity to the beautiful Mount 
Huangshan, its heavy reliance on admission charges to generate tourism 
revenue may be unsustainable. However, we hoped that the Bishan 
Commune would go beyond arts and culture and take on economic 
and social dimensions by encouraging farmers to engage in ‘exchange of 
labour’ (jiaogong 交工), for example, and through other forms of mutual 
aid so that they can depend less on public services.
My own project in Bishan gave me a deeper understanding of the 
difficulties of rural reconstruction. First of all, since the Republican era, 
rural reconstruction, as a spontaneous movement independent of the 
government, always has faced a major constraint—its legitimacy and 
social space depend on its delicate relationship with politics. Any misstep 
can lead to failure, as in the examples of Tao Xingzhi’s Xiaozhuang 
Normal College, Peng Yuting’s experiment in Zhenping and Wen Tiejun’s 
James Yen Rural Reconstruction Institute. So we need to be cautious 
about engaging local authorities ourselves and avoid compromising the 
independence and sustainability of the Bishan Commune when seeking 
the government’s support. The second thing that I learnt from this project 
is that, although rural reconstruction needs financing, corporate and 
government funds would undermine the movement’s independence while 
funding from the general public is inadequate at this time and will not be 
a viable source of financing without persistent effort. James Yen received 
funding from the Rockefeller Foundation but was criticised for relying 
on ‘imperialism’. His case, though successful in a sense, was an exception 
that cannot serve as an example to everyone. A fundamental element of 
Wen Tiejun’s rural reconstruction philosophy is his disapproval of ‘big 
capital’. Wen refuses funding from large corporations and even NGOs, 
which means that his colleagues may be doing their work for its own 
sake without any material reward. At the Bishan Commune, we secured 
the necessary funding by including our programs in the budgets of the 
large arts exhibitions and events we are commissioned to organise, paying 
from our own pockets or asking our friends for donations. None of these 
methods, nevertheless, is sustainable. 
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Third, local communities’ understanding of rural reconstruction is 
sometimes at odds with the lofty ideals of intellectuals. Local people seldom 
recognise the value of outsiders’ work if they don’t perceive any practical 
benefits. Some of them even become your enemies if other groups are 
helped at their expense. For example, cotton farmers in Ding county were 
grateful to James Yen because the cooperatives he helped to form made 
it unnecessary for them to borrow from banks or through intermediaries 
and thus reduced their costs. But, as a result, many local banks went 
bankrupt. Failed banks laid siege to Yen’s Mass Education Association and 
demanded it leave the county. Similarly, we found it both amusing and 
frustrating when some villagers called the Bishan Harvestival, which was 
free to all local farmers, a profitable investment in tourism.15
So why bother engaging in rural reconstruction if it is so difficult? Wen 
once said, ‘Personally, it’s because I can’t stand doing nothing about it. 
Humans, particularly intellectuals, inevitably possess a feminine kindness. 
If intellectuals, as part of the social mainstream, didn’t have that quality 
or didn’t reflect on this issue, the social mainstream would be a masculine 
one or, in other words, would have a tendency toward extreme beliefs’.16 
As a man who was born in rural China, struggled to find his footing in 
the city and then aspired to return to the countryside, I do not sense 
in Wen’s words any condescension but a genuine compassion for his 
fellow Chinese.
15  Editors’ note: In the first half of 2016, the Chinese authorities cut off the electricity and water 
supply and closed the main cultural centre that Ou Ning had established in Bishan, forcing Ou to 
leave the village, though the ideals of the project appear to live on in many aspects of village life; see 
Calum Macleod, ‘Crushed Dreams of Utopia in Rural China’, The Times, 2 May 2016.
16  Hong Liang, ‘Xingdong zai dadi,’ [Action on Land] Chutzpah!, January 2011.
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A Century of Social Alternatives in 
a Japanese Mountain Community
Tessa Morris-Suzuki
The Storyteller and the Stories
The village of Motai in Nagano Prefecture, Japan, is about 2,000 
kilometres away from Bishan in China, where Ou Ning and his fellow 
residents have developed the grassroots social visions described in 
Chapter Two. As far as I know, these two places have no direct connection 
with one another. Both suffer from the problems that assail so many 
small rural communities throughout East Asia and beyond—ageing 
populations, limited employment opportunities—but other than that, 
they are not particularly alike. Bishan, which once lay at the heart of the 
prosperous mercantile Huizhou region, is a place of old stone and brick 
buildings, some of which are now lovingly being restored. Motai and its 
slightly larger neighbouring town of Mochizuki—both now merged into 
the artificial Saku City—were once post-towns on the Nakasendō, one 
of the great roads that ran like arteries across the landscape of premodern 
Japan. Their old buildings are wooden-fronted; their warehouses have 
crumbling earthen walls.
But these small places in Japan and China are like springs of water 
that, although far apart, are fed by the same network of underground 
watercourses—deep, invisible, complicated watercourses running quietly 
under the familiar landscape of East Asian history. On the surface sit 
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China, the emerging superpower whose rampant capitalism has signally 
failed to give birth to liberalism and democracy, and Japan, whose 
increasingly assertive nationalist government struggles to extract the 
nation from the economic quagmire of two-and-a-half ‘lost decades’. 
But  in Bishan and the Mochizuki area, dreams are being pursued that 
(in  anthropologist Tom Cliff’s words) ‘run perpendicular’ to the state 
dreams for both countries.1 These little local dreams have similarities that 
are not coincidental: they spring from the same fluid and meandering 
current of political and social ideas that has been flowing under the surface 
of East Asia for at least a century. 
You can hear the similarities echoing in the words that fly about in the 
community halls of the two places—words like ‘autonomy’, ‘mutual aid’, 
‘endogenous development’, ‘cooperatives’, ‘counter-urbanisation’. You can 
also see and feel similarities in the symbolic sites and events that make the 
dreams tangible. The mixture of tradition and critical modernity enacted 
in the spectacle of Bishan’s Harvestival (see Chapter Two), for example, 
is mirrored on a smaller scale by an event in Motai that I attended on 
a warm spring day in 2014.
This event was the launch of the year’s new saké (rice wine 酒), celebrated 
with speeches and taiko (太鼓) drumming in the courtyard of an ancient 
brewery under a cloudless sky. The brewery, founded in the 17th century, 
stands at the heart of the village. A member of the local assembly arrived 
to offer his congratulations. Young and old tried their hand at pounding 
rice into mochi in a wooden vat whose surface wore the patina of 
generations of use. The tables were laden with home-grown and home-
made delicacies. It seemed like a perfect evocation of ‘traditional Japan’.
1  Tom Cliff, ‘Pastoral Dreams: Bishan Village, Anhui, China’. On the website ‘Survival Politics: 
ARC Laureate Project “Informal Life Politics”’. survivalpolitics.org/case-study/china-2/pastoral-
dreams-bishan-village-anhui-china/.
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Figure 2: The Motai saké festival.
Source: Tessa Morris-Suzuki .
But after the familiar phrases of greeting, the speeches took a less 
predictable turn. The eminent environmental economist Miyamoto 
Kenichi was loudly applauded as he condemned the government’s heavy-
handed top-down development projects, and drew connections between 
local social problems and the sufferings of the Okinawan people in their 
struggle against US military bases. Friends and neighbours in the crowd 
swapped information on the unending aftermath of the Fukushima 
disaster and a forthcoming demonstration against nuclear power; and on 
our way home, we dropped off at the nearby house of an elderly resident, 
to be presented with the libretto of an opera that he and his friends had 
composed, and regularly perform, in Esperanto. This is not eccentricity or 
defiance of tradition. It is an alternative quiet, semi-visible tradition that 
is too often obscured by stereotypes of rural conservatism and Japanese 
group consciousness. The brand of saké being celebrated at this annual 
festival in Motai is called Kataribe かたりべ, which means ‘storyteller’, 
and although the brand itself is only quarter of a century old, the stories 
it tells have origins that go back 100 years or more.
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The long-neglected context from which these stories emerge has recently 
begun to be rediscovered by historians. In Chapter One of this book, 
Sho Konishi explores the strong current of anti-war cooperatist thought 
that emerged in early 20th-century Japan, with powerful connections to 
simultaneous currents in Russia. He also draws attention to the remarkable 
prewar Japanese enthusiasm for the study of Esperanto, and the broader 
internationalism in which this enthusiasm was embedded.2 Robert Stolz’s 
book Bad Water reinterprets the early environmentalism of the Meiji 
era anti-pollution activist Tanaka Shōzō (1841–1913), and shows how 
Tanaka’s vision of ‘natural democracy’ continued to inspire social thinkers 
such as Ishikawa Sanshirō (1876–1956, an anarchist and Esperantist, 
also discussed by Konishi in Chapter One).3 From a somewhat different 
perspective, Tetsuo Najita’s study Ordinary Economies in Japan emphasises 
the significant role that credit and producer cooperatives played in modern 
Japanese development, and explores the distinctive visions of economic 
life that sustained cooperativism, particularly in rural Japan.4 
Such ideas span a wide political spectrum and defy simple categorisation. 
They stretch from the radical political thought of anarchists like Ōsugi 
Sakae  (1885–1923) to the more romantic idealism of the White 
Birch Group  (Shirakaba-ha 白樺派), who espoused humanism, 
social  utopianism  and the folk arts movement. Central figures in this 
group included novelists Arishima Takeo (1878–1923) and Shiga Naoya 
(1883–71, also a disciple of Tanaka Shōzō), Mingei (folk arts 民芸) 
movement founder Yanagi Sōetsu (1889–1961), and Mushanakōji 
Saneatsu (1885–1976). From 1918 onward, Mushanakōji put his social 
visions into action in the communal life of the utopian ‘New Villages’ 
(Atarashiki Mura 新しき村), which he established in Kyushu and Saitama 
Prefecture, and which also influenced the Chinese tradition of rural 
reconstruction that finds contemporary expression in Bishan. 
These social visionaries perceived human life as deeply enmeshed in 
the wider flows of nature. They did not reject the market per se, but 
expressed profound concern at the relentless pursuit of economic might 
and commercial profit in industrialising Japan. They valued the farmer’s 
2  See also Sho Konishi, Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations 
in Modern Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013), particularly Chapter 5.
3  Robert Stolz, Bad Water: Nature, Pollution and Politics in Japan, 1870–1950 (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2014).
4  Tetsuo Najita, Ordinary Economies in Japan: A Historical Perspective, 1750–1950 (Berkeley and 
London: University of California Press, 2009).
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connections to the soil, and dreamed of the re-creation of egalitarian 
small-scale communities, but they also embraced a form of modern 
cosmopolitanism symbolised by their enthusiasm for Esperanto. Their 
heroes (as we have seen) included Lev Tolstoy, William Morris, Peter 
Kropotkin and the French entomologist Jean-Henri Fabre.5
The cooperativist thought discussed by Najita, on the other hand, was 
more often paternalistic and socially conservative, but in certain moments 
and places it too embodied ideas of self-help that overlapped with the 
anarchist radicalism explored by Konishi and Stolz. As Konishi shows in 
Chapter One, during the 1910s and 1920s experiments in cooperative 
farming as well as cooperative ‘People’s Hospitals’ and ‘People’s Cafeterias’ 
flourished in various parts of Japan. Political alliances, indeed, were fluid 
and ambiguous. Some of those linked to Tanaka Shōzō and the White 
Birch Group became active in postwar socialist politics, but others, such 
as Yanagi Sōetsu, were later to be condemned for advocating ideas that 
all too easily resonated with the imperialist ideologies of wartime Japan.6 
During the Cold War era, the fading visions of these loosely connected 
groups tended to be dismissed by orthodox Marxists as failed bourgeois 
idealism, and by advocates of capitalist high growth as muddle-headed 
if not actively subversive. 
This chapter revisits those views by exploring how some of these early 
20th-century critical ideas survived and interacted with postwar social 
and environmental thought, and how they continue to form a vibrant 
part of local life in corners of rural Japan to the present day. To trace the 
history of these alternative traditions, I focus on a region of a few hundred 
square kilometres in the very heart of the island of Honshū—the area 
largely occupied (in administrative terms) by the present-day city of Saku, 
Nagano Prefecture.
5  See Chapter One of this volume; also Konishi, Anarchist Modernity, 297–300.
6  See for example Yuko Kikuchi, Japanese Modernisation and Mingei Theory: Cultural Nationalism 
and Oriental Orientalism (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004); Noriko Aso, ‘Mediating the Masses: 
Yanagi Sōetsu and Fascism’, in Alan Tansman ed., The Culture of Japanese Fascism (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2010), 138–54.
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A Place in the Mountains
The images conjured up by the word ‘city’ are likely to mislead. Saku, 
extending across a wide plateau from Mount Tateshina in the southwest 
towards the foothills of Mount Asama in the northeast, is a city only the 
most artificial sense of the word. Its population of around 100,000 lives 
scattered over an area of more than 400 square kilometres.7 Although 
the expansion of the highway network in the 1980s and 1990s and the 
coming of the Shinkansen super-express in 1997 generated a sprawl of 
shops, houses and factories in the centre of the plateau, many of Saku’s 
inhabitants still live in the towns and villages—Asama, Nozawa, Usuda, 
Mochizuki, Motai and others—which were strung together to form the 
city (sometimes in the face of strenuous resistance) during Japan’s local 
government amalgamations of 1961 and 2005. Each of these communities 
retains its distinct history and sense of identity, and each in turn is a 
mosaic of smaller hamlets with their own stories to tell. Some, like Motai, 
found themselves unceremoniously bisected by the new city boundaries: 
one end of Motai’s main street lies in Saku City while the other is in the 
neighbouring town of Tateshina.
The valleys of Saku, with their volcanic soil and multitude of mountain 
streams, are good rice-growing and saké-brewing country, but the winters 
are bitterly cold, and the higher mountain slopes produce hard-won crops 
of vegetables and buckwheat. The area could be seen as a microcosm of 
rural Japan. Its population is ageing,8 and enthusiastic schemes to attract 
investment and tourism fight a constant battle against a lingering pall 
of economic stagnation. The forces of globalisation stir unease in these 
valleys, and the road sides are dotted here and there with placards 
protesting the free-trade Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
The history of popular social thought that I trace here is not (of course) 
confined to Saku City and its surroundings. It has appeared, disappeared 
and reappeared in many parts of Japan. Both Konishi and Stolz, for 
example, show how the ideas of egalitarian cooperatism developed 
by prewar intellectuals were put into practice in rural communities in 
7  The total population as of 1 October 2014 was 100,085, and had declined slightly over the past 
decade: at the beginning of April 2005 it was 101,393; see Saku-shi no jinkō dēta: 5sai kaikyū betsu, 
www.city.saku.nagano.jp/shisei/profile/tokei/jinkodata02.html. Accessed 6 April 2015.
8  In 2013, 26.6 per cent of Saku City’s population was aged over 65, up from 23.7 per cent in 
2005; see Saku-shi no jinkō dēta.
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Hokkaido.9 But there are several features that seem to have made Saku and 
the surrounding areas of Nagano Prefecture particularly fertile ground for 
nurturing such ideas.
Though a large proportion of the region’s pre-Meiji population were poor 
peasant farmers, the Shinshū area (to use the archaic but still popular 
name for Nagano) had a relatively high level of education. Divided into 
a multitude of small domains, it also contained an exceptionally large 
number of the ‘temple schools’ (teragoya 寺小屋) that provided education 
for commoners in the Tokugawa Era.10 As Japan opened new trading links 
to the rest of the world from the mid-19th century onward, the local silk 
industry flourished, bringing social change and new ideas to the region. 
Shinshū activists played an important part in the popular rights movement 
(jiyū minken undō 自由民権運動) of the 1880s, many of them placing 
particular hope in the role of school education as the path to a freer and 
more equitable society.11 
Rather than tracing the history of one particular intellectual group, this 
chapter takes Saku and its surrounding region as a site for exploring how 
various streams of thought came together and intermingled in a specific 
place, and how the legacies of this confluence are still at work in the 21st 
century. The focus on place directs attention towards the ordinary people 
who took up and developed ideas propagated by their better known 
literary and intellectual contemporaries, and helps us to see how ideas 
and social action are interwoven. Ideas, of course, are not objects handed 
on intact from generation to generation like material heirlooms. They are 
communicated from person to person and from group to group in fluid, 
partial and mercurial ways. Concepts and theories are reinterpreted—
sometimes creatively misunderstood—and shaped by changing spatial 
and temporal circumstances. Diverse intellectual currents come together, 
colliding and sparking in unexpected ways. Ideas not only influence 
action but are also themselves the product of action and lived experience. 
The confluence of ideas and action that has shaped and been shaped 
by local communities in the Saku region is, I think, particularly worth 
9  See Chapter One; also Stolz, Bad Water, Chapter 5.
10  Sakaguchi Mitsukuni, ‘“Ni-yon jiken” to Nagano ken kyōiku: “Kyōiku ken Nagano” ni shūshifu 
o utta “Ni-yon danatsu jiken”’ [The ‘2.4 Incident’ and Education in Nagano Prefecture: The ‘2.4 
Repression Incident’ which Put a Full-Stop to Nagano’s Role as ‘Education Prefecture’], Heiwa to 
teshigoto [Peace and Handicrafts], 18 (July 2013): 144–61 (citation from pp. 145–6).
11  See Shinshū no Minken Hyakunen Jikkō Iinkai ed., Shinshū minken undōshi [A History of the 
People’s Rights Movement in Shinshū] (Nagano City: Ginga Shobō, 1981). 
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recovering in the contemporary Japanese political environment, where 
formal national politics seems devoid of lively debate between alternative 
visions of the future, and where rising nationalism fuels conflict between 
Japan and its neighbours.
Kobayashi Tatsue and the Legacy of the 
New Village and White Birch Teachers
The origins of the social visions at work in Mochizuki, Motai and other 
parts of Saku City today can be traced to the activities of a group of 
residents—most of them local school teachers—who were inspired by the 
writings of the White Birch Group, but who put those ideas to work in 
distinctive ways. One central figure was Kobayashi Tatsue, the son of a 
farmer from Kyōwa Village (now part of Saku City), who was born in 
1896 and had entered of Nagano Prefectural Teacher Training College 
in 1914. Many years later, Kobayashi would recall the moment in 1916 
when he first encountered the ideas of the White Birch Group as he 
browsed the shelves of the college library. There he came upon a 700-page 
magnum opus by Yanagi Sōetsu—a study by Yanagi of the life and works 
of the English poet, artist and visionary William Blake—and his life was 
transformed.12 
Fascinated by the humanism and respect for life that he found in 
Yanagi’s interpretation of Blake, Kobayashi began reading the work of 
Yanagi’s White Birch associates—Arishima Takeo, Shiga Naoya and 
Mushanokōji Saneatsu—and soon joined a local reading group who 
shared his enthusiasm for the White Birch philosophies.13 For young 
teachers like Kobayashi, the ideas of the White Birch Group were not just 
philosophical and aesthetic visions; they pointed to practical education 
methods radically at odds with the school curriculum imposed by the 
government.
The modernising Japanese state had created an effective system of universal 
schooling based on standardised texts, rote learning and substantial 
doses of nationalism. But the spread of education and the introduction 
12  Kobayashi Tatsue, ‘“Shirakaba” no koro’ [The Time of ‘White Birch’], in Kobayashi Tatsue no 
Hon Henshū Iinkai ed., Heiwa to teshigoto: Kobayashi Tatsue 104-sai no tabi [Peace and Handicrafts: 
The 104-year Journey of Kobayashi Tatsue] (Tokyo: Fukinotō Shobō, 2001), 16–26.
13  ibid., 16–18.
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of foreign ideas brought with them trends that alarmed Japan’s rulers. 
The writings of European anarchists, socialists, pacifists and individualists 
found their way across Japan’s borders alongside the scientific, technical, 
economic and legal texts needed to advance the nation’s place in the global 
order. The response of the state education system to these undesirable 
influences was to reinforce the emphasis on discipline, patriotism and 
self-sacrifice. When Kobayashi entered teachers training college, the ethics 
(shūshin 修身) texts used in primary schools had recently been revised to 
place greater emphasis on loyalty to the nation.14
All this was anathema to the ‘White Birch teachers’ (Shirakaba-ha Kyōin 
白樺派教員), as Kobayashi and his fellow students and young educators 
in Nagano Prefecture called themselves. Their readings of Ruskin, Walt 
Whitman, Romain Rolland, Mushanokōji Saneatsu and others had left 
them with a profound belief in ‘personalist education’ (jinkakushugi 
kyōiku 人格主義教育), whose core principles were to ‘nurture the self, 
respect individuality, love beauty and seek peace’.15 The White Birch 
teachers organised reading groups and from 1919 to 1921 published their 
own journal Chijō (地上). They attended lectures by Yanagi Sōetsu (with 
whom Kobayashi Tatsue established a lifelong friendship), Mushanokōji 
Saneatsu and others. Kobayashi Tatsue was also one of the first White 
Birch teachers to embark on the long journey southwards to the wilds 
of northern Kyushu—for some, the longest journey they had ever 
undertaken—to live and work in Mushanokōji Saneatsu’s New Village.
Against the background of rapid Japanese industrialisation and 
urbanisation, Mushanokōji Saneatsu had conceived of the New 
Village as a quasi-Tolstoyan farm community where work and wealth 
would be fairly distributed, and where all would participate equally in 
manual and intellectual labour, and take part in communal decision-
making. The original New Village was created by 16 pioneers, including 
Mushanokōji and his wife, in the Hyūga district of Kyushu in 1918, 
though Mushanokōji himself retreated to the more familiar world of 
urban society in the mid-1920s, and in 1939 almost the entire community 
14  Byron K. Marshall, Learning to be Modern: Japanese Political Discourse on Education (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1994), 107.
15  Yoshikawa Tōru, ‘Heiwa to teshigoto o kataritsuzuketa kyōikusha Kobayashi Tatsue’ [Kobayashi 
Tatsue, the Educator Who Kept on Speaking of Peace and Handicrafts], in Saku no Senjin Kentō 
Iinkai / Saku-Shi Kyōiku Iinkai ed., Saku no senjin - kentō jigyō [Saku Pioneers: An Investigative 
Project] (Saku-Shi: Saku-Shi Bunka Jigyōka, 2012), 26–7; see also Sakaguchi, ‘“Ni-yon jiken”’, 148.
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moved to Moroyama in Saitama Prefecture, where it still exists today.16 
The New Village was not a rejection of modernity or internationalism; 
on the contrary, Mushanokōji advocated scientific and technological 
development as a means to lighten the burden of human labour, and 
believed that people should become fluent ‘not only in their own language 
but also in the world language’ (by which he meant Esperanto).17 But the 
village aimed to be the seed bed of a radically different version of modernity 
where ‘all the world’s human beings would fulfil the will of Heaven, and 
the self which dwells within each individual would be enabled to grow to 
the full’.18 As well as its permanent residents, the village attracted many 
short-term residents and visitors, and Kobayashi Tatsue proved to be 
one of these. He joined the village soon after its establishment in 1918, 
which was also the year of his graduation from college, but soon after 
arriving there he became seriously ill and had to return home to Nagano 
Prefecture.19 As a result, he probably did not meet the prominent Chinese 
intellectual Zhou Zuoren (brother of the even more famous Lu Xun), 
who arrived in the New Village for a visit there in the summer of 1919. 
But Zhou’s arrival symbolises yet another way in which the ripples of the 
White Birch movement spread out from its small group of founders to 
resonate in complex ways across Japan and East Asia, initiating the process 
of diffusion traced by Ou Ning in Chapter Two.
Meanwhile, Kobayashi had come home to a region in turmoil; for his 
fellow White Birch teachers had begun to put their ideas into action 
in their Nagano Prefecture classroom. Their aims—‘to nurture the self, 
respect individuality, love beauty and seek peace’—inevitably soon fell 
foul of a state education system that emphasised obedience, discipline and 
loyalty to nation and empire.20 In 1919, at a school in the mountain village 
of Togura (now part of Chikuma City), a group of White Birch teachers 
transformed the curriculum, replacing the official ethics textbooks with 
readings from works like Tolstoy’s Ivan the Fool and Romain Rolland’s 
Jean-Christophe. In place of the officially prescribed glorification of the 
16  Mushanokōji Saneatsu, Atarashiki mura no sōzō [Imagining the New Village] (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 
1977).
17  Mushakoji, Saneatsu, Atarashiki mura no seikatsu [Life in the New Village] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 
1969), 24.
18  Kobayashi Tatsue, ‘Ko Mushinokōji Saneatsu shi to Shinshū’ [Mushanokōji Saneatsu and Shinshū], 
in Kobayashi Tatsue no Hon Henshū Iinkai ed., Heiwa to teshigoto, 34–7; quotation from p. 36.
19  Kobayashi Tatsue no Hon Henshū Iinkai, ‘Kobayashi Tatsue 104-sai no ayumi’ [The 104-year 
Trajectory of Kobayashi Tatsue], in Kobayashi Tatsue no Hon Henshū Iinkai ed., Heiwa to teshigoto, 
266–9; Yoshikawa, ‘Heiwa to teshigoto’.
20  Yohsikawa, ‘Heiwa to teshigoto’; Sakaguchi, ‘“Ni-yon jiken”’.
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imperial line and the Japanese military, the White Birch teachers promoted 
pacifism and criticised Japan’s colonial expansion into Korea. Questions 
were soon raised in the Prefectural Assembly, and the activities of the 
Togura reformers were crushed. Two teachers were dismissed, while others 
were temporarily suspended, demoted or transferred.21
But some persisted. Kobayashi Tatsue’s close friend Nakatani Isao was 
one of those who took part in the reform attempt and was transferred 
to another school in the village of Yamato (now part of Matsumoto 
City) following the Togura Incident. Nakatani, a passionate and popular 
teacher, continued to put his ideas into practice in quiet ways, taking his 
pupils for long nature walks and contributing the White Birch teachers’ 
journal Chijō. But another purge soon followed. This time, the teachers’ 
main offence was to celebrate Christmas with a school performance 
of Mushanokōji’s dramatised and mildly subversive reworking of the 
Japanese folktale ‘The Old Man who Made Trees Blossom’ (Hanasaku Jijii 
花咲爺). Nakatani was dismissed from his teaching position, sank into 
deep depression and died soon after at the age of 25.22
Kobayashi Tatsue himself was not directly caught up in these events, 
but he was profoundly affected by them. From then on, as a White 
Birch teacher, he would find his life subjected to intense scrutiny by the 
education authorities. In an atmosphere of growing repression, he tried 
to keep his ideals alive in inconspicuous ways, through organising public 
lectures and other events centred on the ideas of the White Birch Group, 
and by collecting and promoting local folk art. But he and other like-
minded teachers faced continual battles with the education authorities, 
and were repeatedly transferred from one school to the next in an effort 
to limit their influence in the classroom.23 In early 1933, a further wave 
of repression resulted in the arrest of over 600 people, mostly in Nagano 
Prefecture, under the ‘Peace Preservation Law’ (Chian Iji Hō 治安
維持法) of 1925. About one-third of those rounded up were teachers 
who were regarded as having expressed radical views. Many of those who 
avoided arrest were cowed into silence by the threat of dismissal and 
21  Sakaguchi, ‘“Ni-yon jiken”’, 149; also Kobayashi, ‘“Shirakaba” no koro’, 22–3.
22  Kobayashi, ‘“Shirakaba” no koro’, 23–24.
23  Yoshikawa, ‘Heiwa to teshigoto’, 26.
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imprisonment. Among  them was Kobayashi, whose sense of remorse 
at his failure to speak out against the political repression of the 1930s 
became a major impetus behind his postwar social activism.24
From one point of view, there can be no doubt that the White Birch 
education movement in Nagano failed. Its liberal and anti-war sentiments 
were unable to withstand the rising tide of militarism, and by the late 
1930s the group’s members had been scattered and silenced. As a practical 
step towards a new society, Mushanokōji’s New Village, too, can easily 
be dismissed as a failure. Its founder dreamed of new villages sprouting 
spontaneously all over Japan, and so transforming society from below; 
but this did not happen, and in retrospect it seems clear that there was 
never any prospect of its happening. Yet the New Village had another, 
less tangible, significance: it was a symbol that provoked people in many 
places to debate and rethink the possibilities of rural life. And the fact 
that there was at least one real New Village in existence made the symbol 
much more powerful than it would have been had it merely been a utopia 
described on paper. That surely is one reason why the echoes of this 
century-old ‘failed’ experiment still reverberates in Bishan, Mochizuki 
and many other places today.
Judgments of historical success and failure are partly a matter of time. 
The rise of militarism, the slide into war and the suppression of the 
White Birch teachers were not the end of the story. Kobayashi Tatsue’s life 
spanned the entire 20th century, and (in evolving forms) carried the ideas 
of early 20th-century humanism into the 21st century. Shortly before 
his 100th birthday in 1996, his friends and supporters created a small 
meeting place and museum, the Kobayashi Tatsue Peace and Handicraft 
Folk Arts Hall, perched on a hilltop overlooking Mochizuki, to house 
the teacher’s large collection of craft objects. This has become a focus 
for ongoing local movements to promote social education, sustainable 
development and local peace initiatives. 
24  Interview with Yoshikawa Tōru, Mochizuki, 25 May 2015.
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Social Education and Visions of a 
Local Future
Looking back at his youthful ideals from the vantage point of postwar 
Japan, Kobayashi Tatsue wrote: 
the consistent element in the White Birch group was the notion of 
‘cultivating the self ’ Japan’s defeat has created a painful awareness of the 
importance of building individuality on firm foundations. To lack your 
own beliefs and perceptions, and to follow the herd wherever others lead 
you, is the source of all evil and misery.25 
The failure of the White Birch intellectuals and other Japanese humanists 
actively to resist militarism and imperial expansionism has often been 
emphasised,26 but what is rarely noted is the deep sense of guilt about that 
failure that impelled some of them to embark on postwar social activism. 
Kobayashi Tatsue was one of those people. Haunted by memories of his 
own inability to speak out against the arrests of his colleagues, he devoted 
his postwar life to promoting their ideals—the ideals of peace and of 
people’s art—with consequences that are still being felt in his home region 
today.27
As a schoolteacher, writer and social activist in the 1950s, Kobayashi 
won support from the local education committee to create a folk craft 
collection that was exhibited and used as a focus for events such as lectures 
by Yanagi Sōetsu and the British Mingei movement potter Bernard Leach. 
He studied and practised traditional textile dyeing techniques, and wrote 
and published widely on the importance of nurturing human creativity 
and on peace and nuclear disarmament. He participated in a local protest 
movement against plans to establish a US military training base on the 
slopes of nearby Mt Asama, and in 1981, at the age of 85, launched a 
successful local journal, Kyōwa Tsūshin (Kyōwa News 協和通信), which 
he continued to edit and publish for the next 10 years. The title was a 
telling play on words: Kyōwa means ‘harmony’ or ‘oneness’, but also 
happens to be name of the village where Kobayashi was born and spent 
the last years of his life.28
25  Kobayashi, ‘“Shirakaba” no koro’, 17.
26  See, for example, Aso, ‘Mediating the Masses’. 
27  Yoshikawa Tōru, ‘Kankō ni atatte’ [On the Occasion of Publication], in Kobayashi Tatsue no 
Hon Henshū Iinkai ed., Heiwa to teshigoto, 1–8, citation from p. 4.
28  Kobayashi Tatsue no Hon Henshū Iinkai, ‘Kobayashi Tatsue 104-sai no ayumi’, 268–9.
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Like the philosophies of his White Birch predecessors, Kobayashi’s 
idealist enthusiasm for folk arts and peace can be (and sometimes has 
been) criticised as naive and impractical. But its tangible impact is vividly 
described by Yoshikawa Tōru, a teacher and activist who first arrived 
in Mochizuki as a young graduate from Tokyo in the early 1960s and 
has lived there ever since. Amongst the postwar generation who came 
in contact with Kobayashi and his fellow former White Birch teachers, 
Yoshikawa writes:
There were those who said ‘I understand the theory all right, but I just 
can’t live the way our teacher does’. And those who studied with him often 
said, ‘I can’t follow what he’s saying’. I have to say that I sometimes felt 
the same way myself. But the people who had been taught by the White 
Birch Teachers as children, even for a short time, were influenced in a 
way that affected the rest of their lives. In old age they were still talking 
about their recollections of that time with such enjoyment that, seeing 
their expressions, I would wonder what the secret of those teachers was.29
In the postwar era, a web of local human interaction brought ideas 
inherited from the White Birch and craft movements into contact 
with new forces of agrarian and peace protest. The allied occupation of 
Japan resulted in the liberalisation of education, and in land reform that 
greatly improved the lives of farmers. As the Japanese economy began to 
revive from the devastation of war, a wave of enthusiasm for grassroots 
education, self-improvement and democratisation was expressed in the 
appearance all over the country of ‘study circles’ (sākuru サークル), where 
farmers, factory workers, housewives and others studied topics such as 
local history, political ideas, arts and literature. ‘Social education’ (shakai 
kyōiku 社会教育) became the buzzword of the era. 
In rural Nagano Prefecture, a focus for this postwar passion for self-
improvement was provided by the Seinendan (Youth Groups 青年団) 
to which most young villagers, male and female, belonged.30 Before and 
during the Pacific War, the rural youth groups were generally seen as 
hotbeds of nationalism, and became a central element of the militarising 
state’s pyramid of social control.31 But in parts of postwar Japan, the 
Seinendan came to play a very different role. In its early postwar years, the 
29  Yoshikawa, ‘Kankō ni atatte’, 2. 
30  Interview with Shimizu Noriko, Shimizu Kiyoshi and Itō Kimiko, Kyōwa, 28 May 2015.
31  Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels, Women and Outcasts: The Underside of Modern Japan (Lanham, 
NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 61–2; Sally Ann Hastings, Neighbourhood and Nation in Japan, 
1905–1937 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 109–22.
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rural grassroots enthusiasm for study and self-improvement was driven 
by a passion for agricultural modernisation. New farm machinery began 
to appear in local fields, and villagers immersed themselves in the latest 
American-inspired manuals on farm management. But by the late 1950s, 
a more critical element was also entering the debates that took place in 
night-time gatherings in the village halls of Saku and surrounding areas—
an element that reflected the changing face of Japanese farming. The rural 
young were not immune from the critical social ideas that, by the 1960s, 
were radicalising Japan’s students and urban youth. In some areas of Japan 
Seinendan members, inspired partly by left-of-centre intellectuals who 
moved to the countryside to disseminate their social ideas, launched music 
and drama groups, discussed visions of a new Japan, and participated in 
strikes for higher produce prices and protests against environmentally 
damaging development projects.
Following the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and of the Security 
Treaty (commonly known as Ampō) with the US in 1951, the Japanese 
Government entered into negotiations with the US on military security 
assistance (MSA) from America to Japan. The agreement, finally signed in 
1954, included a somewhat convoluted arrangement under which Japan 
would buy surplus agricultural produce from the US, and in return, the 
US would pay back part of the proceeds to the Japanese Government as aid 
for heavy industrial development (including support for Japan’s reviving 
armaments industry).32 The inflow of cheap US agricultural produce into 
Japan dealt a serious blow to Japanese farmers, who suddenly found the 
prices for their wheat or milk undercut by dumped US goods. In 1960, 
frustration at the MSA flared up into a strike and protest demonstrations 
by Japanese dairy farmers at the dumping of US milk powder on the 
Japanese market. Farmers from Mochizuki and other parts of Saku City 
were key figures in the protest—the first strike by farmers in Japanese 
history.33 
Criticism of the MSA agreement also flowed into rising opposition to 
the introduction of a revised Security Treaty, and by 1960 some young 
farmers were explicitly linking their own struggles to stay on the land with 
problems of the Japan–US military alliance and with a broader critique of 
32  See John L. Weste, ‘Salvation from Without: Mutual Security Assistance and the Military-
Industrial Lobby in Post-War Japan’ in Stephen S. Large ed., Showa Japan: Political, Economic and Social 
History, 1926-1989, vol. 3 (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 24–43, particularly p. 35.
33  Interview with Kobayashi Tetsuo, Saku City, 16 May 2015; interview with Itō Morihisa, 
Mochizuki, 29 May 2015.
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the trajectory of Japanese industrialisation.34 One farmer who joined the 
Mochizuki Youth Group in 1955 recalls how in 1960 he and his fellow 
members would get up before dawn and ride their bicycles over the rough 
rural roads to the nearest railway station, over 20 kilometres away, to catch 
the train to Tokyo and take part in the mass anti-Ampō demonstrations 
that precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke.35
These activities made local people more aware of a need to understand 
the world they lived in. A group of young farmers who had been involved 
in the milk strike therefore lobbied for the creation of a social education 
centre in Mochizuki. The man appointed to run the centre, Yoshikawa 
Tōru, was a newcomer to the region—a recent graduate from Tokyo who 
threw himself wholeheartedly into the task, working closely with local 
elder Kobayashi Tatsue. During the early 1960s, study circles in and 
around Mochizuki were meeting almost every evening, discussing social 
issues like the Cold War, industrialisation and the growing outflow of 
young people to the expanding metropolitan areas. Here, themes from 
the prewar White Birch philosophies reemerged in new form: the value of 
peace; the search for human creativity; respect for craft traditions; concern 
at the corrosive effects of corporate capitalism on society and community. 
The study groups met in the village halls (kōminkan 公民館) that existed 
in almost every hamlet, and participants ate, drank and talked deep into 
the night around the charcoal braziers that filled the halls with their thick 
haze of smoke.36 Arts and self-expression, in the form of choirs and drama 
groups, went hand-in-hand with heated debates on political and social 
ideas. Kobayashi Tatsue, as director of the village hall and a frequent 
speaker at their classes, influenced the artistic as well as the intellectual 
lives of the young farmer-students, helping them to raise money to buy 
books and even to acquire a record player and records—still luxuries in 
the village at that time.37
34  Kobayashi Setsuo, ‘Nagano Ken chiiki jūmin daigaku ni itaru zenshiteki haikei to shiteki kansō: 
Sengo no nōbunkyō no undō kara chiiki jūmin daigaku ni itaru made’ [Early Historical Background 
and Personal Impressions of the Nagano Prefectural Residents’ University: From the Postwar 
Nōbunkyō Movement to the Regional Residents’ University], in Nagano Ken Chiiki Jūmin Daigaku 
Gakushū Undōshi Henshū Iinkai ed., Tagayashi, manabi, kangaeru: Sengo Nagano ken gakushū 
undōshi [Tilling, Learning, Thinking: The Postwar Nagano Prefecture Educational Movement] vol. 1 
(Nagano City: Nagano Ken Chiiki Jūmin Daigaku, 2013), 43–159.
35  Interview with Shimizu Noriko, Shimizu Kiyoshi and Itō Kimiko, Kyōwa, 28 May 2015.
36  Interview with Yoshikawa Tōru, Mochizuki, 1 July 2013.
37  Interview with Shimizu Noriko, Shimizu Kiyoshi and Itō Kimiko, Kyōwa, 28 May 2015.
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The overtly critical political tone of Mochizuki social education alarmed 
more conservative members of the local government. In 1970, following 
a workshop that questioned local government agricultural policy, the local 
authorities moved to cut the financial support they had been giving to 
the social education programs, and only energetic protests by students 
managed to save Yoshikawa Tōru’s teaching position. But the Japan of 
the 1960s was a very different place from the Japan of the 1910s and 
1920s, when the activities of the White Birch teachers had so easily been 
crushed by the heavy hand of the state. Protests by students and their 
supporters succeeded in not only preserving but even expanding the 
Mochizuki social education program,38 and the experience of protest itself 
became part of the educational experience. Itō Morihisa, the son of a local 
dairy farmer and an eager participant in the social education classes of the 
1960s, recalls: 
Mr Yoshikawa had an accordion, and we would have musical gatherings, 
but at the same time we could also learn about social issues and so forth 
together. I think that was the real basis of our ongoing movement. I was 
head of the local Seinendan at the time, and it was through involvement 
in the struggle to save Mr Yoshikawa’s position as the social education 
director that I developed my own view of the world and a sense of my 
place in society.39
The central message of the social education movement was ‘think for 
yourself ’. Participants were encouraged not to accept the dictates of 
government, but to create their own visions for the future of their region.40 
And as high-tech industrialisation transformed the face of Japan, this 
was to lead to new struggles both with and within the formal structures 
of local government.
The Body Politic—Rural Medicine and 
Social Visions in Saku Central Hospital
Meanwhile, the local world of grassroots ideas and activism was being 
influenced by other currents of thought that came from cooperatism and 
social medicine. The focal point from which these ideas radiated was Saku 
38  Interview with Itō Morihisa, Mochizuki, 29 May 2015.
39  Interview with Itō Morihisa, Mochizuki, 1 July 2013.
40  Interview with Yoshikawa Tōru, Mochizuki, 1 July 2013.
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Central Hospital (Saku Sōgō Byōin 佐久総合病院), founded at the height 
of the Asia-Pacific War. The hospital first opened its doors in January 
1944, at a time when the overriding aim of state medical policy was ‘to 
secure “human resources”—in other words soldiers for the battlefront and 
workers for wartime industry—in order to pursue of the war effort’.41 But it 
was also part of Japan’s extensive cooperative movement, which, as Tetsuo 
Najita persuasively argued, has played a central though long-neglected 
role in economic and social development. As Sho Konishi observes in 
Chapter One, cooperatively run ‘people’s hospitals’ (heimin byōin 平民病
院) had formed a crucial element of the cooperatist/anarchist movements 
of the 1910s and 1920s. 
Like a number of other medical centres throughout the country, Saku 
Central Hospital was an offshoot of a local agricultural cooperative. 
Its second director, appointed six months before Japan’s defeat in war, was 
physician Wataksuki Toshikazu (1910–2006), who had been a member 
of a prewar Marxist study group at the University of Tokyo. Wakatsuki 
had been arrested twice for his political views, and had spent a year in 
prison shortly before his appointment to Saku Central Hospital. He was 
encouraged by a mentor to take a post in this rural mountain community 
in the hope that this would help him to evade the unwelcome attentions 
of the thought police. To obtain release from prison, Wakatsuki had 
been induced to sign a statement of ‘conversion’ (tenkō) renouncing his 
subversive views (an act about which he expressed lifelong regret), but 
the influence of his early encounters with Marxist, socialist and humanist 
ideas continued to influence his thought and medical practice in profound 
ways.42 Following Japan’s defeat, these ideas interacted with the longing for 
a better life felt by many local residents in Saku and surrounding regions 
as they recovered from the disasters of war and faced the massive tasks of 
rebuilding their community. From this interaction, Saku Central Hospital 
emerged as a pioneer of rural social medicine within Japan and beyond.
In the second half of the 1940s, the hospital confronted a massive health 
crisis. Malnutrition and diseases like tuberculosis were rife. Thousands of 
displaced people were returning to the local area from Japan’s lost empire. 
41  ‘Saku Byōinshi’ Sakusei Iinkai ed., Saku Byōinshi [A History of Saku Hospital] (Tokyo: Keiso 
Shobō, 1999), 33.
42  Kawakami Takeshi, ‘Wakatsuki Toshikazu sensei no shigoto to seishin’ [The Work and Spirit 
of Dr Wakatsuki Toshikazu], Bunkaren jōhō [Bunkaren Report], 344 (2006): 33–6; Wakatsuki 
Toshikazu, Nōson iryo ni kaketa 30-nen [Thirty Years Spent in Rural Medicine] (Tokyo: Ie no Hikari 
Kyōkai, 1976), 34–5.
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Medicines and medical equipment were in desperately short supply. 
In these conditions, the Saku medical staff strongly resisted proposals to 
transfer their hospital to the control of government, and insisted that it 
should remain part of the cooperative system, even though they fought 
running political battles with some of the more conservative figures in the 
local agricultural coop43. 
The hospital, whose slogan was (and still is) ‘Together with the Farmers’ 
(Nōmin to tomo ni 農民とともに), was literally sustained by the support 
of the local farm community, particularly after a fire destroyed much of 
the hospital compound in 1949. The funds for reconstruction were raised 
by local residents, and local farmers and the hospital together worked 
out ways to cooperate in linking hospital treatment to community 
health. For example, it soon became clear that the recovery of patients 
discharged from hospital was hampered by poor nutrition, so a system 
was devised where farmers provided vegetables and other produce, 
and hospital staff cooked these into nutritious meals to be delivered 
to recuperating patients. Very unusually for a Japanese hospital at that 
time, Saku Central encouraged patients’ relatives to be present during 
operations.44 The hospital also evolved into the focus of a series of patient 
self-help associations. The members of the first club, made up of patients 
suffering from the crippling and (in the 1940s) incurable Pott’s Disease 
(tuberculosis of the spine), were soon producing their own journal—
Sebone 背骨 (Backbone)—which published both medical information on 
advances in treatment and articles by patients and their families.45
So hospital staff, patients and local residents developed a view of social 
medicine that integrated hospital and community, transforming the 
conventional image of the role of a hospital as an island of technical 
expertise in a sea of potential patients. ‘Health’ from this point of view, is 
not just a matter of the treatment of disease, but a matter of life as a whole. 
Saku Central Hospital became the site of a monthly informal discussion 
group including medical staff, young farmers and others, and ranging over 
a wide spectrum of social and political issues. The hospital drama group 
toured villages presenting plays on problems of health, welfare and society 
(often in a lighthearted, seriocomic style). Wakatsuki Toshikazu described 
43  ‘Saku Byōinshi’ Sakusei Iinkai, Saku Byōinshi, 50.
44  ibid., 36–8 and 41–2.
45  ibid., 62–3; see also Honda Toru, ‘Health Equity: Japan’s Post-War Strides towards Universal 
Health Coverage from a Grassroots Perspective’, Global Health Check (11 November 2014), www.
globalhealthcheck.org. Accessed 17 January 2015.
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the interaction as a form of mutual education: hospital staff passed on 
knowledge about health issues and at the same time learnt about the lives 
of their patients in ways that ‘humanised’ their medical practice.46 When 
Saku Central, known to local conservatives as ‘the Red Hospital’, was 
threatened by the allied occupation’s purge of suspected ‘communists’, 
local residents rallied to its support, and some 45,000 of them signed 
a petition to defend their hospital.
At a personal level, Wakatsuki and his medical staff formed close 
relationships with Kobayashi Tatsue, Yoshikawa Tōru and others involved 
in the social education movement, and after Wakatsuki’s death in 2006, 
younger doctors whom he trained and influenced have continued his 
tradition of social activism. The hospital’s study circles interacted with the 
study circles of the social education movement, and participants in both 
took part in a series of protests that profoundly influenced the nature of 
local economic and social development from the 1970s onward.
The Miyamoto School and Endogenous 
Development
It is a scorching August afternoon, and a group of several dozen people 
are holding their regular gathering in the Kobayashi Tatsue Peace and 
Handicraft Folk Arts Hall. The speakers include Yoshikawa Tōru and his 
former student Itō Morihisa—a farmer and social reformer who has also 
served as a member of the local government assembly. They are joined 
by Irohira Tetsurō, a doctor from Saku Central Hospital; and Miyamoto 
Kenichi, from whom the group takes its name. This is a gathering of 
the Shinshū Miyamoto School (Shinshū Miyamoto Juku 信州宮本塾), 
a discussion circle that has been meeting on a regular basis for over two 
decades to explore visions of sustainable and endogenous development 
for their region. On tables and shelves all around the room stand rows of 
the thickly glazed vases and blue patterned plates collected by Kobayashi 
Tatsue to celebrate the simple beauty of folk crafts. An old weaving loom 
fills one corner of the hall, and photos of Kobayashi and his heroes, among 
them Yanagi Sōetsu, Gandhi and Roman Rolland, look down, benign but 
unsmiling, on the participants. 
46  Wakatsuki Toshikazu, Nōson iryo ni kaketa 30-nen; Wakatsuki Toshikazu, Acceptance speech 
for the 1976 Ramon Magsaysay Award, 1976, www.rmaf.org.ph/newrmaf/main/awardees/awardee/
profile/221. Accessed 18 January 2015.
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Figure 3: A meeting of the Shinshū Miyamoto School.
Source: Tessa Morris-Suzuki .
The Miyamoto School emerged from the social education experiments 
of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and from the protest movements that 
these precipitated. By the 1980s, urban drift and the decline and ageing 
of rural populations were becoming major challenges for regions like 
Saku. In an effort to stave off economic decline, the local government 
put forward a series of development proposals centred on attracting large 
metropolitan firms to invest in the area. These included plans for golf 
courses, for industrial waste disposal plants, and (in the early 1990s) for 
a giant off-course betting centre that, it was hoped, would attract punters 
from all over eastern Japan. The farmers who had taken part in the social 
education movement, many of whom were now entering middle age, saw 
the grand designs of the local authorities as threatening the natural and 
social environment of their region and offering few if any real benefits to 
local people. Their response was to question the plans both from outside 
and inside formal politics. 
A series of small protest movements sprang up in towns and villages 
across  the region. In 1994, for example, a former 1960s member of 
the Mochizuki Seinendan, who had just retired from a career in local 
administration, joined with an elderly woman resident to lead protests 
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against plans to build a potentially highly polluting industrial waste dump 
and incinerator in the mountains close to Mochizuki. This was the start of 
a 10-year struggle, which ultimately ended in victory for the protestors in 
the spring of 2003.47 Yoshikawa Tōru, Itō Morihisa and others, meanwhile, 
were helping to organise public demonstrations against the off-course 
betting centre scheme, which also led to the scheme being abandoned.48 
But the very success of their opposition left the protestors with a challenge: 
to devise alternative strategies that could at least do something to resolve 
the real social and economic problems confronting their region. They were 
not conservatives, simply seeking to hold back the encroaching tide of 
change. But finding coherent and persuasive alternative forms of change 
that fitted the values they espoused was no easy matter. It was here that 
the advice of Miyamoto Kenichi proved crucial. 
Miyamoto’s origins lie outside the Saku region. Born in colonial Taipei 
in 1930, he spent much of his career teaching economics at Osaka 
City University. During the 1970s and 1980s, Miyamoto became 
internationally known both as an anti-pollution activist taking part in the 
movements discussed by Simon Avenell in Chapter Four, and as a theorist 
of the relationship between economic structure and environmental 
crisis. Miyamoto’s work draws on but adapts Marxist economic theory 
to emphasise the role of the state and of state infrastructure policy as a 
cause of ecological destruction, and highlights the vital role of grassroots 
action in preserving the environment.49 By the late 1980s, he was turning 
his attention particularly to development from below, or endogenous 
development (naihatsuteki hatten 内発的発展)—a concept whose 
key elements are that local people devise and manage plans for their 
community’s future, drawing on local resources, and that the value added 
47  Asahi Kensetsu no shōkyakuro ni hantai suru taisaku iinkai, Asahi Kensetsu no noyaki, sanpai 
shōkyakuro ni hantai suru jūmin no kiroku [A Record of the Residents’ Movement against Asahi 
Construction’s Open-Air Burning and Industrial Waste Incinerator] (Mochizuki: Asahi Kensetsu 
no Shōkyakuro ni Hantai suru Taisaku Iinkai, 2009); interview with Iijima Katsuhiko, Mochizuki, 
26 May 2015. 
48  Interview with Yoshikawa Tōru, Mochizuki, 1 July 2013.
49  See Simon Avenell, Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the Shimin in 
Postwar Japan (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2010), 153–5; Tessa Morris-
Suzuki, A History of Japanese Economic Thought (London: Routledge, 1989), 151–3.
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from development should be returned to the local area.50 Miyamoto 
had become a friend of Saku Central Hospital’s rural medicine pioneer 
Wakatsuki Toshikazu, and was eager to develop closer links to the Saku 
region so that he and his students could refine their ideas in direct dialogue 
with small-scale farming communities. His ideas in turn resonated with 
the emphasis on human creativity and respect for crafts traditions that the 
former White Birch teachers had passed on to the postwar generation in 
the Saku region. Miyamoto bought a house in mountains of Saku where 
he spent extended periods of time, particularly after his retirement from 
Osaka City University, and from this base became increasingly closely 
involved in Saku community life.
The Miyamoto School was formed in 1992, as a venue where local 
people from Mochizuki and the surrounding area could come together 
to study the principles of endogenous development and to share their 
ideas for the future of their region with one another and with Miyamoto 
and other academic experts. The group meets once a month, except in 
the depth of winter, and has gradually extended its bounds to include 
participants from a widening area of Nagano Prefecture. Its meetings are 
not lectures, where outside experts instruct local people on the proper 
paths of development, but are forums for a sharing of ideas amongst 
equals. The school has organised field trips to other areas of Japan facing 
similar economic challenges, and has published two ‘Residents’ White 
Papers’ (Nōsonhatsu Jūmin Hakusho 農村発住民白書), setting out local 
projects for endogenous development.
One of the first of these projects for ‘development from below’ was the 
launch in 1993 of the Kataribe saké brand. Itō Morihisa joined hands 
with  Motai’s 300-year-old brewery, supplying them with special low-
chemical farmed rice for this brand, which has become a successful ‘export’ 
product, sold to other parts of Japan as well as to locals and visitors to 
the region. Over the years, the range of local endogenous development 
schemes has gradually grown. A project was established to help city people 
start new lives as farmers in the Saku region, with a particular emphasis 
on organic farming, and this has succeeded in bringing a number of new 
50  Miyamoto Kenichi, Kankyō keizaigaku [Environmental Economics] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
1989); Tanaka Natsuko, ‘Chūsankanchi no naihatsuteki hatten to chiikizukuri no nettowāku: Kita-
Saku gun Mochozuki machi ni okeru chiikizukuri jūmin soshiki no ayumi to kadai’ [Endogenous 
Development in a Mountain District and the Regional Development Network: History and Issues of 
a Regional Development Citizens’ Orgainzation in Mochizuki Town, North Saku District]. Nagano 
Daigaku kiyō [Annals of Nagano University] 19, no. 1 (1997): 49–61.
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farm families to the district. Itō Morihisa has created an educational 
program that allows school groups of urban children to stay on his farm 
and experience agriculture at first-hand. In 2001, a local currency system 
was launched in the nearby city of Ueda, and its 200-odd members are 
now engaged in a range of local development and education schemes. 
An  award-winning restaurant serving locally grown soba has been 
developed by a chef who also continues Kobayashi Tatsue’s tradition of 
researching and preserving local folk crafts.51 The network around the 
Miyamoto School has also maintained its particularly close link to Saku 
Central Hospital, campaigning for the support and development of its 
rural medicine model, and creating its own health initiatives, such as 
support schemes for elderly residents.52
Over the years, the Miyamoto School has debated local problems like the 
Saku City amalgamation, as well as larger national issues such as Japan’s 
postwar pacifist constitution. Today, much interest focuses on nuclear 
power and the international free-trade negotiations surrounding the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership. The participants in the school are not adherents 
of a particular political party or a specific ideology, and there is no party 
line on these matters, though the principles of endogenous development 
inform all their discussions. A characteristic of the school, though, is to 
try to take discussion of problems beyond the purely local framework; 
to consider, for example, not just how the Trans-Pacific Partnership will 
affect local farm sales, but also how it affects other parts of Asia, and (as in 
the case of the MSA and the 1960 Security Treaty renewal) how trade and 
military issues are interwoven.
The Next Hundred Years
How do we judge the success or failure of a grassroots movement? 
If  longevity is a mark of success, the residents of Saku surely deserve 
credit for keeping a lineage of alternative social thought alive for almost 
a century. Interestingly, they have done this without any enduring 
institutional structure, but simply through the transmission of ideas and 
experiences from individual to individual within a fluid and changing 
51  Shinshū Miyamoto Juku ed., Nōsonhatsu jūmin hakusho dai-2 shū: Tomo ni ikiru [A Citizens’ 
White Paper Initiated from the Villages, vol. 2: Living Together] (Mochizuki: Shinshū Miyamoto 
Juku, 2013); interview with Itō Morihisa, Mochizuki, 29 May 2015.
52  Interview with Shimizu Noriko, Shimizu Kiyoshi and Itō Kimiko, Kyōwa, 28 May 2015.
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network of grassroots groups. The ideas they embrace have left tangible 
traces on the life of the region. Without their existence, it is likely that Saku 
City would have had more large-scale corporate development projects of 
the sort promoted by many Japanese local governments in the 1970s and 
1980s, and less organic farming and craft-style production, exemplified 
by local products like Kataribe saké. The rural medicine developed by 
Wakatsuki and the doctors he trained has also left its mark—the Saku 
region is widely recognised for the high quality of its health care.53
But while a formal political party might judge success by election victories 
or the fulfilment of its party platform, the aims of the Saku region’s 
endogenous development networks are broad, open-ended and evolving, 
so assessing their overall achievements is much more difficult. As some 
problems have been overcome, others have come into focus—issues, for 
example, of gender and generation. The social education movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s was overwhelmingly male-dominated. Though 
women performed large amounts of labour on local farms, agricultural 
management was largely in the hands of men, as was leadership in social 
life. In the 1950s and 1960s Seinendan, for example, the convention was 
that the leader would always be a young man and the deputy a young 
woman.54 Over the past 20 years or so, the social hierarchy has been 
changing. Many women now play increasingly important parts in the 
Miyamoto School and endogenous development schemes, among them 
Tsuru Bunka University professor Tanaka Natsuko, a leading Japanese 
expert on the cooperative movement; Mochizuki-born editor and 
publisher Hata Yumiko; and Yoshikawa Tōru’s daughter Yūko, who is a 
member of Saku City Council. But change has been gradual, and there is 
still surely scope for women’s voices to play a greater role in the shaping 
of the network’s ideas. A glance around the room at meetings of the 
Miyamoto School, as at the gatherings of many grassroots groups in Japan 
today, reveals an ageing population of participants. There are many grey 
heads and many backs bent by lives of hard work. This partly reflects the 
ageing of the Saku population as a whole; but, as Yoshikawa, Itō and other 
readily acknowledge, engaging the younger generation is a challenge. 
Meanwhile, Saku’s social alternatives face a mass of larger challenges from 
the outside world. For the farmers of the district, climate change is not 
an abstract concept but a reality faced every day, in plants that ripen out 
53  See for example Honda, 'Health Equity'.
54  Interview with Shimizu Noriko, Shimizu Kiyoshi and Itō Kimiko, Kyōwa, 28 May 2015.
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of season and monsoon rains that fail to arrive on time. Yet, rather than 
focusing on the huge challenges of global warming and of Japan’s pressing 
need for new and safe sources of energy, the national government’s policy 
is directed above all to a pursuit of national might through ever-deepening 
economic and military commitment to the US alliance—a policy that 
raises the defence budget, opens the agricultural market to cheap imports 
and destabilises East Asian relations in ways that many local people find 
deeply alarming. Indeed, the political landscape of Japan appears to have 
undergone a subtle change in recent decades. The metropolitan areas, 
once the main centres of progressive politics, are now dominated by right-
wing local administrations, while in some rural areas growing currents 
of unease are disrupting the traditional image of the countryside as the 
backbone of conservative politics.
When the White Birch teachers started their educational experiments 
in unpromising circumstances a century ago, would they have imagined 
that  their ideas would still be reverberating in the valleys of Saku 
100 years later? Did they see themselves as pioneers of a social revolution 
that would soon sweep the world, or as voices in the wilderness? The story 
of the legacy that grew from their actions provides an illustration of the 
quiet ways in which ideas can survive and grow even in sometimes hostile 
environments. The concepts of humanist schooling and social education, 
of rural community medicine and endogenous development nurtured 
over decades in Saku and surrounding regions have relevance, not just 
for other parts of Japan, but also for many communities worldwide that 
face similar challenges today. The survival of these ideas against the odds 
provides at least some hope that they can be sustained, reshaped and 
reinvigorated over the century to come.
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The early 1970s were an important moment of transnational engagement 
in the Japanese environmental movement. What had until then been a 
largely domestic phenomenon comprising thousands of local mobilisations 
against industrial pollution and rampant development expanded to 
include a new array of transnational initiatives, many with a specific focus 
on pollution in the countries of East Asia. The initial stimulus for these 
new movements was scattered media reports and anecdotal accounts 
that some Japanese companies were relocating their pollutive industrial 
processes to East Asia in response to stricter regulation in Japan. Such 
reports came as a rude awakening to many Japanese activists, who realised 
that so-called ‘pollution export’ undermined their ‘victories’ against 
industrial pollution within Japan. In response, a small number of Japanese 
activists promptly mobilised movements to address pollution export into 
countries such as Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia. Prominent civic activists like the engineer Ui Jun and the 
novelist Oda Makoto organised international conferences with Asian 
activists, while others began publishing monthly newsletters on the issue 
in English and Japanese. A number of Japanese activists also travelled 
to the affected countries to inform local activists about the Japanese 
pollution experience and the successful strategies they had employed in 
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their domestic struggles. Impressively, these meetings sometimes resulted 
in coordinated transnational actions between protestors on the ground 
in East Asia and supporters back in Japan. This kind of transnational 
activity was an entirely new phenomenon in the Japanese environmental 
movement and it marked a significant enhancement in the geographical 
reach of postwar Japanese environmental activism.
In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the new sphere of 
transnational activism in the Japanese environmental movement of the 
1970s. As I explain, I believe the transnational movements were glued 
together by a powerful translocal sentiment in which local struggles 
and activists combined their strong communal identities with an 
emergent East Asian grassroots regionalism. Leading activists served as 
the important ‘connective tissue’ nurturing this translocal sentiment.1 
Though grassroots movements in the region (as we have seen) have a long 
history, I believe that transnational involvement nurtured a new reflexivity 
among the Japanese activists involved, emblematic of the mentalities and 
consciousness of reflexive or second modernity referred to by Anthony 
Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and others.2 If Japanese modernity was marked 
by a brash and unyielding state-led developmentalism focused on the 
questions ‘how do we grow?’ and ‘how do we appropriate the resources 
we need to grow?’ as an economy, as a national state, and as individuals, 
then reflexive modernity has unfolded as a deeply critical project in 
which some individuals have begun to ask ‘what are the consequences 
of growth (or lack thereof )?’ and ‘how do we survive?’ in a world where 
the sureties of the national state framework of modernity are threatened 
and undermined by political, economic, and technological pressures. 
Transnational involvement had a particularly striking impact on the way 
the activists involved conceptualised their activist identity. Within the 
framework of the Japanese nation, civic activists could quite seamlessly 
position themselves as victims of the state and industry. But transnational 
involvement upset this schematic by exposing their complicity—albeit 
indirectly—in the transgressions of Japanese industry abroad. The result, 
I  argue, was a more reflexive activist identity characteristic of the 
mentalities of reflexive modernity. I begin the chapter by briefly tracing 
1  Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 206. 
2  Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, in 
Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash eds, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1994), 1–55.
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some of the earliest and most influential of the transnational movements, 
paying special attention to the role of core activists in bringing people 
together across borders. The latter part of the chapter examines the new 
mentalities and ideas born of this transnational interaction. 
Pollution Export and Response
Civic groups were certainly well aware of Japan’s troubled legacy in 
Asia before the mid- to late 1960s but until then their focus had been 
mainly on resisting conservative rule and the entrenchment of American 
influence domestically. The pursuit of ‘Peace and Democracy’ at home, 
in other words, was seen as the best way to address the misdeeds of the 
past, particularly in Asia and the Pacific. Coupled with this approach, 
restrictions on overseas travel until the 1960s also hindered the formation 
of transnational movement networks. But the outbreak of the Vietnam 
War and the advent of pollution export almost forced Asia onto the 
activist agenda by exposing the direct connections of the region to 
conservative rule, economic growth, and American hegemony at home. 
What resulted was a period of intensive grassroots regionalisation among 
some Japanese civic groups that would continue to develop over the 
coming decades. By ‘grassroots regionalisation’ I certainly refer to the 
numerical growth of Japanese NGOs and groups active in East Asia, 
which was truly significant. But I also allude to what is best described as 
the regionalisation of an activist mindset that had been largely national or 
local in focus up to that point. We might say that the late 1960s and early 
1970s marked a doubling of the civic mindset as domestic and regional 
initiatives came to be seen as necessary components of the same struggle. 
Needless to say, this progressive reengagement with Asia was by no means 
painless and, in many ways, proved more difficult for activists than for 
political or corporate elites who could ‘buy’ their way back into Asian 
countries. Activists, of course, approached their Asian counterparts with 
a deep sense of remorse for Japan’s problematic history in Asia as well as 
a sense of responsibility for the pressing issues of the present. Nowhere 
is this clearer than in movements opposing Japanese industrial pollution 
export to the region.
Japanese pollution export of the early 1970s had its roots in the Japanese 
domestic pollution crisis that stretched from the late 1950s to around the 
early 1970s. I have discussed this domestic history in detail elsewhere but, 
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for the purposes of contextualisation, note the following here.3 Japan’s rise 
as an economic superpower, coming in waves from around the late 1950s 
and again in the 1960s, was accompanied by some of the worst cases of 
industrial pollution in modern global history. As industry spread around 
the Japanese archipelago local communities were devastated by extreme 
forms of atmospheric, water, and ground pollution. Industries wilfully 
pumped dangerous gases into the atmosphere and dumped chemical 
toxins into bays and rivers. Residents living in surrounding communities 
bore the brunt of this rampant industrial expansion. In Yokkaichi City, for 
example, many locals were afflicted with pulmonary diseases and chronic 
asthma caused by poisonous sulphur dioxide emitted from a nearby 
petrochemical facility. At Minamata Bay and later in Niigata Prefecture, 
people were struck down with debilitating motor neuron disease, impaired 
sensation, and loss of bodily coordination due to their inadvertent 
consumption of seafood contaminated with methyl mercury dumped 
by industry (See also Chapter Five). To make matters worse, people in 
affected communities not only endured harrowing medical complications, 
they also faced cruel discrimination from an uninformed public.
Nevertheless, as the pollution problem intensified and spread (eventually 
into big cities like Tokyo and Osaka where air pollution reached dangerous 
proportions in the 1960s), local communities began to organise protest 
movements and to take offending industries to court. These protests and 
court battles sometimes took well over a decade to settle but, by the late 
1960s, the Japanese Government and judiciary began to respond. Local 
governments took the lead by passing stringent regulations and forcing 
industry into pollution prevention agreements. A reluctant national 
government followed, first by passing the Basic Law on Pollution Prevention 
in 1967 and then, at the historic Pollution Diet in 1970, amending the 
Basic Law to give it punitive force and passing over a dozen other pieces 
of pollution prevention legislation. By the early 1970s, Japan had in place 
some of the strictest industrial pollution regulations in the world and a 
body of case law strongly on the side of pollution victims. Some even 
described this outcome as a pollution miracle.
Not entirely by coincidence, there was a marked increase in Japanese 
foreign  direct investment (FDI) into East Asia (and elsewhere) just as 
the new environmental regulations began to bite in the early 1970s. 
3  Simon Avenell, ‘Japan’s Long Environmental Sixties and the Birth of a Green Leviathan’, 
Japanese Studies 32, no. 3 (2012): 423–44.
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From 1967 to 1973 overall Japanese FDI increased tenfold, and between 
1973 and 1976 it essentially doubled that of the preceding 20 years.4 
Along with the quantitative change, Japanese FDI also began to change 
qualitatively in the early 1970s as polluting industries involved in chemicals 
and steel became more prominent.5 To be sure, it would be a mistake to 
attribute this FDI spike entirely to domestic environmental regulations. 
Even activists recognised that other factors such as cheap labour and 
resources played an important role in corporate decisions to go offshore. 
But there is little doubt that domestic regulation also shaped corporate 
investment strategies. Important research by Derek Hall has shown that the 
strict Japanese regulatory regime was very much on the minds of corporate 
executives and government officials in the early 1970s, to the extent that 
pollution export even became a ‘state strategy’ at one point.6 Utilising 
a wealth of government and industry publications, newsletters, and public 
comments, Hall shows beyond doubt that the powerful Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and mammoth corporations like 
Mitsubishi openly admitted that environmental regulation was a factor 
shaping their FDI strategies. In 1970, for example, MITI established 
a special fund to help relocate the pollutive petrochemical industry abroad 
while in the same year the Mitsubishi Corporation noted siting difficulties 
in Japan due to local opposition as one reason for building an oil refinery 
in Southeast Asia rather than at home.7 Overt strategy or not, the 1970s 
witnessed a proliferation of polluting Japanese industries throughout East 
Asia: hexavalent chromium plants in South Korea, chemical processing 
plants in Indonesia, mining operations and steel sintering plants in the 
Philippines, caustic soda plants in Thailand, rare earth mining operations 
in Malaysia, and asbestos processing in Taiwan.8
Japanese environmental activists became aware of the pollution export 
practice relatively early on thanks to a number of fortuitous transnational 
encounters. The first was at the historic United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm in early June 1972. 
4  T. J. Pempel, ‘Gulliver in Lilliput: Japan and Asian Economic Regionalism’, World Policy Journal 
13, no. 4 (Winter 1996–7): 18; Derek Hall, ‘Pollution Export as State and Corporate Strategy: Japan 
in the 1970s’, Review of International Political Economy 16, no. 2 (2009): 262.
5  Hall ‘Pollution Export’, 262.
6  Hall, ‘Pollution Export’.
7  Derek Hall, ‘Environmental Change, Protest, and Havens of Environmental Degradation: 
Evidence from Asia’, Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 2 (2002): 22, 23.
8  Ui Jun, ‘Pollution Export’, in Shigeto Tsuru and Helmut Weidner eds, Environmental Policy 
in Japan (Berlin: Sigma, 1989), 396, 401.
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While participating in the non-governmental forums running parallel to 
the main conference, Ui Jun and a group of industrial pollution sufferers 
from Japan met with activists from other East Asian countries. Ui and 
his group’s main objective was to communicate the story of Japanese 
industrial pollution to the world, so they were deeply shocked to learn 
from their Asian counterparts that Japanese industrial activity was already 
causing concern in the region. 
On his return, Ui communicated this news to anti-pollution activists 
through his national environmental network, the Independent Lectures 
on Pollution (ILP). He scolded himself and fellow activists for their 
naiveté in assuming that Japanese corporations would simply clean up in 
response to domestic protest and regulation. Indeed, so insular was their 
perspective that not until Asian activists alerted them to pollution export 
had they even considered the concrete implications of Japan’s economic 
penetration into the region. For Ui such realities demanded far deeper and 
more substantive engagement with East Asian activists.9 As a first step, 
Ui and his group began publishing an English-language pamphlet entitled 
KOGAI: Newsletter from Polluted Japan, which ran articles on industrial 
pollution in Japan and throughout East Asia. ILP sent the newsletter 
free of charge to subscribers who, in return, provided information about 
industrial pollution in their countries. In this way, the newsletter served as 
both a medium for information transmission and a vehicle for connecting 
anti-pollution protesters across East Asia into a rudimentary transnational 
grassroots alliance.
The contacts Ui and others formed with Asian activists at UNCHE 
resulted in substantive, face-to-face interactions and movements in the 
coming months and years. In late 1972 and early 1973, for example, 
Matsuoka Nobuo, an activist involved in ILP, travelled to Malaysia and 
Thailand where he met with environmental groups. In Kuala Lumpur, 
activists told Matsuoka that they were desperate for technical information 
about pollution and were actively collecting newspaper clippings on 
Japanese industrial pollution. The Malaysian activists frankly stated that 
they were extremely sceptical—if not cynical—about so-called Japanese 
technical and economic ‘assistance’ since these were often simply code 
9  Ui Jun, ‘Kokuren kankyō kaigi hōkoku I’ [Report from the UN Environmental Conference 
I], Kōgai Genron [Fundamental Studies in Pollution] 13 (July 1972): 17–8. Reproduced in Saitama 
Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 2 fukkoku ‘Kōgai Genron’ 
dai 1-kai haihon dai 3-kan [Materials on Pollution Problems Collected by Ui Jun, 2, Reprint: 
‘Fundamental Studies in Pollution’, First Distribution, Vol. 3] (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2007), 221–2.
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words for Japanese corporate exploitation of cheap labour and resources. 
As Matsuoka explained, ‘if we fail to carefully reconsider what assistance 
really is, the Japanese run the risk of losing the good faith of our Asian 
friends to a point where it is irrecoverable’.10 Later Matsuoka travelled 
to Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok where he gave a presentation 
on Japanese pollution to students involved in environmental activism. 
On learning that the Thai students had previously known nothing about 
Japan’s terrible pollution history, Matsuoka felt an overwhelming sense of 
guilt and responsibility. From now on, he observed, Japanese activists ‘must 
be prepared to shoulder another heavy load’ (i.e. taking responsibility for 
Japanese corporate activity in neighbouring countries).11
Ui, Matsuoka, and others’ calls for a new commitment to East Asian 
environmental problems found a cause almost immediately. Only 
months after Matsuoka’s visit to Thailand, another colleague from the 
ILP’s Asia group, Hirayama Takasada, visited Kasetsart University in 
Bangkok to meet with members of the university’s nature preservation 
club. During these meetings the club’s leader showed Hirayama a 
newspaper clipping entitled ‘No Repeat of the Minamata Tragedy’ from 
the Bangkok daily, Siam Rath,  reporting that the Thai Asahi Caustic 
Soda Company—a subsidiary of the Japanese Asahi Glass Company of 
the Mitsubishi Group—was responsible for dumping effluent containing 
caustic soda, synthetic hydrochloric acid, liquid chlorine, and mercury into 
the Chao Phraya River, resulting in a massive fish kill and skin afflictions 
and diarrhoea among residents who consumed the fish.12 The discovery of 
a concrete example of Japanese pollution in Thailand was nothing short 
of earthshattering for Matsuoka and his visceral response is representative 
of the way most other Japanese activists reacted:
10  Matsuoka Nobuo, ‘Tōnan Ajia no tabi kara (Marēshia nite)’ [From a Journey to Southeast Asia: 
Malaysia], Jishu Kōza [Independent Lectures] 18 (Sept 1972): 2. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku 
Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 3-kan 
[Materials on Pollution Problems Collected by Ui Jun, 1, Reprint: ‘Independent Lectures’, Vol. 3] 
(Tokyo: Suirensha, 2005), 346.
11  Matsuoka Nobuo, ‘Mō hitotsu no omoni o seou kakugo o: Higashi Ajia no tabi kara (3)’ 
[The Willingness to Take up Another Burden: From a Journey to East Asia], Jishu Kōza [Independent 
Lectures] 20 (Nov 1972): 38. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., 
Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 4-kan [Materials on Pollution Problems 
Collected by Ui Jun, 1, Reprint: ‘Independent Lectures’, Vol. 4] (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2005), 106.
12  Inoue Sumio, ‘Bokura wa kōgai yushtsu to tatakai hajimeta’ [We Have Begun the Fight against 
Pollution Export], Tenbō [Prospect] 191 (Nov 1974): 50.
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What’s this!? The evil hand of mercury contamination has reached 
Thailand! My naïve assumption that full-scale pollution export was yet 
to come had been betrayed with consummate ease by these cold-hard 
facts. Utterly surprised, for a time I could say nothing. I was thrown 
into utter despair by a piercing reality: ‘pollution export had begun! 
Thai Asahi Caustic Soda was just the tip of the iceberg.’ I was quickly 
filled with rage. I could not allow this. I simply could not allow it. Once 
again I engraved in my mind the purpose of this trip: to communicate 
the situation of Japanese pollution and to find a way to mobilise an 
antipollution movement based on cooperation between Japanese and 
Southeast Asian people.13 
Throughout 1973 and 1974, Japanese and Thai environmental activists 
mobilised one of the earliest transnational movements against industrial 
pollution in postwar East Asian history. In late August 1973, students from 
Thammasat, Kasetsart, Chulalongkorn, Mahidol universities organised 
a nature conservation exhibition on the campus of Thammasat University. 
Around 20 per cent of the exhibition was devoted to displays on Japanese 
industrial pollution with the remainder focusing on environmental 
issues in Thailand. Organisers distributed Thai translations of the ILP 
pamphlet Polluted Japan (prepared by Ui and others for UNCHE), which 
contained detailed information on Japan’s pollution experience. They 
also ran screenings of Tsuchimoto Noriaki’s disturbing documentary film 
Minamata: The Victims and Their World.14 On the Japan side, in September 
1973 around 150 activists from anti-war, environmental, and other civic 
groups marched on the headquarters of the Asahi Glass Company in 
Tokyo with placards reading ‘Asahi Glass, Stop Exporting Pollution!’15 
The Tokyo protest was reported in the Siam Rath newspaper days later 
under the headline ‘Japanese people demonstrate in opposition to factory 
polluting Thailand’. The full-page report contained photographs of the 
demonstration and interviews with Japanese activists, which generated 
13  Hirayama Takasada, ‘Tōnan Ajia kōgai saihakken no tabi (1) Tai nite’ [A Journey of Rediscovery 
to Southeast Asia: Thailand], Jishu Kōza [Independent Lectures] 31 (Oct 1973): 52. Reproduced in 
Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu 
Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 1-kan [Materials on Pollution Problems Collected by Ui Jun, 1, Reprint: 
‘Independent Lectures’, Second Distribution, Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 382. 
14  Hirayama Takasada, ‘Exporting Pollution (The Export of ‘KOGAI’)’, KOGAI: The Newsletter 
From Polluted Japan 2 (Winter 1974): 7; Inoue, ‘Bokura wa’, 52. 
15  Jishu Kōza Ajia Gurūpu, ‘Tai Asahi Kasei Sōda no kasen osen’ [The Pollution of Rivers by 
Asahi Kasei Soda Thailand], Jishu Kōza [Independent Lectures] 31 (Oct 1973), 48. Reproduced in 
Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu 
Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 1-kan [Materials on Pollution Problems Collected by Ui Jun, 1, Reprint: 
‘Independent Lectures’, Second Distribution, Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 378.
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a great response among Thai citizens.16 After these protests, activists 
established the Japan–Thai Youth Friendship Movement (Nichi-Tai Seinen 
Yūkō Undō) to act as the organisational hub for the budding transnational 
mobilisation. 
In the coming months interactions between activists intensified, 
culminating in a historic simultaneous transnational demonstration in 
September 1974. As in the previous year, activists in Tokyo marched with 
banners and placards in Japanese and Thai reading ‘Asahi Glass, Get out of 
Thailand!’ Messages of support from Thai activists were read out during the 
Tokyo protest.17 In Bangkok, student activists held a three-day exhibition 
entitled ‘Opposing Japanese Export of Pollution’, which attracted some 
15,000 people. The organisers’ aims were twofold: to use the Japanese 
experience to raise awareness about industrial pollution among the Thai 
people and to exert pressure on the Thai Government to implement more 
stringent environmental regulations to control industrial pollution.18 
Visitors to the exhibition were greeted at the entrance by a large banner 
reading ‘POLLUTED JAPAN’ and a mock coffin with a photo of a fetal 
Minamata disease victim. Inside were displays of industrial pollution at 
Yokkaichi and Minamata, shocking cases of food contamination from 
arsenic and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs), photos of Japanese nuclear 
power plants, and a series of panels on the Japanese economic penetration 
of Asia. Over the course of the exhibition, various public discussions were 
held on pollution in Japan, local residents and pollution, and anti-pollution 
strategies for youth. Visitors were overjoyed when a statement from the 
demonstrators in Tokyo was read out and they eagerly signed a petition 
opposing the proposed construction of a petrochemical plant by Japanese 
industry in Si Racha in the Gulf of Thailand.19 Thanks to this pressure, 
the Mitsui and Mitsubishi Corporations announced that they would be 
shelving their construction plans. The companies cited increased pollution 
monitoring by Thai students and intellectuals as one contributing factor.20 
Japanese activists walked away from the demonstration with a deepened 
16  Inoue, ‘Bokura wa’, 51.
17  ibid., 52–3.
18  ibid., 53.
19  Okuda Takaharu, ‘Nichitai o musubu kōgai hantai undō’ [An Anti-Pollution Movement 
Linking Japan and Thailand], Jishu Kōza [Independent Lectures] 44 (Nov 1974): 41–54. Reproduced 
in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku 
‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 4-kan [Materials on Pollution Problems Collected by Ui Jun, 1, 
Reprint: ‘Independent Lectures’, Second Distribution, Vol. 4] (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 53.
20  Inoue, ‘Bokura wa’, 53. 
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awareness of the entanglement of Japanese industry and pollution with 
East Asia. As the KOGAI newsletter noted in 1975, ‘We remember what 
a Thai friend said to us, “what brings disasters upon [the] Thai people will 
surely bring them upon [the] Japanese. And conversely, what damages 
[the] Japanese will also damage [the] Thai people”’.21
Deeply concerned about the extent of pollution export, Japanese activists 
involved in the Thai Asahi movement began to carefully scrutinise 
Japanese corporate activity elsewhere in East Asia. Their concerns were 
not unfounded. In mid-February 1974, Hirayama Takasada was alerted to 
an article in the Tōyō Keizai Nippō, a financial newspaper run by resident 
Koreans in Japan. The article, entitled ‘Polluting Plant Exported to South 
Korea?!’, reported how a resident Korean entrepreneur, one Mr Koe, had 
purchased a mercurochrome plant from the Toyama Chemical Company 
and reconstructed it in Inch’ŏn City, South Korea, where he was applying 
for permission to commence operations. Pointing to a possible instance 
of pollution export, the article noted that Toyama Chemical had decided 
to sell the Toyama plant in 1973 after running into problems with 
Japanese regulators over contamination issues.22 Toyama Chemical had 
in fact been forced to halt production of mercurochrome—a highly toxic 
substance—in September 1973 when waters in Toyama Bay were found 
to have mercury levels equivalent to those in Minamata Bay. In December 
1973, tests by the Toyama Prefectural Government revealed toxic levels of 
mercury contamination in industrial sludge near the plant’s drainpipes.23 
It was at this point that managers hatched the ‘ingenious’ solution of 
selling the factory to Koe and simply importing mercurochrome from his 
company once the factory was operational in Inch’ŏn.
In February 1974, Hirayama Takasada and Inoue Sumio—both involved 
in the Thai movement—met with local civic groups in Toyama, which 
confirmed the newspaper report. Hirayama and Inoue subsequently 
produced their own detailed report on the incident and began to mobilise 
in opposition. In late April, groups gathered in protest in Toyama and 
21  Okuda, ‘Documents’, 11. 
22  Hirayama Takasada, ‘Sōkan no ji’ [Some Words on the Launch of the Journal], Geppō kōgai o 
nogasuna 1 [Monthly Journal ‘Don’t Let the Pollution Escape!’] (1974): 1; 1974/2/15; Inoue, ‘Bokura 
wa’, 54.
23  Hirayama Takasada, ‘Toyama Kagaku, kōgai yushutsu chūshi!?’ [Toyama Chemical: Stop 
Exporting Pollution!], Jishu Kōza [Independent Lectures] 39 (June 1974): 28. Reproduced in 
Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu 
Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 3-kan [Materials on Pollution Problems Collected by Ui Jun, 1, Reprint: 
‘Independent Lectures’, Second Distribution, Vol. 3] (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 94.
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outside the company’s Tokyo headquarters. In Tokyo, ILP members were 
joined by representatives from the Zainichi Korean Youth League (ZKYL) 
and the Japanese YWCA. The 200-strong protest group waved placards 
in Japanese and Korean reading ‘Toyama Chemical, Stop Exporting 
Pollution!’ In Toyama, local residents’ groups protested outside railway 
stations and at the Toyama Chemical facilities where they distributed 
pamphlets to employees.24 At the Tokyo protest, Hirayama and Inoue 
were surprised to learn from YWCA participants that women in the 
Inch’ŏn chapter of the YWCA had been conducting a similar protest 
against the mercurochrome factory since February 1974. The Inch’ŏn 
women had apparently learned of the factory relocation from the 
Korean-language Christian Newspaper, which had reproduced the article 
published earlier in the Japanese Tōyō Keizai Nippō. Thereafter the Inch’ŏn 
YWCA women took the bold step of petitioning the Inch’ŏn Mayor to 
deny Koe’s application to commence mercurochrome production. They 
did this at substantial personal risk given the nature of authoritarian rule 
under President Park Chung-hee. The Park regime actively encouraged 
the establishment of Japanese polluting industries in South Korea by 
intentionally avoiding pollution regulation and cracking down on local 
protest.25 In mid-1973, Park brazenly declared that ‘for the purposes of 
the industrial development of our country, it will be best not to worry too 
much about pollution problems’.26
Faced with mounting pressure in both countries, on April 30, some three 
days after the protests, NHK television news reported that the Toyama 
Chemical Company board of directors had decided to abandon their 
plan to import mercurochrome from the plant in South Korea, effectively 
ending operations at that end too. Although the nature of political 
dictatorship in South Korea had made direct coordination impossible, 
Japanese activists rightly concluded that their protest had been a ‘de facto’ 
transnational struggle with the women of the Inch’ŏn YWCA.27 Indeed, 
it was thanks to this joint transnational action that they had succeeded. 
24  Inoue, ‘Bokura wa’, 55.
25  Ogawa Hiroshi, ‘Ajia no mado: Nihon Kagaku no kōgai yushutsu o kokuhatsu suru’ [A Window 
on Asia: Indicting Nippon Chemical’s Pollution Export], Jishu Kōza [Independent Lectures] 42 
(Sept 1974): 57. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū 
kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 3-kan [Materials on Pollution 
Problems Collected by Ui Jun, 1, Reprint: ‘Independent Lectures’, Second Distribution, Vol. 3] 
(Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 307.
26  Hall, ‘Pollution Export’, 269.
27  Inoue Sumio, ‘Babanuki no riron o koete: Nihon Kagaku no kuromu tarenagashi to kankoku 
e no kōgai yushutsu’, Tenbō 204 (Dec 1977): 89.
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As with the Asahi Glass incident in Bangkok, the Inch’ŏn case provided 
yet another opportunity for Japanese activists to rethink their domestic 
struggle in a wider regional context and, by consequence, to reevaluate 
their situation as pollution victims. As one of the placards at the April 
protest noted, ‘We cannot ignore this mechanism in which our “affluence” 
is built on the sacrifice of the South Korean people … . Come on, let’s 
destroy from within Japan the economic invasion and export of pollution 
into Asia … exemplified by Toyama Chemical’s corporate activity’.28 
The  statement  of  the ZKYL expressed a similar sentiment, noting 
that ‘We  are committed to transforming this struggle against Toyama 
Chemical’s pollution export into a joint struggle of the Japanese and South 
Korean people to oppose all forms of pollution export and economic 
invasion and to intensify our condemnation of responsible corporations’.29 
To this end, in June 1974 Hirayama and Inoue established the monthly 
publication, Don’t Let the Pollution Escape, to monitor Toyama Chemical 
and other companies looking to relocate their polluting activities offshore. 
What just a few years before had been a domestic struggle between local 
communities and Japanese corporations was now escalating into region-
wide battle against pollution export and political dictatorship throughout 
East Asia.
The range of movements in ensuing years is too broad to cover here, but 
one further movement against the Nippon Chemical Company (NCC) 
deserves attention in the context of my discussion of the emergence of a 
new reflexivity in 1970s Japanese environmental activism stimulated by 
transnational involvement. Activists became aware of NCC via a report in 
the Nihon Keizai Shinbun newspaper in June 1974. The article reported 
that NCC and its South Korean partner were planning to produce 
sodium bichromate and thenardite at a factory located in the Ulsan 
industrial region. According to the article, NCC’s decision to go abroad 
was prompted by numerous worker compensation claims, increased 
regulation, and civic protest relating to the toxic compound hexavalent 
chromium, a byproduct of sodium bichromate production. NCC’s 
28  Emphasis in original. Hirayama, ‘Toyama Kagaku, kōgai yushutsu chūshi!?’ 95.
29  Hirayama, ‘Toyama Kagaku, kōgai yushutsu chūshi!?’ 93.
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move was provocatively described as ‘a new direction in the development 
of production bases for pollutive industries by way of international 
dispersion’.30
Hirayama and Inoue of the Don’t Let the Pollution Escape movement 
began to investigate NCC immediately. They discovered a record 
of  blatant disregard for environmental regulation and a longer history 
of transgressions against Asian people. NCC began producing sodium 
bichromate in 1915 at factories in Tokyo and the surrounding Chiba 
and Kanagawa prefectures. During World War II, the company actively 
provided material for munitions manufacture and, more troublingly, 
operated a chromium mine that made extensive use of forced Korean 
labour. In the course of their investigations, activists discovered horrific 
instances of torture and inhumane treatment at this mining operation—
all of which they documented (with graphical reproductions) in Don’t Let 
the Pollution Escape and other activist newsletters. Adding to its troubled 
wartime record, in the postwar period NCC began to sell its chromium 
slag to the construction industry for use in the foundations of domestic 
dwellings and for filling unused wet rice paddies. Although it would only 
come to light much later, this slag contained highly toxic chromium that 
the company was well aware of.31 Under increasing pressure from residents 
complaining about foul smells and chemicals leaching from their gardens 
and cases of pulmonary afflictions in workers and communities around 
the factories, in 1972 NCC shifted production of sodium bichromate to 
its Tokuyama factory. Before commencing operations there, the company 
signed a pollution prevention agreement with Tokuyama City pledging 
that it would convert all waste material into soluble trivalent chromium.32 
Yet, despite these undertakings, in September 1972 when a ship sank 
in waters off the coast of Shimonoseki, it was revealed that NCC had 
been dumping unprocessed chromium slag at sea in direct contravention 
of the agreement. Subsequent investigations revealed that the company 
had ocean-dumped an astonishing 5,000 tons of toxic waste material 
30  Ogawa Yoshio, ‘Dai 2 no Toyama Kagaku = Nihon Kagaku no Kankoku e no kōgai yusutsu o 
yamesaseyo’ [Toyama Chemical No. Two: Let’s Stop Nippon Chemical from Exporting Pollution to 
South Korea], Geppō kōgai o nogasuna! Kankoku e no kōgai yushutsu o kokuhatsu suru [Monthly Journal 
‘Don’t Let the Pollution Escape!’ Indicting Pollution Export to South Korea], 3.
31  Ogawa Yoshio, ‘Dai 2 no Toyama Kagaku’, 2; Masayoshi Hideo, ‘Nikkan no genjō to kōgai yusutsu 
soshi undō’ [The Present Situation of Japan-South Korea Relations and the Movement to Stop Pollution 
Export], Geppō kōgai o nogasuna! Kankoku e no kōgai yushutsu o kokuhatsu suru [Monthly Journal ‘Don’t 
Let the Pollution Escape!’ Indicting Pollution Export to South Korea] 7 (Dec 1974): 1.
32  Inoue, ‘Bokura wa’, 59.
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since July 1972. As a result, the Tokuyama Municipal Assembly ordered 
a temporary suspension of production at the factory.33 It was shortly after 
this incident the NCC executives hatched the plan to relocate operations 
to Ulsan in South Korea.
The opposition movement that began to gather steam around mid-1974 
is  an excellent example of the way growing awareness of the pollution 
export  problem—thanks to the transnational activities of individuals 
like Ui, Hirayama, and Inoue—encouraged activists in very localised 
movements within Japan to reconsider the industrial pollution problem 
on a wider regional canvas and, in turn, reconsider their own sense of 
victimisation. By acting as the connective tissue between pollution 
and protest abroad and mobilisations back in Japan, core activists like 
Hirayama helped to grow this awareness both within themselves and other 
Japanese activists. As I noted earlier, it was an awareness that resulted 
in substantive action because some activists began to develop a sense of 
empathy, comradery and responsibility toward the victims of Japanese 
pollution export, even though in many cases they would remain physically 
separated by geographical, cultural and political distance.
The Residents Association to Rid Kōtō, Sumida, and Edogawa Wards of 
Pollution (RAR) is a case in point. This group initially formed to examine 
contamination of their neighbourhoods by toxic materials illegally 
dumped  from NCC’s factories. With the cooperation of an ethical 
municipal employee, the RAR was able to identify numerous locations of 
NCC’s illegal chromate slag dumping, some containing levels of chromium 
1,300 times in excess of regulatory limits.34 Importantly, activists in the 
RAR did not limit their public protests to the local contamination issue. 
On the contrary, as leaders of the movement explained to Inoue Sumio, 
a central pillar of their action was to prevent NCC exporting its pollution 
to South Korea. For these people, NCC’s South Korean manoeuvre was 
part of a single ‘structure of discrimination’. People in this downtown 
area of Tokyo knew all too well that the rich of uptown Tokyo sent all of 
their unwanted things—trash processing, toxic chemical factories etc.—
in their direction. When Tokyo downtowners complained, the company 
simply relocated out to the Japanese countryside. But the structure now 
extended even further, with Japan treating Asia in just the same way 
33  Kawana Hideyuki, Dokyumento Nihon no kōgai 13: Ajia no kankyō hakai to Nihon [Document - 
Pollution in Japan 13: Japan and Asian Environmental Destruction] (Tokyo: Ryokufu, 1996).
34  Kawana, Dokyumento Nihon no kōgai, 101.
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uptown Tokyoites had treated people downtown. The challenge was to 
oppose this structure of discrimination through the straightforward logic 
of ‘don’t force bad things on others, keep them in your own backyard’.35 
To  this end, the RAR organised a series of public protests under the 
banner  ‘NCC, Stop Exporting Pollution to South Korea!’ The central 
refrain of participants was that ‘there is no valid reason to inflict the pain 
we are enduring right now onto the South Korean people’.36 Moreover, as 
the following extract from an RAR demonstration reveals, local residents 
had begun to understand the pollution problem not only on a wider 
regional canvas but also in the context of a fractured history between 
Japan and its neighbours: 
There could be nothing more disrespectful to South Korea and its people 
than to impose this [factory] on them simply because it is not possible 
in Japan. Nippon Chemical must not be allowed to replicate the same 
‘imperialist mentality’ of the war when it forcibly brought Koreans to 
Japan and imposed abusive labor on them. We will fight until pollution 
export is stopped so that normal ties of friendship and goodwill lasting for 
100 years, 200 years, or forever can be constructed between South Korea 
and Japan.37
For Inoue Sumio, the shift from insular localism to regional awareness 
was all about activists abandoning the logic of ‘Old Maid’ for that of a 
‘dual-frontal attack’. Just as the aim of the Old Maid card game was to 
deflect the joker card on to other players, for too long local movements 
in Japan had focused on eradicating pollution from their own backyards 
without concern for its subsequent destination(s). But things were 
different now. Activists—even those in very localised movements—were 
trying to deal with the pollution ‘joker’ at home. Moreover, even when the 
pollution joker managed to escape to Thailand, South Korea, or elsewhere 
in East Asia, activists were now forming transnational ties across borders, 
effectively mounting ‘dual-frontal attacks’ on polluting industries.38
Of course, we need to keep in mind that these transnational movements 
were very small in scale and—as in the case of NCC which successfully 
began sodium chromate production at Ulsan in 1976—that they often 
35  Inoue, ‘Babanuki’, 91.
36  ‘Damatte irarenai: Jimoto higaisha ga dantai o kessei’ [We Cannot Remain Silent: Local Victims 
Band Together], Tōyō Keizai Nippō (6 May 1975). Reproduced in Geppō kōgai o nogasuna! Kankoku e 
no kōgai yushutsu o kokuhatsu suru 14 (July 1975): 31.
37  ‘Damatte irarenai’, 31.
38  Inoue, ‘Babanuki’, 92. 
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failed. But by connecting activists across borders, by opening their eyes to 
the regional implications of Japanese corporate activity, and by connecting 
industrial pollution of the present to transgressions of the past, these 
movements facilitated a rethinking of extant activist identity built around 
entrenched notions of victimhood.
Understanding Aggression 
While not all were successful, the rise of transnational movements against 
pollution export in the 1970s undoubtedly forced Japanese corporate and 
government elites to tread more carefully in their strategy for economic 
expansion in East Asia. As Hall explains, ‘MITI began criticising the 
practice [of pollution export] as early as January 1974, when it called for 
increased surveillance of FDI projects which might constitute pollution 
export’.39 Moreover, as we have seen, decisions to abandon industrial 
projects by Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and other corporations also reveal a 
greater corporate sensitivity to the problem. But the reverberations of the 
new transnational movements were also felt in the realm of Japanese civic 
activism. In this section I look at a few typical examples of how Japanese 
activists began to rearticulate their activism in light of their experiences 
in Asia. I see important ideational developments, especially with respect 
to the degree of reflexivity in activist identity and consciousness. Whereas 
to date the problems had always been positioned external to the self 
(i.e.  industrial pollution, state power) now some activists began to 
reconsider their complicity in these problems.
The more activists learned about pollution export, the more they began 
to suspect that one of the troubling paradoxes of their successful protest 
at home was how it had—unintentionally, to be sure—encouraged 
Japanese corporations to take their polluting processes abroad. This 
realisation came as a rude awakening because it hit at the heart of 
a victimisation consciousness running very deeply in the Japanese 
environmental movement and, indeed, in postwar Japanese civil society 
more broadly. Oda Makoto, the charismatic anti-Vietnam War protestor, 
of course, had articulated this tension between Japanese activists’ sense of 
victimisation by the state and their complicity as aggressors in the context 
39  Hall, ‘Pollution Export’, 274. 
93
4 . TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM AND JAPAN’S SECOND MODERNITY
of the Indochina conflict.40 As Oda explained, ordinary Japanese had, 
to an extent, been victimised by the wartime state and the US fire and 
atomic bombings at the end of the Pacific War and they were now victims 
of quasi-American colonisation in the form of military bases and facilities. 
But this victimisation also made them aggressors toward the Vietnamese 
people because the US assault on that country was using Japan as a staging 
ground. The same could be said of the pollution problem: ordinary 
Japanese people were certainly victims of industrial pollution, but when 
this pollution was directed abroad these same Japanese victims became 
unwitting accomplices in Japanese corporate transgressions overseas. After 
all, to an extent, the affluent daily life and cleaner-living environments of 
all Japanese were built on the suffering of people throughout Asia.
Such logic pervades the discourse of Japanese environmentalists in the 
early to mid-1970s, for example, as in the following ideas of a young 
ILP activist, Aoyama Tadashi, in 1976. From Aoyama’s perspective, the 
Japanese people’s battle against the ‘contradictions born of high-speed 
economic growth’ had produced impressive results. Thanks to these 
struggles, the public was now resolutely opposed to industrial pollution 
and the Japanese natural environment was much cleaner. Yet, despite such 
successes, the Japanese had been woefully unaware of people overseas 
‘suffering in the shadows of Japanese affluence’, nowhere more so than 
in Asia.41 ‘Haven’t we essentially ignored the voices and existence of 
our neighbours up until now?’ Aoyama asked.42 If the Japanese were to 
‘properly comprehend’ their future pathway they needed to ‘listen to the 
appeals’ of these neighbours and to act accordingly.43 In this connection, 
Aoyama felt emboldened by the flowering of the new anti-pollution export 
movements. ‘Ours is a small struggle which began as a battle against 
pollution export and in pursuit of genuine friendship between the people 
of [Asia] and Japan … But from this starting point it escalated into a 
new pollution issue causing uproar throughout Japan.’ More significantly, 
40  Oda Makoto, ‘Heiwa o tsukuru: Sono genri to kōdō – hitotsu no sengen’ [Making Peace: 
Principles and Action – A Declaration], in Oda Makoto, Oda Makoto zenshigoto [The Complete 
Works of Oda Makoto] 9 (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha, 1970), 113–31.
41  Aoyama Tadashi, ‘Nikkan jōyaku 10-nen to kōgai yushutsu hantai undō’ [Ten Years of the 
Japan-South Korea Treaty and the Movement to Oppose Pollution Export], Jishu Kōza [Independent 
Lectures] 58 (Jan 1976): 64. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., 
Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 3-kai haihon dai 2-kan [Materials on 
Pollution Problems Collected by Ui Jun, 1, Reprint: ‘Independent Lectures’, Third Distribution, 
Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 70.
42  Aoyama, ‘Nikkan jōyaku’, 68.
43  ibid.
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Aoyama observed how remarkably different the new mobilisations were 
from the earlier domestic anti-pollution movements. Whereas these 
earlier movements were begun by victims who gathered supporters and 
through joint struggle achieved legal, political and social recognition, 
the new movements were initiated and spearheaded by a cadre of anti-
pollution export advocates who were not themselves direct victims. This 
was an entirely new phenomenon in postwar Japanese environmental 
activism because the initial motivation for action stemmed not from a 
desire for individual or communal retribution and compensation but 
out of concern for others.44 Ui Jun’s ILP movement was a pioneer in this 
respect, opening the way for later transnational movements involving 
Japanese, Thais, South Koreans, Filipinos and others from East Asia. For 
Aoyama, the rise of such advocacy for fellow East Asians promised to be 
a truly revolutionary force in Japanese environmental activism because it 
overlaid a victim-focused agenda with an outward-looking, other-focused 
rubric (i.e. a reflexive outlook). The result, concluded Aoyama, could be 
a movement ‘beyond our wildest dreams’.45 
Aoyama’s exuberance is admirable if not a little overstated, but he was 
on target with respect to the powerfully transformative impact of the 
new transnational movements on Japanese environmental activism and 
the consciousness of activists. Pollution export demanded that Japanese 
activists deal with the aggressor within as a necessary element of any new 
transnational alliance. Indeed, this was the very crux of the matter, and its 
urgency pushed Japanese environmental thought beyond the somewhat 
insular earlier focus on Japanese victims. Only when Japanese activists 
exposed the aggressor within and, from this position of vulnerability, 
attempted to fashion ties of equality with their East Asian counterparts, 
did genuine border-crossing sentiment begin to take root. To be sure, 
this process unfolded at first only in a handful of Japanese environmental 
movements. But I believe its effects on activist identity and civic activism 
in Japanese were more widespread. After these movements it was no longer 
possible to consider Japanese environmental problems or activist identity 
within the narrow framework of the national state, national citizenship or 
national victimisation. The problems and the responses now transcended 
borders and, hence, demanded a new mentality that in a similar way 
transcended the confines of the nation alone. 
44  ibid., 67–8.
45  ibid., 68.
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Conclusion: Transnational Activism and 
Japan’s Reflexive Modernity?
For around two decades now, Ulrich Beck and his colleagues have been 
pointing to the global-historical significance of an emergent reflexive 
modernity worldwide. They argue that ‘when modernisation reaches 
a certain stage it radicalises itself ’ and ‘begins to transform, for a 
second time, not only the key institutions but also the very principles 
of society’.46 First modernity (or simply, modernity) Beck and his 
colleagues describe as  a ‘container’ form of industrial society that was 
based upon the ‘territorial framework’ of the national state, consisting 
of many ‘interlocking social institutions’ such as ‘a reliable welfare state, 
mass parties anchored in class culture, and a stable nuclear family’ all 
supportive of and supported by ‘a web of economic security woven out of 
industrial regulation, full employment and life-long careers’.47 This was an 
order based on distinctions and boundaries: ‘between society and nature, 
between established knowledge and mere belief, and between the members 
of society and the outsiders’.48 Modernity, they explain, was constructed 
around a number of core (yet ultimately fragile) assumptions about 
the individual and the physical world. Subjectivity was assumed to be 
‘calculable’ because of a ‘fundamental assumption’ that ‘subject boundaries’ 
were independently assigned and indisputable—a  ‘breadwinner’ was 
a breadwinner, a housewife was a housewife, and a citizen was a national-
state citizen.49 
But, according to Beck and colleagues, it is precisely at this zenith that the 
radicalisation of modernity begins due to a ‘critical mass of unintended 
side effects’, which bring into question its ‘touchstone ideas’.50 The ‘global 
victory of the principles of modernity (such as the market economy)’ 
has resulted in global environmental degradation, financial crises, and a 
whole range of new uncertainties that, quite ironically, are rendering the 
institutions of modernity ‘ineffective or dysfunctional for both society and 
46  Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss, and Christoph Lau, ‘The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: 
Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme’, Theory, Culture, and Society 20, no. 1 (2003): 1.
47  Beck et al., ‘The Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, 2, 5.
48  ibid., 2.
49  ibid., 23–4, 27.
50  ibid., 8.
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individuals’.51 It is at this historical juncture, argues Beck, that a critical 
reflexivity begins to germinate in which society ‘becomes a theme and a 
problem for itself ’.52 The moment is marked by the rise of a ‘self-conscious 
politics that is self-critical and has its own reshaping perpetually in mind’.53 
Under these conditions of second or reflexive modernity, individuals and 
societies increasingly ‘reflect upon and chart their own course into the 
future rather than adapt to the fate or the flow of events’.54 Needless to 
say, contemporary environmentalism from its very origins worldwide in 
the 1960s was very much a reflexive modern phenomenon because, unlike 
earlier nature conservation movements in which society (‘here’) was seen 
to be destroying nature (‘over there’), environmentalism was primarily 
a movement addressing self-destruction: society was mutilating itself.
So how then does the development of Japanese activists’ involvement in 
East Asian environmental issues substantiate or otherwise resonate with 
these ideas about the onset of reflexive modernity worldwide? On this 
question I tend to agree with the political theorist and environmental 
thinker John Dryzek, who acknowledges that while ‘reflexive political 
action is on the rise, the degree to which this heralds the arrival of a 
reflexive modernity is more contestable’.55 The case of Japanese 
environmental engagement in Asia seems to suggest that, although we by 
no means have the complete transformation to reflexive modernity, we 
undoubtedly see the emergence of reflexive modern identities, especially 
in activist communities. Beck’s theory of reflexive modernity was 
conceptualised in the framework of Western history where modernisation 
was, relatively speaking, ‘stretched’ out compared to other regions such 
as Northeast Asia.56 As Han and Shim point out, countries such as South 
Korea and China have experienced a kind of ‘compressed modernisation’ 
in which ‘the development of first modernity and the transition to second 
modernity happen[ed] almost at once’.57 Japanese modernisation falls 
51  Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, ‘Varieties of Second Modernity: The Cosmopolitan Turn in 
Social and Political Theory and Research’, The British Journal of Sociology 61, no. 3 (2010): 415.
52  Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics’, 8.
53  Jeffrey Berejikian and John S. Dryzek, ‘Reflexive Action in International Politics’, British Journal 
of Political Science 30 (2000): 212–13.
54  John S. Dryzek, ‘Transnational Democracy’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1999): 37.
55  Dryzek, ‘Transnational Democracy’, 38.
56  Munenori Suzuki, Midori Ito, Mitsunori Ishida, Norihiro Nihei, and Masao Maruyama, 
‘Individualizing Japan: Searching for its Origin in First Modernity’, The British Journal of Sociology 
61, no. 3 (2010): 517.
57  Sang-Jin Han and Young-Hee Shim, ‘Redefining Second Modernity for East Asia: A Critical 
Assessment’, The British Journal of Sociology 61, no. 3 (2010): 467–8.
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somewhere between the Western and South Korean/Chinese versions, 
being both less ‘stretched’ and less ‘compressed’.58 But Japan’s First 
Modernity has arguably had more in common with its Northeast Asian 
neighbours because of the prominence of the national state in directing 
and managing growth—the so-called ‘developmental state’. Because of 
the predominance of what they call the ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian state’, 
reflexive modernity in East Asian states according to Han and Shim 
has its own unique dynamics. First, it has been about recognising the 
‘deficiencies’ and ‘pathological consequences’ for humans and for the 
society–nature nexus caused by state-led development and, second, it has 
been about engaging in a ‘critical project’ involving ‘conscious efforts to 
go beyond the highly bureaucratic, state-centred authoritarian pattern of 
development’.59
The development of transnational environmental activism in Japan 
indicates the emergence of critical mentalities associated with reflexive 
modernity from around the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. Most 
indicative is the way activists involved in transnational initiatives began 
to reconceptualise (i.e. reposition) both environmental problems and 
their individual and movement identities beyond the boundaries of the 
nation, national-state citizenship, and victimhood. Japanese activists and 
their allies abroad were clearly struggling against the environmental and 
human side-effects of a modernity shaped by Japan’s global economic 
ascent. To be sure, Japanese intellectuals and radicals had problematised 
‘modernity’ some years earlier, but this was a modernity equated with 
the ‘West’ and, hence, understood—or, at least, portrayed—as something 
inherently foreign. But the modernity Japanese environmental activists 
addressed from the 1960s was absolutely internalised and universally 
shared (although not in the same formation everywhere). The activists 
involved in transnational environmental initiatives challenged this 
modernity in terms of their subjectivity and identity. They recognised the 
ethically problematic limitations of victim consciousness and, in turn, 
aspired to post-national, cosmopolitan ideals that coupled notions of 
entitlement with ideas of self-responsibility. They began to display the 
kind of ‘bricolage biographies’ and ‘nonlinear individualism’ characteristic 
of reflexive modernity in which the sources of subject formation have 
greatly multiplied and subjects are not only produced by but also become 
58  Suzuki et al., ‘Individualizing Japan’, 517.
59  Han and Shim, ‘Redefining Second Modernity for East Asia’, 481.
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producers of their boundaries—they may simultaneously be ‘victims’, 
‘perpetrators’, ‘Japanese citizens’, ‘Asians’, ‘Pacific inhabitants’ and ‘global 
citizens’.60 In this sense, Japanese transnational involvements in East Asia 
of the 1970s and beyond mark an important geographical and intellectual 
transition in the postwar struggle against the dual pillars of modernity 
in the country—namely, state-supported developmentalism, on the one 
hand, and national-state citizenship on the other. 
60  Beck et al., ‘The Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, 27.
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Animism: A Grassroots 




Socioenvironmental crises, such as global warming and nuclear disaster, 
indicate that modern industrial civilisation contains in itself a seed of 
self-destruction. While awareness of these problems is widespread, the 
problems themselves are so deeply imbedded in our civilisation that trying 
to find solutions within existing paradigms is almost a contradiction 
in terms. The knowledge base of the social scientific community, too, 
is formed around paradigms that seem incapable of addressing the 
fundamental crisis faced by contemporary civilisation. In this context, 
the discussion that follows examines two socioenvironmental catastrophes 
in contemporary Japan—Minamata disease and the triple disaster of 
11 March 2011 (or 3.11)—from the perspectives of the local residents. 
I argue that animism has (re)emerged as a grassroots response to the two 
historical disasters in postmodernising Japan.1
1  This chapter, by permission, draws on and develops my article that appeared in ‘Life-world: 
Beyond Fukushima and Minamata’, in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 10, issue 42, no. 2 
(2012) apjjf.org/2012/10/42/Shoko-YONEYAMA/3845/article.html and in Asian Perspective 37, 
no. 4 (2013). The inspiration to connect modernity, animism and Minamata came from the work 
of sociologist Tsurumi Kazuko (1918–2006). In particular, Tsurumi Kazuko Mandara VI: Tamashii 
no maki – Minamata, animizumu, ekorojii [Tsurumi Kazuko Mandala Volume VI: About the Soul – 
Minamata, Animism and Ecology] (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 1998).
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Animism is defined here as an approach to life that presupposes the 
presence of a soul or spirit in animate and inanimate things in nature, 
covering all life (living, dead and yet to emerge), as well as other things 
such as water, air, soil, rocks, rivers and mountains. It is defined as a 
philosophy that allows the possibility of the presence of such things as soul 
or spirit, regardless of one’s belief as to whether such an unseen world 
exists or not. My main concern here is to explore the relationship between 
modernity and the epistemology of animism, and its implications in 
considering the relationship between humans and nature in the world 
risk society—a world where life has become organised around risk, and 
where risk itself is generated for political gain.
The chapter consists of four parts. First, Minamata and Fukushima (as the 
‘epicentre’ of the triple disaster of 2011) are positioned in the historical 
context of postwar Japan. I argue that both disasters represent cases where 
the ‘connectedness that supports life’ was severed not only in the biological 
sphere, but also in the social sphere and that, as a corollary, the pursuit of 
‘connectedness’ emerged as the legacy of both disasters. Second, I present 
a discussion of the philosophy of ‘life-world’ (inochi no sekai いのちの世
界) developed by Minamata fisherman Ogata Masato, whose critique of 
modernity is that its epistemology fails to address the question of the soul 
(tamashii 魂).
The third section covers what I refer to as ‘the Ishimure Michiko 
phenomenon’: a dramatic increase in recognition of and interest in the work 
of Minamata writer Ishimure Michiko since the mid-1990s. Positioning 
Ogata and Ishimure as ‘twin advocates’ from Minamata, I  argue that 
the phenomenon reflects a significant social change in Japanese society, 
i.e. the steady rise in post-materialistic values and increasing reflection 
on the limits of modernity. I argue that the Minamata discourse of 
animism, presented by Ishimure, addresses the needs of Japanese society 
as it matures into a postmodern society, especially after 3.11 when people 
became particularly interested in the relationship between humans and 
nature, or more precisely, in the question of life, nature and soul.
After exploring the animistic discourse from Minamata and the increased 
interest that it evokes, I introduce three examples where animistic 
tradition became a powerful resource for reconstructing communities 
in the disaster-stricken areas of Japan after the 3.11 triple disaster. They 
are: the case of folk festivals, the meaning of shrines as tsunami marker, 
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and the significance of sacred forests (chinju-no-mori 鎮守の森). I argue 
that animistic epistemology, an intangible cultural heritage of Japan, was 
a common thread in grassroots responses to the triple disaster.
The conclusion of the chapter is this: in order to face the self-destructive 
tendencies of modernity, the philosophy of animism, reframed as 
an informal, grassroots life philosophy in post-industrial and post-3.11 
Japan, opens up a new theoretical space to discuss relationships between 
humans, nature, and the unseen world. The grassroots responses to 
world risk society in Japan illuminate a lacuna in current Western-made 
social science: its inadequacy in fully addressing the questions of nature, 
spirituality, and life.
Minamata, Fukushima and Connectedness: 
A Lacuna in Modernity
German sociologist Ulrich Beck stated that Japan plunged into the ‘world 
risk society’ as a result of the nuclear accident in Fukushima.2 Beck’s 
phrase ‘world risk society’ refers particularly to things such as nuclear 
accidents and global warming, unfortunate and unwanted byproducts of 
modernity, which threaten the very existence of our civilisation. In order 
to minimise the risk, Beck postulates that it is essential to transform the 
system itself—but the question is what to change and how to change it.
World risk society occurs in what sociologists call late,3 second,4 or 
liquid5 modernity, the main characteristic of which is individualisation, 
where the connection between the individual and social institutions 
weakens. The moral and ethical foundations of society are also eroded. 
This raises the question of what moral and ethical foundation could be 
used to protect modern societies from the self-destructive tendencies of 
modernity. One reference we can draw on for considering this question 
is a report produced by the Ethics Committee for a Safe Energy Supply 
2  Ulrich Beck, ‘Kono kikai ni—Fukushima aruiwa sekai risuku ni okeru Nihon no mirai’ 
[On  This Occasion—Fukushima or the Future of Japan in World Risk Society], in Ulrich Beck, 
Suzuki Munenori, and Ito Midori eds, Risuku ka suru Nihon shakai [Japanese Society That Becomes 
a Risk] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2011).
3  Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991).
4  Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).
5  Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2000).
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in Germany, of which Beck was a member, in response to the Fukushima 
nuclear accident. Based on the report, Germany decided to decommission 
all its nuclear plants within 10 years. The report reads: ‘A special human 
duty towards nature has resulted from Christian tradition and European 
culture’.6 This begs an immediate question of what might be an Asian 
principle of environmental ethics.
When I think about the nuclear disaster in Fukushima from this 
perspective what puzzles me most is this: the ‘Minamata problem’ was 
studied by some of the best and the most critical social scientists in Japan, 
to the extent that they established what is now called ‘Minamata Studies’ 
(Minamata-gaku 水俣学). My question is why, then, after all this study, 
were we unable to prevent Fukushima? The question is not just about 
power and political economy, but also about epistemology. Have we not 
missed something important that is the key to understanding Minamata 
and Fukushima?
Minamata disease, one of the worst cases of industrial pollution in human 
history, was caused by organic mercury contained in effluent from the 
Chisso chemical factory in Minamata. It was officially recognised in 1956, 
which also marked the beginning of Japan’s high economic growth period. 
After the official recognition, however, neither Chisso nor local or national 
governments took adequate measures to reduce the discharge for 12 years. 
In those 12 years, the production of acetaldehyde, for which organic 
mercury was used as a catalyst, increased threefold, exacerbating the 
poisoning.7 The Japanese Government finally recognised organic mercury 
as the cause of the problem in 1968, the year when Japan became the 
second-largest economy in the world. Subsequently, the organic chemical 
industry lost its edge, superseded by the petrochemical industry.8 
The human cost of the Minamata problem is immeasurable. While 
the extremely stringent criteria required for government recognition as 
a Minamata disease patient has limited official numbers to about 3,000 
(mostly deceased), an additional 11,000 sufferers received a payout in 
1995, and another 65,000 or more people applied for ‘relief measures’ 
6  Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply, Germany’s Energy Transition – a Collective Project 
for the Future (Berlin: Offices of the Ethics Commission on a Safe Energy Supply in the Federal 
Chancellery, Germany, 2011).
7  Harada Masazumi, ‘Minamata Disease as a Social and Medical Problem’, Japan Quarterly 25, no. 
1 (1978).




in 2012 when the Japanese Government launched what they called the 
‘final’ compensation scheme.9 Epidemiological studies by independent 
medical researchers conducted in the 2000s estimated that some two 
million people in the Minamata region are still affected by low-level 
methyl mercury exposure.10 In addition to the human cost, the devastating 
impact upon other lives, such as fish, cats, pigs, birds, and the ecosystem 
has been immeasurable.11 
The nuclear accident in Fukushima, on the other hand, occurred only 
days after China officially displaced Japan as the world’s second-largest 
economy.12 The human cost of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima is also 
immeasurable. As of 2015, four years after the accident, there are almost 
120,000 ‘nuclear refugees’,13 who are at high risk of ‘nuclear-accident-
related death’ (genpatsu jiko kanrenshi 原発事故関連死). Within three 
years of the disaster, over 1,700 (mostly elderly) deaths were related 
to the accident. Seven hundred of these deaths occurred more than a 
year after the accident while in the same time period, in the two other 
prefectures devastated by the tsunami, the number of disaster-related 
deaths was less than 20.14 In addition, by February 2016, 116 cases of 
thyroid cancer among youth had been confirmed.15 Using the incidence 
rate of thyroid cancer in the general population, around four cases would 
have been expected.16 The cost to other life forms was also immeasurable. 
Almost 3,000 cows, 30,000 pigs and 600,000 chickens and unaccounted 
numbers of pets were left behind to starve to death in the nuclear exclusion 
zone.17 Within five months of the accident, over 3,400 farm animals were 
9  ‘More Than 65,000 Apply for Relief for Minamata Disease’, Asahi Shimbun (English Digital), 
1 September 2012.
10  Shigeru Takaoka, ‘Minamata kara Fukushima e no kyōkun’ [Lessons from Minamata 
to Fukushima], Shinryō Kenkyū [Clinical Research] 470 (August 2011).
11  Ogata Masato, Chisso wa watashi de atta [Chisso Was I] (Fukuoka: Ashi Shobō, 2001).
12  Robert Guy, ‘It’s Official, China Is No.2’, The Australian Financial Review, 15 February 2011.
13  Ganjoho [Cancer Information Service Japan], Fukushima kara kengai e no hinan jōkyō [The 
Current State of Evacuation from Fukushima to Other Prefectures] (2015), www.pref.fukushima.
lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/117392.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2016.
14  ‘Shimbun Kyōkai Shō honshi “Genpatsujiko kanrenshi’ kyanpēn”’ [Newspaper Association 
Award to Fukushima Minpō for ‘Nuclear Accident-related Death’ Campaign], Fukushima Minpō, 14 
September 2014.
15  ‘Gan kakutei hitori mashi 16-nin, 2-junme kodomo kōjōsengan chōsa’ [Confirmed Cases of 
Cancer Increased by One to be 16 in the Second Survey of Thyroid among Youth], Fukushima Minpō, 
16 February 2016.
16  Ganjoho [Cancer Information Service Japan], ‘Graph Database Tyroid Incidence Age-Specific 
Rate for 2010’, ganjoho.jp. Accessed 14 June 2015.
17  ‘Ushi 3-zen to, buta 3-man biki, genpatsu 20-kiro ken ni – gashi ka’ [3,000 Cows and 30,000 
Pigs in the 20 Kilometre Zone – Death by Starvation Suspected], Yomiuri Online, 19 April 2011.
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‘euthanised’.18 Genetic and ecological impacts on other species, such as 
birds, butterflies, cicadas have also been reported.19 Although the nuclear 
disaster was triggered by the earthquake and tsunami, the official report 
of the National Diet of Japan judged that the accident at Tokyo Electric 
Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant was ‘manmade’ in 
that it resulted from ‘the collusion between the government, the regulators 
and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties. They effectively 
betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents’.20 (See also 
Chapter Six.)
Minamata and Fukushima thus symbolise the beginning and the end 
of the period of Japan’s economic development and its trajectory of 
modernisation. Both signify catastrophic environmental and social 
disasters, the impact of which is still current. Between 1956 and 
2011, social science research in Japan has contributed enormously to 
understanding the structural problems associated with modernity as 
symbolised by Minamata. As a result, even though they are 55 years 
apart, we can see that there are fundamental commonalities between 
Minamata and Fukushima. From the perspective of political economy, 
the commonalities include the fact that both problems were based on 
relentless pursuit of profit; collusive relationships between industry, 
governments, bureaucracy, and the media; marginalisation of critical 
scientists; manipulation of scientific data; discrimination against rural 
people; and destruction of the food production base. In other words, 
Fukushima confronted us with the reality that the structures that caused 
and exacerbated the Minamata problem have continued almost intact, 
despite the knowledge gained in social sciences, allowing more ‘manmade’ 
devastation to happen, this time making Japan a world risk society. Here 
we come back to the question again: have we not missed something 
important, the key to understanding Minamata and Fukushima? What 
kind of knowledge can contribute to bringing about a fundamental 
change in society to prevent similar disasters from happening again?
18  ‘Anrakushi shobun no kachiku 3,422’ [3,422 Farm Animals Euthanised], Fukushima Minpō, 31 
August, 2011.
19  Atsuki Hiyama, Chiyo Nohara, Seira Kinjo, Wataru Taira, Shinichi Gima, Akira Tanahara and 
Joji M. Otaki, ‘The Biological Impacts of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident on the Pale Grass Blue 
Butterfly’, Scientific Reports 2 (2012). Timothy A. Mousseau and Anders P. Møller, ‘Genetic and 
Ecological Studies of Animals in Chernobyl and Fukushima’, Journal of Heredity 105, no. 5 (2014).
20  The National Diet of Japan, The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 




Seen from a different angle, the commonalities between Minamata and 
Fukushima can be summarised as a breakdown of connectedness at a 
multitude of levels: family (e.g. the impact of death or health impairment 
of a family member, loss of housing, land, and other possessions); work 
(e.g. loss of a job and livelihood); food production (farming and fishing); 
traditional and local ways of life; and the sense of connectedness with 
nature, past and future, ancestors and descendants. Both disasters caused 
deep schisms and paralysis in the affected communities depending on 
the residents’ position vis-à-vis the company responsible for the disaster 
and how each person wanted to respond to the crisis—in the case of 
Fukushima, typically a mother wanting to move to a safer place with the 
children while her husband and in-laws stayed put, leading to ‘nuclear 
divorce’ (genpatsu rikon).
The breakdown of connectedness occurred not only in sociological 
spheres, but also in biological dimensions. In the case of Minamata 
disease, connectedness in the nervous system of the brain was severed. 
Mercury disrupts the growth of neurons in the brain, and this severing 
of connectedness of the nervous system was visually captured in a video 
by researchers from the University of Calgary.21 The effect is the same for 
organic mercury that causes Minamata disease.22 Radiation, on the other 
hand, destroys DNA and severs connectedness among cells. A photo of 
DNA taken from Ōuchi Hisashi, who died after being exposed to an 
excessive amount of radiation in a localised nuclear accident in Tokaimura 
in 1999, shows that his DNA was completely torn into pieces by radiation. 
As a result, his body lost the connectedness that is necessary to maintain 
life, i.e. lost the memory required to regenerate cells, eventually turning 
his body cells into a pulp.23 If one of the characteristics of modernity 
is the weakening of connectedness, Minamata and Fukushima epitomise 
it to its extreme. They show how industrial nationalism, the most 
efficient capitalist system in modernity, ended up destroying the very core 
of life itself.
21  F. L. Lorscheider et al., ‘How Mercury Causes Brain Neuron Degeneration’, 2013, www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Z1RHWfJSo6w. Accessed 16 June 2015.
22  M. Aschner et al., ‘Metallothionein Induction in Fetal Rat Brain and Neonatal Primary 
Astrocyte Cultures by in Utero Exposure to Elemental Mercury Vapor (Hg0)1’, Brain Research 778, 
no. 1 (1997).
23  NHK TV Crew, A Slow Death: 83 Days of Radation Sickness (New York: Vertical, 2008).
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Is it any wonder then that words that mean connectedness emerged as 
a legacy of both Minamata and Fukushima? In the case of Minamata, 
the key word is moyai 舫い, which means tying boats together. For the 
Fukushima/triple disaster it is kizuna 絆, meaning bonds. It is clear that 
people in Japan felt the need for more connectedness with society after 
Fukushima. This has been captured by official statistics as well. A public 
opinion survey conducted in 2012 by the Cabinet Office shows that 80 
per cent of over 6,000 respondents indicated that, after the 2011 disaster, 
they came to realise the importance of connectedness with society to a 
greater extent than they did earlier.24
Feeling a sense of connectedness with everything around us, that is 
spirituality in the broadest sense.25 In this sense, the legacy of Minamata 
and Fukushima, namely moyai (tying ships together) and kizuna (bonds), 
can be considered as a discourse of spirituality. In other words, the civil 
discourse of Minamata and Fukushima can be considered to be a discourse 
of spirituality.
‘Life-world’: A Critique of Modernity 
from Minamata
Minamata fisherman Ogata Masato (緒方正人) is the person who 
coined the term moyai (tying ships together) as the legacy of Minamata.26 
His critique of modernity is extensive,27 but his most profound insight 
is that:
The Minamata disease incident has left a question that cannot be dealt 
with as a political issue. It is the biggest and most fundamental question, 
a question that cannot be transformed into a question of politics or 
institutions. That is the question of the soul (tamashii 魂).28
24  Cabinet Office of Japan, Shakai ishiki ni kansuru yoron chōsa [Survey on the Perceptions of 
Society] (Tokyo: Naifukaku, 2012).
25  Marian De Souza et al., ‘General Introduction’, in M. de Souza et al. eds, International Handbook 
of Education for Spirituality, Care and Wellbeing (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009).
26  Ogata Masato, interview by author, digital recording, Minamata, 16 January 2012.
27  For details see Shoko Yoneyama, ‘Life-World: Beyond Fukushima and Minamata’, The Asia-
Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 10, issue 42, no. 2 (2012).
28  Ogata, Chisso, 67.
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Ogata says that we need a more substantive expression of what soul is. 
He writes: 
I have been thinking lately how we can convey what soul is, and what we 
can say about the soul … Previously I stated that it is another name for life, 
but in a way, I think it can also be called ‘the stamp of humanity’ (ningen 
no akashi 人間の証). Especially after the war, various things have been 
modernised and mechanised so they can be integrated into the system-
society. This has devoured the soul, which is the basis for the connectedness 
among people, between humans and other living things, and between humans 
and the sea, rivers and mountains … I think that the promise of being 
human is to sense life (inochi o kankaku suru 命を感覚する) and to 
manage life (inochi o tsukasadoru 命を司る). Human beings are that sort 
of life-existence (seimei sonzai 生命存在) and, essentially, we are never 
a mechanical or institutional existence (emphasis added).29
How can soul be ‘another name for life’ and at the same time ‘the stamp of 
humanity’? Underlying this is Ogata’s notion of ‘system-society’ (sisutemu 
shakai システム社会) and ‘the life-world’ (inochi no sekai いのちの世界 
or seimei sekai 生命世界), the two sides of our modern living. By ‘system-
society’ Ogata means a composite of institutional (legal, economic, 
political and to some extent social) aspects of modern society,30 which 
have a tendency to mechanise and institutionalise humans. ‘The life-
world’ on the other hand represents the world from which we as human 
beings have emerged as ‘life-existence’, the world to which we return after 
death, the world that enables us to connect to other people, other forms 
of life and inanimate things in nature in a non-institutional way (i.e. 
simply as life) and the world that enables us to see the problems of system-
society.31 By saying that soul is another name for life, Ogata poses soul as 
the essence of life, the essence of our existence, or the stamp of humanity 
that enables us to feel and manage life in such a way as to prevent us from 
being completely mechanised and institutionalised in the system-society, 
and perhaps, if we use the terminology of Beck, prevent us from being 
destroyed in the world risk society. Ogata’s notion of the life-world thus 
refers to the entirety of life–soul–nature nexus that defies modernity. 
29  ibid., 192–3.
30  ibid.
31  Yoneyama, ‘Life-World’.
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What connects us to the life-world, in Ogata’s philosophy, is the ‘memory 
of life’ (inochi no kioku 命の記憶). He writes:
In the age of ‘modernity’, we have standardised, institutionalised and 
mechanised many things in the name of modernisation. In the process, 
we reclaimed the sea of Minamata that was full of life saying that it 
was polluted by mercury. But perhaps it was not just the sea we buried. 
We have created a system of concealment to continue institutional and 
mechanical burying. That can be summarised as the creation of a ‘false 
memory system’ (偽りの記憶装置). By doing so, we have perhaps moved 
away from the essence of life, and the memory of the essence of life. I 
cannot help but feel that various social problems we face today happened 
because we have lost the ‘memory of life’ (命の記憶).32
For Ogata, ‘memory of life’ first means his own memory of the life he had 
as a child in a Minamata unpolluted by organic mercury, a memory also 
shared by other locals:  
Once Minamata Bay was the treasure chest of our sea. Here schools of 
fish came to spawn. The young fry matured here and then returned to 
repeat the cycle. The bay was like a womb. In what is now landfill between 
Hyakken Port and Myojin Point, the silver scales of sardine and gizzard 
shad shimmered in the sunlight. Mullet leapt. Shrimp and crab frolicked 
in the shallow. At low tide we collected shellfish. At the edge of the waves 
we gathered seaweed – wakame and hijiki. These were the things that 
nourished us.33 
This memory of life, where everyday living was almost entirely supported 
by the blessings of nature, was at one with the notion of gotagai, a word 
from the local Minamata dialect that means ‘we’re all in this together’. 
It is a name given to the sense of connectedness of all life within nature. 
Ogata writes:
[Gotagai] doesn’t mean simply that we humans rely upon each other 
for our existence but that plants and animals are also partners in this 
life. Gotagai includes the sea, the mountains, everything. Human beings 
are part of the circle of gotagai; we owe our existence to the vast web 
of interrelationships that constitute life.34 
32  Ogata, Chisso, 63.
33  Oiwa Keibo and Ogata Masato, Rowing the Eternal Sea: The Story of a Minamata Fisherman, 
trans. Karen Colligan-Taylor (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 122.
34  ibid., 164.
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This ‘web of interrelationships that constitute life’ goes beyond his 
personal life. It also refers to the vast continuum of life, millions of years 
in the past as well as in the future. It is best portrayed by ‘The Image 
of Biohistory’, an artwork developed by the Osaka-based Biohistory 
Research Hall, which illustrates the history and diversity of life that came 
into being from a common genome over the course of 3.8 billion years.35 
Biologist Nakamura Keiko, who was invited to the 50th Anniversary 
of the Official Recognition of Minamata Disease, stated that all living 
things share the same origin (genome); that human beings are only one of 
the diverse species that share the same history of development; and that 
human beings are in nature (i.e. not outside it). In her speech she stressed 
the importance of regaining our sense of being as living things (ikimono to 
shite no kankaku o torimodosu 生き物としての感覚をとりもどす).36 
‘Regaining our sense of being as living things’ was also the main point 
of Ogata’s keynote speech at the conference. The aim of the conference 
was to present recommendations from Minamata to the world about how 
to achieve a sustainable future, transcending victimhood. The conference 
proceedings are titled ‘Minamata for New Genesis: Recommendations 
for the Future’ (Sōseiki o Mukaeta Minamata: Mirai e no Teigen 創世記を
迎えた水俣: 未来への提言).37 Ogata concluded his keynote speech by 
saying that:
Although we live in the system-society where economy is based on 
insatiable wants and desires (yokubō keizai 欲望経済), I think that there 
will be a way to transcend it with a new meaning. A hint can be found 
in our sense of life as a living being (ikimono to shiteno inochi no kankaku 
生き物としての命の感覚). For that, I think it is time for each of us to 
return to the starting point as one life-existence (seimei sonzai 生命存
在), from where we re-live a life … The new ‘genesis’ (sōseiki 創世紀) 
included in the title of this conference, Minamata for New Genesis, is also 
sōseiki 創生紀, an era to create life.38  
35  Nakamura Keiko, Dan Marina, and Hashimoto Ritsuko, ‘The Image of Biohistory’, 
JT Biohistory Research Hall, www.brh.co.jp/imgs/about/emaki/emaki.jpg. Accessed 20 June 2015.
36  Nakamura Keiko, ‘Seimei kagaku: Ikimono kankaku de kangaeru’ [Bioscience: To Think about 
it with Senses of a Living Creature], in Saitō Yasuhiro et al. eds, Sōseiki o mukaeta Minamata: Mirai e 
no teigen [Minamata for New Genesis: Recommendations for the Future] (Minamata: Minamatabyō 
Kōshiki Kakunin 50-nen Jigyō Iinkai, 2007).
37  Ogata Masato, ‘Keynote Speech: Sōseiki o mukaeta Minamata: Mirai e no teigen’ [Minamata 
for New Genesis: Recommendations for the Future], in Minamatabyō Kōshiki Kakunin 50-nen Jigyō 
Jikkō Iinkai ed., Sōseiki o mukaeta Minamata.
38  ibid., 31.
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More practically, though, Ogata asks ‘how [can we] break ourselves from 
our own spell and liberate ourselves’39 from the spell of ‘system-society’ 
driven by the pursuit of affluence? He does not suggest that we should 
give up living in system-society in order to pursue living in the life-world. 
Rather, he sees the relationship between the two as ‘right foot and left 
foot’: both indispensable for walking. The question is how to live within 
this potentially contradictory dual structure.
We need to think how to live with the dual structure. In the global-
capitalist-market economy, we are controlled by a view of the world 
dominated by the economy and we cannot escape from it. It is a world 
regulated by clock-time, and we feel as if everything is controlled by the 
overwhelming power of the economy and politics. But precisely because 
of this, I think it is necessary to have our own time in ‘cosmic-time’, in 
order to relax and refresh, and find and regain a sense of our true selves. 
I think that each person is like a small universe and that it is possible for 
each of us to find our own way, existentially, to connect to the cosmic-
time where life is eternal. It seems to me that living this duality provides 
a very important hint for us to remain and regulate ourselves as humans. 
To put it differently, we work in the system-society to earn our living, and 
we live in the life-world to live our life. It’s like doing two-sword fencing, 
or having two different, top and bottom, streams of wind, or a double 
helix structure in one’s life.40
For Ogata, to recognise this duality means understanding that he himself 
was part of the ‘Chisso-ish’ society and to recognise that he was ‘another 
Chisso’ in a sense that he is part of history where it is not possible to live 
without relying on materials and systems supported by companies like 
Chisso. Ogata emphasises, however, the importance of knowing where 
each of us ‘stands’, i.e. ‘where you put your centre of gravity’ (jūshin 重
心) and ‘where you point your soul’.41
Sadly, I myself cannot escape from the money economy or the economic 
system. I use my mobile phone, and my boat is equipped with GPS, for 
instance. Although I cannot escape from the system, I am still resisting 
stubbornly. What is it that I am defying? There is only one point ultimately. 
It is where you put your ‘trust’ (shin o doko ni oku ka 信をどこに置くか, 
with shin as in shinrai 信頼). In the end, it is the question of where you place 
your trust, the system-society or the life-world.42
39  Ogata Masato, telephone interview by author, digital recording, Sydney to Minamata, 
25 August 2012.





For Ogata, the life-world presents an absolute, ethical frame of reference in 
which he, as human being, has a responsibility to nature even though he 
is living in the system-society. What empowers humans to do this task, 
according to Ogata, is our soul, our memory of life, the life that makes us 
human, the stamp of humanity, i.e. the life-world as the life–soul–nature 
nexus that defies modernity. Ogata presents a philosophy, a foundation for 
environmental ethics that addresses human responsibility vis-à-vis nature/
life at this historical crossroad when the globalising world faces the life-
threatening reality of ‘self-reflexive’ modernity.
In the terminology of Morris-Suzuki, Ogata’s philosophy of life-world 
is a voice of ‘informal life politics’ or ‘survival politics’ that arises from 
grassroots Japan. In the terminology of Lyotard, it is a little narrative that 
can produce a new kind of knowledge that opens up our imagination 
to the unknown, something that has been outside the epistemological 
boundaries of existing knowledge.43 
The new space Ogata opens up is the space to address life (inochi 命), 
soul (tamashii 魂) and nature as a single mutually entwined relational 
entity. The concept of moyai (tying ships together), a legacy of Minamata, 
is part of this philosophy. His notion of the life-world is a strong critique 
of modernity in that it questions a key empirical reality of modernity. 
He argues that modernity ‘devours the soul’ from everyday life and ‘de-
spiritualises’ cultures.44 He also challenges modernist epistemology: the 
secularist premise of social science that puts matters related to spirituality 
(or the unseen world) outside its boundary. Although Ogata himself does 
not use the word animism, his philosophy of life-world is a contemporary 
version of animism ‘armed’ with deep insights into modernity. And it is 
precisely the issues of animism that have been treated in sociology ‘with 
the utmost reserve, if not disdain’,45 as if it was ‘magic’. The elimination 
of ‘magic’, according to Max Weber, is ‘one of the most important aspects 
of the broader process of rationalisation’,46 that is to say, it is the key 
to modernity.
43  J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 60–7.
44  Kieran Flanagan, ‘Introduction’, in K. Flanagan and P. Jupp eds, A Sociology of Spirituality 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2007), 1.
45  ibid.
46  Talcott Parsons, ‘Translator’s Note (Chapter IV, Endnote 19)’, in The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism by Max Weber (London: Unwin University Books, 1930–1974), 222.
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Lyotard defines postmodern as ‘incredulity towards the metanarrative’47 
of modernity, and the principle of postmodern knowledge to be ‘not the 
expert’s homology, but the inventor’s paralogy’.48 In that sense, the life-
world is postmodern knowledge or, more precisely, a postmodern version of 
animism that emerged as a grassroots response to the socioenvironmental 
disaster that hit a periphery of Japan at the height of its industrialisation. 
While Ogata illuminates and articulates the relationship between the 
system-society and the life-world in lucid and powerful language, the 
sociological significance of his work is better understood in conjunction 
with the works of the writer Ishimure Michiko, in the context of what 
I call the ‘Ishimure Michiko phenomenon’.
The Ishimure Michiko Phenomenon: 
An Animistic World to Pine for
Ishimure Michiko (石牟礼道子) is a Minamata writer, often referred to 
as an environmental novelist, or the Rachel Carson of Japan, and is one of 
the key members of the Minamata movement. Her signature piece, Kugai 
Jōdo: Waga Minamata Byō [Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: My Minamata 
Disease 苦海浄土 わが水俣病] illustrates the plight as well as the beauty 
of life of those affected by the disease/poisoning, in a novel that is based 
on factual information about Minamata. Like Ogata, Ishimure’s work is 
fundamentally a critique of modernity, and like him, life, soul and nature 
are at the core of her work.49 Unlike Ogata, however, Ishimure uses the 
term ‘animism’ whereas Ogata, as mentioned earlier, uses the phrase 
life-world. Ishimure writes:
With what sort of human character should we describe the immoral 
behaviour of the modern industry that exacted and continues to exact 
harm to nature and to the very basis of life therein, in the remote villages 
of Minamata? It surely was another form of the ruthless exploitation 
of people and nature by monopolistic capitalism. Yet, simply to point 
that out will not be sufficient. Living spirits and dead spirits hover over 
my hometown without being able to attain Buddhahood. I consider 
47  Lyotard, Postmodern, xxiv.
48  ibid., xxv.




the words of these spirits as the pristine language of their social class. I 
therefore must become a shaman for modernity by fusing my notion of 
animism and pre-animism.50
Although Ishimure does not use the word animism often in her literary 
work, an animistic ambiance runs through her work, in her descriptions 
of nature and people. The one closest to the definition of animism is the 
following passage from Kamigami no Mura [Villages of the Gods 神々
の村].
A communal village well almost always was located in a place where 
camellias and other evergreens grew thick. Trees would collect 
water for the spring and the spring in turn would nourish the trees. 
Time immemorial dwelled in the spring and in the trees. 
Each well had its own kami (deity/god/spirit カミ); mountains had a 
kami; ships had a kami; rocks had a kami; rice paddies had a kami; sea 
had a kami; rivers had a kami; each kami dwelled in its own place and had 
a unique and lovable character. 
The cheeky careless kami of the river, who had a plate attached to the top 
of its head, would go up the river, deep into the mountains, and sneak 
into, in the depth of the night, into a miner’s hut at the Fuke Gold Mine 
in Satsuma …
When people wanted to have a kami for their rice field, they would find a 
suitable stone, pour lots of shōchū (potato wine) onto it, and thus imbue 
a  soul into the stone. The villages were protected by impromptu kami 
such as these. The little kami in fact were also the people themselves.51 
(Author’s translation)
Although Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow was published in 1969, Ishimure 
was marginalised for a long time as a literary figure, until the 1990s.52 
Since then, there has been a substantial increase of recognition and interest 
in her work in Japan, which then created a snowball effect and what might 
be called the ‘Ishimure Michiko phenomenon’ occurred. The change is 
50  Ishimure Michiko, Kukai jōdo sekai bungaku zenshū III-04 [Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow, World 
Literature Series III-04] (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 2011–2012), 44. 
51  ibid., 236.
52  Watanabe Kyōji, ‘Ishimure Michiko no jiko keisei’ [The Establishment of Self of Ishimure 
Michiko], in Iwaoka Nakamasa ed., Ishimure Michiko no sekai [The World of Ishimure Michiko] 
(Fukuoka: Gen Shobō, 2006).
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indicated clearly by the number of times her name appeared in the Asahi 
newspaper as shown in Figure 4. (This data was collected using the Kikuzo 







































































* Courtesy of Maki Hammond, PhD candidate, University of Adelaide. BA
Figure 4: The ‘Ishimure Michiko Phenomenon’: Ishimure Michiko in the 
mainstream media (1970–2014).
Source: Author's work .
Another strong indicator of the Ishimure phenomenon is the succession of 
awards she has received since the 1990s. In 1993, she received the Murasaki 
Shikibu Literary Award, with commendations by Umehara Takeshi, the 
then Director of the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 
and Setouchi Jakushō, a renowned writer. This award connected Ishimure 
for the first time officially with the mainstream literary world of Japan. 
She then received a 2001 Asahi Award, together with Miyazaki Hayao 
and others; followed by a 2002 Minister of Education and Science Award 
for the Promotion of Art; 2013 Avon Award for Women; and, in 2014, 
the 32rd Hanatsubaki Award for Contemporary Poetry by Shiseido and 
the prestigious 8th Gotō Shinpei Award.
The recognition of Ishimure’s work took different forms as well. Her long-
term friendship with sociologist Tsurumi Kazuko, a grandchild of Meiji 
statesman Gotō Shinpei, led to a chance to talk in length with Empress 
Michiko at Tsurumi’s memorial service, which subsequently led to a visit 
by the Heisei Emperor and Empress to Minamata in 2013. For the first 
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time in history after the outbreak of Minamata disease in the 1950s, 
a Japanese emperor visited Minamata, and following Ishimure’s request, 
the royal couple met congenital Minamata disease sufferers who were in 
their 50s.53 The Asahi newspaper twice reported the role Ishimure played 
in the royal visit, in such a way that generated a sense of reconciliation and 
healing between Minamata sufferers and the imperial family.54
There seem to be three intertwined factors behind the Ishimure Michiko 
phenomenon. First is the steady publication of her highly original work.55 
In addition to literary works, Ishimure produced numerous collections 
of poems, picture books and essays, including a column in the Asahi 
newspaper, Chotto Shinkokyū [Taking a Big Breath] that lasted from 
1999 to 2005.
The second factor explaining the Ishimure Michiko phenomenon is the 
development of the Minamata movement itself, in which Ogata and 
Ishimure have been key players. The first big spike in Figure 4 coincides 
with the 1996 Minamata Tokyo Exhibition that was held to mark the 
40th anniversary of the official recognition of Minamata disease. One 
of the key features of the exhibition was an old, barely seaworthy fishing 
sailboat, the Nichigetsu maru [Sun Moon Boat 日月丸], which Ogata 
sailed from Minamata to Tokyo ‘in order to push the poison back to the 
capital’.56 This exhibition heralded a new era whereby Minamata became 
connected at a new level to the civil society of Japan. For instance, 
Minamata Forum, a Tokyo-based non-profit organisation that organised 
the Tokyo Exhibition, has continued to show the exhibition at 23 other 
venues since the original event in 1993, attracting over 130,000 visitors 
53  Kitano Ryūichi, ‘“Ima mo kurushimu Minamata no kanja ni atte” – Ishimure-san kōgō-sama 
ni tegami’ [Please Meet Still Suffering Minamata Patients – Ishimure Wrote a Letter to the Empress], 
Asahi Shimbun, 25 October 2013, Tokyo.
54  Kitano Ryūichi, ‘Ishimure-san ga miokuri – Kōgō-sama kara dengon “Okarada taisetsu 
ni”‘[Ishimure Saw Them Off – a Message from the Empress – Please Take Care], Asahi Shimbun 
(Seibu), 29 October 2013.
55  This includes compilations of her work: an 18-volume Ishimure Michiko zenshū [Complete 
Works of Ishimure Michiko] published by Fujiwara Shoten between 2004 to 2014; and another 
series, a seven-volume Ishimure Michiko shibun korekushon [Ishimure Michiko Literary Works] 
published also by Fujiwara in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, just before the triple disaster, Ishimure’s 
flagship work, Kukai jōdo (Trilogy), was published as part of Sekai bungaku zenshū [World Literature 
Series], as the only Japanese entry in the series. The trilogy included 1969 Kugai jōdo [Paradise in the 
Sea of Sorrow], 1997 Tenko [Lake of Heaven] and 2006 Kamigami no mura [Villages of the Gods], 
which altogether took 40 years to complete.
56  Ogata, Chisso, 122.
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by 2015.57 In May 2016, a  special memorial lecture series to mark the 
60th anniversary of the official recognition of Minamata disease, held by 
the Minamata Forum at the University of Tokyo, was attended by nearly 
2,400 people including some 90 volunteers.58
At the same time, key players of the Minamata movement began to 
express themselves in different ways. Ogata’s two books were published 
in 1996 and 2001, the latter being Chisso was I.59 Ishimure’s Noh play 
was performed in Tokyo, Kumamoto and Minamata in the early 2000s. 
The 50th anniversary of the official recognition of Minamata disease was 
titled ‘Minamata for New Genesis’, reframing the Minamata incident as 
a historical experience with a significant message for the future. A field 
of study, Minamata Studies, was established in the 2000s by Harada 
Masazumi, a doctor who had devoted his entire working life to the care of 
Minamata disease patients. Kumamoto Gakuen University where Harada 
taught became the mecca of Minamata Studies and the five-volume 
Minamata Gaku Kōgi [The Minamata Studies Lectures 水俣学講義] 
was published between 2004 and 2012. The Minamata incident has thus 
entered a new phase since the mid-1990s and has flourished. In Ogata’s 
words, Minamata is no longer a ‘movement’ but an ‘expression’.60 Through 
these developments since the mid-1990s, Minamata disease has become 
established as a robust reference point of civil society Japan. The work of 
Ishimure Michiko has been the key medium to connect Minamata and 
civil society, and the Ishimure Michiko phenomenon is an indication of 
the strength of that connectedness. 
The third factor behind the Ishimure Michiko phenomenon is a broader 
social change in Japanese society.61 World Values Surveys show that 
‘postmaterialist values’ are one of the strongest indicators of the cultural 
57  Minamata Forum, ‘Minamata Forum katsudō naiyō’ [Minamata Forum Activities], 
www.minamata-f.com/activity.html. Accessed 29 June 2013.
58  Minamata Forum, Minamata-byō kōshiki kakunin 60nen kinen tokubetsu kōenkai [Special 
Memorial Lecture Series to Mark the 60th Anniversary of the Official Recognition of Minamata 
Disease], www.minamata-f.com/evt_201605.html. Accessed 2 July 2016.
59  Ogata Masato and Tsuji Shinichi, Tokoyo no fune o kogite [Rowing the Eternal Sea] (Tokyo: Seori 
Shobō, 1996); Ogata, Chisso.
60  Ogata Masato, interview by author, digital recording, Minamata, 25 January 2013.
61  This paragraph first appeared in Shoko Yoneyama, ‘Spirituality in Life Stories in Postmodernising 
Japan’, Elizabeth Morrell and Michael Barr eds, Referred Conference Proceedings, the 18th Biennial 




transformation from modern to postmodern62 and that Japan was part 
of this major shift in the highly industrialised world.63 This value change 
has been captured in public opinion polls that are conducted annually 
by the Cabinet Office. In the early 1980s, the proportion of those who 
considered the ‘richness of heart/mind’ (kokoro no yotakasa 心の豊かさ) 
to be more important than ‘material affluence’ (mono no yutakasa 物の
豊かさ) exceeded those who valued the ‘material’ over the ‘mind/heart’, 
and the gap became wider, reaching 64 per cent for ‘mind/heart’ and 30.1 
per cent for ‘material’ in 2012.64 For many people, the meaning of existence 
has become more important than what they possess. Japan has been very 
much part of the rise of a ‘new spiritual culture’ in industrialised societies, 
which surfaced in Japan as the rise of interest in ‘mind/heart world’.65 
The word supirichuaru (spiritual) became a buzzword in the 2000s, and 
played a pivotal role in the discourse of the new spirituality culture. A 
linguistic study of supirichuaritii (spirituality) as a loan word found that 
the word ‘spirit’ has been translated as tamashii (soul 魂), kokoro (heart こ
ころ or 心), or inochi (life いのち or 命), suggesting the close relationship 
between the notions of ‘soul’ and ‘life’ in Japan.66
This broad value change that began in the 1980s has been amplified by a 
major shift in Japanese society since around 1990, which pushed people 
to reflect on the meaning of prosperity in a society that had reached its 
growth plateau. It started with the 1989 death of the Shōwa Emperor, 
Hirohito, who symbolically represented the ‘postwar’ development. 
This was followed by the 1990 bubble burst, the collapse of an excessively 
speculative money economy based on the construction industry that 
was the mainstay of Japan’s economy in the 1980s. At the time when 
Japan became a post-industrial society in 1995 and the labour force in 
the service industry exceeded that of manufacturing, Japanese society was 
awash with incidents that pushed its citizens to ask existential questions. 
These incidents included the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kobe, the 
62  Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1997), 86. 
63  ibid., 333.
64  Ministry of the Environment (Japan), Kankyō hakusho, junkangata shakai hakusho, seibutsu 
tayōsei hakusho [White Paper on the Environment, Recycling Society and Bio-Diversity] (Tokyo: 
Ministry of the Environment, 2013), chapter 2, section 1, www.env.go.jp/policy/hakusyo/h25/html/
hj13010201.html. Accessed 2 July 2016.
65  Shimazono Susumu, Spirichuaritii no kōryū [The Rise of Spirituality] (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 2007).
66  Harumi Minagawa, ‘“Spiritual” Interpreted: A Case of Complex Lexical Borrowing in Japanese’, 
Japanese Studies 32, no. 3 (2012).
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terrorist sarin-gas attack by the Aum Supreme Sect in the subway near the 
government district of Tokyo, and a series of horrendous crimes committed 
by youth, starting with the decapitation of a boy by a 14-year-old ‘school 
killer’ in Kobe.67 The level of anxiety in society was amplified by economic 
stagnation since the early 1990s, a major policy shift for casualisation of 
the workforce in 1995, and the spread of neoliberalism, which had broad 
implications (e.g.  the prevalence of the culture of bullying in Japanese 
society in general).68
The Ishimure Michiko phenomenon occurred against this backdrop of 
growing scepticism about economic development, broader value changes 
in postindustrial and postmodern Japan, and increasing need to respond 
to existential questions. It was also in this context that people in Japan 
were confronted with the 3.11 triple disaster, and Ishimure was no 
exception. The nuclear accident in Fukushima in particular provoked 
her sense of mission, and raised the significance of her work to a new 
height. A documentary film on Ishimure Michiko, released in 2013, 
‘Hana no okudo e’: Ishimure Michiko rasuto messēji [Towards the Paradise 
of Flowers: Ishimure Michiko’s Last Message 花の憶土へ], opens with an 
introductory statement: 
Ishimure Michiko has kept questioning the ‘poison of modern civilisation’. 
In post-3.11 Japan, she extends her questions to the destiny of the Earth.69
Sociologist Mita Munesuke, Emeritus Professor of Tokyo University, 
captured the relevance of Ishimure’s work as follows:
‘Minamata Disease’ represents nothing but the malady of Japan’s 
capitalism as a whole. And if the collapse of the ‘life-world’ constitutes the 
malady of the modern world as a whole, the essence of Ishimure Michiko’s 
work is that it provides spiritual medicine that heals the body and the soul 
of the modern world (My translation. Emphasis added.)70 
67  Shoko Yoneyama, The Japanese High School: Silence and Resistance (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999).
68  Shoko Yoneyama, ‘The Era of Bullying: Japan under Neoliberalism’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: 
Japan Focus 6, issue 2, 1 December (2008).
69  Kin Taii, Hana no okudo e [Towards the Paradise of Flowers] (documentary film), 2013.
70  Mita Munesuke, ‘Ijutsu toshite no sakuhin: “Ten no Io” o yomu’ [Literary Work as a Medical 
Art: Reading the Fish of Heaven], in Shiranui: Ishimure Michiko no kosumolojii [Shiranui: The 
Cosmology of Ishimure Michiko] (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2004).
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The Ishimure Michiko phenomenon can be considered as an indication 
that Japanese society has been in need of ‘spiritual medicine’ as an 
antidote to modernity. She made this evident through her illustrations of 
the world where humans live as part of nature, as part of the continuum 
of life, or the life-world where life and ‘soul’ (tamashii) are connected. 
And this is the world that was destroyed by Chisso, a company that 
represented modernity and the domination of money and materials over 
life, soul and nature. In the context of Japan, the cultural reference that 
addresses the life–soul–nature nexus is animism. The Ishimure Michiko 
phenomenon suggests that even before the triple disaster, there was an 
increasing interest in the life–soul–nature nexus vis-à-vis modernity. As 
in the case of Ogata, Ishimure’s work has provided a robust discourse on 
life–soul–nature, or discourse on animism as a grassroots response to the 
first socioenvironmental crisis in post-war Japan.
It is on the basis of this idea that I now turn to the final section of the 
chapter, which introduces three developments that suggest animistic 
tradition has regained relevance in post-3.11 Japan. The developments 
are renewed appreciation of folk festivals, local shrines, and sacred forests 
(chinju-no-mori) in the disaster-stricken areas.
Reconnecting with the Cultural Heritage 
of Animism in Post-3.11 Japan
Folk Festivals: Folklorist Akasaka Norio (赤坂憲雄), who specialises in 
Northeast Japan, points out that folk festivals/arts (minzoku geinō 民俗
芸能), though they had been in decline before the triple disaster, were 
the very first thing to be revived in many tsunami-struck communities.71 
Akasaka introduces the case of the Deer Dance in Minamisanriku, which is 
particularly relevant here. Minamisanriku is in the area where the tsunami 
was most ferocious, and in this town alone more than 800 people, or one 
in 20 of the population, lost their lives. The whole town was reduced 
to rubble, and the community was decimated. How was it possible to 
reconstruct a local festival in such a situation? Akasaka writes about a local 
fisherman, Muraoka Kenichi, who lost everything and wandered through 
the rubble for months, searching for anything related to his life. He found 
only two things. One was a shell ring he had made for his wife, and 
71  Akasaka Norio, 3.11 kara kangaeru ‘kono kuni no katachi’ [Post 3.11 Reflections on the Way We 
Are in This Country] (Tokyo: Shinchō Sensho, 2012), 85. 
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the other was a taiko drum used in the traditional Deer Dance.72 Before 
the tsunami, Muraoka had played a key role in preserving the dance. 
He thought that the taiko would have been washed away, together with 
everything else, because of its light weight. When he found the drum in 
the mud, he thought: ‘Okay, I might be able to start again’.73 Eventually, 
locals managed to find all but one of the drums along with costumes and 
outfits for the dance, all buried in the mud. The first person keen to do 
the Deer Dance was a 12-year-old boy, Onodera Shō, who persuaded his 
friends, who were scattered among various shelters, to learn the dance 
together.74 When the revived Deer Dance was finally performed, local 
people watched it with tears in their eyes.75
Akasaka remarks that folk festivals/arts played a significant role in 
uniting people in the disaster-stricken communities that were divided by 
numerous private differences: were there deaths in the family, were the 
bodies found or not, and was the family house lost, etc. Festivals were 
particularly effective in uniting people because acts of sacrament for the 
dead as well as repose for dead souls are strong themes of local festivals in 
Northeast Japan. Also, the festivals are open to everyone, unlike Buddhist 
funerals, which are strictly a family matter. 76
Significantly, the dead souls in this context include those of animals. 
Concerning the Deer Dance, for instance, a memorial stone erected 
approximately 300 years ago reads: ‘This dance is dedicated to the repose 
of the souls of all creatures living or dead’.77 In addition to the Deer 
Dance in Minamisanriku, there are various other versions of the dance 
as well as other animal-related festivals/arts in the region. Akasaka holds 
that animism is an intrinsic part of the festivals and is also associated 
with the Buddhist notion of shikkai jōbutsu (悉皆成仏).78 In Japanese 
Buddhism, shikkai jōbutsu, the long version of which is sansen sōmoku 
shikkai jōbutsu (山川草木悉皆成仏), means universal enlightenment 
not only for humans but for all entities, living and dead (i.e. humans, 
animals, birds, insects, etc.), including grass and trees, as well as other 
72  ibid., 84–5 and 154–5.
73  Ishino Nahoka, ‘Furusato ni hibike, bokura no kodō to yakudō’ [May Our Heart Beat and 
Our Energy Reverberate in Our Hometown], Kokoro Puresu [The Heart Press], 2014, kokoropress.
blogspot.com.au/2014/01/blog-post_24.html. Accessed 2 July 2016.
74  ibid.
75  Akasaka, 3.11 kara, 155. 
76  ibid.
77  ibid., 158.
78  ibid., 159.
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inanimate things such as mountains and rivers. To what extent people 
engaging in the recovery of folk festivals/arts were conscious of such 
cultural traditions is unknown. As pointed out by Akasaka, however, 
folk  festivals/arts functioned as a latent cultural mechanism connecting 
people divided by the disaster.79
Shrines as Tsunami Markers: Imamura Fumihiko (今村文彦), 
a  specialist in tsunami engineering and disaster archives, presents a 
picture of a tiny wooden shrine surrounded by several trees, standing 
miraculously undamaged in the middle of a vast sea of mud left by the 
tsunami.80 He points out the significance of local shrines acting as ancient 
landmarks of safe haven during tsunami and stresses the importance of 
transmitting the memory of disasters to descendants as part of disaster 
prevention measures.81 The example Imamura draws on is Namiwake 
shrine (浪分神社), the name of which suggests a place where ‘waves are 
divided (i.e. stopped)’. Local legend is that the god of the sea appeared on 
a white horse at the time of the Jōgan tsunami (860 AD) and controlled 
the surging wave by dividing it to the north and the south. Imamura’s 
research team’s analysis of alluvial deposits found data consistent with 
the legend. The Jōgan tsunami stopped just a few hundred meters from 
the shrine.82 
A striking illustration showing the significance of shrines as landmarks 
of the ‘tsunami line’ was broadcasted by TBS TV soon after the triple 
disaster (Hōdō Tokushū, 21 August 2011). The report was based on the 
investigation by a local environmental surveyor Kumagai Wataru who 
became curious about the fact that many shrines withstood the tsunami. 
Further investigation of an area stretching 30 kilometres to the north from 
Minamisōma, the area most affected by tsunami, revealed that out of 84 
shrines in the area, 67 stood undamaged. These undamaged shrines were 
almost exactly on the line that showed how far inland the tsunami came.83 
79  ibid., 161.
80  Imamura Fumihiko, ‘Miyagiken Sendaishi Wakabayashiku engan shūhen’ [The Coastal Area of 
Wakabayashi Ward in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture: Photo Image], Gakujutsu no dōkō [Academic 
Trends] July 2012 (2012).
81  Imamura Fumihiko, ‘Daishinsai no jittai to kyōkun no seiri ni mukete’ [Facts About the Great 
Earthquake and Lessons to Be Learned], Presentation at Higashinihon Daishinsai Shakai Shihon 
Saisei Fukkō Shinpojium [Northeast Japan Disaster Symposium for Social Capital Reconstruction 
and Recovery] (Miyagi Prefectural Office, 2012).
82  Takase Hiroshi, Yoshida Kazushi, and Kumagai Wataru, Jinja wa keikoku suru [The Warning 
from Shrines] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2012), 76.
83  ibid., 38.
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They were all small ‘village shrines’ (sonsha 村社), many nameless and no 
more than tiny wooden structures, that had been cherished and cared for 
by local people for hundreds of years. Data available from the Association 
of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honchō 神社本庁) further indicated that it was 
the old shrines that tended to survive the 2011 tsunami. Of 100 shrines in 
the disaster region that were listed in the imperial survey of Shinto shrines 
compiled in 927 AD (meaning they are more than 1,000 years old), only 
three were damaged by the 2011 tsunami. A public relations officer of the 
association hypothesises that the Jōgan tsunami of 860 AD influenced the 
location of these ancient shrines.84 Research on the Jōgan tsunami deposit 
has revealed that the frontline of the area inundated by the tsunami more 
than 1,000 years ago is almost exactly the same as that in 2011.85 
Figure 5: A small village shrine stands intact in the area completely 
devastated by the tsunami including the tide-water control forest. 
The coastal area of Wakabayashi Ward in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture.
Source: Courtesy of Professor Imamura Fumihiko, Director, International Research Institute 
of Disaster Science (IRIDeS), Tohoku university .
84  ibid.
85  ibid., 93.
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It is not yet clear whether the small shrines located on the tsunami 
line were built to mark the safe haven, or if they are there because they 
survived the devastation of the tsunami over 1,000 years ago. Either way, 
what is significant here is the meaning people find in this line of surviving 
shrines. This is clearly expressed in the words of the mayor of Sōma, 
a city also devastated by the tsunami. In his own neighbourhood many 
people survived by escaping to a local shrine that was believed by the 
locals to enshrine ‘the god of tsunami’. Many ran to the shrine following 
the teaching of their ancestors: ‘tsunamis come up to the shrine, and if 
you reach the shrine you are saved’. The mayor describes the shrine as 
a monument of past tsunami experience and says it is there to transmit 
knowledge to descendants: ‘I felt most grateful to the ancestors’.86 
As with the case of the local folk festival, the significance of this post-3.11 
experience lies in the sense of being connected with the past, by realising 
anew the significance of the old, often small and nameless shrines, while 
at the same time feeling the sense of care of ancestors. It is possible that 
in the disaster-stricken areas where much was lost, quite paradoxically, 
people found a deeper sense of connectedness with the past. Shrines 
can at times be associated with state Shintoism, but in this context, the 
political dimension is hardly relevant. Rather, the meaning of shrines as a 
symbol of folk religion and local community comes across strongly. And 
as was the case with the tradition reflected in the notion of ‘sansen sōmoku 
shikkai jōbutsu’ in Buddhism, Shinto as the most ancient spiritual heritage 
of Japan is also deeply animistic. The (re)discovery of the significance of 
shrines in the aftermath of the 3.11 disaster is all about the nexus between 
nature (tsunami), life (of the living) and souls of the dead (people and 
all other forms of life that once existed), and in that sense it strongly 
represents the animistic essence of Shinto as folk religion.
In the recovery effort after the triple disaster, another significance of shrines 
was reappreciated, and provided theory and practice for a project that 
aims to protect future generations. Shrines have provided a foundation 
for the project, which now constitutes a new trend of civil society Japan. 
It is the appreciation of the trees surrounding shrines, the sacred forests, 
or chinju-no-mori. 
86  ibid., 54–5.
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Chinju-no-mori Project: A project to create a green seawall along the 
coast of the tsunami-affected region began soon after the disaster. It is 
called the Chinju-no-mori (Sacred Forest 鎮守の森) Project.87 It  is  a 
grand-scale project that aims to create a 20 to 25-metre-high, and 
300-km-long seawall, which is likened to the Great Wall in China. It is 
a combination of public works, to create the 5-metre-high mound using 
a gigantic amount of tsunami debris that is otherwise hard to dispose of, 
and volunteer work, to plant local trees on top of the mound. This organic 
seawall is expected to grow up to 20 metres high to provide a flexible, 
robust and beautiful, low-maintenance and sustainable buffer to mitigate 
tsunami impact and to prevent people and objects from being washed 
away into the sea. 
The project consists of independent subprojects led by different 
administrations, such as prefectural governments, the Forestry Agency, 
and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, all 
of which are in charge of the public works to prepare the mound. The 
volunteer work on the other hand includes gathering local seeds and 
nuts, preparing seedlings, planting them, and removing weeds. Between 
2012 and 2016, a total of 38,451 people participated in the project as 
volunteers, collecting local seeds and nuts, and nurturing and planting 
336,200 trees.88
The impetus for the project comes from ecologist Miyawaki Akira (宮脇
昭), Emeritus Professor at Yokohama National University, who has devoted 
his life to the tree-planting movements around the world. He is the vice-
president of the Chinju-no-mori Project, a public interest incorporated 
foundation (公益財団法人), presided over by former prime minister 
Hosokawa Morihiro. It is an umbrella organisation that arranges tree 
planting, after receiving requests from governments, corporations and 
citizens’ groups. Miyawaki received the 2015 Gotō Shinpei Award, 
following Ishimure Michiko’s award in 2014.
Miyawaki had always stressed the importance of a forest having a mixture 
of native trees indigenous to the area, especially evergreen broadleaf 
trees such as castanopsis, machilus and oak. The impact of the tsunami 
confirmed his theory to a much greater extent than he originally 
87  The name of the project was changed from ‘Great Forest Wall Project’ to ‘Chinju-no-mori 
Project’ in June 2016.
88  ‘Chinju-no-mori Project’, morinoproject.com. Accessed 19 June 2016.
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anticipated. He witnessed that the native machilus (Japanese bay trees) 
not only survived the tsunami but were able to regenerate and regrow. In 
clear contrast, mono-culture forests of non-indigenous trees such as the 
pine forest along the coast of Minamisanriku were not only destroyed 
completely by the tsunami, but the severed trunks became projectiles that 
harmed people and damaged buildings. The non-indigenous forests failed 
to stop people being washed away into the sea, and were also unable to 
regenerate.89 
Miyawaki calls forests that consist of a mixture of indigenous evergreen 
broadleaf trees inochi no mori (forests of life 命の森). He argues that 
these  forests preserve DNA specific to the local area, cultivate the 
sensitivity, creativeness and intelligence of local people, help to stimulate 
the local economy, and collectively contribute to a sustainable global 
ecology. He also argues that these forests tend to survive natural disasters 
(such  as earthquake, typhoon, fire, tsunami) and live for thousands of 
years because they are anchored around a group of tall trees whose roots 
go deep into the ground. These anchor trees are surrounded by multiple 
layers of trees of varying heights, which in turn are surrounded by shrubs 
and grasses.90 Miyawaki empahsises that the prototype of the ‘forest of life’ 
is the chinju-no-mori, the sacred grove that surrounds shrines, consisting 
of a mixture of broadleaf evergreen trees and shrubs indigenous to the 
local area. As he remarks, the sense of sacredness is also significant as it 
prevents trees from being cut down.91
Just as shrines were built to protect their ancestors from tsunamis, people 
are building forest seawalls, using the knowledge gained from the sacred 
groves surrounding a shrine. This movement is the complete opposite 
of the national government’s project to build a gigantic concrete seawall 
along the coast of the Tohoku region. Many people feel that a concrete 
seawall is an imposition of a huge, costly construction project that cuts 
the connectedness between people and nature (especially those who 
work at sea). Concrete seawalls become old and weak with time whereas 
forest seawalls grow bigger and stronger. Forest seawalls reconnect people 
with nature and protect them for generations to come. It is possible 
89  Miyawaki Akira, Gareki o ikasu ‘mori no bōhatei’ ga inochi o mamoru [Forest Seawall Built on 
Debris Protects Life] (Tokyo: Gakken Shinsho, 2011); Miyawaki, Akira, ‘The Japanese and Chinju-
no-mori: Tsunami-Protecting Forest after the Great East Japan Earthquake 2011’, Phytocoenologia, 
44, issue 3–4 (2014): 235–44.
90  Miyawaki, Gareki, 33–4.
91  ibid.
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that the project represents a new phase of civil society Japan where 
administration, citizens and cultural heritage are all connected to the 
theme of protecting life. 
Anthropologist John Clammer points out that the celebration of local 
festivals distinguishes folk Shinto from the more institutionalised state 
and sect Shinto.92 This is a significant remark as ‘shrine’ or localised folk 
Shinto played a pivotal role in all the previously discussed post-3.11 
recovery efforts: local folk festivals belong to folk Shinto; most of the 
shrines on the tsunami frontline were small ancient shrines; and sacred 
groves represent the ecology of folk Shinto as indicated by the anti-shrine-
consolidation protests by Japan’s first ecologist, Minakata Kumagusu, 
at  the end of Meiji period. Clammer holds that before the late 19th 
century when a more institutionalised form of Shinto was introduced 
with the aim  of promoting nationalism, Shinto was better understood 
as ‘an  ecology’. Folk Shinto provided a way, after 3.11, for people to 
reconnect with each other (through the folk festivals), to connect with 
ancestors (by  becoming aware of the significance of ancient shrines as 
tsunami markers) and to form a connection with their descendants 
(by  constructing the great forest seawall using the seeds from, and 
knowledge of, the sacred forests surrounding folk shrines). The key words 
used here are exactly the same as the descriptors of the ecology of folk 
shrines: ‘local’, ‘small’, ‘diverse’ and ‘grassroots’. Clammer claims that folk 
Shinto is nothing but a sophisticated example of animism.93
According to Clammer, animism in shrine Shinto comes with radical 
epistemological implications arising from a permeable sense of human–
nature boundaries, which allows ‘the positive forces that exist on the 
other side of the boundary … [to] pass through into the human realm’.94 
The sense of wonder encapsulated in all three examples seems to suggest, 
in Clammer’s words, the ‘permeable sense of human-nature boundaries’: 
the Deer Dance costume being found in the tsunami mud and debris, the 
string of 67 small ancient shrines on the tsunami line, and the miraculous 
survival of local machilus trees, species that constitute sacred groves. This 
sense of wonder was felt not only by locals but also by visiting specialists: 
the folklorist Akasaka, the tsunami engineer Imamura, and the ecologist 
92  John Clammer, ‘The Politics of Animism’, in John Clammer, Sylvie Poirier, and Eric Schwimmer 
eds, Figured World: Ontological Obstacles in Intercultural Relations (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2004), 90.
93  ibid., 102. 
94  ibid., 93.
127
5 . ANIMISM
Miyawaki. So, do these examples suggest the presence of helpful forces 
that can pass through into the human realm as explained by Clammer? 
We do not have the answer to this question, but these episodes are 
strong examples of radical epistemology that animism can bring about to 
empower people confronted with socioenvironmental disaster.
Animism as Grassroots Response for 
a New Modernity
Clammer points out that animism is ‘still widely used [in Japan] as a way 
of explaining the distinctiveness of the national culture and as a vehicle 
for constructing a model of Japanese society’.95 Indeed, the polytheistic/
pantheistic world of Shinto that accommodates an infinite number of 
kami (deity/god/spirit) as natural life-forces within objects or places 
can be understood as classical animism. The Buddhist notion of ‘sansen 
sōmoku shikkai jōbutsu’, which preaches that the Buddha resides not only 
in humans but in all things, living and dead, animate and inanimate, 
can also be regarded as classical animism. The availability of this cultural 
heritage was a precondition of Ogata’s philosophy of the life-world, 
Ishimure’s literature, and the Ishimure Michiko phenomenon, as well as 
the grassroots responses to the triple disaster as discussed above. 
The contention of this chapter, however, is that the significance of animism 
has actually gone beyond that of cultural heritage. I argue that animism 
(re)emerged as a grassroots response to socioenvironmental crises in 
increasingly ‘postmodern’ (i.e. post-materialist) Japanese society, and that 
this has two significant political and epistemological implications.
Firstly, in political terms, one undeniable characteristic of the discourse on 
animism in Japan is that it has been part of what Morris-Suzuki calls ‘eco-
nationalism’, a strong intellectual current that locates nature at the core 
of Japan’s national identity.96 Recently, animism has been used to criticise 
monotheist cultures, saying that Japan’s tradition can fix environmental 
problems and bring about a sustainable future,97 i.e. a new version of 
eco-nationalist inspired Nihonjinron (theories about the Japanese). In this 
95  ibid.
96  Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).
97  Yasuda Yoshinori, Isshinkyō no yami: Animizumu no fukken [The Darkness of Monotheism: 
Revival of Animism] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2006).
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chapter, animism has been located clearly at the other side of the political 
spectrum: a ‘worm’s-eye level’ rather than a ‘bird’s-eye level’. This has 
enabled us to discuss animism sociologically, as a grassroots response 
to the political economy of Japan and, more broadly, to modernity 
itself. Animism has been presented not as a question of ontology in an 
ethnographic context, but as grassroots discourse of survival. As pointed 
out earlier, Ogata’s philosophy of life-world is nothing but a postmodern 
version of animism, and so is Ishimure’s literature, which has catered for 
the emotional and spiritual needs of Japanese society today.
In an article titled ‘The Politics of Animism’, Clammer goes one step 
further and argues:
animism has profound political implications [since] it contains a model 
of human-nature relationships beyond the sociological categories of 
the state; it is extremely difficult to codify or to convert into any easily 
administrable theological system; and when it is linked with expressions 
such as shamanism it can become subversive, a form of power residing 
in implicit knowledge, a counter-discourse … and indeed a way of 
undermining the categories of conventional science.98 
As Clammer asserts, the ‘increasing significance of ecological, feminist, 
and New Age thinking in effecting intellectual currents suggests that such 
ideas, long current in Japan, are, despite their no doubt very different 
sources, becoming more and more widely diffused’.99 The rise of the field 
of study called post-humanism is an indication of the perceived need to 
completely reconsider the human–nature relationship. Clammer’s insight 
suggests that animism that (re)emerged in Japan as a citizens’ discourse of 
survival has the political power to appropriate ‘cultural heritage’ to present 
a view of ‘the new world from below’, and that this has even broader 
potential to accommodate the needs of a world that is painfully aware of 
the contradictions and limitations of modernity.
This leads us to the second significance of animism that emerged from 
the grassroots quest for survival in Japan. That is, it can help us address 
the question of soul in social science and beyond. In the field of social 
science, the question of the soul constitutes a big lacuna. This is because 
social science itself is the product of modernity, and secularism has been 
its most fundamental premise. Matters regarding the soul therefore have 




been epistemologically strange in the social sciences. As a consequence, 
animism was treated for a long time as if it were magic, and its elimination 
was considered key to modernity. At the same time, notions of nature 
and life have been quite limited in the social sciences. Is it possible for 
the discourse on animism that emerged from Minamata and Fukushima 
(or  post-3.11 Japan) to fill this lacuna and provide a new/old kind 
of principle of environmental ethics?
Animism is not unique to Japan. Its primordial-indigenous tradition 
merged with Daoism from China and is now the basis of the strong 
cultural heritage of East Asia and beyond. Ogata’s philosophy can be 
considered as a late modern and grassroots version of this cultural heritage 
and thus has the potential to provide environmental ethics that have 
wide relevance in Asia. If, as the German Ethics Commission for a Safe 
Energy Supply points out, environmental ethics should be drawn from a 
spiritual tradition, animistic culture might be as appropriate in the East as 
Christian tradition and European culture is in the West.
The World Risk Society occurs in the second/late/liquid modernity where 
the connection between the individual and social institutions weakens. 
The sociological observations presented in this chapter suggest that after 
the two environmental catastrophes of Minamata and Fukushima,100 
many people in Japan have come to learn to connect with each other 
in a new (yet, at the same time, old) way, and that a sense of animism 
plays an important part in this. Animism was there to make connections 
between different entities: the living and the dead, the past and the future, 
ancestors and descendants, the local area and nature, humans and animals, 
people, both in, and outside the community. In her 1999 seminal article 
titled ‘Animism Revisited’, Bird-David argued that animism represents 
relational epistemology in contrast to modernist epistemology,101 which 
then stimulated a renewed interest in animism—often referred to as 
100  To be precise, the three examples discussed as post-3.11 searches for survival have been drawn 
from areas, devastated by the earthquake and tsunami, which are north of Fukushima. In Fukushima 
where the nuclear crisis is current, it is likely to take decades, as was the case of Minamata, for any local 
discourse to emerge that goes beyond the present legacy of kizuna (bonds). However, given the very 
nature of the devastation—the total and direct threat to all connectedness of life, the ecosystem and 
community—it is likely that the vision of the life-world (or animism) will emerge from Fukushima 
with an even sharper focus on the themes of life, nature and the soul.
101  Nurit Bird-David, ‘“Animism” Revisited’, Current Anthropology 40, no. Supplement February 
(1999).
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New Animism.102 This new study of animism fits very well with the 
understanding of animism that emerged as a grassroots response to the 
socioenvironmental disaster in Japan. 
The search for survival in post-Minamata and post-Fukushima 
Japan suggests that achieving a sustainable future may demand an 
epistemological change in social sciences, so that we can revise concepts 
such as animism, as well as the concepts of soul, life and nature, in a new 
light. This means including the unseen in the realm of social sciences. 
It may sound radical, but perhaps there really is nothing new in this. After 
all, sociology did not exist before Durkheim established the existence 
of social phenomena sui generis that are independent of the actions and 
intentions of individuals. Would it be going too far to say that recognition 
of the existence sui generis of ‘the life-world’, the world of animism, where 
soul, nature and life are all connected, might be the pre-condition for 
a new modernity where sustainable development is possible?




Informal Labour, Local 
Citizens and the Tokyo Electric 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Crisis: Responses to Neoliberal 
Disaster Management
Adam Broinowski
Nuclear workers are important as sentinels for a broader epidemic of 
radiation related diseases that may affect the general population.1
We live with contradictions everyday.2
Introduction
The ongoing disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station 
(FDNPS), operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), since 
11 March 2011 can be recognised as part of a global phenomenon that 
has been in development over some time. This disaster occurred within 
a social and political shift that began in the mid-1970s and that became 
1  Paul Jobin, ‘Radiation Protection after the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster 3.11’, The Journal of 
Ohara Institute for Social Research, August 658 (2013): 3 (14–30).
2  Anonymous, Association Franco-Japonaise (ASUKA), Témoignages No.1 [Statements by 
Fukushima genpatsu kokuso-dan] (2014): 6. For a copy contact: www.asuka-association.org/contact/.
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more acute in the early 1990s in Japan with the downturn of economic 
growth and greater deregulation and financialisation in the global 
economy. After 40 years of corporate fealty in return for lifetime contracts 
guaranteed by corporate unions, as tariff protections were lifted further 
and the workforce was increasingly casualised, those most acutely affected 
by a weakening welfare regime were irregular day labourers, or what we 
might call ‘informal labour’. 
During this period, many day labourers evacuated rented rooms (doya 
どや) and left the various yoseba (urban day labour market よせば, or 
lit. ‘meeting place’) to take up communal tent living in parks and on 
riverbanks, where they were increasingly victimised. With independent 
unions having long been rendered powerless, growing numbers of 
unemployed, unskilled and precarious youths (freeters フリーター) 
alongside older, vulnerable and homeless day labourers (these groups 
together comprising roughly 38 per cent of the workforce in 2015)3 
found themselves not only lacking insurance or industrial protection but 
also in many cases basic living needs. With increasing deindustrialisation 
and capital flight, regular public outbursts of frustration and anger from 
these groups have manifested since the Osaka riots of 1992.4 
As Mike Davis observed, an un(der)protected informal sector in cities and 
industrial zones around the world occurs where there is a dilution or absence 
of labour rights and is characterised by ‘semi-feudal kickbacks, bribes, 
tribal or gang loyalties and ethnic exclusion’.5 Whether on a construction 
site, on the pavement, or in a domestic employment situation, informal 
labour comprises a surplus or reserve army of mercenary, irregular or 
precarious workers who pay off their debt for the opportunity to work 
through the availability of their cheap labour power.
3  Jeff Kingston, ‘How to become an Activist: Start as a Japanese Part-Timer’, Bloomberg, 
29  May  2015, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-29/how-to-become-an-activist-start-as-
a-japanese-part-timer. Accessed 16 July 2015.
4  The Osaka riots of 1992 are known as the ‘anti-unemployment riots’ in the Kamagasaki day 
labour centre in Nishinari ward. Day labourers who could no longer pay the rent demonstrated on 
the streets in protest. As distinct from the 1990 riots in the same location, which were specifically 
targeted against corrupt ties of the Nishinari police with a yakuza group, a large number of youths 
joined the day labourers in 1992 to protest against unemployment. See M. Yang, K. Haraguchi 
and T. Sakurada, ‘The Urban Working-Class Culture of Riot in Osaka and Los Angeles: Toward a 
Comparative History’, in B. Fraser ed., Marxism and Urban Culture (New York: Lexington Books, 
2014), 230–31.
5  Mike Davis, Planet of the Slums (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 185.
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In this chapter, first I outline the conditions of irregular workers at nuclear 
power plants and the excess burden they have borne with the rise of nuclear 
labour in Japan since the 1970s. I then turn to post-3.11 conditions 
experienced by residents in radiation-contaminated areas. Contextualising 
these conditions within the genealogy of radiodosimetry standards, I seek 
to show, through personal interviews and localised responses, how those 
who are regularly exposed to radiation from Fukushima Daiichi are now 
confronting problems similar to those faced by informal nuclear labour 
for decades in Japan. This analysis shows how, after 40 years or more 
of environmental movements as discussed in Chapter Four, the struggle 
continues to find viable solutions to the systemic production of the 
intertwined problems of environmental crises and labour exploitation, 
and suggests how potential alternative directions for affected populations 
may lie in their mutual combination.
Conditions for Informal Labour Employed 
in Nuclear Power Stations
The phenomenon of assembling and recruiting a relatively unskilled 
labour pool at the cheapest rate possible is typical in nearly all of Japan’s 
large-scale modern industrial projects in the 20th century. As early as the 
late 19th century, however, non-criminal homeless men were recruited 
for such projects, whether forced, coerced or voluntarily from the major 
day-labourer (hiyatoi rōdōsha 日雇い労働者) sites (yoseba) established 
in Sanya (Tokyo), Kotobuki (Yokohama), Kamagasaki (Osaka) and 
Sasashima  (Nagoya). In pre–World War II and wartime Japan, yakuza 
tehaishi (手配師 labour recruiters) operated forced labour camps 
known as takobeya (たこ部屋 octopus rooms) for Korean and Chinese 
labourers who had been transported to work mainly in coal mines and on 
construction sites.6 
The Dodge Line policy of 1949 stemmed rapid inflation by stabilising 
the yen, drastically curtailing government spending in the public sector, 
directly affecting education, public works and services such as the Japan 
National Railway (JNR), and cutting export subsidies for small businesses 
while expanding loans to big business.7 Aimed at replacing the ‘production 
6  Brett Nee, ‘Sanya: Japan’s internal colony’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 6, no. 3 (1974): 14.
7  Sugita Yoneyuki, Pitfall or Panacaea: The Irony of US Power in the Occupation of Japan 1945–1952 
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 52–68.
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first’ with an ‘export first’ approach, this policy of economic liberalisation 
increased unemployment, lifted tariff protection and reconfigured the 
zaibatsu (財閥 industrial and financial business conglomerates during 
the Meiji, Taisho and Showa periods) as conglomerates without holding 
companies. The ranks of unemployed labour, including zainichi (在日 
resident in Japan) Korean and Chinese, swelled in urban ghettos. During 
the 1950s, the new labour unions were crushed, and, with the return of 
the big conglomerates, agriculture increasingly faced growing competition 
from cheap American food imports. Urban labourers were rendered more 
pliable and many farmers and fisher people were forced from traditional 
livelihoods and communities to do seasonal work (dekasegi 出稼ぎ) on 
large-scale industrial or construction projects.8 As the ties to their village 
communities and practices weakened or were lost, many became semi-
nomadic, drifting from site to site and randomly collecting in yoseba. Like 
the shanty town or reservation in the colonised sectors of third world/
decolonising countries as observed by Frantz Fanon, these were akin to 
the renewed ‘disreputable places inhabited by disreputable people … 
[where] you die anywhere from anything … this world divided in two, is 
inhabited by different species’.9 
In the 1960s and 1970s, with the closure of coal mines, as reliance on 
coal-fired power was replaced by petroleum, gas and nuclear-based energy 
generation, informal labour was in demand for the construction of tankers 
and ore carriers in shipyards fitted with new technologies and on projects 
such as the national Shinkansen and expressways, the 1964 Olympics and 
1970 ‘Japan World Exposition’, and nuclear power stations. Day labourers 
and irregular workers were vital in this period for the supply of vulnerable 
and flexible cheap ‘unskilled’ labour for menial, dirty and dangerous jobs 
(garbage collection, morgue work, work with animal carcasses, work 
involving toxic industrial materials etc.). 
In the labour employment structure, the parent company (moto-uke 元
請け) employs a subcontracting company (shita-uke 下請け), which 
employs another subcontractor (mago-uke 孫請け) that relies on labour 
brokers (tehaishi/ninpu-dashi 手配師／人夫出し), who are often yakuza-
connected, to guarantee a certain number of workers per day. This nodal 
structure ensures the parent company penetration to the bottom social 
8  Funamoto Shūji, Damatte notare jinuna Funamoto Shūji ikoshū [Don’t Die Silently by the 
Roadside: Posthumous Writings of Funamoto Shūji] (Tokyo: Renga Shobo Shinsha, 1985), 199–200.
9  Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 4–5.
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layers while reducing their liability for the costs of labour power (accidents, 
health insurance, safety standards) and maintains responsiveness to the 
violent logic of supply and demand. Primary and secondary contractors 
receive money from parent companies like TEPCO to cover workers’ 
salaries and expenses, special danger allowances and bonuses. By 
employing tehaishi who operate in a liminal zone of under-regulation, 
they hire cheaply, rapidly, under minimal conditions and seemingly 
without a direct duty of care.
The rapid build of nuclear power stations was planned in the 1960s by a 
consortium of major investment banks, electric utilities and construction 
companies and/or industry manufacturers (Mitsubishi, Tōshiba, Hitachi, 
Sumitomo, etc.), and was carried out in the 1970s, with increased 
momentum in response to the oil crisis of 1974–76. Through an intensive 
‘regional development’ program of rural industrialisation from the early 
1970s, politically disempowered communities were targeted as potential 
cheap labour as their environs were designated as sites for nuclear 
projects by investment capital. In a combination of regulatory capture 
and economic dependency, utilities moved in to provide employment 
opportunities to communities while the same communities steadily lost 
control over their resources and subsistence economies. In the process, 
they lost political agency as their political representatives often received 
corporate and state inducements for these projects. As TEPCO owns the 
electricity distribution system in Fukushima Prefecture, which includes 
hydroelectric and thermal power stations as well as nuclear, and is a major 
employer and investor in Fukushima Prefecture,10 it has considerable sway 
in the political process as well as over electricity bills. 
By the early 1980s, irregular workers came to comprise nearly 90 per 
cent of all nuclear workers.11 As nuclear reactors grow increasingly 
contaminated and corroded by radiation over time, informal labour 
became fodder for regular maintenance, cleaning, repairing and/or 
venting and refuelling of these nuclear reactors to reduce exposures to 
permanent company employees such as scientists and engineers. As the 
10  Toshihiro Okuyama, ‘Radiation Doses 4 Times Larger for ‘Outside Workers’ at Nuclear Plants, 
Asahi Shimbun, 26 July 2012, ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201207260071 
(subscription only).
11  Eighty-eight per cent of 83,000 workers in Japan’s nuclear sector and 89 per cent of 10,303 
workers at Fukushima Daiichi are in subcontracting service positions. See Editors, ‘Radiation doses 
4 times larger for “outside workers” at nuclear plants’, Asahi Shimbun, 26 July 2012, ajw.asahi.com/
article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201207260071. Accessed 14 January 2015. 
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power station must be halted during the maintenance period, this period 
equates to a lack of production and profitability and is kept to a bare 
minimum by the operators, an approach that led to a litany of safety 
oversights and accidents.
Although provided less training, informal nuclear workers are paid higher 
over a shorter employment period than regular workers, whose insurance 
is taken out of their wage. Sworn to secrecy,12 after a superficial safety 
education drill, they are sent into highly contaminated, hot and wet 
labyrinthine areas. Their work includes scrubbing contaminated areas, 
installing shields to reduce exposure for skilled workers, decontaminating 
and repairing pipes and tanks, welding, transporting contaminated 
materials and waste, washing contaminated uniforms and tools, removing 
filters and clearing garbage, inspecting gauges in high-level areas, 
dispersing chemicals over nuclear waste piles, pouring high-level liquid 
waste into drums and mopping up waste water. Although radioprotection 
regulations have been tightened in the last decade, working conditions 
for irregular workers have not necessarily improved and, without 
sufficient information about radiation danger, they can still be exposed 
to over 1 millisievert (mSv) of external radiation within minutes in high 
concentration areas and accumulate large amounts of internal radiation.13 
Since 3.11, invoking the International Commission on Radiological 
Protection’s (ICRPs) often-used ALARA (as low as reasonably allowable) 
principle to justify this regulatory contingency, the state also raised 
nuclear workers’ limits from no more than 50 mSv per year (mSv/y) 
and 100 mSv/5 years to 250 mSv/y to deal with emergency conditions, 
and determined that there would be no follow-up health treatment for 
those exposed to doses below 50 mSv/y, while TEPCO decided to not 
record radiation levels below 2 mSv/y in the misplaced justification that 
the effects would be negligible. In December 2011, ‘cold shutdown’ 
was (erroneously) declared and the workers’ limit was returned to 100 
mSv/5 years. It will likely be raised again as the government expedites 
decommissioning to meet its estimated completion by 2030–2050.14 
12  Kazumi Takaki, ‘Listen to Their Silent Cry: The Devastated Lives of Japanese Nuclear Power 
Plant Workers Employed by Subcontractors or Labour-brokering Companies’, Bulletin of Social 
Medicine 31, no. 1 (2014): 10. 
13  Yuki Tanaka, ‘Nuclear Power Plant Gypsies in High-tech Society’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, 18, no. 1 (1986): 12. See also Takaki, ‘Listen to Their Silent Cry’, 9.
14  For perspective, the estimated completion of decommissioning of Chernobyl is 2086.
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Although very few regular workers’ cumulative doses exceeded 20 mSv/y 
in any year prior to 3.11, by June 2015 the official number rose to 6,64215 
with doses of irregular nuclear workers often un(der)counted. 
In a fast-track 40-year plan to decommission Fukushima Daiichi 
(i.e.  removing the cores and dismantling the plant), as of August 2015 
roughly 45,000 irregular workers (‘front-line’ workers, or ‘nuclear gypsies’) 
had been assembled at the J-Village Iwaki-Naraha soccer stadium before 
entering the sites. As well as jobs at the power stations, they work on 
decontamination and construction sites throughout the prefecture, which 
include those designated for the 2020 Olympics, a new school in Futaba 
(the town nearest to FDNPS), a large centre for radiation monitoring, 
a large research and training institute for reactor decommissioning, and 
a giant sea wall for tsunami prevention (see also Chapter Five). Yakuza-
linked labour brokers (tehaishi/ninpu-dashi), eager to profit from the post-
3.11 decommissioning budget (conservatively estimated at $150 billion), 
use social media and oral contracts to recruit these workers from the most 
vulnerable populations for ‘clean up’ work.16 In this customary cascade 
of diluted responsibility, their original wage and conditions are skimmed 
or cut away (pinhane sareta ピンハネされた) by contractors (roughly 
733 companies) so that some irregular workers receive as little as 6,000 
yen per day and only a very small fraction of the 10,000 yen per day 
in danger money promised by the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) 
and TEPCO.17
Irregular workers’ oral contracts with tehaishi are often illegal or 
dangerous, and are sometimes imposed on workers through threats or use 
of force.18 In addition, the day labourer may become indebted to tehaishi 
for housing and/or loans for lifestyle dependencies (i.e. gambling, drugs, 
prostitution). As products of structural discrimination, itinerant and/or 
15  Editors, ‘Fukushima daiichi genshiryoku hatsudensho sagyōsha no hibaku senryōen no hibaku 
se ni tsuite’, TEPCO, 31 July 2015, www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu15_j/images/150731j0604.pdf. 
Accessed 1 August 2015.
16  See Hiroko Tabuchi, ‘Unskilled Recruited for Fukushima Duty’, The Age, 18 March 2014, www.
theage.com.au/world/unskilled-recruited-for-fukushima-duty-20140318-hvk08.html; Saito Mari 
and Antoni Slodowski, ‘Japan’s Homeless Recruited for Murky Fukushima Clean-up’, Reuters, www.
reuters.com/article/us-fukushima-workers-idusbre9bt00520131230.
17  Michael Okwu, ‘Gangsters and “Slaves”: The People Cleaning Up Fukushima’, Al Jazeera 
America, 8 January 2014, america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-
blog/2014/1/7/fukushima-cleanupworkerssubcontractors.html.
18  Editor, ‘Yajuku rōdōsha no genpatsu hibakusha no jittai o tekisuto shite itadakimashita’, 
Sanya Blog - Yajuku-sha shitsugyō sha undō hōkoku, 15 April 2011, san-ya.at.webry.info/201103/
article_11.html. Accessed 19 January 2016.
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irregular workers who are already socially isolated may find it difficult 
to build support networks, whether through marriage, family or solid 
friendships. Obligated within a semi-legal economy and stripped of rights 
and protections, each worker is pitted against the other, young and old, 
stronger and weaker, individual and family man, for basic survival. 
Over the past 40 years, poor monitoring and record-keeping has meant 
that many former nuclear workers who develop leukaemia and other 
illnesses have been denied government compensation due to their 
lawyers’ inability to prove the etiological link between their disease 
and employment. For example, the death of Yoshida Masao (58), the 
Fukushima Daiichi manager who was among the ‘Fukushima 50’ who 
remained at the plant to manage the nuclear meltdowns in their critical 
phase and who developed oesophagal cancer in 2013, was not recognised 
by TEPCO as related to radiation exposure from Fukushima Daiichi as 
the cancer was deemed to have developed too quickly after the initial 
accident.
Irregular nuclear workers have commonly relied on permanent employees 
to monitor, record and calibrate their doses. Denied sufficient information 
about radiation exposure risks, and preferring not to jeopardise their 
contracts and provoke physical intimidation if they complain about 
their conditions, many collude with company officers (who record their 
accumulated doses) to camouflage and underestimate their dose rates 
(particularly for internal doses). This allows them to extend their time 
and contracts at nuclear plants before they are deemed to have reached 
(or  exceeded) the maximum annual dose limit (50 mSv/y).19 When a 
nuclear worker is diagnosed with abnormalities in a routine check-up, 
some subcontractors may falsify nuclear workers’ passbooks.20 Despite the 
long lives of internalised radionuclides, it has been customary either not 
to measure this properly and/or to simply reset the dose record at the 
end of each financial year.21 While protective clothing and procedures 
have grown more stringent for nuclear workers, especially after some 
workers died and fell ill from heat-related causes, irregular workers remain 
19  On methods of dosimetry camouflage see Paul Jobin, ‘Radiation Protection After the Fukushima 
Nuclear Disaster 3.11’, The Journal of Ohara Institute for Social Research 658 (August 2013): 9.
20  Jobin, ‘Radiation Protection’, 9.
21  In the 1980s, it was standard practice at the Tsuruga plant of the Japan Atomic Power Company 
(JAPC) to reset accumulated doses to zero on four days of every month. See Tanaka Yuki, ‘Nuclear 
Power Plant Gypsies’, 9. 
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far less protected.22 At Fukushima Daiichi, where crews are overworked 
and understaffed, irregular workers often commit errors leading to 
cases of serious injury and large leaks of radioactive materials into the 
environment. This is further compounded by the lack of understanding 
or recognition of chronic illnesses in either permanent or irregular nuclear 
workers. This has sometimes led to poorly explained deaths of nuclear 
workers.23
In October 2015, a welder in his late 30s and father of three from Kita-
Kyushu became the first worker in four years to be awarded workers’ 
insurance payments (medical costs and loss of income for temporary 
disability) while three more cases remained undecided. He was 
diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukaemia after having accumulated 
19.8  mSv/y  from exposure to a radiation leak and one year’s work at 
Fukushima Daiichi (Reactors 3 and 4) and the Genkai nuclear plant 
(Kyushu) (both of which use MOX fuel).24 While compensation was 
recognised under nuclear workers’ compensation insurance legislation 
(1976), the Health Ministry maintained that a causal link between illness 
and employment remains to be scientifically proven. After the delayed 
report by TEPCO of 1,973 workers exposed to over 100 mSv/y by 
mid-2013, by August 2015 21,000 of the 45,000 irregular workers had 
been exposed to over 5  mSv/y and 9,000 workers to over 20 mSv/y.25 
TEPCO and the central government would certainly be worried about a 
spike in compensation claims. 
Without a proper health regime, the permanent damage incurred by 
irregular nuclear workers far outweighs the value of their cheap labour 
power. With their use as filters as they move to each plant, as nuclear 
22  Kazumi Takaki, ‘Listen to their Silent Cry’, 10. 
23  See, for example, Fukushima Daiichi genshiryoku hatsudensho no jōkyō ni tsuite, 30 July 2016, 
TEPCO, www.tepco.co.jp/press/report/2016/1314410_8693.html. 
24  Mixed-Oxide fuel (MOX) combines uranium (U238) and plutonium (Pu 239-240) in nuclear 
fission. The plutonium component makes the fuel even more toxic as well as producing longer-lived 
waste than with uranium fuel.
25  Yuri Oiwa, ‘Ministry Recognizes Link between Fukushima Nuclear Worker’s Leukemia 
and Radiation Exposure for 1st Time’, Asahi Shimbun, 20 October 2015, ajw.asahi.com/
article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201510200086. Since the time of writing, this article has been 
made unavailable online. For verification, an online mirror link can be found at: www.fukushima-
is-still-news.com/2015/10/worker-cancer-case-confirmed-2.html. It is worth recalling that in 2013 
TEPCO, after an earlier underestimation of ‘only 178’ workers, had finally admitted that 1,973 
workers had been exposed to over 100 mSv/y. See ‘Nearly 2000 at Fukushima No. 1 Face Higher 
Thyroid Cancer Risk’, Japan Times, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/19/national/1973-
fukushima-plant-workers-show-higher-risk-for-thyroid-cancer/#.V9ff_LXgwXg.
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workers grow older and sicker they become less able to commodify their 
labour and are unlikely to receive proper treatment and/or compensation 
(due to insufficient data and high radiation safety limits among other 
things). Although the endless production of labour willing to take on 
this dangerous work and the devolution of responsibility and ambiguity 
around radiation health effects are used to justify the continuation 
of these practices, if workers are knowingly placed in harmful conditions 
the employer is in breach of a duty of care under the Labour Standards 
Law. As byproducts of a discriminatory industrial labour system, these 
irregular nuclear workers and their families, like many elsewhere, are 
deprived of basic rights to health and well-being. As one labourer stated in 
relation to Fukushima Daiichi: ‘TEPCO is God. The main contractors are 
kings, and we are slaves’.26 In short, Fukushima Daiichi clearly illustrates 
the social reproduction, exploitation and disposability of informal labour, 
in the state protection of capital, corporations and their assets.
Conditions for Residents of Post-3.11 
Radiation-Affected Areas
For roughly 30 years, the exclusion zone around Chernobyl has been set 
at 30 kilometres. Between 1 and 5 mSv/y is the assisted evacuation level 
and mandatory evacuation is 5 mSv/y and above. Unlike the approach 
adopted for Chernobyl, which was to achieve containment (a sarcophagus 
was built in eight months) and permanent resettlement of 350,000 people, 
the government and TEPCO have adopted a ‘dilution’ approach—
to widely disperse and redistribute (‘share’) radioactive materials and 
waste and decontaminate residential areas. To date, this has permitted 
the permanent release through venting, dumping and incinerating of 
radioactive materials into the air, land, water and sea, and circulation in 
the food chain and recycled materials on a daily basis since March 2011.
Over the first few days at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, 
severity (International Nuclear Event Scale) levels were steadily raised 
from level 3 to level 5 to level 7, and the mandatory evacuation zone 
was gradually expanded from 10 to 30 kilometres. On 16 March 2011, 
readings in Aizu-Wakamatsu Middle School (100 kilometres from 
FDNPS) in Fukushima Prefecture returned 2.57 microSv/h (microsieverts 
26  Okwu, ‘Gangsters and “Slaves”’.
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per hour),27 and Kōriyama (60 kilometres) recordings returned 3.6–3.9 
microSv/h. Inside people’s homes in Kōriyama, levels were between 1.5 
and 2.0 microSv/h and 8.2 microSv/h in the downpipes.28 This data was 
made public only three months later. On 6 April, schools in Fukushima 
Prefecture were reopened. As the boundaries, legal limits and information 
were gradually altered, populations were urged to return to work. At the 
same time the legal safety level for mandatory evacuation for the public 
(radiation safety level 1972) was raised from 1 to 20 mSv/y,29 based on 
a cumulative 100 mSv dose averaged over five years, suddenly shifting 
the parameters for ‘low-level’ radiation and designating the general public 
with the level previously designated to nuclear workers. 
The US Government advised a mandatory evacuation zone of 50 miles 
(80 kilometres). Several nations’ embassies in Tokyo evacuated their staff. 
Of roughly 2 million in Fukushima Prefecture, about 80,000 people 
from 11 municipalities were ordered to evacuate while another 80,000 
evacuated voluntarily. By late 2015, about 118,862 remained evacuated.30 
Sixty thousand of these people live in temporary housing and many 
lacked basic needs. There were many evacuees who sought public housing 
27  There is discrepancy on this measurement. Officially, the Japanese Government calculates 0.23 
microSv/h = 1 mSv/y based on an average eight hours/day outdoors per person. The ICRP, however, 
calculates 0.08 microSv/h = 1 mSv/y. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sievert-ICRP_definition_of_the_sievert. 
When including normal background radiation, calculations normally vary between 0.11 and 0.18 
microSv/h. This is complicated by the fact that radiation from Fukushima Daiichi has been and 
continues to be distributed across the entirety of Japan, so that normal background post-3.11 is in fact 
abnormally elevated. See See Hiroshi Ishizuka, ‘Cesium from Fukushima Plant Fell all over Japan’, 
Asahi Shimbun, 26 November 2011, ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/aj201111260001. 
Since the time of writing, this article has been made unavailable online. For verification, an online 
mirror link can be found at: www.infiniteunknown.net/2011/11/27/cesium-from-fukushima-plant-
fell-all-over-japan-even-on-okinawa-1700-km-from-nuke-plant/. 
28  Kataoka Terumi on 18 May 2012 as recorded for the Fukushima kokusodan (Fukushima plaintiffs) 
presentation to the Fukushima district attorney’s office against 33 TEPCO past and present officers, 
government officials and medical experts made in 2013. See N. Field and M. Mizenko eds, Fukushima 
Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Was Committed?, Amazon Digital Services: Complainants for 
Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 1st edition (12 May 2015), 360.
29  The Radiation Safety Level law permits nuclear workers 100 mSv over 5 years and no more than 
50 mSv in any year; female workers no more than 5 mSv in 3 months; denies citizens entry to areas of 
5.2 mSv/y, women are limited to 2 mSv/y; 5 mSv is the threshold for claims of occupational disease; 
food in general is measured below 1 mSv/y; 5 mSv and above prohibits residence and consumption 
of food and water. 
30  Although it was reported by the end of 2015 that this number had dropped to below 100,000, 
there was some discrepancy in calculation as those who had bought houses in the locations they had 
evacuated to were no longer included as ‘evacuees’. See Editors, ‘Fukushima Nuclear Evacuees Fall 
Below 100,000’, Japan Times, 9 January 2016, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/01/09/national/
fukushima-nuclear-evacuees-fall-100000/#.VpDnE1LzN_l.
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who have been turned away.31 There are additional evacuees affected by 
the earthquakes and tsunami who come from other prefectures (including 
parts of Miyagi and Ibaraki), some of whom were also affected by radiation 
exposure.
The situation in many villages within contaminated areas signifies how 
government policies have further exposed a wide range of people—farmers, 
shopkeepers, taxi drivers, factory workers, mothers (as reproductive 
workers), school students, local public servants—to conditions informal 
workers have long had to endure. In several cases (i.e. Iitate, Minami Soma, 
Namie), the notification of residents of radiation danger was delayed and 
potassium iodide pills were not distributed. Similarly, data on weather 
patterns and distribution gathered by the SPEEDI monitoring system32 
was suppressed. These populations were not adequately informed of what 
the dose readings meant in terms of health risk. When people did seek 
measurement and treatment for their likely exposures, hospitals and other 
institutions with the requisite measuring technologies refused to measure 
them, as it was deemed ‘there was no reason for internal contamination 
and so there was no reason to measure’.33 These people unwittingly became 
hibakusha (被曝者), broadly defined as victims of radiation exposure.
Even though the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster has caused near-
permanent pollution, the conflation of the radiation problem with 
tsunami and earthquake destruction to be managed as a single large-
scale ‘clean-up’, reconstruction and revitalisation operation as instituted 
by the National Resilience Council 2013 has occluded the materiality of 
radiation. Informal workers on ‘decontamination projects’ washed down 
public buildings and homes and scraped up and replaced soil and sludge 
contaminated at levels found for example at between 84,000–446,000 
31  By the end of 2015, Fukushima Prefecture had built housing for around 17 per cent of the 
43,700 Fukushima households that remained without a permanent home. This was based on the 
categorisation of ‘long-term evacuee’ as only pertaining to those who only wanted to remain evacuated 
until evacuation orders had been lifted. Those who wanted to remain evacuated permanently or 
until safety had been proven were not considered ‘long-term evacuees’. Editors, ‘Nuclear evacuees 
surveyed about living in public housing later became non-eligible’, The Mainichi, 5 December 2015, 
mainichi.jp/english/articles/20151205/p2a/00m/0na/013000c. Since the time of writing, this article 
has been made unavailable online. For verification, an online mirror link can be found at: dunrenard.
wordpress.com/2016/page/153/.
32  SPEEDI monitoring system is the computer-based emergency response system linked to the 
Japan Weather Association and Science and Technology Agency of Japan to predict radiological 
impacts in local and workplace areas due to nuclear accident.
33  Takahashi Kei in Allain de Halleux, Fukushima e yōkosō, vol. 1 (at 4 min 40 sec), 14 June 2013, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjv1b6Zn9DY. Accessed 15 May 2015. 
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Becquerels per kilogram (Bq/kg) in Kōriyama (60 km from Fukushima 
Daiichi).34 They also collected waste that included radioactive debris, 
uniforms and tools. The organic waste is stored on government-purchased 
land in black industrial bags piled in large walls and mounds to create 
a sort of buffer zone on town margins and in areas determined as long-
term irradiated zones.35 Other contaminated waste is burned in newly 
constructed incinerators in towns nearest the plant (such as Futaba, 
Okuma, Naraha, Tamura, Tomioka, with more planned) in addition 
to the incineration already underway in major cities since 3.11, even 
while evacuees are being compelled to return to some of them (Tamura, 
Kawauchi, Naraha) where evacuation orders have been lifted. In addition, 
in June 2016 the Ministry of the Environment approved radioactive soil 
of up to 8,000 Bq/kg to be reused in national public works. Although 
stipulated to be used for roads and barriers (such as sea walls) under a layer 
of non-contaminated materials, there is concern that these will corrode 
over time leading to recirculation in the environment.
As compensation schemes are contingent upon where evacuees come from 
(whether these are areas where there are plans to lift evacuation orders, 
areas pending decontamination in the shorter term, or those deemed 
difficult to return to), those mandatory evacuees without property have 
received on average 100,000 yen per month while voluntary evacuees have 
received 60,000 yen per month, even if radiation levels in their residential 
areas were high. The return to towns that received over 50 mSv/y (Futaba, 
Namie, Okuma) remains unlikely for decades, but if evacuees do return 
to other villages, they risk lifetime re-exposures of up to 20 mSv/y. In late 
2015, Iitate village, for example, was divided into Areas 1 and 2, which 
34  Wada Nanako (Hanawa-machi liaison for the incineration of radioactive debris and member of 
Fukushima kokuso-dan) in Anonymous, Témoignages No.1, Association Franco-Japonaise ASUKA 
2014: 13 (1–18). For a copy, contact www.asuka-association.org/contact/. The calculation of 
radiation distributed in soil as it translates to potential damage to the human body has significant 
variables and is contested. The provisional safety limit was 500 Bq/kg, which was lowered to 100 
Bq/kg in Japan after Fukushima. The ICRP calculated that a total body activity of 1,400 Becquerels 
would correspond to 20 Bq/kg of body weight in a 70 kg adult and is equivalent to 0.1 mSv/y 
exposure. That would make the internationally accepted limit of 1 mSv/y equate to 200 Bq/kg in a 
70 kg adult or 14,000 Bq in soil. See Stephen Starr, ‘Implications of the Massive Contamination of 
Japan with Radioactive Cesium’, 11 March 2013, Helen Caldicott Foundation Symposium, New York 
Academy of Medicine. For an alternative calculation see fn 61.
35  Watanabe Miyoko (Tamura) observed that in spite of their protests, ‘400 tons per day of 
irradiated waste is burned everywhere. [This is planned] in our village factory’. ‘Témoignages No.1’, 
2014. Further, Wada Nanako testified that ‘Incinerators have been built, sometimes secretly, in 
Samegawa, Sōma, Fukushima, Kōriyama [and Miyakoji in Tamura]. There will be 20 built in total’. 
‘Témiognages No. 1’, 2014: 13.
NEW WORLDS FROM BELOW
144
are being prepared for repopulation (54,000 people), and Area 3, which 
so far remains out of bounds. Although the topsoil contaminated with 
Caesium was stripped and replaced (i.e. returning 0.6 microSv/h) and its 
houses and roads were washed down, 96 per cent of Iitate remained at 
1 microSv/h. As Iitate is 75 per cent forest, which trapped a large stock 
of contamination, the land re-concentrates through radiation circulation 
(hence, quickly returned to 2.6 microSv/h).36 If the majority in Iitate, 
who are primarily agricultural workers, can no longer harvest vegetables, 
rice, wild mushrooms and vegetables (sansai 山菜) or burn wood for heat, 
and their houses are re-irradiated, then only the semi-autonomous elderly 
are likely to return. By August 2015, less than 10 per cent of roughly 
14,000 eligible had applied for temporary return.37 
So-called ‘decontamination’ and ‘remediation’ has been deployed to justify 
redefining evacuation boundaries and lifting evacuation orders so as to 
cut compensation payments. Following the 37th National Emergency 
Response Headquarters meeting held at the Prime Minister’s Office in 
June 2015 in which the Prime Minister decreed that ‘evacuees must return 
to their hometowns as quickly as possible and start new lives’,38 in late 
August 2015 evacuees were told if they chose to return home they would 
receive a one-off payment of 100,000 yen per household. If they did not, 
once evacuation orders had been lifted, ‘free rent’ (yachin hojo 家賃補助) 
for voluntary evacuees would be cut by March 2017 at the very latest.39 
Further, the government announced its intention to partially lift the 
restriction on the ‘difficult-to-return zone’ by 2022 so as to counteract 
the negative image of the area and its produce.40 Without alternative 
income, and with a significant housing shortage due to the restriction 
36  Greenpeace, ‘Investigation Exposes Failure of Fukushima Decontamination Program’, 21 July 2015, 
www.greenpeace.org/japan/ja/news/press/2015/pr20150721/20150721-Press-Release-Greenpeace 
-investigation -exposes-failure-of-Fukushima-decontamination-program-/. Accessed 22 July 2015. 
37  In other towns such as Naraha, where an estimated 46 per cent of 7,368 registered evacuees 
hope to return while only 780 are willing to return immediately, personal radiation monitors were 
distributed and radiation monitoring of tap water and water filtration systems implemented to 
reassure them that it was safe. See ‘Evacuation Order Lifted Completely in Naraha near Wrecked 
Fukushima Plant’, Japan Times, 5 September 2015,  www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/05/national/
japan-to-lift-evacuation-order-for-fukushima-town-of-naraha/.
38 Government of Japan (GoJ), The Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, June 2015, japan.
kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201506/12article1.html.
39  Editors, ‘Fukushima Prefecture Looking to End Free Rent for Voluntary Disaster Evacuees in 
2017’, The Mainichi, 16 June 2015, mainichi.jp/english/articles/20150616/p2a/00m/0na/015000c. 
Accessed August 2015.
40  Otsuki Noriyoshi, ‘Ban to be Lifted on Fukushima’s Worst Affected Zone by 2022’, Asahi 
Shimbun, 1 September 2016, www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201609010066.html. 
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of new public housing, many have been and will be forced to return to 
contaminated areas, to endure radiation exposure without compensation. 
If only the elderly return, there will be few prospects for young families 
in such towns where there is little local business and infrastructure, and 
public facilities and housing are in disrepair. 
In Naraha, between May and August 2015, ambient readings in populated 
areas officially determined as ‘low or moderate’ returned 0.3–0.7 microSv/h 
and soil samples returned 26,480–52,500 Bq/kg of Caesium 137 and 
134 combined (and 18,700 Bq/kg in the town’s water reservoir).41 While 
the majority of former residents are more likely to either pull down their 
houses and sell the land or maintain their homes as vacationers, there is 
additional private and state pressure to industrialise these former idylls as 
‘reconstruction hubs’. As part of the ‘Innovation Coast’ plan, for example, 
1,000 irregular workers have resided on the town’s outskirts as they built a 
giant research facility (estimated cost: 85 billion yen) to train hundreds of 
workers in reactor simulations and use of specialised robots. As industry 
colonises and transforms such towns, the pressing concern of unmitigated 
radiation levels in soil, forests and water, whether from distribution or 
recirculation, remains due to the long-lived decay and harmful effects of 
these radionuclides. 
Similarly, in the effort to stimulate business, highways (Route 6) and 
train lines (Jōban line) passing directly through the (former) evacuation 
zone were reopened in 2015, although traffic must still travel with closed 
windows at the time of writing. Regular users of these corridors such as 
railway and transport workers and irregular nuclear workers accumulate 
higher doses from regular exposure while radioactive particles attached to 
vehicles are dispersed beyond contaminated areas. Clearly, a containment 
and permanent resettlement approach has been deemed untenable in the 
belief it would disrupt economic productivity levels. As one high school 
student insightfully observed, ‘Sensei … If they [really wanted to turn] 
Fukushima into an evacuation zone they’d have to block the Route 4 
highway, Tōhoku expressway and Shinkansen’.42 Nevertheless, in lieu of 
overall reconstruction costs less conservatively estimated at half a trillion 
dollars, it may have been cheaper in the longer term to adopt permanent 
resettlement, education, health treatment and work creation strategies.
41  Iwaki Monitoring Centre, www.iwakisokuteishitu.com/pdf/weekly_data.pdf.
42  Kazuki Jinno (35 years old) in Fukushima Radiation, 2015: 537.
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Official Medicine: The (Il)logic of Radiation 
Dosimetry 
On what basis have these policies on radiation from Fukushima Daiichi 
been made? Instead of containing contamination, the authorities have 
mounted a concerted campaign to convince the public that it is safe 
to live with radiation in areas that should be considered uninhabitable 
and unusable according to internationally accepted standards. To do 
so, they have concealed from public knowledge the material conditions 
of radiation contamination so as to facilitate the return of the evacuee 
population to ‘normalcy’, or life as it was before 3.11. This position has 
been further supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which stated annual doses of up to 20 mSv/y are safe for the 
total population including women and children.43 The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and United Nations Scientific Commission on the 
Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) also asserted that there were no 
‘immediate’ radiation related illnesses or deaths (genpatsu kanren shi 原発
関連死) and declared the major health impact to be psychological. 
While the central and prefectural governments have repeatedly reassured 
the public since the beginning of the disaster that there is no immediate 
health risk, in May 2011 access to official statistics for cancer-related 
illnesses (including leukaemia) in Fukushima and southern Miyagi 
prefectures was shut down. On 6 December 2013, the Special Secrets 
Protection Law (Tokutei Himitsu Hogo Hō 特定秘密保護法) aimed at 
restricting government employees and experts from giving journalists 
access to information deemed sensitive to national security was passed 
(effective December 2014). Passed at the same time was the Cancer 
Registration Law (Gan Tōroku Hō 癌登録法), which made it illegal to 
share medical data or information on radiation-related issues including 
evaluation of medical data obtained through screenings, and denied 
public access to certain medical records, with violations punishable with 
a 2 million yen fine or 5–10 years’ imprisonment. In January 2014, the 
IAEA, UNSCEAR and Fukushima Prefecture and Fukushima Medical 
University (FMU) signed a confidentiality agreement to control medical 
data on radiation. All medical personnel (hospitals) must submit data 
43  IAEA, ‘Actions to protect the public in an emergency due to severe conditions at Light Water 
Reactor’, May (2013): 97, accessed August 2015, www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/
EPR-NPP_PPA_web.pdf.
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(mortality, morbidity, general illnesses from radiation exposures) to 
a central repository run by the FMU and IAEA.44 It is likely this data 
has been collected in the large Fukushima Centre for Environmental 
Creation, which opened in Minami-Sōma in late 2015 to communicate 
‘accurate information on radiation to the public and dispel anxiety’.
This official position contrasts with the results of the first round of the 
Fukushima Health Management Survey (October 2011 – April 2015) of 
370,000 young people (under 18 at the time of the disaster) in Fukushima 
prefecture since 3.11, as mandated in the Children and Disaster Victims 
Support Act (June 2012).45 The survey report admitted that paediatric 
thyroid cancers were ‘several tens of times larger’ (suitei sareru yūbyōsū 
ni kurabete sūjūbai no ōdā de ōi 推定される有病数に比べて数十倍の
オーダーで多い) than the amount estimated.46 By 30 September 2015, 
as part of the second-round screening (April 2014–March 2016) to be 
conducted once every two years until the age of 20 and once every five 
years after 20, there were 15 additional confirmed thyroid cancers coming 
to a total of 152 malignant or suspected paediatric thyroid cancer cases 
with 115 surgically confirmed and 37 awaiting surgical confirmation. 
Almost all have been papillary thyroid cancer with only three as poorly 
differentiated thyroid cancer (these are no less dangerous). By June 2016, 
this had increased to 173 confirmed (131) or suspected (42) paediatric 
thyroid cancer cases.47
The National Cancer Research Center also estimated an increase of 
childhood thyroid cancer by 61 times, from the 2010 national average 
of 1–3 per million to 1 in 3,000 children. Other estimates of exposure 
to radiation, obtained from direct thyroid measurements in Namie town 
in April 2011, although discontinued under government pressure, also 
returned much higher results than official estimates (i.e. 80 per cent 
44  Editors, ‘Gan tōroku hō no seiritsu, kuni ga zenkoku no kanja jōhōhan wo database ni’, Huffington 
Post, 6 December 2013, www.huffingtonpost.jp/2013/12/06/cancer-datebace-japan_n_4396656.html. 
Accessed 15 July 2015.
45  The Act stipulates expanded health checkups; assessment of doses and their health effects; 
alleviation of health concerns; long-term support for radiation effects; support for choice of residence 
and settlement; provision of regular medical care; reduction of medical expenses for children (unborn 
included) and pregnant women; lifelong medical checkups for those from contaminated areas.
46  Fukushima Prefectural Government, 19th Prefectural Oversight Committee Meeting for 
the Fukushima Health Management Survey, Fukushima Prefecture, 18 May (2015): 1, www.pref.
fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/115335.pdf.
47  Yuri Oiwa, ‘15 More Child Thyroid Cancer Cases Found in Fukushima’, Asahi Shimbun, 7 June 
2016, www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201606070042.html. 
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positive, 1 at 89 mSv, 5 over 50 mSv, 10 at 10mSv or under).48 In April 
2014, Dr Tsuda Toshihide, an epidemiologist at Okayama University, 
declared this a ‘thyroid cancer epidemic’ (kōjōsen densenbyō 甲状腺伝染
病), and predicted multiple illnesses from long-term internal radiation 
below 100 mSv/y and advocated for a program of outbreak (emergency 
or rapid) epidemiology in and outside Fukushima.49 Similarly, a Tokyo-
based physician, Dr Mita Shigeru, circulated a public statement notifying 
his colleagues of his intention to relocate his practice to Okayama due 
to overwhelming evidence of unusual symptoms in his patients (roughly 
2,000). Given that soil in Tokyo post-Fukushima returned between 1,000 
and 4,000 Bq/kg, as compared to an average of 500 Bq/kg (Cs 137 only) 
in Kiev soil, Mita pointed to a correlation between these symptoms and 
the significant radiation contamination in Tōhoku and metropolitan 
Tokyo.50
While results from the Fukushima Health Survey demonstrate flaws in 
the official dosimetry model and public safety campaign, the survey itself 
also has clear limitations. It is limited to subjects in a specific age bracket 
in one prefecture and one non-fatal illness (thyroid cancer, which can be 
treated with surgery but has lifelong side effects) from the ingestion of one 
radionuclide (Iodine 131) with a relatively short half-life (eight days) that 
comprised only 9.1 per cent of the total releases. Its dosimetry is based on 
the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) model,51 which is 
for external exposure only, does not account for exposures in the initial 
days of the disaster and uses Japanese Government data that has been 
criticised for underestimating releases and exposures.52 Further, the survey 
ignores the damage from the bulk of the total inventory including longer-
48  The most contaminated area is Nakadōri (605 per million, 50 times higher than total) while 
other parts are 12 times the total. Editors, ‘Fukushima Government Terminated Iodine 131 
Exposure Study, Citing it Might Concern Residents’, Simply Info, 14 June 2013, www.fukuleaks.org/
web/?p=6243. Accessed January 2015.
49  Ministry of the Environment (MoE), 8th Expert Meeting, Status of Disaster Victims’ Health 
Management, 16 July 2014, in Editors, ‘Running Backwards on Health Support after the Nuclear 
Accident: Ministry of Environment Expert Meeting’, Tokyo Shimbun, 22 July 2014. 
50  Mita Shigeru, ‘Why did I Leave Tokyo’ [letter to Association of Doctors in Kodaira, WNCR, 
16 July 2014, www.save-children-from-radiation.org/2014/07/16/a-tokyo-doctor-who-has-moved-
to-western-japan-urges-fellow-doctors-to-promote-radiation-protection-a-message-from-dr-mita-to-
his-colleagues-in-kodaira-city-t/. Accessed 17 July 2014.
51  Keiichi Akahane et al., ‘NIRS External Dose Estimation System for Fukushima Residents after 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accident’, Nature Scientific Reports 2013 (3): 1670, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC3628369/.
52  See ‘New Radiation Release Estimates Compiled’, Simply Info, 4 November 2013, accessed 
January 2015, www.fukuleaks.org/web/?p=11668.
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lived radionuclides (such as Plutonium 239, Caesium 137, Strontium 
90, Americium 241, among others), some of which are more difficult to 
measure on ordinary and less sensitive Geiger counters and which have 
been distributed and continue to circulate across a wide area. It also ignores 
other organ diseases, unusual chronic illnesses and premature births and 
stillbirths, voluntary terminations and birth deformities occurring in and 
beyond Fukushima prefecture.
In addition to the control of relevant data, the government has used other 
methods to encourage residents to stay in radiation-contaminated areas. 
In May 2011, Dr Yamashita Shunichi, then co-director of Fukushima 
Medical University and the Fukushima Health Management Survey and 
a specialist from Nagasaki on radiation illness in Chernobyl, declared there 
was a 1 in 1 million chance of children getting any kind of cancer from 
radiation and there would be negligible health damage from radiation 
below 100 microSv/h, and prescribed smiling as an aid to living with 
radiation to a public audience in Fukushima.53
Dr Yamashita is only one among a host of politicians, bureaucrats, experts 
and advertising and media consultants who support the post-3.11 safety 
mantra of anshin (secure 安心), anzen (safe 安全), fukkō (recovery 復
興). Through public meetings, media channels, education manuals and 
workshops,54 local citizens in Fukushima Prefecture were inundated with 
optimistic and reassuring messages, also known as ‘risk communication 
discourse’, and central and prefectural government-sponsored ‘health 
seminars’ encouraging a ‘practical radiation protection culture’ in which 
they have been urged to take responsibility (jiko sekinin 自己責任) for 
their own health (e.g. wearing glass badges, self-monitoring, avoiding 
hotspots), form bonds of solidarity (kizuna 絆) with their community 
and participate in the great reconstruction (fukkatsu 復活) for the 
revitalisation of a resilient nation (kyōjinka kokka 強靭化国家) as a whole. 
To counteract baseless rumours (ryūgen higo 流言蜚語) and the negative 
impact of gossip (fūhyō higai 風評被害) of radiation in contaminated 
53  See ‘Unbelievable Comment by Mr. Yamashita’, 8 May 2011, accessed 15 August 2015, www.
youtube.com/watch?v=UOgaBUDFeb4&feature=related. Another physician, Dr Arai from Asahi 
Nairyō Clinic, Kōriyama, who subscribes to the hormesis theory, augmented the description of ‘low 
level radiation’ (up to 50 mSv/y) as ‘an angel’s smile’, while claiming that food with small amounts of 
radiation would attract a premium, and that Fukushima would become the number one health land 
in the country. See Asahi Nairyō Clinic, December 2012, e.oisyasan.ne.jp/asahi-cl/topics/radi.html.
54  Such as ‘Public Opinion Policy Related to Nuclear Power’ by JAERO (Japan Atomic Energy 
Research Organisation/Nihon Genshiryoku Bunka Zaidan); ‘The Nuclear Power Story’ by the 
Ministry of Education (MEXT); ‘Nuclear Fuel Cycle lectures’ by the Ministry of Finance (MoF).
NEW WORLDS FROM BELOW
150
Fukushima produce, citizens in and beyond Fukushima Prefecture, and 
even non-citizens, have been encouraged to buy and consume Fukushima 
produce as an expression of moral and economic support (through 
slogans such as ‘Ganbare Fukushima!’ がんばれ福島!). At the same time, 
to reduce ‘radiophobia’ and anxiety, while focusing on the psychological 
impact from stress, health risks from radiation exposures have been 
trivialised and/or normalised for the general public.55 
This approach is backed up by international nuclear-related agencies. 
As stipulated on 28 May 1959 in the ‘WHA12-40’ agreement, the 
WHO is mandated to report all data on health effects from radiation 
exposures to the IAEA, which controls publication. On no other medical 
health issue is the WHO required to defer publication responsibilities 
to another institution. Scientific expertise at the IAEA primarily lies in 
nuclear physics (radiology and dosimetry) as opposed to epidemiology 
and medical expertise on radiation effects to living tissue. The IAEA and 
its related UN bodies are informed by the International Commission 
of Radiation Protection (ICRP) recommendations on radiation dose 
assessments derived from the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission/
Radiation Exposure Research Foundation (ABCC/RERF) lifetime studies 
of hibakusha (被爆者) in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This dosimetry is 
primarily based on an average exposure of a 20–30-year-old ‘reference 
man’ (originally modelled on a US Army soldier) mainly to short-term 
one-off acute gamma radiation exposure. While it recommends caution, 
the ICRP continues to maintain that anything below 100 mSv/y is a 
‘low dose’ and that the risk of ‘stochastic effects’ are yet to be scientifically 
proven beyond doubt. Within this framework, it would seem reasonable 
to raise the level from 1 to 20 mSv/y. 
The ABCC/RERF studies ignored, however, biological contingencies 
of sex, age, constitution, other health conditions and the variegated 
effects (including complicating chemical and metabolic dynamics) 
55  MEXT booklets designed for students at all levels assert that (a one-time external exposure 
dose) below 100 mSv/y is negligible; natural and man-made radiation have the same effect; cancer 
has multiple causes and is difficult to trace; and that radioactive materials are no longer harmful after 
they bond with soil. See www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shuppan/sonota/attach/1313004.htm. Further, 
Kataoka Terumi testified that public health leaflets in Kōriyama were distributed stating, ‘In the 
future, one in two children in your class will have a cancer, and ten of them will die’, as part of 
a program to familiarise children to the realities of cancer. Kataoka reports that the leaflets were 
subsequently withdrawn from circulation due to a negative public response.’ Association Franco-
Japonaise (ASUKA), Témoignages No.1 [Statements by Fukushima genpatsu kokuso-dan] (2014): 7. 
For a copy contact: www.asuka-association.org/contact/.
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from both internal and external exposures to different radionuclides of 
all types (‘low level’ internal radiation is at least 20 times greater). After 
Chernobyl, the WHO and IAEA used the ICRP dose model to conclude 
that there were up to 56 deaths of ‘liquidators’ (clean-up workers) 
from acute radiation sickness and 4,000 additional cancers;56 and that 
environmental effects such as lifestyle (i.e. parental alcoholism, smoking) 
and ‘radiophobia’ (stress and depression) contributed to excess illnesses 
in 80 per cent of adult cases. It also concluded that no harm would be 
received by the 2 million farmers and more than 500,000 children who 
continued living in radioactive areas in Belarus. 
Nevertheless, it is no longer possible to ignore a significant body of research, 
including 20 years of scientific studies compiled in Belarus and Ukraine 
that show serious depopulation, ongoing illnesses and state decline.57 
These studies have found genetic effects within a radius of 250–300 km 
from Chernobyl, while children’s health in Belarus has declined from a 
situation where 80 per cent of the child population was healthy prior to the 
Chernobyl disaster to a situation post-Chernobyl where only 20 per cent 
are healthy.58 In 1995, Professor Nechaev from the Ministry of Health and 
Medical Industry (Moscow) stated that 2.5 million people were irradiated 
from Chernobyl in the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian Prime Minister 
Marchuk stated that 3.1 million had been exposed to Chernobyl radiation 
and Professor Okeanov from Belarus observed a spike in leukaemia and 
cancers among liquidators in Gomel relative to duration of exposure.59 
By 2001, of 800,000 healthy Russian and Ukrainian liquidators (with an 
average age of 33 years) sent to decontaminate, isolate and stabilise the 
56  The Chernobyl Forum, ‘Health effects of the Chernobyl accident and special health care 
programmes’, Vienna, April (2006): 113, accessed July 2015, www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/
chernobyl/WHO%20Report%20on%20Chernobyl%20Health%20Effects%20July%2006.pdf.
57  See Alexey Yablokov, Vassili Nesterenko, Alexey Nesterenko, Chernobyl: Consequences of  the 
Catastrophe for People and the Environment (New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
2009). This was recognised by President of the Academy of Sciences in Belarus in December 1999, 
and confirmed in April 2000 by Vice–Minister of Health of Belarus at a parliamentary hearing 
about the Chernobyl disaster. See also Wladimir Tchertkoff, ‘The Crime of Chernobyl – a Model for 
Fukushima’, IndependentWHO [April 2013], 5 February 2014, independentwho.org/en/2014/02/05/
chernobyl-model-fukushima/. Accessed 10 July 2015.
58  Statement from the President of the Academy of Sciences in Belarus, in December 1999, confirmed 
by the Vice-Minister of Health of Belarus at a parliamentary hearing about the consequences of the 
Chernobyl disaster, in April 2000. See Tchertkoff, ‘The Crime of Chernobyl’, 2014.
59  Nechaev and Okeanov presented at the 1995 WHO-Geneva Conference, the Proceedings of 
which have remained inaccessible to the public. See Michel Fernex, ‘The Chernobyl Catastrophe 
and Health’, 3 May (2000): 5, accessed 1 July 2015, independentwho.org/media/documents_autres/
michel_fernex_the_chernobyl_catastrophe_and_health_03may2000_en.pdf.
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reactor, 10 per cent had died and 30 per cent were disabled. By 2009, 
120,000 liquidators had died, and an epidemic of chronic illness and 
genetic and perigenetic damage in nuclear workers’ descendants appeared 
(this is predicted to increase over subsequent generations).60 The full 
extent of the damage will not be understood until the fifth generation of 
descendants. By the mid-2000s, 985,000 additional deaths between 1986 
and 2004 across Europe were estimated as a direct result from radiation 
exposure from Chernobyl.61 
Given this background of regulatory capture and radical discrepancies in 
methods and estimates prior to the Fukushima disaster, it is less surprising 
that there may be a process of regulatory capture and cover up underway 
in response to Fukushima Daiichi. In December 2011, a Cabinet 
Office Working Group chaired by RERF chairman Nagataki Shigenobu 
consisted of 18 Japanese ICRP members (including Niwa Otsura and 
Yamashita Shunichi). The experts invited Mr Jacques Lochard to provide 
external expertise. Lochard is an economist, ICRP member, Director of 
the Center of Studies on the Evaluation of Protection in the Nuclear Field 
(CEPN) (funded by Electricité de France EDF), and co-director of the 
CORE-ETHOS Programme in Chernobyl (1996–1998).
The CORE (Cooperation and Rehabilitation in the Belarusian territories 
contaminated by Chernobyl) Programme organised a takeover of 
radioprotection health centres in Ukraine and Belarus, and delayed 
a health audit beyond five years while it produced the ETHOS report 
outlining a ‘sustainable system of post-radiological accident management 
for France and the European Union’.62 While local scientists (led by Yuri 
Bandazhevsky and Vassili Nesterenko) recommended whole body counts 
(WBC) for each child (in which 50,000 children would be tested with 
60  R. I. Goncharova and N. I. Ryabokon, ‘Dynamics of Gamma-emitter Content Level in Many 
Generations of Wild Rodents in Contaminated Areas of Belarus’, Radiobiological Consequences of 
Nuclear Accidents 2nd International Conference, 25–26 October 1994.
61  Yablokov et al., Chernobyl, 210. 
62  ETHOS and CORE are products of the French nuclear industry, financed through Centre d’étude 
sur l’Evaluation de la Protection dans le domaine Nucléaire (CEPN), formed in 1976 by EDF, the 
Autorité de Sureté Nucléaire (ASN) and/or the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies 
Alternatives (CEA). The ETHOS co-directors (M. Henry Ollagnon, l’Institut National d’Agronomie 
Paris-Grignon; Gilles Hériard-Dubreuil, Mutadis Consultants; Jacques Lochard, CEPN) initiated the 
European CORE program, with the support of the Chernobyl Committee of the Government of 
Belarus, the United Nations Development Programme, French and German embassies, the European 
Commission, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation of Switzerland, United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank and four districts of 
Belarus.
153
6 . INFORMAL LABOuR, LOCAL CITIZENS AND THE TOKYO ELECTRIC FuKuSHIMA DAIICHI
spectrometers), food measurement, dietary radioprotection (prophylaxis 
through adsorbents) and resettlement of those exposed to radiation over 
1 mSv/y,63 the ETHOS manual concluded that in a similar radiological 
event in western Europe, resettlement would be restricted to those exposed 
to more than 100 mSv/y. By factoring in ‘social, economic and political’ 
costs, ETHOS proposed ways for populations to live with radiation, 
and identified psychosomatic illnesses derived from ‘stress’ based on 
unfounded fears (i.e. ‘radiophobia’) of radiation as the greatest health risk. 
After a prolonged delay, in 1996 the IAEA and WHO finally settled on 
5 mSv/y as the mandatory evacuation limit in a compromise between the 
Soviet (1 mSv/y) and western European (100 mSv/y) recommendations 
after Chernobyl.64 These agencies targeted ‘alarmist’ reports (including 
social protests) as encouraging ‘radiophobia’, stressing the psychological 
impacts of radiological events.
In post-3.11 Japan, the Japanese Cabinet Office Working Group65 
reinforced the IAEA dosimetry regime by reiterating that cancers only 
emerge four to five years after exposure, that increases in cancers within 
63  Professor Vassili Nesterenko (Institute of Nuclear Energy of the Academy of Sciences of Belarus) 
was removed from his post after demanding a 100 km mandatory evacuation zone in July 1987. 
He formed the Institute of Radiation Safety (Belrad) and organised 370 radiological monitoring 
centres in contaminated villages in Belarus to train doctors, teachers, nurses, parents and children in 
radioprotection ecanthropogammetric measures, pectin diets and information. Dr Yuri Bandazhevsky 
(Gomel Medical Institute) identified the etiology of low-level radiation impacts on organs and tissues. 
In 1994, Nesterenko and Bandazhevsky worked in the contaminated territories. Bandazhevsky 
found above 50 Bq/kg would lead to irreversible lesions to vital organs. From 1996, Belrad Institute 
measured internal contamination with spectrometers in the villages and Nesterenko used apple pectin 
as an absorbent of Cs137. This reduced Cs137 in the child’s body by 60–70 per cent. See Tchertkoff, 
‘The Crime of Chernobyl’, 2014.
64  IAEA Conference, ‘One Decade after Chernobyl: Summing up the Consequences of the 
Accident’, 8–13 April 1996, www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/te_964v1_prn.pdf.
65  Nagataki stated that 99.8 per cent of 1,080 children measured in March 2011 were under 5 mSv 
and nobody exceeded 50 mSv. MoE Expert Group members include Nagataki Shigenobu—Emeritus 
Professor at Nagasaki University, former chairman of Radiation Effects Research Foundation, 
mentor of Yamashita Shunichi, chair of Cabinet Office Working Group; Niwa Otsura—Cabinet 
Office Working Group 2011, retired Kyoto University Professor (molecular biology and radiation 
biology), Special Professor at Fukushima Medical University, WHO Expert Group, editor Health 
Risk Assessment from the Nuclear Accident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, 
Based on a Preliminary Dose Estimation (February 2013), ICRP member, funded by Federation of 
Electric Power Companies of Japan (Denjirenkai), advocate of one-tenth of WHO estimates; Endo 
Keigo—Kyoto College of Medical Science president; Ban Nobuhiko and Honma Toshimitsu—2013 
UNSCEAR Fukushima report authors; Sasaki Yasuhito—former Expert Group chairman.
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this period could not be attributable to the accident,66 and that illnesses 
in people exposed to radiation below 100 mSv/y could be concealed by 
other carcinogenic effects and other factors (rendering them statistically 
negligible), and thus could not be proven to be radiation related. In fact, 
in July 2014, Nagataki Shigenobu declared that it would be ‘disastrous to 
conclude [from the survey findings] an increase in thyroid cancer’ was due 
to radiation exposure.67 Consequently, privileging a government study of 
the thyroid glands of 1,080 children in late March 2011 (a very small 
sample), Nagataki claimed that almost none had exceeded 50 mSv for 
internal exposure and that 99.8 per cent of the population in Fukushima 
Prefecture could be estimated to have received an external dose below 
5 mSv. Nagataki dismissed the need for further medical screenings, regular 
check-ups or internal radiation tests (whole body counter, urine and blood 
tests) at hospitals and clinics in Fukushima Prefecture or elsewhere. 
Instead, the government appears to have adopted the ETHOS model: 
‘improving’ community life in radiation-contaminated areas through local 
education and support groups; encouraging proactive self-responsibility 
(i.e. self-monitoring with government monitors) for children and 
parents (including pregnant women); stamping out ‘stigma’ attached 
to ‘Fukushima’ residents, the area and its produce while stigmatising 
‘radiophobia’; and encouraging evacuees’ return after and even prior to 
‘decontamination’.68
66  This contradicts Ban Nobuhiko’s finding on leukaemia one to two years after irradiation of lab 
mice, www.oita-nhs.ac.jp/member/cat5_top/cat193/cat351/post_20.html;  www.labome.org/expert/
japan/oita/ban/nobuhiko-ban-572788.html. Leukaemia and thyroid tumours within one or two 
years was found in Belarus. See International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), 
Health Effects of Chernobyl: 25 years after the Reactor Disaster, April 2011, www.chernobylcongress.
org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/chernob_report_2011_en_web.pdf. Accessed March 2015.
67  Hiranuma Yuri, ‘Questioning the Very Status of the Ministry of the Environment Expert Meeting 
Regarding the Status of Disaster Victims’ Health Management’, Fukushima Voice version 2e, 3 August 
2014, fukushimavoice-eng2.blogspot.com.au/2014/08/questioning-very-status-of-ministry-of.html; 
‘Genpatsu jiko go no kenkō shiji de gyakusō: Kankyō shō’ no Senmonka kaigi’, Tokyo Shimbun, 22 July 
2014, www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/tokuho/list/CK2014072202000168.html. 
68  See, Yuri Oiwa, ‘NRA Plan to Implement Use of Personal Dosimeters No Easy Task’, Asahi 
Shimbun, 21 November 2013, ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201311210067. 
Since the time of writing, this link is no longer available. For verification, an online mirror link 
can be found at: www.fukushima-is-still-news.com/article-personal-dosimeters-easier-said-than-
done-121232568.html.
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By September 2015, an officially estimated 3,407 people (up from 3,194 
the previous year) had died from ‘effects related to the great east Japan 
earthquake’ (Daishinsai kanren shi 大震災関連死).69 In March 2015, 
about 1,870 deaths of those who had evacuated due to the overall disaster 
were deemed to have been from ill-health and suicide. By March 2016, 
this had increased to 2,208 deaths, while 1,386 deaths were estimated 
to have been caused by effects related specifically to the nuclear disaster 
(genpatsu kanren shi).70 Further, a statistically significant 15 per cent 
drop in live births in Fukushima Prefecture in December 2011, and a 
20  per  cent spike in infant mortality were found to have been caused 
mainly by internal radiation from the consumption of contaminated 
food.71 Nor do statistics on abortions seem to have been factored into 
official accounts. As the statistics are so temporally specific, anxiety 
(disruption, evacuation) is unlikely to have been the major factor as the 
spikes would be more prolonged. It has also been extrapolated from the 
conservative UNSCEAR 2013 estimate of a 48,000 person Sv collective 
dose, that another 5,000 are expected to die from future cancers in Japan 
(and larger numbers to become ill).72 Using the Tondel model, however, 
the European Commission on Radiation Risk (ECRR), in contrast to the 
ICRP dose model, which estimates 2,838 excess cancers within 100 km 
radius over 50 years excluding internal radiation, estimated that 103,000 
excess cancers within 100 km would be diagnosed within 10 years and 
200,000 in the next 50 years.73
69  See GoJ, Reconstruction Agency, 25 December 2015, www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-
cat2/sub-cat2-6/20151225_kanrenshi.pdf. See also, www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/
sub-cat2-1/20141226_kanrenshi.pdf; Editors, ‘Death toll grows in 3/11 aftermath’, Japan Times, 5 
March 2015, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/15/national/death-toll-grows-in-311-aftermath/.
70  ‘Genpatsu kanren shi 1368 nin ni honshi shūkei 1 nen de 136 ninzō’, Tokyo Shimbun, 6 March 
2016, www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/national/list/201603/CK2016030602000127.html. 
71  Alfred Körblein, ‘Increased Infant Mortality and Decline in Birth Rate after Fukushima’, 6 February 
2014,  accessed 15 June 2015, www.strahlentelex.de/Koerblein_infant%20mortality%20after%20
Fukushima.pdf; Alfred Körblein, ‘Decline of Live Births Nine Months after Fukushima’, February 
(2016), www.researchgate.net/publication/292540026_Decline_of_live_births_in_Japan_nine_months 
_after_Fukushima; Alfred Köblein, ‘Perinatal mortality after the Fukushima accident’, February 2016, 
www.researchgate.net/publication/291818329_Perinatal_mortality_after_the_Fukushim a_accident.
72  Ian Fairlie, ‘Summing up the Effects of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster’, August 2015, www.
ianfairlie.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Summing-up-the-Effects-of-the-Fukushima-Nuclear-
Disaster-10.pdf. Accessed August 2015.
73  Chris Busby, ‘The Health Outcome of the Fukushima Catastrophe: Initial Analysis from Risk 
Model of the European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR)’, 30 March 2011, Green Audit, 
Occasional Paper, presented at ECRR/ GSRP conference, Charite Hospital Berlin, July 2011.
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As with informal and formal nuclear workers, if these deaths were 
officially recognised as being tied to radiation from Fukushima Daiichi, 
then the family of the deceased as main income earner would be eligible 
for a 5  million yen ‘consolation’ payment (half for others). Further, it 
would also imply the need for stricter radiological protection standards 
and a greater number of permanent evacuations and official health 
treatment program that would effectively limit the so-called ‘benefits’ 
associated with nuclear power generation.74 In short, it is not surprising 
that the overwhelming emphasis in scientific studies and public reports 
has been placed on psychological impacts rather than disease and deaths 
(particularly but not limited to nuclear workers and children) and the 
argumentation over the significance of thyroid cancers. The same pattern 
occurred after Chernobyl and Three Mile Island.
Local Responses to State–Corporate 
Suppression and Lack of Public Health 
Protection
Faced with the post-3.11 reality of government (and corporate) policy 
that protects economic and security interests over public health and well-
being, the majority of the 2 million inhabitants of Fukushima Prefecture 
are either unconscious of or have been encouraged to accept living with 
radioactive contamination. People dry their clothes outside, drink local 
tap water and consume local food, swim in outdoor pools and the ocean, 
consume and sell their own produce or catches. Financial pressure after 
3.11 as well as the persistent danger of social marginalisation has made it 
more difficult to take precautionary measures (i.e. permanent relocation, 
dual accommodation, importing food and water) and develop and share 
counter-narratives to the official message. Nevertheless, some continue to 
conceal their anxiety beneath a mask of superficial calm.
As Fukushima city resident Shiina Chieko observed, the majority of 
people seem to have adopted denial as a way to excise the present danger 
from their consciousness. Her sister-in-law, for example, ignored her 
son’s ‘continuous nosebleeds’, while her mother had decided that the 
community must endure by pretending that things were no different from 
74  See for example, the ICRP 2005 draft recommendations, www.icrp.org/docs/2005_recs_
CONSULTATION_Draft1a.pdf. 
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pre-3.11 conditions.75 Unlike the claim that risk is evenly distributed, it 
is likely that greater risk is borne by those who eat processed foods from 
family restaurants and convenience stores, as well as infants, children and 
young women who are disproportionately vulnerable to internal radiation 
exposures. Most mothers, then, have an added burden to shield their 
children while maintaining a positive front in their family and community.
Some, such as Yokota Asami (40 years old), a small business owner and 
mother from Kōriyama (60 km from FDNPS), demonstrated initiative 
in voluntarily evacuating her family. She decided to return (wearing 
goggles and a mask, she joked) in September 2011 when her son’s regular 
and continuous nosebleeds (in 30-minute spells) subsided. The Yokotas 
found themselves the victims of bullying when they called attention to 
radiation dangers, and were labelled non-nationals (hikokumin 非国民) 
who had betrayed reconstruction efforts. Her son was the only one to put 
up his hand when he was asked along with 300 fellow junior high school 
students if he objected to eating locally produced school lunches. He also 
chose not to participate in outdoor exercise classes and to go on respite 
trips instead. When it came time to take the high school entrance exam, 
he was told by the school principal that those who took breaks could not 
pass. He took the exam and failed. When he asked to see his results he 
found that he had, in fact, enough points to pass (the cut-off was 156 
while he received 198 out of 250 points). The Yokotas decided that it was 
better to be a ‘non-national’ and protect one’s health. Their son moved to 
live in Sapporo.76
In March 2015, Asami reported that doctors undertook paediatric 
thyroid operations while denying any correlation (inga kankei 因果
関係) with radiation exposures. They also urged their patients to keep 
their thyroid cancer a secret to enhance their employment or marriage 
prospects, although it would be difficult to conceal the post-operation 
scar.77 Yokota also indicated she knew of students having sudden heart 
attacks and developing leukaemia and other illnesses.78 
75  Shiina Chieko, interview with the author, digital audio recording, 23 March 2015.
76  Yokota Asami, interview with the author, digital audio recording, 6 February 2015.
77  See Editor, ‘Fukushima Children’s Thyroid Examination: How Shunichi Yamashita Would like 
Doctors to Deal with the Results’, Fukushima Voice, 4 May 2012, fukushimavoice-eng.blogspot.com.
au/2012/05/fukushima-childrens-thyroid-examination.html. Accessed 12 June 2015.
78  Yokota Asami, interview with the author, digital audio recording, 6 February 2015.
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This seems to be supported by Mr Ōkoshi, a Fukushima city resident, 
whose two daughters experienced stillbirths after 3.11. While Ōkoshi 
found that doctors have regularly advised women in the area to abort 
after 3.11, presumably to avoid miscarriages and defects, they do not 
discuss direct causes. He also observed regular illnesses experienced by 
many of his friends, and some sudden deaths. After a friend (62 years old) 
started saying strange things, he was diagnosed with brain dysfunction. 
He died quickly. Another friend (53 years old) was advised by a doctor 
to monitor a polyp in her breast. When she sought second opinions, she 
discovered she had accumulated an internal dose of 22 mSv and had a 
rapidly developing liver cancer. She also died quickly.79 There are many 
more such stories that are being actively ignored by the authorities. As 
Shiina put it, ‘we’re getting leukaemia and cataracts and we die suddenly. 
The TEPCO registrar has been inundated with complaints’.80 
While radiation contamination is clearly a health and environmental issue, 
state-corporate methods deployed by executives to protect (transnational) 
financial, industry and security interests and assets also make it a political 
issue.81 As things do not change by themselves, rather than turning one’s 
frustration inward in self-blame, turning to prayer or deceiving oneself 
into returning to pre-3.11 lifeways in contaminated areas, Shiina states 
that people, particularly those most affected, must develop political 
consciousness. 
To achieve this ambitious objective is not as complicated as it might 
sound. Nishiyama Chikako (60 years old), for example, returned to 
Kawauchi village to run for the local assembly after the mandatory order 
was lifted in December 2011. She found, as she commented in her blog, a 
link between TEPCO and the tripling of the Kawauchi budget post-3.11. 
Subsequently, she reported that her blog was shut down by unknown 
hackers on several occasions.82 
This sort of information and communication control appears to be 
widespread. After 3.11, the central government hired advertising 
companies Dentsū and Hakuhōdō (formerly McCann Ericson Hakuhodo) 
to run a ‘public acceptance’ campaign. Young teams were dispatched 
nationwide to conduct ‘public opinion guidance’ (yoron yūdō 世論誘導). 
79  Mr Ōkoshi, interview with the author, digital audio recording, 24 March 2015. 
80  Shiina Chieko, interview with the author, digital audio recording, 23 March 2015.
81  Shiina Chieko, interview with the author, 23 March 2015.
82  Nishiyama Chikako, interview with the author, digital audio recording, 24 March 2015.
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The teams consisted of casual labour (earning 2,000–4,000 yen per hour) 
hired under a confidentiality clause (shuhi gimu 守秘義務) to manipulate 
information (jōhō kōsaku 情報工作) and harass internet users.83
Media professionals have been subjected to similar tactics. The Asahi 
TV journalist Iwaji Masaki (Hōdō Station), one of the few mainstream 
journalists covering the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in depth, for 
example, was intimidated by police for interviewing (December 2012) 
informal nuclear workers who showed shoddy decontamination practices 
that entailed contaminated waste disposal rather than removal and the 
mother of a child with thyroid cancer. Airing the program was delayed 
until August 2013. Before he could complete his planned segments on 
the US$1 billion class action for compensation for unusual and serious 
illnesses filed against TEPCO, General Electric, Hitachi and Tōshiba in 
2015 by sailors from the USS Ronald Reagan (which provided assistance 
quickly after the disaster, and among whose crew 250 were ill and three 
had died),84 on 29 September 2013, Iwaji was reportedly found dead in 
his apartment (having suffered carbon monoxide poisoning in a sealed 
room as he slept). Much speculation followed on social media, including 
both plausible reasons for suicide and testimonies from friends that knew 
him well that Iwaji himself stated he would never commit suicide, but the 
story was conspicuously ignored by major news channels.85
The former mayor of Futaba village Idogawa Katsuichi was harassed on 
social media for calling attention to illnesses and for the resettlement of 
pregnant women and children. When Kariya Tetsu characterised Idogawa 
in his popular manga series (Oishinbo 美味しんぼ), and depicted 
the manga’s main character as suffering from nosebleeds after visiting 
Fukushima, Kariya’s editors shut the series down following accusations of 
‘spreading rumours’ from some readers, media commentators and high-
83  ‘Netto kōsaku-in no seitai (Truth About Net Managers)’, 16 September 2014, ameblo.
jp/64152966/entry-11925550749.html. Accessed 1 August 2015.
84  The class action also intends to prove that up to 70,000 American citizens were exposed to 
radiation from Fukushima Daiichi. See Charles Bonner, lawyer for the USS Ronald Reagan class 
action plaintiffs, www.youtube.com/watch?v=V0zGbG2dTvo. 
85  See non-government organisation founder of Social Uplift and journalist, and personal friend 
of Iwaji, Beverly Findlay-Kaneko at 12–17.45 mins. on Nuclear Hotseat, 16 September 2014, 
nuclearhotseat.com/2014/09/13/nuclear-hotseat-169-beverly-findlay-kaneko-on-journalist-iwajis-
death-karl-grossman-on-nukes-in-space/. See also Beverly Kaneko-Findlay, ‘Update on Fukushima’, 
14 September 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=xm2oibl00ie. See also Imanishi Noriyuki, ‘Asahi 
TV Rage: Big Battle with Police at the Shoddy Decontamination Interview Site’, 21 December 2013, 
www.imanishinoriyuki.jp/archives/35811450.html. 
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level politicians. Similarly, Takenouchi Mari, a freelance journalist and 
mother who evacuated from Fukushima in 2011, received thousands of 
slanderous messages and threats to her two-year-old son and her property 
after criticising the co-founder of Fukushima ETHOS on her blog in 
mid-2012. She too reported that her internet account was suspended and 
her request for a police investigation ignored. She was counter-sued for 
harassment and subjected to a criminal investigation and civil law suit.86
Among the activists who have been arrested for anti-nuclear protests, 
the academic Shimoji Masaki of Hannan University (9 December 2012) 
was arrested by Osaka Prefectural Police and charged with ‘violating the 
Railway Operation Act’ for walking through an Osaka station concourse 
while participating in a demonstration against radioactive waste 
incineration (17 October 2012). Shimoji had reiterated that residents, 
due to radioactive incineration (which was due to commence in Osaka in 
February 2013), would be forced to bear the burden of air, food and water 
contamination.87
Despite such obstacles to developing a political consciousness as well as 
the obvious difficulties in permanently resettling large populations, it has 
been not only evacuees who have had to think about their fundamental 
life priorities after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear distaster. Some have 
adopted real (not only psychological) self-protection mechanisms. 
The  voluntary Fukushima Collective Health Clinic (Fukushima Kyōdō 
Shinryōjo 福島共同診療所), for example, is founded on three principles: 
respite (hoyō 保養), treatment (shinryō 診療) and healing (iryō 医療). 
Co-founder Dr Sugii, advocates a return to the 1 mSv/y limit, and seeks 
to inform those who for whatever reason cannot move from contaminated 
areas in Fukushima Prefecture.88 This is modelled on Belrad, the 
independent health clinic in Belarus run by Alexey Nesterenko, which 
prioritises knowledge, safety and open information on radiation and its 
health impacts. 
86  Takenouchi Mari, ‘2nd Consultation to Kyoto Bar’, April 2014, accessed 1 July 2015, 
savekidsjapan.blogspot.jp/2014/04/2nd-consulation-to-kyoto-bar.html.
87  Shimoji Masaki, ‘Demand for the immediate and unconditional release of Associate Prof. Masaki 
Shimoji’, Civic Activity – an Organization Supporting Citizens Opposing Spread of Radiation, 
15 December 2012, keepcivicactivity.jimdo.com/english/. See also, ‘Press Conference for the Apology 
and Immediate Release of Professor Masaki Shimoji and other People Unjustly Arrested for Opposing 
Debris Incineration in Osaka’, 15 December 2012, iwj.co.jp/wj/open/archives/46334; ‘Statement 
from Mr. Shimoji during unjust detention’, 13 December 2012, goo.ne.jp/garekitaiho1113/e/79c68fd
4e86da4ec02b2e01a5188052b.
88  Dr Sugii, interview with the author, digital audio recording, 24 March 2015.
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To counteract the misinformation residents were exposed to post-
Chernobyl, over time and with limited resources, Belrad and other 
organisations have disseminated information and organised respite 
trips for children in affected areas. In 2015, for example, subsidised 
respite trips were organised for 50,000 children, and results have shown 
that  over  two  continuous years of respite those who accumulated 25–
35 Bq/kg had reduced the amount to 0 Bq/kg. Unlike the flat limit of 
100 Bq/kg of Caesium in food in Japan (50 Bq/kg for milk and infant 
foods, 10  Bq/kg for drinking water), Belrad recommends an internal 
radiation limit of 10–30 Bq/kg in the body (although it advises below 
10 Bq for infants to avoid lesions and heart irregularities).89 It should 
be noted that these limits do not guarantee safety against the effects of 
repeating internal radiation exposure from consuming contaminated 
foods, which is relative to the length of time the radiation remains and its 
location in the body. 
While some communities, such as the town of Aketo in Tanohama, Iwate 
Prefecture, have struggled to block the siting of nuclear waste storage 
facilities,90 others are also organising to reduce radio-accumulation in 
their children through respite trips,91 as well as concentrating on indoor 
activities, measuring hotspots and decontaminating public areas and 
pathways, pooling funds for expensive spectrometers to monitor internal 
exposure and food and water, incorporating dietary radioprotection, as 
well as finding ways to reduce anxiety.
Many local farmers cannot admit the already near-permanent damage to 
their land (which may continue for hundreds of years) because it would 
imply the devaluation of their property and produce as well as threatening 
their ancestral ties to the land, commitments and future plans. While many 
are keenly aware of their responsibilities, the push by the Fukushima and 
central governments to identify and gain access to markets for produce 
from irradiated areas would make it easier to overlook uncomfortable 
factors. Some have argued that given the reassurances of safety from 
the highest authorities, these offical figures should therefore relocate to 
89  See Kamanaka Hitomi, Canon Dayori, vol. 4 (2015) (Independent DVD documentary, dir. 
Kamanaka Hitomi).
90  Toshihide Ueda, ‘Women in Tohoku Village Refused to Play Host to Nuclear Plant’, Asahi 
Shimbun, 2 September 2015, ajw.asahi.com/article/views/column/aj201509020011. Since the time 
of writing, this link is no longer available. For verification, an online mirror link can be found at: 
www.fukushima-is-still-news.com/2015/09/tanohata-women-against-nukes.html.
91  Sasaki Michinori (38 years old) in Fukushima Radiation, 848. 
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contaminated areas and consume these products regularly. Despite the 
fairness of this statement, a more utilitarian logic has prevailed. In the 
name of reconstruction and revitalisation of Fukushima and the nation, 
the dilution of Fukushima produce with unirradiated produce to return 
measurements just under the required limits, radiation spikes in soil and 
food or the mutation of plants as Caesium replaces potassium (K40), 
for example, tend to be minimised. In this climate, the distribution and 
relabelling of Fukushima produce for urban and international markets 
(i.e. in a black market of cut-price bulk produce picked up by yakuza and 
other brokers) is likely to continue.
To date, the majority of evacuees have refused to return to (de)contaminated 
areas. Some claim they are yet to receive accurate information to justify it. 
Independent specialists such as Hosokawa Kōmei (Citizens’ Commission 
on Nuclear Energy), who develops models for transition to renewable 
alternatives, anticipate an increase in evacuee populations as they predict 
increased resettlement of Fukushima residents over 20–30 years.92 As some 
evacuees recognise the potential for second or third Fukushimas, they 
have sought to strengthen their collective identities and rights. Through 
local organisation and alternative life practices, whether in micro-scale 
ecovillages and transition towns93 with communal occupancies and squats, 
parallel currencies and local exchange systems (roughly 70 substantive 
projects), organic food co-ops, self-sufficient energy systems, local 
production and recycling, carpools and free kindergartens, such groups are 
seeking to reconstruct and model core social priorities, focusing on clean 
food, health and community cooperation rather than the internalised and 
dreary competition for material accumulation.
Although the accountability of authorities with prior knowledge has yet 
to be properly investigated, one of the largest groups of collective legal 
actions  to be mounted in Japanese history includes some 20 lawsuits 
by  10,000 plaintiffs. The Fukushima genpatsu kokuso-dan (Group of 
Plaintiffs for Criminal Prosecution 福島原発告訴団), formed on 
20 April 2012, filed a criminal case (lodged 3 September 2013, Fukushima 
District Court) against 33 previous and present officers of TEPCO, 
government officials and medical experts for ‘group irresponsibility’ and 
the neglect of duty of care, environmental damage and harm to human 
health. Mutō Ruiko, one of the key plaintiffs, declared the main aim to be 
92  Hosokawa Kōmei, interview with the author, digital audio recording, 30 March 2015.
93  Uno Saeko in Kamanaka, Canon Dayori.
163
6 . INFORMAL LABOuR, LOCAL CITIZENS AND THE TOKYO ELECTRIC FuKuSHIMA DAIICHI
symbolic: to publicly record injury, reclaim the victims’ sense of agency 
and protect the next generation. In short, they were seeking recognition 
of wrong and harm done rather than primarily financial redress. This 
moderate aim was undoubtedly tempered by recognition of regulatory 
capture: those who were cavalier with safety procedures ‘were now in 
charge of restarts; those responsible for the “safety” campaign were now 
in charge of the Health Survey; [there has been] no responsibility for the 
SPEEDI cover-up; and TEPCO is not being held responsible for [faulty] 
decontamination’.94
The judgement of this case was handed down at the Tokyo District Court 
on the same day as the announcement of Tokyo’s successful Olympics 
bid (9  September 2013). The case was dismissed on the grounds that 
the disaster was beyond predictability (sōteigai 想定外), which made 
negligence  hypothetical.95 A citizens’ panel (Committee for inquest of 
Prosecution) overturned the dismissal and renewed the claim against three 
TEPCO executives on 18 December 2013. They demanded, alongside 
a  ruling of negligence against three former TEPCO executives, the 
inclusion of physical, economic, social and psychological harms: illness, 
paediatric underdevelopment (radiation exposures, excessive isolation 
indoors), financial losses (unemployment, loss in property value, rental 
costs of two homes, relocation, travel, etc.), family and community 
division, ijime (bullying いじめ) and stress. Many plaintiffs also claimed 
that their disrupted reliance upon nature,96 as inviolable and precious,97 
should be recognised as harm. This too was dismissed and again a citizen’s 
panel found against the three TEPCO executives.98 In May 2015, 10 groups 
of plaintiffs formed a network named Hidanren (被弾連, Genpatsu Jiko 
Higaisha Dantai Renrakukai) comprising 20,000 people. The Fukushima 
kokuso-dan again made a claim to another citizens’ panel, which found in 
94  Mutō Ruiko, Fukushima Radiation, 268.
95  Hamada Kentaro, ‘Fukushima Operator’s Mounting Legal Woes to Fuel Nuclear 
Opposition’, Reuters, 17 August 2015, uk.reuters.com/article/japan-nuclear-tepco-legal-
idUKL3N10E2G820150817. Accessed 17 August 2015.
96  Asada Mariko (63 years old), 27 April 2012, Fukushima Radiation, 303.
97  Furukawa Machiko (64 years old), 1 June 2012, Fukushima Radiation, 400.
98  Editors, ‘Indictment of TEPCO trio encourages Fukushima nuclear accident victims’, Asahi 
Shimbun, 1 August 2015,  ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/aj201508010032. Since the 
time of writing, this link is no longer available. For verification, an online mirror link can be found at: 
www.fukushima-is-still-news.com/2015/08/teoco-s-indictment-a-sense-of-justice.html. Yayoi Hitomi 
(54 years old), 11 May 2012, Fukushima Radiation, 343; Matsutaka Chiwaki (41 years old), 8 June 
2014, Fukushima Radiation, 343.
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July 2015 in favour of indicting the three TEPCO executives for trial.99 
In addition, a civil case filed in June 2015 by 4,000 plaintiffs from Iwaki 
seeking to prove negligence and not just harm sought to use previously 
withheld evidence to show fair warning of a 3.11-type scenario was 
given. This case focused the court on the operator’s calculation of risk 
probability of a tsunami of that size and, rather than aiming at financial 
compensation, it sought to deter nuclear operators from future negligent 
practices if ruled in favour. In anticipation of out-of-court settlements, the 
Japanese Government increased the budget for compensation payments 
to 7 trillion yen (US$56 billion).
Conclusions
From this discussion, it is evident how an advanced capitalist nation-state 
deploys a disposable population of informal labour to absorb the dangers 
inherent to the use of large-scale nuclear technologies and its private 
extractive and accumulation practices. Since its inception, nuclear power 
has been regarded by some as a symbol of Japan’s postwar civilisational 
progress.100 At the same time, the health of many thousands of people 
has been endangered in exposures to radiation while harms have been 
perpetrated upon local communities and nuclear workers and the 
environment more broadly as millions of people have been integrated 
within the centralising and concentrating dynamic of the transnational 
nuclear power industry. 
On the mediated surface, Fukushima Daiichi has been used to prove to the 
world that a nuclear disaster of significant scale can be overcome and that 
people can survive and return to their normal lives. The government has 
concentrated on proving that it is safe for the Olympics, safe for tourism, 
safe to consume local produce, and safe to restart nuclear reactors (with 
25 reactors expected to be supplying 20 per cent total energy by 2030). 
The neoliberal disaster model adopted, in which the state prioritises the 
profit of private corporations and their wealth-creating strategies while 
99  For more on this see Norma Field, ‘From Fukushima: To Despair Properly, to Find the Next 
Step’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 14, issue 11, no. 3, September 2016.
100  Kasai Yoshiyuki, Chairman of Central Japan Railways, described nuclear power as the nation’s 
‘bloodstream of economic activity’ and the only way to obtain sustainable baseload electric power. 
Kasai Yoshiyuki, ‘Nuclear Energy is Indispensable for Japan's Future’, November, Association 
of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies, Commentary No. 165, 2012, www.jiia.or.jp/en/
commentary/201211/13-1.html. Accessed March 2014.
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minimising public services and pursuing deregulation (e.g. of labour 
conditions), is indicated not only in the official intention to rebuild the 
local economy of Fukushima Prefecture, but also to expand, including 
through its transnational nuclear industry, Japan’s financial, military and 
industrial sector after Fukushima. This reflects the priority given to both 
the interests of the utilities, banks and construction companies involved 
in the reconstruction program, and those of multinational corporations, 
foreign governments and international regulatory and financial institutions 
involved in this sector. 
At the same time, the sovereign duty to protect the fundamental needs of 
the population and reflect majority will is secondary to these priorities. 
Unlike a natural disaster, owing to the materiality of radiation that 
continues to be dumped and vented into the environment, facilitating 
the return to pre-disaster conditions by forgetting and rebuilding 
communities in contaminated areas is a practice of illusion. Despite the 
claims of the Abe administration and other nuclear promoters, Japan’s 
safety standards cannot adequately insure against the seismic activities 
or extreme weather events and their impacts on that archipelago. The 
authorities have furnished people with the means by which to normalise 
sickness and pathologise anxiety to justify the return to nuclear power 
reliance, while suppressing those who seek to resist it. The wealth of a 
healthy society and environment cannot be traded for the putative 
convenience and economic benefits of nuclear power generation as they 
are not comparable values. Official denial of the steady accumulation and 
exposure to ‘low-level’ internal radiation in a growing segment of the 
population only aggravates rather than protects the affected communities 
from the stresses related to Fukushima Daiichi. This inescapably leads to 
the need to address greater systemic problems that underlie such disasters. 
As the previous organic life of village communities in contaminated zones 
is transformed into retirement villages and ad-hoc industrial hubs for 
temporary workers, this alienation from food, land, community, history, 
the human body and nature itself is a warning of the growing negative 
costs of the rapid expropriation and consumption of the planetary 
commons under a globalised system. Just as nuclear energy is not the 
solution to climate disruption caused by reliance on fossil fuels in a global 
capitalist economy, nor are radiation exposures comparable to everyday 
risks in modern society (i.e. transport accidents). If introducing ‘mistakes’ 
into the human genome is to be wagered against the daily conveniences 
of ‘modern’ life then this aspect of modernity is unsustainable. Although 
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somewhat anthropocentric, it is a timely reminder that the Nobel Prize 
laureate (1946) Herman Müller stated in 1956, ‘the genome is the most 
valuable treasure of humankind. It determines the life of our descendants 
and the harmonious development of the future generations’.101 
And so we return to the basic problem that no nuclear reactor can operate 
without radiation-exposed labour, particularly of informal or irregular 
workers. If these populations refused to work and joined in support 
with a network of translocal groups on informal and alternative life 
projects for greater self-sufficiency such as micro-financing, small-scale 
and permaculture farming on non-contaminated land, renewable and 
decentralised energy production and distribution, or campaigns for greater 
distribution of wealth, better public education and health improvement, 
these communities and workers could be active agents in devising models 
that could eventually become viable for adaptation to larger human 
populations. This application at scale cannot come too soon in the 
present context of imminent exhaustion of the planetary commons from 
the systemic demands for relentless economic growth and accumulation 
of wealth and power for the few.
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National Subjects, Citizens and 
Refugees: Thoughts on the Politics 
of Survival, Violence and Mourning 
following the Sewol Ferry Disaster 
in South Korea
Cho (Han) Haejoang
Introduction: One Incident That Made 
People Ask ‘What is a State?’
Don’t politics exist so that the people and the state do not engage in 
a naked clash for power? Don’t politics lead two opposing parties, who 
would otherwise have no place to meet, to a common ground? Those 
currently in power, however, seem to have risen to their positions because 
of their lack of empathy and compassion. To avoid responsibility and 
climb even higher upon the rungs of power, they appear ready to step on 
more bodies… The most important thing, therefore, is the recovery of 
the political. However, this notion of political does not involve begging 
the state for power but making a public for ourselves. (Lee Gye-sam, 
social activist)1
1  Lee Gye-sam, ‘Chamsi mŏmch’wŏsŏja’ [Let’s Stop for a Moment and Stand Up], Hankyoreh 
Newspaper, 8 May 2014.
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Though I am not a particularly accomplished storyteller, I wish to share 
with you a story about a particular incident 事件, not accident 事故, 
that of the Sewol ferry in South Korea.2 Since South Korea’s founding 
as a nation in 1948, many incidents—both large and small—have 
occurred on the Korean peninsula. However, this incident, which took 
place in 2014, was special in prompting many of its citizens to ask, ‘What 
is a  state?’ This incident has forced many intellectuals and grassroots 
activists to contemplate more deeply about society, nation and the future 
of humankind. Furthermore, it has compelled many ‘ordinary’ citizens 
to seriously address the issue of ‘survival politics’. It also compelled many 
young people to ponder whether they should continue supporting this 
state or shift their allegiance to another one, by emigration for instance. 
This incident has not ended but is still unfolding.
After the devastating civil war of 1950–53, South Korea transformed 
itself into the world’s 13th-largest economic power in the short period 
of 60 years. Though Koreans often pride themselves on this fact, with 
the Sewol Ferry Disaster they seem to realise that there is something they 
could have done better. They have come to realise not only that South 
Korea is a highly risky society, but also that their ‘loving nation state’ has 
been feeding the avaricious market, while caring little about its people. 
Observing the collapse of Korean society after the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997, I wrote an essay arguing that there are ‘no citizens but only 
a national subjects’ and ‘no individuals but only families’.3 The subjects 
that I found during the financial crisis and the ensuing recovery process 
were not the ‘individual citizens (simin 市民)’ but the ‘national subjects 
(kukmin 國民)’. Rather than opening up a public/civilian space to discuss, 
reflect upon and resolve the crisis, the national subjects were desperately 
trying to overcome the crisis within the paradigm of the developmental 
authoritarian state. Moreover, they were doing so only as members 
of a family, not as individual citizens. There were few debates about the 
2  There is an ongoing struggle between those who wish to view the Sewol tragedy as an unfortunate 
‘accident 事故’ and those who wish to view it as a socially noteworthy historical ‘incident 事件’. 
In a  segment of the online forum of ‘Slow News’, started by some youth on 28 April 2014, they 
ask, ‘Was Sewol tragedy an accident? Or an incident?’ Warning against the irresponsible behaviour 
of the existing media outlets that have forsaken their duty of delivering accurate information, they 
declare that the Sewol tragedy was an ‘incident’ that has resulted from the ‘overall failure of the system’ 
within South Korea created by gross negligence. At the same time, they warn against the totalising 
perspectives implied by the term ‘overall failure of the system’, and, instead, emphasise the particular 
perspectives on this incident. plus.google.com/101120182737860073943/posts/c1QwKkc9riN.
3  Haejoang Cho, ‘You are Entrapped in an Imaginary Well: The Formation of Subjectivity Within 
Compressed Development – a Feminist Critique of Modernity and Korean Culture’, Inter-Asia 
Cultural Studies 1 (2000): 49–69.
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widening social divisions within society or about changing the direction 
of modernisation. Around 1997, however, there was still a certain amount 
of trust and loyalty in the state and family. Now, it seems difficult to find 
these. In an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) survey, only 24.8 per cent of Koreans stated that they trusted the 
government. The average for OECD countries was 42.8 per cent, while 
82.2 per cent of the Swiss said they trusted the government. Moreover, 
with the rapid disintegration of families, growing class polarisation, rising 
youth unemployment, and skyrocketing elderly poverty and suicide, 
South Korea seems one of the most wretched among the OECD states. 
If anything, the Sewol Ferry Disaster seems to have crushed any remaining 
faith in the state. As articulated by activist Lee Gye-Sam above, it has 
resulted in a standoff between the state and the people. How can people 
recover trust in their nation when all sense of public sentiment and 
politics seems irretrievably lost, or replaced by acrimonious cynicism? 
Dwelling on this question, South Korean people/citizens have been 
undergoing a  profound experience of learning through the agony and 
anxiety produced by the Sewol Ferry Disaster. Rather than lamenting 
this seemingly hopeless situation, I view it as a time and space for self-
reflection where people can fundamentally retool their consciousness. 
That is, I believe that catastrophic events, in providing a profound sense of 
‘social catharsis’, can transform into ‘emancipatory catastrophism’.4 As a 
Korean citizen and resident, who has, for the past two years, experienced 
the grief and depression of emancipatory catastrophism, I want to share 
some thoughts on modernity, violence and survival politics, and introduce 
terms such as ‘citizens of compassion’ and ‘cosmopolitan refugees’.
The Events Near Jindo Island, 16 April 2014
After crossing the line of unimaginable pain, P’aengmok Harbor 
has become a mortuary of corpses. When the bodies arrive from the 
shipwreck, an hour and ten minutes away, the medical examiners call 
them out one by one using not names but rather only numbers and other 
details – ‘Female # 75, 168 centimeters, white short-sleeve shirt, black 
Adidas track pants, thin build, long hair, braces, birthmark on the right 
4  Ulrich Beck, ‘Haebangjŏk p’akuk: kŭgŏsŭn kihubyŏnhwa mit wihŏmsahoee ŏttŏhan ŭimiga 
itnŭnka?’ [Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does it Mean to Climate Change and Risk Society?], 
paper presented at The Seoul Conference 2014 with Professor Ulrich Beck Public Lecture. Organised 
by Joongmin Foundation for Social Theory, Center for Social Sciences of Seoul National University, 
8 July 2014.
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side of face.’ When some parents, who, upon hearing these words, cry 
out, ‘Oh, that’s my child!’ and run off to identify the child, everybody 
cries. Parents who are waiting for the corpse of their child, congratulate 
those who have recovered theirs. Parents, who have recovered their child’s 
body, feel sorry because other parents are still waiting to recover their 
own. As you can see, it’s an unimaginable scene of pain and suffering with 
parents who have recovered their dead child, parents who are still waiting 
for their missing children, and volunteers who are helping both groups 
of parents. (Ju Jin-u, from Green Review)5 
The ‘Sewol Ferry Accident’ or ‘Disaster’ occurred at 8:48 am on 16 April 
2014 when the Sewol, a passenger ferry carrying 476 passengers and cargo, 
capsized off South Korea’s southern coast near Jindo County. Initially, 
in the breaking news of the accident, all passengers were reported to be 
alive and to have been rescued. After these initial reports were quickly 
discounted, the country sat down to seemingly endless hours of live 
coverage of the ferry slowly sinking to the bottom of the cold spring 
ocean. Passengers on this ferry were mostly students from Danwon 
High School in Ansan, Kyung-gi Province, on a long-awaited field trip. 
Of the 325 students in total, only 75 of them survived the accident.6 
Among the 15 teachers in charge, three survived. Two days later, one of 
the three surviving teachers, the head teacher—overcome with grief and 
guilt—hanged himself from a pine tree. As for the surviving families, they 
forged strong bonds of sorrow and grief as they shared scenes like the one 
described above at P’aengmok Harbor.
Amidst the sorrow and grief, there was hot, molten anger—anger on 
the part of surviving families who heard that the passengers on the ill-
fated ferry were told, in an onboard announcement, to put on their 
life jackets and sit tight in their cabins until further notice. While the 
children who disobeyed the crew’s instructions and came immediately 
onto the deck after the accident survived, those who obediently followed 
the announcement perished. Also enraging the surviving families and 
the public was the fact that the captain and ferry crew abandoned 
their youthful passengers and were the first to board the rescue boats. 
Finally, there was the irresponsible attitude of the president and her high-
5  Kim Jong-chul, Kim Young-ok, Ju Jin-woo, and Ha Seung-woo, ‘Roundtable Discussion: 
Hangukiranŭn nara, hŭimang ŭn itnŭnga?’ [Is There Hope Within a Country like South Korea?], 
Noksaek Pyungrone [Green Review] 137 (2014): 41–2.
6  Lee Young-ji, ‘“Sewŏlho ap’ŭm” tanwŏn’go chorŏbsik… saengjonhaksaeng do chorŏpsaeng 
do urŏtta’ [‘The Pain of Sewol’ and the Graduation Ceremony at Danwon High School: Even the 
Surviving Students Cried], Yonhap News, 9 January 2015.
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ranking officials when they visited the accident site. Rather than lamenting 
the untimely deaths and worrying about the state of grief of other people 
in the country, they appeared to be more concerned about avoiding public 
blame. According to reporter Ju Jin-u, with the government doing little to 
defuse public anger and alleviate suffering, it was mostly bystanders and 
volunteers who carried the torch of hope for the grieving families.7 
At the same time, mysteries involving mind-boggling acts of ineptitude 
remain unresolved. On that morning, when the youthful passengers were 
texting their families for help or to say goodbye, the Korean Coast Guard 
sent out no rescue boats. Soon after the accident, the public also learned 
that Sewol had been a decrepit ferry with an extended lifespan. The ferry 
Sewol (meaning to ‘transcend the world’ in Korean) had been owned by 
a 73-year-old CEO named Yoo Byung-un, who was later discovered to 
be the leader of Kuwon-p’a, a religious sect awaiting the millennium. 
Like many successful business leaders, he had built his company through 
corrupt relations with politicians. For instance, due to the deregulation 
of the shipping industry by the previous Lee Myung Bak administration, 
Mr Yoo was able to import an 18-year-old ship from Japan in 2012 and 
modify it in order to add more room for passengers and cargo. He managed 
to carry out these modifications despite their violation of various safety 
regulations. The public also became incensed when they learned about 
the short-term contract for the captain, indicative perhaps of his level of 
experience or reliability, and lack of safety training for the crew. Still, it 
was not until they learned about the missing CCTV tapes and internal 
communication records that they began to ask a more fundamental 
question: ‘Where was the state, responsible for the safety of its people, 
during all this?’ Prior to the accident, many had prided themselves on 
being members of an advanced nation. Adding to their frustration was 
the lack of information, which gave rise to wild rumours and deepened 
the public’s sense of misgiving and distrust of the government. While the 
government remained tight-lipped about the accident, the mainstream 
media focused its attention on an extensive manhunt for Mr Yoo, who 
had gone into hiding. The country’s mood became further agitated when 
a body was discovered in a village garlic field on 12 July, giving rise to wild 
rumours on the internet that it was Mr Yoo’s.
7  Kim Jong-chul et al., ‘Roundtable Discussion’, 8–9.
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Earlier, on 19 May—several weeks after the prime minister took the 
blame for the accident and resigned—President Park Geun-hye took to 
the podium to address the nation. As she wiped away tears and called out 
the names of the adult passengers who had died on the ferry while trying 
to rescue other passengers, she said she took full responsibility. Then, 
addressing the widespread rumours of collusion between the government 
and private sector, she announced the dismantling of the Korean Coast 
Guard and the establishment of the Ministry of National Safety in its 
place. Through such reforms, she vowed to dig out the poisonous roots 
of Kwan-p’ia (Bureaucratic Mafia) that had ‘held the lives of the nation 
for ransom’.8 Finally, she proposed setting up a Truth Commission to 
investigate the causes of the accident and the failure of the rescue effort. 
Rather than reassuring the surviving families and public, however, the 
president’s address further aggravated them. Many wondered whether the 
dismantling of the Korean Coast Guard would bring those responsible 
for the botched rescue effort to justice or let them off scot-free. Instead of 
investigating the many questions that the public had about the accident, 
the prosecutors also focused their energy on guaranteeing the death penalty 
for the ferry captain, as if that would solve all the mysteries surrounding 
this accident. Finally, in order to demand a thorough investigation of the 
accident—i.e. what had happened, how it happened, and how tragedies 
like this could be prevented in the future—the surviving families began a 
vigil in Seoul’s downtown plaza.
In the aftermath of the accident, the surviving families lived like refugees, 
sleeping on the floors of makeshift accommodations within gyms, tents, 
and funeral homes near the site where the ferry sank. As they shared 
grievances and tried to make sense of this senseless tragedy, the parents 
of the students at Danwon High School bonded like no other victims 
of any tragedies before.9 Together, they engaged in various protests and 
marches to make sure that a similar accident would not reoccur within 
Korean society. In one protest, they marched to the headquarters of the 
Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), a public corporation that had been 
heavily criticised for its highly distorted accounts of the disaster. After 
that, they marched to the Blue House, home of the Korean president, to 
demand the passage of a special law to guarantee the political neutrality 
of the Truth Commission proposed by President Park. However, not only 
8  article.joins.com/news/blognews/article.asp?listid=13414472.
9  Refer to the early CNN news coverage. www.youtube.com/watch?v=4i_qKM7SMn8  
24 April 2014.
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did the president refuse to meet the families, KBS’s biased coverage of the 
disaster continued, prompting the families to carry out another protest on 
14 May calling for the resignation of its CEO Gil Hwan-young. While KBS 
reporters at the site of their protest shed tears of sorrow, the KBS editorial 
office refused to allow coverage of the demonstration.10 Moreover, while 
KBS’s CEO did eventually resign, he was quickly replaced by another 
CEO who shared a similar background and views. 
After camping for 76 days outside the Blue House, the families moved 
their protest to Kwanghwamun Square—a large open area that sits amidst 
tall government buildings in the administrative core of Seoul. Overnight, 
these families, who had been living ordinary lives as middle-class people 
waiting for their children to grow up, attend college, and pursue their 
dreams, became activists as they began to lose their previously held trust 
in the government. Vowing to avenge their children’s deaths and prevent 
a similar accident in the future, they approached Min-pyŏn (Lawyers 
for a Democratic Society) to ask for their help in launching a Special 
Investigation Committee. The aim of this committee was to pressure the 
government to set up a Truth Commission as soon as possible and pass 
a special law to grant it strong investigatory and prosecutorial powers. 
In order to ensure the political neutrality of this commission, they also 
proposed that half of its members be composed of individuals nominated 
by the government and the other half of individuals nominated by the 
committee. Throughout the entire process, the surviving families and the 
Special Investigation Committee tried to maintain a neutral position vis-
à-vis the government and utilise official channels. Neither proved to be an 
easy task as society was already too polarised and corrupt. 
Along with an ultra-right wing group of conservative nationalist 
Christian  organisations, some radical right-wing young people soon 
emerged to express their open hostility towards the surviving families 
and their street protests. These conservative groups began to put forth 
a counter-discourse, accusing the families of making ‘unreasonable’ and 
‘excessive’ demands on the government that sowed social disorder and 
contributed to economic stagnation. After exhaustively covering their 
10  ‘“Chega kachog iŏdo...” KBS kicha ŭi nunmul’ [Even if I’m a Family Member, the Tears of 
a KBS Reporter], YouTube video, 0:22, posted by ‘Newstapa’, 5 May 2014. www.youtube.com/
watch?v=iFzK2hjpbms.
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activities, the  mainstream media began to pressure the families to just 
‘let things be’. Deploying the expression ‘public fatigue’, it began to assert 
that people were tired of hearing about the families’ protests. 
According to Han Wan-sang, a respected academic and intellectual, this 
type of discourse that employs expressions referring to ‘public fatigue’ 
can be considered a form of linguistic censorship, comparable to Nazi 
propaganda employed during the totalitarian period.11 Indeed, quotations 
from master Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels, such as the following, 
could be easily found circulating on the internet: 
It would not be impossible to make people believe that a square is in fact a 
circle with sufficient repetition and a psychological appeal. They are mere 
words, and words can be molded until they clothe ideas and disguise … 
One cannot determine theoretically whether one propaganda is better 
than another. Rather, good propaganda has the desired results and bad 
propaganda does not lead to the desired results. It does not matter how 
clever it is, for the task of propaganda is not to be clever, its task is to lead 
to success.12 
While grieving continues to occur in Ansan, where the students had gone 
to school, similar protests and vigils have spread among diasporic Koreans, 
especially mothers, in cities around the world.13 This essay, however, will 
focus less on these social activities of grieving and healing than on the 
discourses that have emerged and surround this disaster. In prompting 
many people to question the state’s ability to safeguard the safety of its 
people, the Sewol Ferry Disaster has become a key political issue that has 
rent the nation in two. While one group claims that the country can only 
move on from this disaster after properly mourning the deaths of these 
children, the other claims that it was a simple ‘accident’. They condemn 
the surviving families and their supporters for ‘pestering’ the government. 
In the next section, let us examine the positions of these polarised groups 
more carefully. 
11  Han Wan-sang, ‘P’iro tamron’ p’ŏttŭrinŭn i ttang ŭi ‘sŏnjangdŭl’ [The ‘Captains’ of this Land 
who are Propagating the ‘Fatigue Thesis], Hankyoreh Newspaper, 11 September 2014.
12  Kim Jae-han, ‘Sŏndong en chŭngo ŭi taesang p’ilsu … koepelsŭ, chŏnsŏn nŏmu hwagdaehae 
chamyŏl’ [Instigation Necessitates the Target of Hatred … Goebbels’s Aggrandising of the Enemy 
Line led to Self-Destruction], Joong-ang Daily, 25 April 2014.
13  For example, there is a Sewol Ferry Disaster protest as part of a peace rally held every Wednesday 
in Minneapolis, US, and there is a Remembering Sewol UK team (rememberingsewoluk.wordpress.
com) that holds candlelight rallies, makes social media postings, organises study groups, etc.
175
7 . NATIONAL SuBJECTS, CITIZENS AND REFuGEES
Grieving Citizens and the Politics 
of Compassion
It’s not as if we heard about the Sewol Ferry Disaster afterwards. Rather, 
it was like we were there with the students on the ferry as it slowly sank 
into the sea. With images of the ferry accident transmitted to us in real 
time through the media, the whole country saw its sinking last April. 
So it wasn’t something that we ‘heard’ or ‘read about’ afterwards but 
something that we ‘saw’ directly with our eyes as we sat or stood where 
we were in our everyday lives. Day-by-day, achingly slowly, we saw it 
unfold on the morning news, the evening news, and on the Internet. 
While people responsible for the disaster were busy calculating their losses 
and avoiding blame, we saw the ferry sink further into the sea. Eating, 
sleeping, working, walking, we saw it. And even now we continue seeing 
it and it is likely we will be made to continue to see it whether the ferry 
breaks up, rusts away, or becomes metal in a scrap yard. (Kim Ae-ran, 
excerpt from ‘Slanted Spring, What We Have Seen’)14 
Observing the unfolding Sewol Ferry Disaster and its grief-stricken 
families, the entire nation was given an important opportunity to reflect 
on their lives. Viewing this disaster as an important window into Korean 
society, Jeon Gyu-chan, a media scholar, called it a ‘remote visual event’—
an event that unfolded before the eyes of the nation like ‘a horrible 
nightmare with nothing to veil it’.15 During its unfolding, the mainstream 
media—operating under strict government censorship—earned the title 
of ki-re-ki (journalist garbage) for its highly distorted coverage. Even 
so, through its ‘outstanding affective and intellectual perception’, the 
viewing public, Jeon Gyu-chan argues, was able to grasp the essence of the 
situation with just a passing glance. Perhaps realising that they too live in 
an era overshadowed by death, the viewers formed a ‘grieving community’ 
in front of their television screens. Psychotherapist Carl Jung argued that 
when a community experiences a tragedy, it becomes afflicted by a ‘big 
dream’ that serves as a collective warning. Certainly, the Sewol Ferry 
Disaster was one such event in South Korea, making everyone aware of 
the fragility of their everyday lives within which a tragedy like this could 
befall anyone at any time.
14  Kim Ae-ran, ‘Kiunŭn pom, uriga pon kŏt’ [Slanted Spring, What We Have Seen], in Kim 
Ae-ran et al., Nunmŏn chadŭl ŭi kukka sewŏlhorŭl paraponŭn chakkaŭi nun [A Country Gone Blind: 
Writers’ Perspectives on the Sewol Ferry Accident] (Paju: Munhak Dong-nae, 2014), 12.
15  Jeon Gyu-chan, ‘Yŏngwŏnhan chaenansangt’ae: Sewŏlbo ihuǔi sikanǔn ŏpta’ [Perpetual 
Calamity: There is No Time After Sewol], Kim Ae-ran et al., Nunmŏn chadŭl ŭi kukka, 154–5.
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As people converged around the surviving families’ protests, many others 
around the country refrained from drinking, singing and dancing, and set 
up similar altars for grieving. Every night, groups of citizens—mothers of 
young children, in particular—held candlelight vigils in their respective 
neighbourhoods with banners that read ‘We Will Never Forget’, ‘Let Us 
Fly to Where There is No More Corruption, Calculation and Conspiracy!’ 
and ‘Once a Happy Family, We Have Lost Everything’. During this 
national grieving, Lee Chul-soo, a print artist and a highly respected 
public intellectual, engaged in an artistic performance of sending online 
postcards to his fans, mourning the children’s deaths. Here is his first 
postcard, postmarked 16 April:
There were too many—too many and too young. Some agonies, growing 
pains, and many dreams. Some just starting their first love, some trying 
to make their dreams come true. Meeting only death in that southern 
sea, you are now lost. What was that moment like when you were drawn 
to your death? So many people wailing in despair for you. If your death 
weighs so heavily upon our hearts, how unbearable it must be for your 
families. The possibility of a miracle to save you hanging by a single 
thread as the dark night descends. We can’t even find words to offer our 
condolences.
Figure 6: ‘Too Many. Too Many and Too Young.’
Source: Courtesy of Lee Chul-soo .
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On 25 April, he sent another postcard with the following inscription, 
‘Fly from the Depths of the Sea to the Heavens!’ 
The world is weeping. Farewell. Farewell. To a land without collusion, 
without endless calculations of profit, without bribery. To such a place, 
go, you beautiful souls. There is no such place here. There is no such 
place here. 
Figure 7: ‘Farewell. Farewell.’
Source: Courtesy of Lee Chul-soo .
On 5 May, he wrote still another postcard with the following quote from 
one of the surviving families: 
We were poor but happy. But, now that you have gone, we are completely 
destitute.
With the establishment of the Task Force for the Families of Victims/
Missing/Survivors and the Citizens Task Force for Sewol Ferry Disaster, 
the 10-million signature petition for the passage of Sewol Special Law 
began. By 7 June 2014, the petition had collected one million signatures. 
By the first-year anniversary of the disaster, that number had ballooned to 
six million.16 On 8 July, two bereaved fathers also began a 750-kilometre 
16  Jang Sul-gi, ‘“600-man sŏmyŏng muryŏkhwahanŭn sihaengryŏng”, kilkŏri nongsŏng sichak’ 
[‘The Ordinance Neutralising the Power of 6-Million People Petition’, The Start of the Sit-Down 
Protest], Media Today, 30 March 2015.
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trek across the country from Danwon High School to Paeng-mok Harbor 
carrying a cross. During this long trek of mourning, tens and hundreds 
of citizens, who wished to share their grief and consolation, greeted 
them. On 14 July, urging the adoption of a proper Sewol Special Law, 
the Sewol Ferry Disaster families began fasting. This drew people who 
wanted to show their solidarity not only to Kwanghwamun Plaza, but 
also onto online spaces, where individuals posted pictures and shared 
stories of their own fasting. On YouTube, people began to upload videos 
of Sewol commemorations, such as fields of yellow ribbons to express 
people’s grief. Nationwide, citizens held protests with banners that read 
‘Life before profit!’ and ‘People before money!’, as well as open forum 
discussions, which prompted many to reflect on their fast-paced lifestyles 
and question the cherished concepts of ‘nation’, ‘compressed modernity’, 
and ‘unbridled neoliberalism’. Soon, these acts of grieving took on more 
artistic and cultural forms. While the Hankyoreh Newspaper printed 
stories and sketches of children who had passed away by cartoonist Bak 
Jae-dong, an art gallery exhibited the keepsakes of a girl who had dreamt 
of becoming a fashion designer before dying in such an untimely manner. 
On the 100th day after the sinking, various commemorations took place 
nationwide, including a concert by the Paris-based and world famous 
pianist Paik Kunwoo. After cancelling a world tour, he held a concert 
on Jeju Island (the destination of the ill-fated ferry) instead, to mourn 
the children’s deaths. In front of Seoul Plaza at City Hall, over 50,000 
grieving citizens gathered under the slogan ‘A Day of Promise to Never 
Forget’. On the stage, Kim Jang-hoon, a popular activist singer, sang 
a duet with the recorded voice of a girl who had died on the ferry but left 
behind an audition tape, bringing the audience to tears. At the end of the 
concert and memorial service, everyone applauded when popular singer, 
Lee Seung-hwan said, ‘I suddenly realize that we are such pitiful people 
with a state that is either unable or unwilling to protect its people. Instead 
of avoiding this ugly truth, however, let us eat well and stay strong so that 
we may never forget what we have seen and learnt from this tragedy’.17 
17  ‘[NocutView] ‘Kimchanghun- Yisŭnghwan, nunmul ŭi k’onsŏt’ŭ “4.16 chŏltae itchi 
ankesssŭmnida”’ [Kim Jang-hoon & Lee Seung-hwan, the Concert of Tears, ‘We Will Never Forget 
04/16], YouTube video, 3:03, posted by ‘NocutV’, 25 July 2014. www.youtube.com/watch?v=1HER
muciE0s&feature=youtu.be.
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Overseeing this act of mourning were over 10,000 police and military 
troops as part of 130 squadrons that were deployed to control the grieving 
public.18
In addition to these spontaneous acts of civic gathering, a flood of writings 
began to appear on the disaster. Declaring that the Sewol Ferry Disaster 
was ‘not an omen but the result of accumulated events’, novelist Bae 
Myung-hoon writes: ‘Though there have been many warnings, the strange 
and unsavory ways in which the nation state has been operating have been 
made crystal clear by this accident’.19 Viewing the Sewol Ferry Disaster 
as more than an ‘accident’, rather a momentous ‘event’ that has unveiled 
the state’s corrupt inability to protect its own citizens, novelist Pak Min-
gyu wrote a highly metaphorical account of ‘The Sinking Ferry of South 
Korea’, likening the nation to the doomed Sewol, a vessel that was built 
and originally operated in Japan, and then ineptly refitted to enable it to 
carry a dangerously large load. Analogously, Pak depicts Korea’s system 
as being shaped by Japanese colonialism, dangerously ‘retrofitted’ under 
postwar US auspices, and then operated by a crew of politicians and 
citizens who failed to acknowledge that their ship was sinking.
Looking back, 10 years was too short a time to build a democratic nation, 
which had a distorted concept of ‘public interest’ from the beginning. 
Since the colonial period, the most ardent desire of Korean people has 
been to become the confident and dignified members of an independent 
nation. Unlike citizens in the West, who had built their cities and publics 
since the 12th century, Koreans became ‘colonial’ citizens of a modern 
nation only in the 19th century. Identifying the public with the state, 
they became readily mobilised by the state during its modernisation 
process. During this process, they continued to view the public as 
a  state-dominated community rather than a voluntary community of 
communicative citizens. This perception of the public also appears 
within the language. The terms, ‘people’ and ‘citizen’, have very different 
connotations. To be more precise, ‘people’ referred to ‘national subjects’, 
a collective body of mobilised people rather than ‘citizens’, who can make 
and change the nation from below. Through the Sewol Ferry Disaster, 
Korean public intellectuals have realised the folly of identifying the public 
18  Im Jong-myung and Kim Yae-jee, ‘Sewŏlho 1chugi sŏulkwangchang 5manyŏ unchip… 
ch‘umoche mach‘igo haengchin’ [50,000 Citizens Who Have Gathered for the 1st Anniversary 
of Sewol Diaster in Seoul Plaze Commemorating That Day], NEWSIS, 16 April 2015.
19  Bae Myung-hoon, ‘Nuka tapeya halkka?’ [Who Should Answer?], Kim Ae-ran et al., Nunmŏn 
chadŭl ŭi kukka, 105–6.
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with the state. For instance, some people have responded to the demand 
of the surviving families ‘to investigate and prosecute those responsible 
for the accident’ with the statement that it is like ‘handing a knife to the 
victim of a crime’. In reply, Pak Min-gyu retorted, ‘Does that mean that 
we should give the knife back to the killer instead?’ In a nation dominated 
by the state, he asks, ‘Who should stand as the judge of the public when 
the state is a criminal suspect and the public enemy is the public itself?’20 
Following the accident, protestors have cited Article 1, Clause 2 of the 
Constitution most frequently within their protests: ‘the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Korea shall reside in the people, and all state authority shall 
emanate from the people’. This chapter, once again, expresses the strong 
will of protestors to recover the ‘state for the people’.
The Sewol Ferry Disaster has dredged up acute feelings of sadness and 
anger within the Korean people.21 If, as cultural critic Kim Young-ok 
argues, politics is the transformation of everyday feelings, emotions and 
consciousness into public speech, then this disaster has done exactly that. 
It has forced people to take the small moments of self-awareness that 
have formed from gazing into the black hole of despair and transform 
them into public speech. Shuttling back and forth between the public 
and private spheres, the surviving families and mourning citizens are 
recovering the practices of empathy and mourning that were either 
suppressed or excluded from the phallocentric political sphere. One such 
ritual drew upon shamanistic and Catholic practices. Upon hearing that 
the parents’ hearts were heaviest when they were sorting through the box 
of possessions of their deceased child recovered from the accident, a group 
of nuns set out to alleviate the sorrow of one mother who had lost her son 
in the Sewol Ferry Disaster. As the mother took her son’s clothes out of 
the box and into the bathroom to wash them one by one, the nuns sat on 
the floor lit with a candle and sang hymns. As the mother dried, ironed, 
and folded the clothes, other mourners recited poet Chun Sang-byung’s 
Kui-ch’un (‘Returning to Heaven’) and wailed in grief. The mother thus 
bid farewell to her child with utmost love and devotion. Although few 
parents could partake in this kind of mourning ritual attended to by the 
nuns, various other forms of mourning and healing have taken place in 
Ansan. Though I do not cover these rituals of mourning extensively within 
this essay, I wish to emphasise the ways in which the Sewol Ferry Disaster 
20  See Kim et al., Nunmŏn chadŭl ŭi kukka, 53.
21  Kim Jong-chul et al., ‘Roundtable Discussion’, 6.
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has given rise to these collective practices of grieving that allow people 
to recover their sense of mutual dependency and ethical responsibility.22 
Also providing great condolence was Pope Francis’s visit to South Korea 
from 13–18 August,23 which prompted many people to begin asking how 
they could share another’s pain.
Following the public outpouring of grief and protests, intellectuals 
and social scientists went on to develop further discourses about the 
relationship between the Korean state and neoliberalism, arguing that this 
disaster represented not a glitch but a basic flaw within the entire system. 
Scholars ranging from economist Woo Sun-wook24 to sociologist Han 
Byung-chul claimed that the real culprit behind the children’s murder 
was not the ferry captain or its owner but neoliberalism. They claimed 
that the Sewol Ferry Disaster was the natural culmination of 50 years 
of compressed modernisation during which the pursuit of economic 
growth became privileged above everything else. Scholarly publications, 
including those by Jin Jang-duk, argued that this tragedy disclosed the 
‘dual nature’ of South Korea’s risk society: its structural deficiency in terms 
of the shipping industry and the broader problems of Korean society 
caught in the tidal wave of privatisation.25 Historian Park Myung-rim has 
brought up the issue of modernisation without social welfare by pointing 
out how Western countries became neoliberalised only after having 
enjoyed a social welfare state for many decades. In contrast, South Korea, 
in adopting neoliberal ideals almost immediately after the overthrow of 
military dictatorships, continues to have weak social welfare programs 
and is experiencing what he terms ‘malicious neoliberalism’.26 
22  ‘Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is 
in that sense, depoliticizing. But I think it furnishes a sense of political community of a complex 
order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the relational ties that have implications 
for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility.’ Judith Butler, Precarious Life: 
The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso, 2004), 22.
23  ‘P’ŭranch’isŭk’o kyohwang, sewŏlho danshik 34-il Gim yŏng o-ssi wiro’ [Pope Francis 
Comforting Kim Young-oh’s 34-day Sewol Disaster Fasting] YouTube video, 1:21, posted by 
‘MediaVOP’, 15 August 2014. www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-81bkiuQYk.
24  Woo Suk-hoon, Naeril su ŏmnŭn pae [A Boat That One Cannot Get Off] (Paju: Oong-jin Jishik 
House, 2014).
25  Chang Duk-jin et al., Sewŏlhoga urieke mutta chaenangwa konggongsŏng ŭi sahoehak [Sewol 
Disaster Asks Us: Sociology of Disasters and Publicness] (Paju: Han-ool, 2015).
26  Lee Sae-young, ‘Saramŭi kach’irŭl chik’iryŏ…tasi konggongsŏngida’ [People are the Centre. 
A Country with a Collapsing Public: What Caused the Sewol Ferry Accident?], Hankyoreh Newspaper, 
14 May 2014.
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These academic discourses, however, fail to sway ordinary citizens who 
grieve. Part of the reason for this gap between academic discourses and 
popular sentiment is the control of media and information by the state 
power. Another reason is the highly judgemental language used by 
intellectuals as well as ordinary citizens. The intellectuals, as members 
of the post-Enlightenment generation, pretend that they know the 
truth. The  tone of their discourse closes down—rather than opening 
up—a  dialogue. As discussions of the Sewol Ferry Disaster continued 
to be framed through the discourses of nationalism and familism, the 
majority of citizens, who initially felt the ‘heart of heaven’ descend upon 
them, find themselves increasingly estranged from the protests. I consider 
this unfortunate trend to be the result of South Korea’s modernisation 
process, which has paid little attention to the formation of a public sphere 
where citizens could voluntarily meet and solve their collective problems. 
Now there are people with hatred in their hearts who protest against 
the opening of the public sphere of grieving. In the next section, let us 
examine these growing voices of opposition. 
National Subjects of Animosity and the 
Politics of Fear
The political climate after the Sewol Ferry Disaster has become infinitely 
more complicated. Observing the unfolding events of the Sewol Ferry 
Disaster, social critic Gang June-man, from the perspective of a progressive 
and concerned citizen, has identified five stages of despair.27 The first was 
realising that none of the involved parties—the ferry owner, captain, 
or crew—considered life more important than money. The second was 
witnessing the disappointing attitudes and responses of public authorities, 
including the maritime police. The third was seeing the president and 
politicians reflect similarly irresponsible attitudes. The fourth was noting 
that not all shared the indignation of the grieving families and citizens. 
The fifth was tallying the results of the regional elections, which took place 
49 days after the accident. Intellectuals had expected people to turn their 
backs on the conservative politicians, not one of whom had a sensible 
plan to ease the nation’s sense of loss and hopelessness. Instead, the re-
election of these same politicians shattered the intellectuals’ own naive 
belief in the people. After this series of disappointments, the Sewol Ferry 
27  Gang June-man, Ssakachi ŏmnŭn chinbo [The Worthless Progressives] (Inmulgwa Sasang, 2014), 
129–31.
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Disaster became stuck in the opposing logics of the two political parties. 
While the left-wing opposition party tried to use the issue to expand its 
own power, the right-wing government, tense at the possibility of being 
blamed for the disaster, tried to bury it altogether. When a certain segment 
of civil society joined the opposition party’s call for the resignation of the 
president, the Sewol Ferry Disaster simply spawned more controversies.
Adding fuel to the fire have been the controversies around the Sewol 
Special Law. When the surviving families demanded a closer examination 
of this law, some netizens began to make sensationalist claims in order to 
oppose them. Among them were: ‘The surviving families are demanding 
the designation of all victims as national martyrs’; ‘Are Sewol families some 
kind of government?’; ‘The efforts of the surviving families to extract one 
more cent from the government are now exposed’. Through this smear 
campaign, they tried to portray the families as selfish individuals out 
for personal gain.28 Even though these claims are groundless, they have 
become the primary way to understand the Sewol Ferry Disaster.
In fact, one of the growing problems within Korean society is the inability 
to distinguish fact from fiction, with struggles for truth giving rise to 
further falsehoods. These falsehoods are then further manipulated to 
exacerbate an already tense political situation. For instance, when one man, 
identifying himself as the descendant of a Korean War veteran, proposed 
the formation of a group to oppose the passage of the Sewol Special Law, 
he was soon joined by the ultra-right Fathers’ Coalition. Not only did 
they make ridiculous claims about these surviving families demanding 
special privileges for their deceased children, they also compared the 
Sewol Ferry Disaster to an ordinary traffic accident that neither the state 
nor the nation was responsible for. In their words, the children had simply 
died on a school trip, which they undertook out of their own volition 
and for their own pleasure. When the parents of the Sewol victims began 
a hunger strike on 17 July to demand a fair and speedy investigation of 
the accident, anti-Communist and ultra-right wing groups, including the 
Fathers’ Coalition and fundamentalist Christians, gathered to denounce 
them as bad parents. They also claimed that giving the surviving families 
the power to hold an independent and impartial investigation would 
shake the legal foundation of the country. Portraying the fasting parents 
28  Lee Ju-young, ‘Sewŏlho yugachok tulrŏssan ŭihok 3kachi, chinsil ŭn?’ [Three Doubts 
Surrounding Sewol Disaster’s Surviving Families: The Truth?], Ohmynews, 16 July 2014.
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as a pro-Communist and pro-North Korean force bent on toppling 
the government, some even warned the president of a second Kwangju 
Uprising.29 
At the hunger strike, joining the Fathers’ Coalition were the ‘Volunteer 
Battalion of Mothers’—a team of middle-aged women in vests who 
carried picket signs with incendiary messages on them, such as ‘How 
much financial compensation do you want, that you are out here fasting 
and protesting instead of quietly crying at home?’ or ‘How well do you 
want to live that you’re willing to sell [the bodies of ] your children?’ 
As groups like these waved these signs in front of the fasting parents,30 
wild rumours began to spread widely, especially among senior citizens. 
Among them were accusations that the surviving families were putting 
forth political demands only to wrestle more compensation from the 
government. Taxi drivers and shopkeepers often asked me whether the 
protests of the families were not prolonging the economic recession. 
Others stated that the state should not compensate these families since 
their children had died in a ‘boating accident’ and taxpayers had not 
agreed to use their taxes to compensate them. In 2015, when the amount 
of the families’ compensation was finally determined, an old lady in my 
neighbourhood asked me, ‘I heard that if a person gets hit by a car, he 
receives US$200,000 (200 million won) in compensation. Why is it then 
that the surviving families are getting US$800,000 (800 million won)?’ 
She then added, ‘I heard that the costs of recovering the sunken ferry are 
astronomical. So why bother trying to recover it at all?’ When I asked 
her about the source of this information, she answered, ‘Kakao Talk’, 
which is a phone and messaging service similar to WhatsApp or Skype. 
In a mediascape of smart phones and internet shared by all generations, 
these distorted rumours spread quickly even among the older generation 
of grandparents in their 60s and 70s. 
The group that concerns me most is that of young people who show 
strong animosity toward the surviving families. As one example of their 
obnoxious behaviour, on 6 September, in a so-called ‘100 Pizza Party’ 
sponsored by a businessman, they sang, danced and gorged on food in 
29  Yonhap News, 23 April 2014; The Kwangju Uprising, also known as Kwangju Democratisation 
Movement, was a popular movement crushed by government troops under Chun Doo-hwan in May 
1980 in the city of Kwangju, South Cholla Province, killing more than 600 civilians.
30  Bak Bo-na, ‘Anchŏnsahoenŭn ŏttŏhke kanŭnghanka? “Chasik p’ara hogangharyŏ hanya” nŭn 
pibang e tapanda’ [How is a Safe Society Possible? Responding to Slanderous Accusations of ‘Selling 
One’s Children to Live Well’], Ohmynews, 29 July 2014.
185
7 . NATIONAL SuBJECTS, CITIZENS AND REFuGEES
front of the fasting families outside their Kwanghwamun shelter. Further 
fomenting hatred have been the actions of ‘Ilgan Best’ (Ilbae), an online 
community originally known for their political satire, which is now 
promoting hatred against social minorities including women, people 
from Cholla Province (the home region of president Kim Dae Jung who 
fought against president Park Jung Hee’s military regime, often a target 
of discrimination by people from other regions) and foreign migrant 
workers.31 Ilbae members, who consider social minorities to be free riders, 
say that they are fed up with helping them. They make spurious claims 
that ‘[i]f the Sewol Special Law gets passed, the surviving families will get 
too many benefits’ and ‘[i]mpure forces are using the unfortunate deaths 
on Sewol ferry to siphon off national resources’. In such a manner, they 
express their concern for the country.32 Even a few years ago, this kind of 
behaviour was socially unacceptable.33 However, by widely reporting on 
these hateful protests, conservative news outlets not only condone them 
but also exploit them to try to turn public opinion against the surviving 
families’ struggle for justice.
Another target of public attacks was a father, who, after losing his daughter, 
began a month-long fast to demand the passage of the Sewol Special Law. 
When the fact of his previous divorce became public knowledge, all types 
of smear campaigns began to surface. While some claimed that the father, 
Kim Young-oh, ‘had not once changed a diaper in his life’, others accused 
him of ‘enjoying the high-class sport of archery even though he had never 
paid one cent in alimony’. In the face of media attacks that portrayed him 
as an unfit father because he was divorced, Kim Young-oh was forced to 
reveal a copy of his empty bank account. Within it were figures for the 
money that he had wired to his ex-wife for their daughter’s living expenses, 
including health insurance and cell phone bills.34 According to sociologist 
31  For Ilbae, refer to Kim Hak-june, The Emotional Fellowship of Hatred and Wildness in Internet 
Community’s ‘Ilbae Storage Site’. Master’s thesis, Seoul National University, Sociology (2014); Yoon 
Bo-ra, ‘Ilbae and Hatred Against Women’, Jinbo Pyungrone, Issue 57 (2013): 33–56. Bak Seun-young, 
‘Wigi ŭi namsŏngdŭl “yŏsŏng ŭn paeryŏ anin ch’ŏkkyŏl taesang” twit’ŭllin chŏkkaesim’ [Men  in 
Crisis: Women as Objects not of Consideration but of Eradication: A Misdirected Hostility], 
Hankgook Ilbo, 30 May 2015. 
32  ‘Wigi ŭi namsŏngdŭl “yŏsŏng ŭn paeryŏ anin ch’ŏkkyŏl taesang” twit’ŭllin chŏkkaesim’ [Men in 
Crisis: Women are not Subjects of Care but Elimination], Hankook Ilbo, 26 May 2015.
33  Chae Gyung-june, Kim Si-yuen and Lee Hee-hoon, ‘Ilbae, Sewolho tansiknongsŏngjang 
chupyŏnseo” “pizapati’ kkaji”’ [Ilbe: Even a ‘Pizza Party’ Near Sewol Disaster’s Fasting Family 
Members], Ohmynews, 6 September 2014.
34  Lee Hyun-jeong, ‘Ingansŏng, kachok, kŭriko kiŏkhanŭn haengwi e kwanhayŏ’ [Humanity, 
Family, and the Practice of Remembering], in No Myung-woo et al. eds, P’aengmokhangesŏ pulŏonŭn 
parlam [The Wind Blowing from P’aengmok Harbor] (Hyunshil Munhwa, 2015), 113.
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Kim Dong-choon, President Park Geun-hye and her administration have 
used various tactics, including employing the Korean state intelligence 
agency, to spread vicious rumours and pit the surviving families against 
each other. These tactics, he argues, constitute a form of informational 
warfare aimed at protecting their power and authority.35 
Like others, I remain highly critical of efforts by the Park Geun-Hye 
administration and mainstream media to discredit the surviving families 
and bury the truth of what had happened on the Sewol. I also consider 
it necessary to better understand those citizens who so readily believe 
their lies. Dwelling on a similar issue, Kim Dong-choon attributes the 
animosity of the older generation to their wretched lives. According to 
him, people in their 60s and above have a tremendous amount of anger and 
resentment that they are unable to express as legitimate grievances. Even 
though they consider themselves the main agents behind the country’s 
rapid economic ascent under the military government, many continue to 
live impoverished lives. Therefore, having never asked for nor received any 
compensation from the state, they feel a severe sense of relative deprivation 
when they hear the surviving families demanding reparations.36 Moreover, 
to the ‘Cold War’ generation, the term ‘redistribution’ automatically 
evokes feelings of repulsion. They consider it selfish and corrupt to talk 
about compensation when reviving the stagnant economy remains such 
an urgent task. Therefore, they repeatedly assert that the Sewol Ferry 
Disaster was simply an accident that neither the state nor government is 
responsible for. They also declare that the bereaved should not do anything 
to promote social disorder and deepen the economic recession. Still, 
despite the animosity that these far right–leaning seniors share with their 
younger counterparts, their root of discontent does not lie in unbridled 
neoliberalism but the Cold War system.
Contrary to many people’s perception of Ilbae as young fanatics, many are, 
in fact—according to sociologist Kim Hak-june, who has done extensive 
field research within this community—kind and polite young men with 
35  Kim Dong-choon, ‘Kukka puchaewa kamchŏngchŏngch’i: sewŏlho ch’amsa ihuŭi hankuksahoe’ 
[The Absence of the State and Politics of Emotion: Korean Society after the Sewol Ferry Disaster], 
No et al., P’aengmokhangesŏ pulŏonŭn parlam, 188.
36  ibid., 186.
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great respect for their self-made fathers.37 What most distinguishes Ilbae 
is their sense of righteousness. Many say they prefer the corruption of 
the conservative government to the incompetence and hypocrisy of the 
leftist government. They also harbour resentment against women who 
demand equal treatment despite not having served in the military. These 
women include their girlfriends who make them pay for going on dates 
but offer little ‘service’ in return. To them, people with disabilities, foreign 
workers and mothers who get child support from the state are all parasites 
who feed off hard-working and tax-paying citizens. As such, these young 
people ignore structural inequalities and emphasise the values of self-
reliance and individual responsibility. Within this framework, they view 
the birth of children into well-to-do families, for instance, as part of their 
personal ‘ability’.
By virtue of some 20,000 people, who gather on its website every hour to 
curse, act in a rowdy manner, and vent their anger by calling each other 
losers, Ilbae has become South Korea’s most powerful online community. 
Growing up in the aftershock of the IMF crisis, most Ilbae members have 
experienced cutthroat competition to get into college. As consumers of 
private after-school education since youth, many have internalised the 
‘winner-take-all’ mentality of neoliberalism. Without any alternative role 
models, few have had a chance to cultivate a sense of belonging. To them, 
everything is ‘private’ and a ‘matter of fact’. Despising anyone who talks 
about ‘truth’ without supporting ‘facts’, they dismiss kkon-dae (derogatory 
term for older people who always try to teach) who, in their minds, 
merely preach without providing any evidence. ‘What is your real motive 
in bringing up the issue of compensation?’ they ask the sympathetic and 
warm-hearted citizens who support the grieving families. Is it any surprise 
that people should be unable to care for others who are suffering when 
they have not received such care themselves? From a student, I heard of 
one 30-year-old woman, who, passing by the protest site of the surviving 
families, started screaming at them to stop ‘nagging’ the government. 
Having not received love and support themselves during their youth, they 
are unable to understand the suffering of others. 
37  Kim Hak-june,  ‘Int’ŏnet kŏmyunit’i ‘ilbejŏjangso-esŏ nat’ananŭn hyŏmo wa yŏlkwang ŭi 
kamchŏngtonghak’ [The Emotional Dynamics of Hatred and Wildness in Internet Community’s ‘Ilbae 
Storage Site’], Master’s thesis, Seoul National University, Sociology, 2014. Chun Gwan-yool, ‘Iche 
kukka ap’e tangdanghi sŏn “ilpe ŭi ch’ŏngnyŏndŭl”’ [‘Ilbae Youth’ Who Stand Proudly Before the 
Nation], Sisa-in, Issue 367 (29 September 2014).
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Considering themselves to be smarter and more sophisticated than gullible 
citizens who support the grieving families, these radicalised youths spend 
their days engaging in satirical discourse. Claiming ‘You are an idiot, I’m 
an idiot’, they refuse to take anything seriously. How are we to understand 
these radicalised youths who, after 30 bloody years of democracy protests, 
have emerged as cynical narcissists and conservative egoists, who dismiss 
the past decade of democratic politics as ‘the lost decade’? According to 
sociologist Kim Hong-jung, the reason that these youths have emerged 
as cynical narcissists is because they have internalised the imperative to 
survive at all costs.38 Having adopted survivalism as their modus operandi, 
many youths not only fail to empathise with the pain of society’s losers 
but also heap scorn and hatred upon them. In a slightly different context, 
philosopher Renata Saleci argues that when life becomes a brutal war 
for survival, the young generation, in particular, experiences a form of 
‘neurotic anxiety’.39 Just like post-traumatic stress disorder experienced 
by soldiers returning from battle, this neurotic anxiety can be seen as 
the result of a combination of factors. In evaluating the relationship 
between survivalism and conservatism, we may view it as the result of 
youth adapting themselves to a reality in which they feel social change is 
impossible.
Also undeniable is how effectively the conservative government has 
managed to manipulate both law and media within this gloomy 
environment to further their agenda. In aligning itself more strongly with 
the market, the Korean state seems to believe that it no longer needs to 
pay any attention to its more enlightened citizens. Instead, it can rely on 
money and power to pursue its political agenda. State manipulation of 
the media has become more sophisticated under the conservative regime 
of President Lee Myung-bak (known as the ‘Economy President’ because 
of his background as the former CEO of Hyundai Construction) and 
President Park Geun-hye, the daughter of Park Chung-hee, the military 
dictator responsible for the nation’s economic development in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Under these two administrations, government control of 
political demonstrations has strengthened to the point that it is becoming 
38  According to Kim, ‘survivalism’ is a collective psychology formed by people to respond effectively 
to the various problems created by the conditions of late modernity. Kim Hong-jung, ‘Survival, 
Survival Ethics, and the Youth Generation’, Hangook Sahoe-hak 49, Issue 1 (2015), 179–81.
39  Here, ‘realistic anxiety’ refers to a known danger while ‘neurotic anxiety’ refers to an unknown 
one. Renata Seleci, Puran [On Anxiety], trans. Bak Gwang-ho (Paju: Humanitas, 2015), 48–9.
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impossible to participate in them.40 With political parties needing only 
30 per cent of the popular vote to win an election (because of low voter 
turnout), the right-wing party has focused on ‘economic recovery’ and 
‘threat of North Korean invasion’ while the left-wing party has focused on 
the corruption and immorality of the right. Together, these two political 
stances mean that real issues affecting the country remain unaddressed. 
Within a political environment in which many citizens are becoming 
increasingly cynical, I fear the growth of a movement similar to Nazism 
in Germany during the early part of the 20th century. The likelihood of 
such movement emerging is very high when the ‘industrial generation’—
who did not have the time or the leisure to cultivate a humanitarian 
consciousness—meets the ‘neoliberal generation’—who are struggling 
to survive within the cruel and competitive society—under the umbrella 
of state power. As for the Sewol Ferry Disaster, after the government’s 
successful recruitment of young foot-soldiers from the ranks of the 
calculating consumer generation, there appears to be no solution in sight. 
It is precisely because of this mounting sense of crisis that I highlight the 
issues of a ‘weak state’ and ‘capitalism that has run out of steam’, as well as 
of the politics of survival that must cultivate global citizens. 
People, Citizen, Refugee and the Politics 
of Survival 
On 16 April 2014, many citizens of South Korea became mesmerised 
by the scenes of a ferry sinking. Images of text messages and video 
footage—sent by the students to their parents and friends hours and even 
minutes before their death—kept the country glued to television sets 
and smartphones. What made this disaster particularly notable was the 
participation of the whole nation during its unfolding. Via its mediated 
representations, people participated in ‘real’ time, both in the unfolding 
events on the ferry and the ensuing rescue efforts. In the process, they 
became simultaneous ‘witnesses’ and ‘survivors’ of this disaster. With the 
sinking of the Sewol ferry, people have witnessed a chain reaction of crises 
in South Korean society.
40  On 29 September, the National Police Agency declared that a person would be arrested right 
away should they cross the police line. They also stated that they were pursuing legal amendments 
to double the penalty to a ‘minimum of 6 months of imprisonment and a fine of $500 (500,000 
won) and below’. Kim Seung-hwan, ‘P’olrisŭ lainman nŏmŏdo kŏmgŏ… kyŏngch’al, chiphoe 
siwimunhwa okchoena’ [Arrest for Even Crossing the Police Line … Police Stranglehold of Rally and 
Protest Culture], Hankook Ilbo, 30 September 2015.
NEW WORLDS FROM BELOW
190
It was during this period of growing intolerance that I became aware of 
the Syrian refugee crisis. On 2 September 2015, the world was gripped by 
the photo of a three-year-old child whose drowned body had washed up 
on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea in a resort town. Wearing a red 
T-shirt and navy blue shorts, face down in the sand, he was later identified 
as Aylan Kurdi, a child of a Syrian family who had been fleeing the 
country’s five-year civil war for Europe.41 In the past five years, the Syrian 
refugee crisis has resulted in over 240,000 deaths, 4,013,000 refugees, 
and 7,600,000 displaced persons within its borders—representing the 
biggest displacement of people since the two world wars.42 Following 
the drowning of more than 2,000 boat people in the Mediterranean Sea 
in 2014, another 800 people drowned in April 2015 in the Libyan Sea. 
More than all these deaths, however, this one photo of a drowned child, 
which circulated widely over the internet with the hashtag ‘Flotsam of 
humanity’, struck at the hearts of people around the world. 
When 20,000 Syrian refugees arrived in northern European cities such 
as Vienna and Munich, residents greeted them with hugs, gifts and 
welcoming applause. In Iceland, in an online discussion started by a group 
critical of the government’s policy to accept only 50 refugees, 10,000 
people volunteered to find housing for the refugees.43 A photo of a Syrian 
father selling ballpoint pens on the street while he cradled his sleeping 
daughter in his arms circulated on social media networks, and raised 
$140,000 to help him. Liberalisation of refugee policies followed within 
some European nations. Buoyed by the outpouring of humanitarianism 
among her people, Germany’s Prime Minister Angela Merkel, who had 
been so firm and tough about the recent Greek financial crisis, announced 
the country’s acceptance of all Syrian refugee applicants. Relenting on his 
earlier anti-immigration stance, Denmark’s Prime Minister Lars Lokke 
Rasmussen also announced the acceptance of 1,000 refugees. Watching 
41  Cho Il-joon, ‘P’atae Milryŏon 3sal Siria nanmin aiŭi chukŏm … Chŏnsekye “Kongpun”’ [The 
Corpse of a 3-year-old Syrian Refugee Child Swept up to the Beach by Waves … world ‘outrage’], 
Hankyoreh Newspaper, 3 September 2015. 
42  Yul Lee, ‘Five Years of Syria’s Civil War … 240,000 Deaths and 4 Million Refugees’, Yonhap 
News, 7 August 2015.
43  Seo-young Ha, ‘Refugee-Refusing European Governments, Citizens who Invite Refugees 
to Their Home’, Joongang Daily, 3 September 2015.
191
7 . NATIONAL SuBJECTS, CITIZENS AND REFuGEES
the European Commission’s move ‘to avoid a humanitarian tragedy’44 
amid an outpouring of compassion, Korean media pundits exclaimed, 
‘This is the miracle that Aylan has bestowed upon humanity’.45
In collectively experiencing this tragic moment between life and death, 
human beings feel a sense of compassion that, previously deeply buried 
within their hearts, springs forth. While Korean Buddhist monk Tobŏp, 
during the Sewol Ferry Disaster, called this sense of spiritual awakening the 
‘heart of heaven’ or ‘sacred heart (kŏrukhan maŭm)’, lawyer Kim Tak-su 
declared it to be ‘the first mind (chŏt maŭm)’. In Durkheimian terms, 
we might view it as the emergence of a ‘collective consciousness’ when 
grieving and fearful people gather together and transcend their individual 
fear and suspicion anger to a higher order—the ‘sacred’. Grieving the 
deaths of children both during the Syrian refugee crisis and Sewol Ferry 
Disaster, they are engaging in efforts both large and small to make sure 
such tragedies do not occur again—whether that means showing up at the 
train station laden with flowers to welcome the Syrian refugees or signing 
a petition to demand the proper investigation of the Sewol Ferry Disaster. 
Here I am asking how long humanitarian impulses or compassion that 
rise out of witnessing tragedies could last. There is talk about ‘compassion 
fatigue’; people feel fatigue because they cannot find proper ‘exit’ for the 
confrontation with the state power. Moreover, people are getting busier as 
disastrous incidents and crises occur more frequently.
In this essay, I tried to describe a movement of compassionate and 
hospitable citizens and one of fearful and hate-mongering ones. These 
two contrasting movements and groups of citizens coexist as if they were 
two nations within one nation-state. Similarly, in the case of the Syrian 
refugee crisis, next to the outpouring of humanitarian compassion were 
scenes of open hostility directed against the refugees. On 8 September 
2015, people around the world were shocked by the video of a female 
Hungarian journalist tripping a Syrian father, who was running away 
from the Hungarian police with a child in his arms, and then kicking 
a child refugee.46 They also became incensed when they watched a video 
44  Duncan Robinson, Alex Barker, and James Politi, ‘Greece Under Pressure to Set Up Facilities for 
50,000 Refugees’, Financial Times, 26 October 2015.
45  Song Young-in, ‘Aillani Pakkun Sesang … Tokilsŏ Nanmin Hwanyŏngmulkyŏl’ [The World 
that Aylan has Changed … The Wave of Welcome for Refugees in Germany], Yonhap News, 
7 September 2015. 
46  ‘Hungarian Camera Woman for Fascist Channel Caught on Camera Attacking Immigrants’, 
YouTube video, 0:22, posted by ‘Chewing tinfoil’, 9 September 2015. www.youtube.com/watch?v=i
Tasfpovhe4&feature=youtu.be.
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of a young mayor in Àsotthalom, Hungary, ordering refugees to stay out 
of his town, while striking the pose reminiscent of a neo-Nazi thug or 
gun-toting cowboy.47 Where is this open animosity coming from? And 
what will happen to the growing sense of antipathy brewing in northern 
European countries? How long can the ‘heart of heaven’ that sprang forth 
from watching the pain of others last? Can I be hopeful, believing that 
uncovering the miseries and disasters will open a platform of collective 
learning of ‘social catharsis’ that can open new paths of survival for 
humankind?
After the Sewol Ferry Disaster, many academics have called for more 
public-minded ‘citizens’. Sociologist Song Ho-gun, for instance, argues 
that much of Korean society’s misery can be traced to its lack of public 
virtue.48 Noting that economic growth has far outpaced the development 
of sociopolitical virtues, he urges South Korean people to respect one 
another and serve the public as a community of self-governing people. 
I agree with his argument but feel the prescription is too simplistic. Having 
transformed itself from a strictly ruled colony to a leading economic 
power in a matter of 60 years, South Korea is pointed to as a model 
state for its successful ‘take off’. In the maelstrom of global capitalism, 
however, the people caught up in this compressed rush and ruled by an 
unforgiving developmental state had to compromise and sacrifice many 
things. As novelist Park Min-gyu explains above, with the ‘ferry of South 
Korea’ having started sailing in an unbalanced state, it cannot help but 
grow more tilted as it continues to sail. The obsession with catching up 
with so-called ‘advanced nations’ has spawned a nationalism and statism 
that tries to unify the population into one powerful nation. This mass 
hatred appearing in later developing nations such as present-day Korea 
and Hungary is a product of this crippling modernisation. I have closely 
followed the growing phenomenon of youths in such countries, who 
are sympathetic to this brand of insular nationalism. Their anger and 
frustration has surfaced because, although they may have joined the 
middle class in their own countries, the dreams they had of enjoying the 
kind of lives of comfort enjoyed by middle-class nuclear families in earlier 
developed nations have been dashed. Also, in countries where you must 
face dying alone without anyone to help you, those demanding help from 
47  Cho Seung-hyun, ‘“Nanmin hyŏppaksŏng” yŏngsang ollin hŏnggari sijang “uri tosiro omyŏn 
t’uok”’ [‘Threatening Refugees’ The Video of Hungarian Mayor: Imprisonment if You Come to Our 
Town], Hankyoreh Newspaper, 19 September 2015. 
48  Song Ho-gun, Nanŭn simininga sahoehakcha Songhokŭn, simin ŭi kirŭl mutta [Am I a citizen? 
Sociologist Song Ho-gun. asking about the path to citizenship] (Munhak Dong-ne, 2015).
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the state or others themselves must understand the level of anger that 
must pervade such a society, and its blowback effects, like the woman 
who angrily yelled at the families of the Sewol victims for ‘nagging’ the 
government. Because such people, as citizens, have not had the experience 
of receiving ‘gifts’ from the state or acts of ‘caring’, they themselves don’t 
know how to give of themselves or care for others. Instead, they came 
to think that the proper way to live one’s life is to exist each for oneself, 
living off one’s own efforts alone. For these people, the Korean phrase first 
popularised during the hard times of the 1960s, ‘Let’s all prosper [live 
well] together’, just seems like hypocrisy.
‘Creating the public’ involves building trust and cooperation among 
individual citizens. Compared with northern Europe, when one comes 
face-to-face with such expressions of naked hatred as in South Korea 
or Hungary, it is difficult to ‘create a public’. In recent years, a growing 
number of politicians have capitalised on people’s anxiety and hostility 
to seize state power. Such politicians want to separate the public into 
opposing groups in order to produce mass anger. They pay no heed to 
methods for constructively gaining and holding on to state power. They 
tend to emphasise ‘economic growth’ or ‘economic recovery’, while 
spending tremendous amounts to buy new weapons. They also ignore 
citizens’ objections to continue supporting indefensible technologies such 
as nuclear power plants, fracking, and long-distance oil pipelines. Even 
as they make international agreements to forestall climate change, they 
make no efforts to ensure that the measures required by those agreements 
are carried out.
This kind of activity is not only occurring in the later developed countries. 
During his 2016 election campaign, US President Donald Trump 
emphasised a politics that pits group against group, stirring up hatred 
and hostility. Employing hateful speech as his weapon, he has succeeded 
in generating a sensational sideshow that attracts disaffected American 
voters. Trump has called Mexicans ‘rapists’, referred to women as ‘bimbos’ 
and ‘fat pigs’, and promised to shut down mosques, keep a database of 
Muslims, and round up the children of ‘illegal’ immigrants. Stephen 
Miles of Avaaz has commented that ‘Trump isn’t the only politician on the 
global stage exploiting political alienation and fear to sow hate, but he’s the 
only one who is doing it with $2 billion worth of media attention’. Miles 
said he hopes to ‘use Trump’s media magnetism to our advantage and 
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trigger a massive story about the world rejecting this hate-mongering’.49 
My cousin, who sent me this anti-Trump initiative, commented that 
‘I thought Trump’s campaign was a joke and a publicity stunt and can’t 
believe he has gotten this far’. 
What about the first ‘advanced nations’ in Europe? How are they 
faring compared to the later developed countries? With the continued 
stagnation of their economies, there is a growing trend towards political 
conservatism and radicalisation of patriotic youth in advanced nations 
as well. As societies become more conservative, the welcoming gestures 
of citizens in northern Europe towards Syrian refugees cannot but seem 
more precious. Their gestures of warmth and empathy are not enough to 
solve the situation of Syrian refugees. Are they the ‘kind but incompetent’ 
citizens that some Korean youth mock as the ‘obnoxious left’ or citizens 
who have had their consciousness ‘raised’? I admire people in European 
social democracies in their long-term effort to overcome sheer capitalistic 
greed after the two world wars, but I also know that it would not be easy 
for them to move out of their ‘comfort zone’.
Within the current world order, which is characterised by unending series 
of disasters, catastrophes and hostility, no place on the globe is safe. For 
future generations, we leave behind a devastated ecosystem, the terror of 
new viruses, economies on the brink of collapse, the danger of nuclear 
arms and weapons plants, heightened class conflicts, a widening divide 
between the rich and poor, high youth unemployment, low fertility, ageing 
societies without systems for providing adequate elder care, and the fears 
and anxieties that follow the collapse of national economies. Within this 
context, I propose that we replace the binary of ‘sŏnjin-guk vs hujin-guk’, 
the ‘advanced/developed nation vs undeveloped/developing nation’, deeply 
embedded within the modern mindset, with the notion of ‘sŏnmang-guk 
vs humang-guk’, the ‘rapidly vs slowly collapsing/declining/burning-
out nation’. This may involve replacing the indices that measure Gross 
National Product with indices that reflect their potential destructiveness. 
Such indices should take into account the number of nuclear power plants 
49  This following letter appears on Avaaz.org: ‘Dear Mr. Trump, This is not what greatness looks 
like. The world rejects your fear, hate-mongering, and bigotry. We reject your support for torture, 
your calls for murdering civilians, and your general encouragement of violence. We reject your 
denigration of women, Muslims, Mexicans, and millions of others who don’t look like you, talk like 
you, or pray to the same god as you. Facing your fear we choose compassion. Hearing your despair 
we choose hope. Seeing your ignorance we choose understanding. As citizens of the world, we stand 
united against your brand of division. Sincerely.’ (The petition already has approximately 5,112,000 
signatures as of March 2017) avaaz.org/en/deartrump_rb_loc/?acDWXcb.
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in a nation, the degree of disconnectedness and atomisation among its 
members, or its potential for dealing with the innumerable contingencies. 
In this context, the concept of ‘refugee’ in survival politics proves far more 
useful than the concepts of ‘national subject’ or ‘citizen’ in a ‘politics of 
progress’. During the Sewol Ferry Disaster, people in South Korea who 
once believed in the myth of economic development begin to increasingly 
realise that the state is but ‘a system of organised irresponsibility’.50 After 
overcoming their sense of astonishment and bewilderment when gazing 
upon the ‘unpainted face’ of the nation-state, they have begun the long 
journey of overcoming their abject situation. Already, I have encountered 
many who have embarked on this journey by embracing a refugee-like 
existence including self-exile or psychological refuge. They ask questions 
such as ‘Will Japan or China accept us if we also become refugees?’ 
‘Or will we die as boat people in the East Sea/Sea of Japan?’ ‘Is it better 
to leave this country before that happens? If so, where?’ In the departure 
of these youth for a better life elsewhere, one can find a reason for Ulrich 
Beck’s hope in the face of countless disasters and untold miseries that 
characterise risk society. According to Beck, the shock administered 
to humanity by massive disasters will also produce the ‘conditions for 
cosmopolitanism’, resulting in countless miracle-like events, including a 
new social consensus on the environment. His colleague Bruno Latour 
has also said, ‘society has never been the equivalent of a nation-state’ 
and ‘society has always meant association and has never been limited to 
humans’.51 With the disappearance of one cosmos, Latour further suggests 
using the term cosmopolitics instead of cosmopolitan.52 Here, I want to 
suggest that young people engage in survival politics by becoming ‘global 
refugees’ to transform the present catastrophe into an emancipatory one.
In October 2015, I visited International People’s College in Denmark, 
the sister school of Haja Production School, which I founded after the 
Asian financial crisis in Seoul. A boarding school with approximately 
100 students from over 35 countries, the International People’s College 
is an excellent global school that aims to foster ‘global citizens’. While 
I was there, the principal and teachers were discussing how to cultivate 
compassion and competence as global citizens among the students. Based 
on my limited observation, the problem appeared to lie in their concept 
50  Interview with Ulrich Beck, ‘System of organized irresponsibility behind the Fukushima crisis’, 
Asahi Shimbun, 8 July 2011, blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_7ab41de50100tb1n.html.
51  Bruno Latour, ‘Whose cosmos, which cosmopolitics?’ Common Knowledge 10, no. 3 (2004): 
450–51.
52  ibid., 453.
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of citizenship. The courses at the school covered many important topics 
such as the historical roots of the violence of the Australian state against 
its Aboriginal population and issues surrounding the multinational 
corporations, such as Monsanto. Still, students seemed to have a hard 
time personalising these issues and accepting them as their own. While 
students from the humang-guk—the ‘slowly collapsing/declining/burn-
out nations’—appeared somewhat tired of these dystopian stories, for the 
students from sŏnmang-guk—the ‘rapidly collapsing/declining/burning-
out nations’—the challenges were too real to face.
What is clear here is that these youngsters are going to have to come 
to terms with the fact that these local disasters and catastrophes are 
globally connected. From this perspective, I find the term ‘global refugee’ 
much more useful than ‘global citizen’. Whether one has been physically 
displaced or not, the personal realisation that one is being displaced 
from one’s country of citizenship is likely to be a good start of learning. 
In coming to this realisation and cultivating one’s sense of being a refugee, 
these displaced citizens may do well to heed the words of one native 
woman from the Chiapas region in Mexico: 
If you have come here to help me, you are wasting your time. But if you 
have come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us 
work together.53
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Thinking of Art as Informal Life 
Politics in Hong Kong
Olivier Krischer
Towards a Language of Social Action
This chapter considers artistic practices as a form of informal life politics 
in the context of Hong Kong, through the case of the Wooferten 活化廳 
art space. Besides situating the space’s emergence in the context of local 
cultural politics, and a ‘translocal’ network of regional collaborators, I also 
consider theoretical approaches to this form of creative action, and relate 
them to the often overlooked history of social movements in Hong Kong.
The challenge of thinking about collective social actions or movements 
in Hong Kong became clearer to me after being invited to present 
at a symposium organised by ZKM (Zentrum für Kunst und 
Medientechnologie), Germany, in January 2014, titled ‘Global 
Activism Symposium’.1 The roster of speakers was inspiring yet also 
revealing, including members of Occupy Wall Street, an activist turned 
politician from Iceland’s Pirate Party, street artists and journalists from 
1  ‘Global Activism Symposium’ was held at ZKM Centre for Art and Media Karlsruhe from 
24–26 January 2014, coinciding with the exhibition Global Activism. For details of presentations and 
speakers, see www.global-activism.de/global-activism-symposium.
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the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, a South African ANC (African 
National Congress) veteran turned academic, American direct democracy 
advocates, and some artists working with ‘radical’ political groups.2 
Although I had introduced a number of participants from Hong Kong 
when approached by the organisers, they eventually came back to ask 
if I would speak on their behalf. I found it awkward situating the range 
of actions and motivations from Hong Kong and other urban contexts 
in East Asia, each with their own particular history and epistemology, 
into a politics of ‘global activism’.3 The so-called Umbrella protests would 
not occur until September of that year, and I don’t recall anyone at the 
symposium showing awareness of Hong Kong’s own Occupy Central 
movement.4 There was, of course, traffic in creative ideas between people 
facing similar pressures of the neoliberal urban economy, but the different 
facets of Hong Kong politics, its history and ‘post-colonial but not 
independent’ reality, seemed a world away. While I could introduce these 
informal sites of creative action on the other side of the world, I was 
afraid they would be lost in translation. Did I even know the words to 
make sense of them myself? Reflecting on this brings to mind the words 
of another border-crossing artist:
If the language I used failed to deliver, was I to appropriate another that 
talked to others even though it did not talk to me? How would a universal 
language work when the spaces in which we dwell are not synchronised?5
2  The latter refers to the New World Summit, a project established by Dutch artist Jonas Staal, 
as a series of ‘summits’ for political organisations that have been outlawed by the governments under 
which they live (typically as ‘terrorists’), pointing to the limits of ‘democracy’. The first summit, 
held at the Berlin Biennale in January 2014, included representations by the Kurdish Women’s 
Movement, the Basque Independence Movement, the National Liberation Movement of Azawad and 
the National Democratic Front of the Phillipines. See www.newworldsummit.eu.
3  I also found it awkward speaking on behalf of a wide group of artists whom I had discussed 
with organisers with the intention of their participation, rather than my own. I suspect that had the 
Umbrella protests of September 2014 occurred before the exhibition and symposium, participation 
by Hong Kong artists and activists would have been sought.
4  Part of the spread of ‘Occupy’ actions following Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Central was an 
occupation under the HSBC bank headquarters, in Central, Hong Kong, initiated 15 October 2011 
and forcibly evicted on 11 September 2012.
5  Phaptawan Suwannakudt, ‘Catching the Moment, One Step at a Time’, in F. Nakamura, 
M.  Perkins and O. Krischer eds, Asia Through Art and Anthropology: Cultural Translation Across 
Borders (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 99.
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Figure 8: Exhibition view from Global Activism at ZKM Centre for Art and 
Media, Germany, February 2014. Detail of an artwork by Mark Wallinger, 
comprising a reconstruction of a ‘peace camp’ in London’s Parliament 
Square, where activist Brian Haw lived from 2001 until his eviction in 
2006, in protest at the UK’s participation in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In 2007, Wallinger’s ‘installation’ based on Haw’s encampment won the 
prestigious Turner Prize following its exhibition at the Tate Modern. 
Source: Olivier Krischer .
How can we talk about collective actions in Hong Kong or East Asia, 
particularly in cases where networks of collaborators work between formally 
distinct political systems? Calling for less ‘state-centred’ understandings of 
politics, some recent approaches in political science recognise the integral 
role of ‘informal politics’ in various East Asian political systems. Ditttmer, 
Fukui and Lee’s Informal Politics in East Asia (2000), for example, focuses 
on the ways informal actors, particularly kinship groups and factions, 
work to affect change through formal political institutions, legally or 
otherwise.6 Interestingly, they note how such informal affiliations can 
predate the institutional systems with which they now negotiate. Examples 
6  L. Dittmer, H. Fukui and P. N. S. Lee eds, Informal Politics in East Asia (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). This features case studies from Taiwan, China, South Korea, 
North Korea and Vietnam.
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include the roles of former Route Army factions in China, Kuomintang 
(KMT) factions in Taiwan, or the oligarchic continuity bridging pre- 
and postwar politics in Japan. While sharing certain modes of action, 
such informal actors operate differently in different political systems. 
In China, ‘submerged networks’ might only become apparent during 
leadership changes or Party crises, whereas elsewhere they have become 
structural and publicly acknowledged, as in Japan.7 While the so-called 
marketisation of conflicts of interest can decrease violent confrontation, 
it can also lead to increased corruption. Significantly, the authors point 
out that such informal, even ‘illegal’ machinations are often employed 
to affect legitimate change where formal channels have become difficult 
or unworkable. 
But this analysis remains focused on formal institutions as central 
agents in societal change. Where Fukui recognises that an appreciation 
of informal politics means that ‘many contemporary social issues are … 
neither a priori private and non-political nor a priori public and political’, 
institutions remain the legitimate political agents.8 For Dittmer, informal 
politics ‘consists of the use of non-legitimate means (albeit not necessarily 
illegal) to pursue public ends. Thus it is conceptually sandwiched between 
formal politics on the one hand and “corruption” on the other’.9 Despite 
expanding the notion of politics, this still seems close to the ‘who gets 
what, when, and how’ approach, in which it remains institutions that 
author(ise) change in ‘public’ life.10 Informal politics here acts according 
to the limits of an existing system, even when circumventing it. Moreover, 
the persistence of such informal channels is attributed to the weak rule 
of law and weak formal institutions, while institutional democratisation 
is aligned with economic growth. Accordingly, for Dittmer, Fukui and 
Lee, the ‘logical step’ is to form or join institutionalised political parties, 
which provide more ‘civil’ means of settling differences.11 But what about 
7  Lowell Dittmer, ‘Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective’, 
in Dittmer, Fukui and Lee, Informal Politics in East Asia, 298–99.
8  Haruhiro Fukui, ‘Introduction: On the Significance of Informal Politics’, in Dittmer, Fukui and 
Lee, Informal Politics in East Asia, 1–20, citation from 8.
9  Dittmer, ‘Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective’, 292. Emphasis 
in the original.
10  See Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, reprinted in Harold D. Lasswell, 
The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell (New York: The Free Press, 1951), 295–461.
11  Dittmer, ‘Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective’, 307.
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attempts at redefining a formal system or of acting autonomously of 
formal structures, either individually or collectively, such as in the form 
of social movements or citizen collectives?
In the wake of the Paris student movement of May 1968, some European 
historians and sociologists reconsidered the role of social movements not 
merely as ephemeral protests but as vehicles of urban change. Building on 
the work of Alain Touraine, Manuel Castells in particular has theorised the 
relationship between cities and social change, focusing on civic movements 
across different times and cultures.12 Discussing the Comunidades 
of Castilla (1520–22), in which citizens allied with nobles against the 
Spanish monarchy, Castells recognised that citizens acted collectively on 
the basis of common concerns rather than structural conditions such as 
social class. ‘[T]he comuneros designated their opponents in terms of their 
monopoly over political institutions and not on the basis of their social 
privileges.’13 Castells sees this as representing the underlying structure 
of social movements in many times and places. This importantly casts 
social movements and citizen collectives as legitimate historical agents. 
However, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between ‘movements’ 
and uprisings in Castells’ work. In his case studies, people directly seek 
more equitable political representation by affecting institutional change, or 
through revolution, which here means the seizure of institutional power.14 
Even in his more recent work on social movements in the ‘Internet age’—
including civil uprisings in Iceland and North Africa, and the Occupy 
movement in North America—Castells remains drawn to a dualistic 
interaction between ‘power and counterpower’, an ‘endless historical 
process of conflict and bargaining’ with institutions that ‘regulate peoples’ 
lives’.15 While he identifies a fundamental ‘battle for the construction 
of meaning in the minds of the people’, Castells seems less concerned 
with the ways in which people constantly renegotiate such systems 
12  Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 291.
13  ibid., 7.
14  The other case studies are the Paris Commune (1871), the Glasgow Rent Strike (1915), the 
Movimiento Inquilinarios or ‘Tenants Union’ strike in Veracruz, Mexico (1922–27), and the ‘revolt 
of the American cities’ during the 1960s, demanding community control and racial equality in the 
face of a burgeoning postindustrial society. Hence, in all but the last example what Castells presents as 
‘movements’ essentially took the form of uprisings, as direct and temporary challenges to institutional 
authority.
15  Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge, 
UK: Polity, 2012), 5.
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at an individual level too.16 What if actors do not form ‘the majority’, 
despite collective mobilisation? Or if collectives are tenuous, protracted 
or intermittent networks of loosely affiliated groups and individuals? 
How do we recognise collective actions that take the form of ongoing 
collaborations rather than rallying behind a single cause or principle?
Responding particularly to the anti-nuclear movement of the early 1980s, 
Alberto Melucci observed that what he called ‘new social movements’ 
had increasingly shifted ‘from the “political” form, which was common 
to traditional opposition movements in Western societies, to cultural 
ground’.17 Melucci felt the very notion of a movement is confined by 
the limited vocabulary of sociological discourse, which ‘inherits a legacy 
of dualism from philosophies of history’18 and therefore suffers from the 
‘epistemological challenge’ of belonging to the same conceptual framework 
as ‘progress’ or ‘revolution’.19 Understood in this way, social movements 
are described either in terms of ‘breakdown’ (collective economic crisis or 
social disintegration), or ‘solidarity’ (shared interests within a common 
structural condition, such as class). This dualism might be expressed in 
terms of ‘structure/motivation’, where collective action derives either from 
the logic of the system (e.g. socioeconomic context) or from personal 
beliefs (e.g. ideology, values).20
Instead, Melucci considered movements or collective actions as 
social constructions, ‘built by an organisational investment’.21 
By  concentrating on ‘systemic relationships rather than the logic of 
actors’, he comes to describe movements as ‘action systems’: a structure 
that facilitates communication and interdependence among actors, 
even in apparently loose or temporary circumstances. These systems are 
dynamic, ‘built  by  aims, beliefs, decisions, and exchanges operating in 
16  ibid., 246.
17  Alberto Melucci, ‘The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements’, Social Research 52, 
no. 4 (Winter 1985): 789. For a comparative definition of ‘old’ and ‘new’ political paradigms as they 
are used here, see Claus Offe, ‘New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics’, Social Research 52, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 821–32. Briefly, the ‘old’ paradigm of the post–
World War II period emphasised economic growth and security, keeping civil society at a distance 
from public policy participation; the ‘new’ paradigm, writes Offe, is action in a third space that 
does not conform to the binary public or private of liberal politics. The ‘political’ here is when both: 
1. The actor claims the means of action be recognised as legitimate, and 2. The ends of action can be 
recognised by the wider community.
18  Melucci, ‘The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements’, 790. 
19  ibid., 799.
20  ibid., 790.
21  ibid., 792–3.
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a systemic field’. Collective identity thus becomes less a condition than 
‘a shared definition’ of the plural opportunities and constraints offered by 
collective action.
Actors in conflicts are increasingly temporary, and their function is to 
reveal the stakes, to announce to society that a fundamental problem 
exists in a given area. They have a growing symbolic function; one can 
probably speak of a prophetic function. They are a kind of new media. They 
do not fight merely for material goals or to increase their participation 
in the system. They fight for symbolic and cultural stakes, for a different 
meaning and orientation of social action. They try to change people’s 
lives; they believe that you can change your life today while fighting for 
more general changes in society.22
Furthermore, Melucci accepted that postindustrial urban life, as it was 
then emerging, has not only an economic base but also a symbolic and 
cultural one. Collective action is not carried out simply to exchange goods 
or increase formal political participation, ‘it challenges the logic governing 
production and appropriation of social resources’.23 The organisation of 
such movements is more diffuse, like a network, ‘“informal” relationships 
connecting core individuals and groups to a broader area of participants 
and “users” of services and cultural goods produced by the movement’.24 
Increasingly autonomous, this kind of collective action is a ‘point of 
convergence for different forms of behaviour which the system cannot 
integrate’—not only for conflict, but also for ‘social deviance and cultural 
innovation’.25 The ‘movement networks’ become systems of exchange, 
through which people and information circulate, with participation 
becoming a goal in itself. ‘Since action is focused on cultural codes, the 
form of the movement is a message, a symbolic challenge to the dominant 
patterns.’ In short, by practicing the change they are struggling for, ‘they 
redefine the meaning of social action for the whole society’.26 
22  ibid., 797. Emphasis in the original.
23  ibid., 798.
24  ibid., 798–9.
25  ibid., 799.
26  ibid., 801. Melucci developed these ideas into a general theory of collective identity and 
action in the late 1980s and 1990s, particularly with the increased effect of telecommunications 
on collective social actions. See Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual 
Needs in Contemporary Society (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989) and Challenging Codes: Collective 
Action in the Information Age (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a 
comparative discussion of Melucci’s work on theories of community as action and collective identity, 
see Gerard Delanty, Community, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 94–9.
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The Politics of Aesthetics
How does the action of a part symbolically challenge, by its very 
definition, the meaning of the whole? Bearing some similarity to 
Melucci’s reinterpretation of a movement as a dynamic ‘action system’, 
Jacques Rancière’s re-reading of aesthetics has had a notable impact on 
current thinking in both the arts and politics. Rancière sees aesthetics 
not merely as ‘the sensible’, but rather as a certain ‘modality’ through 
which the sensible is distributed (partagé, literally ‘shared’). This derives 
from Rancière’s understanding of the Greek term aesthesis as the capacity 
both to perceive something and to make sense of it.27 This situates politics 
as emerging from the aesthetic experience itself, because of ‘the way in 
which aesthetic experience—as a refiguration of the forms of visibility 
and intelligibility of artistic practice and reception—intervenes in the 
distribution of the sensible’.28
To appreciate Rancière’s notion of a politics of aesthetics, it is useful to 
consider his distinction between three ‘regimes of identification’ in art: 
the ethical, the poetic and the aesthetic.29 In the ethical regime, ‘art’ is not 
valued for itself. Rather the origin and purpose of art take precedence. 
Judgement is based on the extent to which an image, for example, fulfils 
its function. The poetic regime involves representation, in that the 
principle of mimesis organises ‘ways of doing, seeing, making, judging’. 
It distinguishes art as such, allowing the identification of imitations and 
the development of normative principles, which underpin the classical 
‘fine arts’. By contrast, in the aesthetic regime ‘artistic phenomena 
are identified by their adherence to a specific regime of the sensible, 
which is extricated from its ordinary connections and is inhabited by a 
heterogeneous power, the power of a form of thought that has become 
foreign to itself ’.30 The aesthetic regime frees art from the rules of subject, 
material and genre; it removes the ‘mimetic barrier’ that distinguishes 
artistic ‘ways of doing and making’ from other social practices.31
27  Jacques Rancière, ‘The Aesthetic Dimension: Aesthetics, Politics, Knowledge’, Critical Inquiry 
36, no. 1 (Autumn 2009): 1.
28  ibid., 5.
29  Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. Gabriel Rockhill 
(London; New York: Continuum, 2004), 20–4.
30  Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 22.
31  ibid.
205
8 . THINKING OF ART AS INFORMAL LIFE POLITICS IN HONG KONG
For Rancière, the aesthetic regime is a democratic situation; it is here that 
politics takes place as such, because for him the demos is not the power 
of the everyone but rather of ‘the whoever’. ‘It is the principle of infinite 
substitutability or indifference to difference, of the denial of any principle 
of dissymmetry as the ground of the community.’32 Dissymmetry is 
a structural inequality, while the democratic ‘supplement’ represents 
an inherent capacity to question the perceived or prevailing order of 
the system. ‘This is the aesthetic dimension of politics: the staging of a 
dissensus—of a conflict of sensory worlds—by subjects who act as if they 
were the people.’33 Rancière’s concept of politics liberates democracy from 
the state; it also implies that politics is naturally transgressive—it points 
to the inherent potential of the political subject whose faculties open to 
them an aesthetic experience, an ‘as if ’, in which anything is possible 
(or thinkable).34 ‘Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be 
said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, 
around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.’35 It is in this 
sense of politics as transgressive that we might discover the potential for 
aesthetic, creative practices to intervene in and redefine the status quo. 
I think it is also significant that this approach emphasises the staging 
of politics, the enacting of an ‘as if ’, which (in politics) is a legitimate 
state of being. This function of metaphorical action is highly relevant to 
creative forms of activism.
Wooferten: Community, Art and Activism
An examination of Wooferten in Hong Kong provides an opportunity to 
explore informal life politics from the perspective of aesthetic practice and 
metaphorical action. It should also be noted that it is just one example 
among many different initiatives that have emerged in Hong Kong during 
the last decade. It was by no means the first artist-run space, nor the 
first organisation using arts to activate or interrogate ideas of community 
and local heritage, but it offers a good example of the establishment, 
development and transformation of a fixed space for artistic and social 
32  Rancière, ‘The Aesthetic Dimension: Aesthetics, Politics, Knowledge’, 10.
33  ibid., 11.
34  This has also more broadly been part of Rancière’s attempts to deprivilege philosophy as the 
exclusive domain of sense-making. See Gabriel Rockhill, ‘Translator’s Introduction: Jacques Rancière’s 
Politics of Perception’, in Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 2.
35  Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 13.
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experimentation, in years that have seen a flurry of social action. 
The participation of a younger generation of so-called ‘Post-80s’ artist-
activists has also been significant in Wooferten’s experience.36
It is difficult to succinctly describe Wooferten, as the nature of the 
space, its activity and ‘management’ has evolved in response to both the 
administrative system under and against which it operates, as well as to 
the community in and with which it acts. When I first visited, on a balmy 
Hong Kong night in August 2011, a Japanese activist-artist, Ichimura 
Misako, was about to start her presentation. Her talk was being translated 
from Japanese to Cantonese for a crowd of around 20 people—which at 
Wooferten meant the shopfront space was packed. Ichimura is a ‘homeless 
artist’ and activist who had been invited by the space to spend a couple of 
weeks in Hong Kong, presenting her work informally while also realising 
a series of actions locally. These local actions were then photographed and 
added to documentation she showed as an exhibition. On one wall, painted 
a vivid red, ran the Japanese words ‘Hands off Miyashita Park!’, with a 
megaphone positioned nearby. These seemed like a vignette, reenacted for 
this Hong Kong audience, from the protests in which Ichimura had been 
active, against plans by the Nike Corporation to ‘sponsor’, gentrify and 
commercialise a Tokyo public park used by homeless people.
Wooferten was established in September 2009 as a non-profit 
organisation,  and successfully applied to operate the Shanghai Street 
Artspace, administered by the Arts Development Council (ADC).37 
This old corner shop once operated as a Chinese herbalist until the late 
1990s, yet the building belongs to the Hong Kong Government. Around 
2000, the government agreed to lease it to the relatively new ADC as a 
goodwill gesture and made it available for arts projects based on annual 
competitive applications. For nearly a decade it was used for a variety of 
36  Lee Chun Fung 李俊峰, ‘Cong bashihou de guandian kan huohuating’ [Wooferten, seen from 
a Post-80s Perspective] 從八十後的觀點看活化廳, in Yuk Hui and DOXA Collective eds, Creative 
Space: Art and Spatial Resistance in East Asia (Hong Kong: Roundtable Synergy Books, 2014), 214–22.
37  The Hong Kong Arts Development Council is a statutory authority established in 1995 to advise 
the Hong Kong Government on cultural policy, distribute grants and promote various art forms in 
the territory.
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small-scale arts programmes, ranging from art education to exhibitions, 
nominally inspired by the idea of ‘community arts’, in a renovated white-
cube gallery setting.38 
By 2009, when artist Luke Ching (b. 1972) noticed that the ADC 
was soliciting applications again, the local art scene, and indeed Hong 
Kong more generally, had significantly changed; as founding member 
and inaugural manager Jasper Lau put it, ‘people were talking about 
community’.39 Ching, whose pioneering practice actively intervenes in or 
‘hijacks’ parts of city life,40 saw an opportunity to focus on artistic process 
rather than object-making, and to interrogate the idea of community art 
being touted by the ADC. Ching approached artist friends whose work 
had engaged with political and social issues; as a result, Wooferten was 
established as a non-profit arts organisation, with 10 ‘members’, nominally 
led by Ching and managed by critic-curator Jasper Lau.41 The space was 
intended as a place in the middle of Yau Ma Tei where the community 
could meet art, and art could meet the local community. Yau Ma Tei is an 
old Kowloon neighbourhood that now finds itself at the edge of the future 
West Kowloon Cultural District—a massive, and controversial, HKD80 
billion cultural and commercial development announced in 1996–97, 
designed to realise the Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government’s 
vision of Hong Kong as a ‘world city’, but which has repeatedly been 
criticised as a typical top-down project that ignores existing communities, 
local needs and real cultural diversity.42
38  Unless otherwise noted, the following information is based on interviews with founding 
members  Jasper Lau Kin-Wah and Lee Chun Fung (interviewed in Yau Ma Tei, Hong Kong, 
19  January 2012) and Luke Ching Chin-Wai (interviewed at Wooferten, in Yau Ma Tei, Hong 
Kong, 24 October 2013), as well as articles reflecting on Wooferten. See particularly Lee Chun Fung, 
‘Wooferten’, in Alice Ko ed., Reverse Niche: Dialogue and Rebuilding at the City’s Edge (Taiwan, 2013), 
202–11 [Chinese] and 216–24 [English]. I have generally referred to the Chinese version, as the 
English is an abridged translation.
39  Interview with Lau, Hong Kong, 19 January 2012.
40  Interview with Luke Ching; see also Lee Chun Fung, ‘A Good Idea is Hijack’, dated 2 November 
2012, translated by Sumyi Li. This was apparently published for the Asia Art Award 2010 in which 
Ching was nominated. leechunfung.blogspot.com.au/2012/11/a-good-idea-is-to-hijack-it.html.
41  Interview with Lau, Hong Kong, 19 January 2012. The 10 founding members were Luke Ching, 
Jasper Lau, Kwang Sheung Chi, Doris Wong Wai-ying, Wan Yau, Clara & Gum Cheung, Cally Yu, 
Edwin Lai Kin Keung, Law Man Lok and Lee Chun Fung.
42  The West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD) project is a legacy of Hong Kong’s first post-
handover Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, and has become a much studied example of post-handover 
governance issues. See Agnes Shuk-mei Ku, ‘Contradictions in the Development of Citizenship in 
Hong Kong: Governance without Democracy’, Asian Survey 49, no. 3 (May/June 2009): 521–4; and 
Carolyn Cartier, ‘Culture and the City: Hong Kong, 1997-2007’, The China Review 8, no. 1 (Spring 
2008): 66–9.
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Ching’s original idea was for Wooferten to be a short-term creative 
experiment, lasting only one or two years. In the first year, the group 
developed exhibitions and projects that actively sought to engage with 
and learn about the surrounding community, not only as an audience 
for their artwork but as participants, local experts and neighbours—or 
rather kaifong 街坊, people from the neighbourhood (a Cantonese term 
that repeatedly appears in Wooferten materials). The project ‘Small Small 
Prize! Big Big Pride!’ took the form of a competition where participants 
were asked to nominate their favourite local shops, for which DIY 
trophies were made by Wooferten and delivered with fanfare to the 
winning establishments. Another early project, ‘Mastermind’, connected 
artists with the workshops of local craftspeople and technicians, including 
expert activities outside the typical realm of the arts, such as electrical 
repairs and locksmithing. Like many of Wooferten’s subsequent projects, 
these were bilateral: Wooferten learnt more about the area and their 
neighbours, while  also sharing skills, resources and local history, and 
cultivating more trust.
The space often played with the formal concept of an institution to serve 
new purposes: for example, when they discovered that a flower plaque 
(faapai 花牌) maker had lost his workshop in nearby Sham Shui Po due 
to an urban redevelopment project, Wooferten offered him a permanent 
space at the back of their premises, as an ‘Artist in Residence’, naming him 
Wooferten’s ‘Flower Plaque Master in Residence’. Subsequently, Wong 
Nai-chung, the flower plaque master, adapted his commercial practice to 
suit his new circumstances, creating plaques with slogans of protest, as 
well as making public presentations and demonstrations to raise awareness 
of this unique local cultural practice, which has been pushed ever further 
from the city by rising rents and the upscaling of local businesses. Once 
resident at Wooferten, Wong’s work became part of the space’s activity; 
he made a large ‘Wooferten’ faapai for the shopfront, and later began 
contributing a regular column to Wooferten’s local newsletter, becoming 
inextricably associated with the space.43
43  Ironically, Wong Nai-chung’s work has since become better known, while the surge in projects 
relating to local customs and heritage has also heightened awareness of flower plaques and other 
local artisanal trades being pressured by urban redevelopment. Jasper Lau has published a slideshow 
explaining how the government repossessed Wong’s shop and home, and his subsequent practice. See 
‘Flower Plaque (Faa Pai) Craft Master Wong Nai Chung’, YouTube video, 6.30, posted by ‘kin wah 
lau’, 2013. www.youtube.com/wa tch?v=lu7JftKIHDo, accessed 18 December 2015.
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Figure 9: An event at Wooferten in September 2013.
Source: Courtesy of Lee Chung Fung and Wooferten .
Wooferten’s development then took a slightly different turn, with 
management passing to the youngest founding member, Lee Chun 
Fung. When the ADC seemed poised to take the space back after a year 
of operation, members deliberated on whether to reapply or to leave.44 
Lee and a few others chose to carry on developing the space’s activities, 
emphasising a two-pronged approach: continuing to make experimental 
art projects with community relevance, while also promoting the gallery 
space as an informal community centre, providing amenities such as 
a  water fountain, comfortable sofa and public computer, even posting 
a sign on the door that invited locals to drop by ‘anytime’. Local children 
(including those of South Asian migrant working families in the area) 
stop by after school; some elderly neighbours, even volunteers from 
other parts of Hong Kong, started dropping in to take part in whatever 
was happening and to propose their own projects. This ‘living room’ 
indeed seems to be reflected in the organisation’s name: ‘Wooferten’ is an 
44  Jasper Lau and Lee Chung Fung, interview by author, digital recording, Hong Kong, 19 January 
2012; also see Lee Chung Fung ‘Wooferten’, in Lee Chung Fung ed., Wooferten’s Art/Activist in 
Residence (AAIR) 2011-12, (Hong Kong: Wooferten, 2014), 129.
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alternative, slightly Anglophone-looking transliteration of the Cantonese 
words wut faa teng, suggesting a ‘hall’ or place (teng 廳) for ‘activation or 
revitalisation’ (wut faa 活化).45 
Lee Chun Fung and Art Activism
Born in 1984, Lee identifies as a member of Hong Kong’s ‘Post-80s’ 
generation, those who came of age in the late 1990s to mid-2000s, the 
first decade of People’s Republic of China (PRC) rule, in which issues of 
Hong Kong values and identity progressively came to the fore.46 After 
graduating in fine arts from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
Lee  worked with the Artist Commune, another community-oriented 
non-profit arts organisation, established in 1997 and located in the Cattle 
Depot Artists Village—a repurposed heritage building also administered 
by the ADC. Why this interest in community? One notable turning point 
is the year 2003, marked by the SARS outbreak, an economic downturn 
that dented the developmental myth of Hong Kong as a money market 
and, most importantly, saw massive popular protests against attempts to 
introduce anti-subversion laws (the notorious Article 23). For Lee, and 
many other 20-somethings, however, the real catalyst was the movement 
to preserve Central’s Star Ferry Pier, in 2006.
In August 2006, Lee and a group who came to be known as ‘We Are 
Society’ began to stage weekly performances and installations at the 
pier, later joined by teaching artist Kith Tsang Tak-ping and his students 
from Polytechnic University. They hoped to raise public awareness of the 
government’s decision to demolish the 1950s pier despite heritage reports 
noting its significance in public memory and the potential for an outcry.47 
While other political and conservation organisations attempted to 
negotiate with the government and then to apply legal pressure, as Lee has 
45  ibid., 129.
46  Debate surrounding the definition and legacy of the Post-80s continues in Hong Kong. See Gary 
Wong Pui-fung and Yuk Hui eds, Pre- & Post-80s: Beyond Social Movements—Imagining Discourse and 
the Generation (Hong Kong: Roundtable Synergy Books, 2010). 
47  Cartier, ‘Culture and the City: Hong Kong, 1997–2007’, 76.
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observed, the Post-80s group deliberately chose direct action, stressing 
the personal concern they felt for what was at stake, and hence the need 
to represent themselves rather than waiting to be represented by others.48
In her article reflecting on cultural and urban development in the first 
decade since Hong Kong’s handover to Chinese rule, Carolyn Cartier 
describes attending the protest site just prior to the final closure and 
demolition.
[T]he entrance to the piers had been boarded up, and cultural activists 
had mounted placards, information boards and banners all around … in 
the middle of the roadway where taxis had queued, was a young woman 
sitting on top of a high ladder, dressed in taut black, looking towards 
the clocktower. Scissors in hand, she intermittently and methodically cut 
off pieces of her hair and gave them to the cold breeze. Police stood by 
and watched; news camera crews filmed her and bystanders with digital 
cameras put them on movie mode. She was having a mesmerising effect, 
her silent performance speaking to Hong Kong people: the loss of the Star 
Ferry piers is deeply personal, like losing a piece of yourself.49
Even as the Star Ferry pier was being finally closed and demolished in 
December 2006, protestors, no doubt buoyed by public support, vowed 
to take the fight to the nearby Queen’s Ferry Pier, slated for a similar 
fate in April of the following year under the government’s reclamation 
project. Attempts were made to legally challenge the government’s 
position on demolition as the only feasible option. Yet, while the high 
court eventually ruled in the government’s favour and police evicted the 
remaining protestors (some of whom had begun a hunger strike), the 
Post-80s had already coalesced, invigorating the pre-existing groups of 
social actors and inspiring new ones. By the time of the Queen’s Ferry 
action, a certain pattern was emerging: young activists occupied the site, 
draping banners and tents over the building, while also hosting various 
creative events in situ, all well documented by the media, the participants 
and passersby. Meanwhile veteran activists, pan-democrat politicians and 
experts (e.g. conservationists and architects) pointedly questioned the 
government’s claim of lacking viable alternatives to demolition, evidently 
48  Transcript provided by Lee Chun Fung, from his presentation ‘We Wanna Make a Change: 
Art and Social Actions of the Post-80s Generation’, presented on 29 May 2011 in ‘Backroom 
Conversations: Open Platform’, hosted by Asia Art Archive for the 2011 Hong Kong Art Fair.
49  Cartier, ‘Culture and the City: Hong Kong, 1997-2007’, 77.
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inspired by the Post-80s’ new style of protest.50 Eventually, some of the 
young protestors launched a hunger strike, but all were soon forcibly 
removed by police for ‘illegal obstruction’.
Again in late 2009, when the government had begun to demolish parts 
of Choi Yuen village, in New Territories, to make way for a high-speed 
rail link51—which will terminate in the West Kowloon Cultural District 
development—a loose yet sizeable coalition of art workers, activists and 
Post-80s (many of whom had taken part in actions to preserve the Star 
and Queen’s Ferry piers), gathered in support of the village. Some Post-80s 
formed the ‘Post 80s Anti-High Speed Rail’ group. Apparently inspired 
by the protests of Korean farmers against the World Trade Organization 
in 2005, they staged a Tibetan-style single-file walk through five districts, 
silently pacing, with rice in their hands, prostrating themselves in the 
winter wind every 26 steps, as they wove their way towards the building 
of the Legislative Council in the centre of downtown Hong Kong.52 Later, 
back in Choi Yuen, organisers coordinated with local villagers to stage 
a two-day festival amid the half-demolished buildings, which became 
site-specific installations (including a photography show of the Post-80s 
walking action), ad hoc museum displays, public sculptures, as well as 
stages for literature readings and music concerts. Films were screened and 
homemade snacks were sold by volunteers, in what was dubbed ‘Choi 
Yuen Tsuen Woodstock: An Arts Festival among the Ruins’, a defiant 
display of grassroots cultural solidarity.53 
One particularly important focus of Lee’s artistic and curatorial work has 
been the history of the June Fourth protests in Beijing and subsequent 
crackdown, a topic that is both near and far from Hong Kong. On the 
50  For instance, veteran ‘leftist’ activist Leung Foon, from the Society for Community Organisation 
(established in 1972), comments on this intergenerational relationship in ‘West Kowloon and 
Star Ferry Pier’, in Iman Fok ed., Our Life in West Kowloon (Hong Kong: Society for Community 
Organisation, 2007), 31–5. Also see Wong and Yuk eds, Pre- & Post-80s: Beyond Social Movements—
Imagining Discourse and the Generation.
51  Officially known as the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link, dubbed ‘XRL’, 
constructed by the MTR Corporation, in 2011 the project was already accused of being an unjustified 
public expense at HKD67 billion; whereas in 2015 this has risen to an estimated HKD85.3 billion. 
See www.expressraillink.hk/en/project-details/key-information.html. Accessed 18 December 2015.
52  Valerie C. Doran, ‘Viewed From a Train: Glimpses of the Artist as Hong Kong Citizen’, 
Perspectives (Asia Art Archive Newsletter), March 2011, www.aaa.org.hk/Diaaalogue/Details/977. 
Accessed 20 September 2013. The village’s support group also produced a two-hour documentary film 
about the movement, Raging Land: Breaking New Ground Through Thorns and Thistles [ 鐵怒沿線－
蓽路藍樓 Tienu yanxian - bi lu lan lou] (Hong Kong: V-artivist and Supporting Group of Choi Yuen 
Village, 2010), DVD. 
53  Doran, ‘Viewed From a Train’.
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one hand, on 1 July every year a march is held in memory of the event, 
the first of which, in 1989, remains the largest collective public action 
in Hong Kong’s history. However, Lee has been acutely aware of not 
having personally experienced June Fourth at the time, given his age. 
Unlike an older generation, which remembers the scenes on the news 
and took part in that first march, some Post-80s like Lee have actively 
sought to form their own knowledge of and relationship with this 
history.54 To  mark the 20th  anniversary of June Fourth, in mid-2009, 
just prior to the establishment of Wooferten, Lee and colleagues from We 
Are Society organised ‘P-at-riot’, a project held at the Cattle Depot Artist 
Village, comprising exhibitions, performances and discussions to not 
only commemorate the anniversary of June Fourth but also to probe each 
participant’s relationship to the event and its memory in Hong Kong. 
A statement from exhibition materials remains a significant reflection on 
the relationship of the Post-80s to such events, and their tendency to 
search for their own answers: 
Twenty years have passed, and we have now grown up. In our eyes, 
June 4th is not just a historical incident that is waiting for vindication, 
it is an attitude which should be passed on to the next generations. 
In  discussing June 4th, we have decided to move from melancholy 
(perhaps, a melancholy which could not be totally genuine). What we 
should bring up again here is the attitude of rethinking about the current 
situation as well as the gesture of standing out for the truth.
An anecdote about the origin of the name We Are Society aptly explains 
this different attitude among recent social activists and artists in Hong 
Kong, who identify more readily as ‘the people’. Jasper Lau has explained 
that the name derives from the 1982 film Nomad (directed by Patrick 
Tam Kar Ming). When Cecilia Yip’s character asks, ‘What have we ever 
contributed to society?’, Leslie Cheung retorts, ‘What do you mean, 
society? We are society’.55 
54  Anecdotally, a number of Hong Kong artists I have spoken to born in the 1960s, who were 
in their early to late 20s at the time, recall the 1989 march as their first (and, in many cases, until 
recently, their only) direct involvement in public actions—despite recognising that June Fourth 
left them more aware of politics or current affairs. See for example Olivier Krischer, ‘Wilson Shieh: 
Political Avatar’, Wilson Shieh … Sumbody (Hong Kong: Osage Gallery, 2013), 33–48.
55  Jasper Lau Kin-wah, ‘Tipping Over: Of Politics of Aesthetics as Hong Kong Demands our Art 
Activism’, Art Critique of Taiwan ACT 47 (2012): 75, note 2.
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In early 2011, after returning from a residency at Tokyo’s 3331 Arts 
Chiyoda centre, Lee had the idea to launch a residency programme 
through which, on a shoestring budget, Wooferten would host six artists 
and events between 2011–12, focused on guests who used their creative 
work as a method of social action. From Tokyo, Lee invited Ichimura 
Misako 市村美佐子, who lives as a homeless person in Tokyo’s Yoyogi 
Park. Ichimura (a graduate of Japan’s prestigious Tokyo University for the 
Arts) had become interested in squatting after a short stay in Amsterdam 
in 2002, and soon decided to move onto the streets after returning to 
Japan. From this position she shares the experiences of fellow homeless 
people, particularly women. One initiative was to start a ‘barter café’ with 
fellow resident Ogawa Tetsuo in the blue-tent village where they lived, as 
a place where homeless and non-homeless could meet without the need 
for money. Ichimura has also become involved in causes related to the 
use of public space, such as the long protests to stop the privatisation 
of Miyashita Park in 2008–10, mentioned above.56 Ichimura brought 
documentation from this protest to Hong Kong during her residency 
and organised a meal in a nearby small park, which included distributing 
food to anyone passing by. During her stay she tried to connect to local 
homeless people, to compare their situation with hers in Japan, and 
produced a series of photographs in which she lies down comfortably 
on local park benches, defying their intentionally anti-homeless designs, 
a common feature of gentrified urban public spaces worldwide.57
56  Tetsuo Ogawa 小川哲男 (trans. Chen ‘Nine Zero’ Jiong-lin), ‘The Resistance of Miyashita Park 
Art Village’ 宮下公園藝術村的抗爭 [gongxia gongyuan yishucun de  kangzheng], in Yuk Hui and 
DOXA Collective eds, Creative Space: Art and Spatial Resistance in East Asia (Hong Kong: Roundtable 
Synergy Books, 2014), 164–79.
57  See Olivier Krischer, ‘Lateral Thinking: Activist Networks in East Asia’, ArtAsiaPacific 77 (2012): 
99; also Misako Ichimura, ‘Subversion in Parks and Streets’, Wooferten’s Art/Activist in Residence 
(AAIR) 2011-12 (Hong Kong: Wooferten, 2014), 97–101.
215
8 . THINKING OF ART AS INFORMAL LIFE POLITICS IN HONG KONG
Figure 10: Installation view of Ichimura Misako’s ‘Homeless Artist’ 
exhibition at Wooferten, August 2011. The slogan on the wall reads 
‘Hands off Miyashita Park!’, referring to the ultimately unsuccessful 
protests by Ichimura and colleagues to save Tokyo’s public Miyashita 
Park from private commercial development by the Nike Corporation. 
Source: Courtesy Ichimura Misako and Wooferten .
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The residency was also a way to build a regional network for Wooferten, 
connecting between locales rather than official agencies in first-tier cities, 
which is the typical formula for ‘international’ cultural projects. Lee had 
been introduced to Ichimura through a Korean artist-activist colleague, 
Kim Kang. Kang had been invited to Hong Kong in July of that year, 
with her collaborator and partner Kim Youn Hoan, and they led squatting 
workshops. Like Ichimura, Kim Kang had experienced squatting in 
Europe, in her case in France where she had written a postgraduate thesis 
on the subject. When she returned to Korea, the pair organised ‘Oasis 
Project’, targeting a building owned by Korea’s largest arts association, the 
Federation of Artistic and Cultural Organisations of Korea, established 
in 1961, which has enjoyed close ties with successive conservative 
governments during its 50-odd year history. In 1994, the federation 
lobbied for funding to construct a 25-storey high-rise building in the 
centre of Seoul, ostensibly for artist use. By 2004, the project was still 
incomplete, apparently because government-allocated funds (around 
KRW16.5 billion, or USD14.8 million) had been redirected by the 
association, and also due to disputes with the contracted construction 
companies. The Kims argued that, as artists, this prime piece of Seoul real 
estate was intended for their use, so they went about organising a well-
publicised squat event in which they stormed the building, with media in 
tow. While the federation claimed the whole project was illegal, the media 
attention ultimately led to an investigation and to charges relating to the 
federation’s misuse of funds.
When Oasis Project came to an end in 2007, the Kims formed Lab39 
with like-minded colleagues to investigate issues of government use of 
public land, producing a number of research reports. They moved into an 
area of Seoul known as Mullae-tong, at that time one of the few remaining 
light industrial areas of small-scale workshops, flanked by apartment 
complexes. They encouraged fellow artists and musicians to move into the 
area, which meant negotiating individual leases, but soon well over 100 
artists had relocated. Cafes and music venues quickly popped up, even 
as the steel workshops continued trading. For  their 2011 Hong Kong 
residency, the Kims adapted their project ‘Squat Geography Information 
System (SGIS)’, holding workshops to form a database of  potential 
Hong Kong squatting sites, then undertaking an inspection of some, such 
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as the former Oil Street Artist Village. They also documented the process 
of scaling the fence and symbolically ‘reclaiming’ this once vibrant public 
building.58
A History for Social Movements 
in Hong Kong
Through the memorialisation of June Fourth as public memory, and 
through the development of activist residencies connecting Hong 
Kong urban issues to those of other metropolises in the region, Lee and 
Wooferten colleagues have bridged historical and national frontiers, 
and have reconnected with and created alternative narratives of identity 
and history in Hong Kong. In some cases, Lee has been surprised to 
discover the hidden resonance between contemporary and historical 
sites of social action—an example of which I will return to below. Many 
historians have marveled at the apparent social stability of colonial Hong 
Kong, described by some, for example, as an ‘administrative absorption 
of politics’.59 As history was often commissioned by the ruling authority 
or its allied elites, alternative narratives have surfaced only recently. Hong 
Kong’s unique situation of ‘decolonisation without independence’ makes 
instances of anti-authoritarian action, even those that appear nationalistic, 
remain historically sensitive. Yet, even before 1997, social movements 
shaped politics and local identity in a variety of ways that, while distinct 
from the contemporary situation, nevertheless deserve to be rediscovered 
as parts of a longer historical arc through which to understand life politics 
in Hong Kong.
While the 1940s–50s saw labour strikes and reflections of the Chinese civil 
war, the watershed moment in postwar Hong Kong social movements was 
the so-called Kowloon riots of 1966–67. Most notably, the riots seem, in 
hindsight, to have prompted far-reaching policy shifts in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, through which the colonial administration invested more 
58  Olivier Krischer, ‘Lateral Thinking: Activist Networks in East Asia’; Kim Kang and Kim Youn 
Hoan, ’S.G.I.S. in Hong Kong’, Wooferten’s Art/Activist in Residence (AAIR) 2011–12 (Hong Kong: 
Wooferten, 2014), 62–67. Part of the site (No. 12 Oil Street, formerly the Royal Hong Kong Yacht 
Club clubhouse) was renovated and reopened as ‘Oi! Oil Street Art Space’ in May 2013.
59  Ambrose Y. C. King, ‘Administrative absorption of politics in Hong Kong: emphasis on the 
grassroots level’, in Ambrose Y. C. King and Rance P. L. Lee eds, Social Life and Development in Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1981), 129.
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earnestly in the recognition and enrichment of the local quality of life. 
Projects such as the highly effective Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (1974), the underground Mass Transit Rail system (1979),60 
even the recognition of Cantonese as an official language (1974), all date 
from this period and are now perceived as integral parts of local identity, 
generating notions such as rule of law, technology and efficiency, and 
Hong Kong as bastion of Cantonese heritage. 
It is not my intention to claim that these riots raised the quality of Hong 
Kong life during the 1970s. Rather, my aim here is to deepen the context 
of contemporary social movements by showing the complex relationships 
that exist with earlier issues and sometimes even particular sites. The 1966 
incident, for instance, was directly triggered by opposition to a fare 
increase on the Star Ferry, which escalated from general complaints and 
petitions when one man launched a hunger strike and openly clashed with 
the authorities, leading to wider protests, government repressions and 
then rioting.61 Barely a year later, in May 1967, a series of labour disputes 
came to a head when 21 workers at a plastic flower factory in Kowloon 
clashed with police.62 Within days the communist-dominated Hong 
Kong Federation of Trade Unions stepped in, and then on 15 May the 
Chinese Government made an official statement of protest to the British 
Embassy in Beijing. Anti-British demonstrations were staged in Beijing 
and Guangzhou, backed by People’s Daily editorials, which reframed the 
disputes as an anti-colonial movement—echoing aspects of China’s own 
ensuing Cultural Revolution. Seizing on this tacit endorsement, Hong 
Kong communists and leftist sympathisers initially launched anti-colonial 
demonstrations, strikes and propaganda campaigns; but when, by August, 
60  While the first MTR line was opened in 1979, construction had begun in 1967, based on a 
government-commissioned study on alleviating traffic congestion.
61  Tai-lok Lui and Stephen W. K. Chiu, ‘Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics’, in 
Tak-wing Ngo ed., Hong Kong’s History: State and Society Under Colonial Rule (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 104.
62  The factory was in fact owned by Li Ka-shing, then a young businessman, now one of Asia’s 
wealthiest people, with influential stakes in all major aspects of Hong Kong life and beyond, including 
shipping, real estate, retail, communications and utilities. He is generally considered one of the most 
powerful figures in Hong Kong’s capital-orientated political landscape.
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the administration shut down leftist newspapers and launched raids and 
arrests, some leftists started a violent bombing campaign that lasted till 
October.63
Hong Kong was for many a safe haven from decades of uncertainty and 
conflict in China, memories easily rekindled by the Cultural Revolution. 
Rather than inspiring anti-colonial solidarity, such leftist violence had the 
opposite effect, radicalising anti-colonial politics to the point of alienating 
its intended constituency. The colonial administration quashed leftist 
agitators and quickly worked to bolster confidence in the government. 
The riots failed to open new channels of political participation, but they 
did draw attention to social issues such as labour conditions, access to 
housing and social services, which would inform both new government 
policies and grassroots pressure groups in the decade to come. In effect, 
‘politics had now been localised’:64 there was a shift from ideological 
‘Chinese politics’ to more spontaneous, issue-driven actions, which—
given the lack of political access inherent in the colonial ‘consultative 
democracy’ model—made protests the medium of local grievances.65
While Communist China may have been rejected, this did not equate to an 
increased identification with the colonial regime. For a younger (by then 
often Hong Kong-born) generation during the 1970s, the search for a new 
cultural identity even extended into an interest in cultural nationalism, 
exemplified in the ‘imported’ issue of the Defend Diaoyutai Movement.66 
In parallel, between 1950 and 1980, the colonial government gradually 
implemented stricter controls on immigration, introducing a ‘Hong 
Kong Belonger’ classification from 1971, which  seemed to positively 
identify local identity, albeit as an offshoot of essentially exclusionary 
63  Robert Bickers and Ray Yep eds, May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967 (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 6–11. In preparation for May Days in Hong Kong, the 
editors organised a public forum on the riots in 2007, testimonies from which are included at the 
back of the book. Some who had witnessed or participated in the riots spoke of the experiences for 
the first time in nearly 40 years. In their study of social movements in Hong Kong, Lui and Chiu note 
there were no publicly available records documenting the experiences of riot participants, providing 
instead excerpts of a 1996 interview suggesting that non-communist students, many of them barely 
teenagers, had been mobilised, for example to print and distribute leftist anti-colonial materials, 
and were subsequently arrested by the authorities despite their young age. See Lui and Chiu, ‘Social 
Movements and Public Discourse on Politics’, 116, note 20.
64  Lui and Chiu, ‘Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics’, 105.
65  Lui and Chiu, ‘Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics’, 102.
66  Lui and Chiu, ‘Social Movements and Public Discourse on Politics’, 108. ‘Defend Diaoyutai’ 
refers to the movement to assert China’s territorial right to the disputed islands known as Daioyutai 
in Chinese and the Senkaku Rettō in Japanese.
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immigration policy shifts in the United Kingdom. This began to formalise 
distinctions between locals and newcomers in the face of ongoing, though 
more regulated, Chinese immigration. In 1980, the government assumed 
complete control of immigration. In her study of identity formation in 
relation to immigration policy, Agnes Ku has pointed out the multiple 
factors that contributed to identity formation in Hong Kong during 
this period, which include but are not limited to demographic shifts, 
distinction  from Communist China amid the Cold War, community 
formation in the face of economic and social crises (such as the 1967 
riots, or later the arrival of Vietnamese boat people), adherence to 
economic liberalism and rapid growth, or demographic shifts.67 What is 
clear, however, is that the issue of Hong Kong identity was still shifting 
and unresolved when the colonial government formally embarked on the 
handover process in 1984.
In the period between the Draft Declaration of 1984 and the 1997 
handover, expectations regarding political participation also significantly 
changed in Hong Kong. Beijing was perhaps unprepared for such a shift 
and largely interpreted demands for greater democratic participation as the 
result of British intervention in what would otherwise have been a smooth 
transition of sovereignty from the colonial administration to a Beijing-
stamped bureaucracy of public servants with decades of local experience. 
Since then, at the heart of most large-scale protests have been the issues 
of state–capital collusion and a lack of equitable representation in the 
SAR’s functional constituency model—most spectacularly in the recent 
so-called Umbrella protests, which initially rallied not for ‘democracy’, 
but the rather more concrete demand for ‘real elections’ (i.e. universal 
suffrage). Seen in this light, recent informal actions can be related to far-
reaching issues of not only political representation, but more nuanced 
questions of local identity and values.
67  Agnes S. Ku, ‘Immigration Policies, Discourses, and the Politics of Local Belonging in Hong 
Kong (1950–1980)’, Modern China 30, no. 3 (July, 2004): 328.
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Post-Wooferten Postscript 
From late 2013, the Arts Development Council informed Wooferten 
that its application for the coming year would not be approved. Lee 
and colleagues decided to occupy the space and they launched a media 
campaign to encourage debate around the closure. While the cyclical 
nature of ADC grants had not been surprising, they wished to draw 
attention to the unique position they had forged in the local community. 
There was a distinct irony in the way a multibillion dollar project such as 
the WKCD could be mired in a lack of public relevance, while a small 
space that worked hard to understand and be understood by its existing 
local community could be unceremoniously shut down. They have since 
formed the Wooferten Working Group to continue their activities, and 
through this they maintain a regular social media presence. In January 
2014, with their eviction imminent, I received an upbeat email message 
from Lee Chun Fung, in which he noted: 
In fact, I think once we want to keep on doing something with the 
community we have no need to worry about not having a space to 
do it. And I don’t need many resources either. We will do it in a more 
autonomous way, I’m quite confident about that. Hong Kong is an 
interesting place [now] because there are many artists concerned about 
their community. Most important is to sustain the network and keep on. 
That’s just the very beginning.68
Lee’s comment is reminiscent of Melucci’s notion of the new social 
movement as an action network. Many art spaces and groups that have 
emerged in protests and social actions have since dispersed, but the 
individual artists and activists continue to share the same concerns, albeit 
looking for different means to articulate and act on them. Some have 
turned to full- or part-time farming, others to education, still others 
have altogether distanced themselves and their artwork from the flurry 
of protests. Some young artists have gone on to join longer-standing 
organisations engaged in urban and social research. I know one artist 
who has also begun intense research into religious art, setting aside his 
conceptual practice in the search for ‘spiritual’ responses to contemporary 
flux. In the same email conversation, Lee also wrote: ‘To me, art never 
68  Lee Chun Fung, email correspondence with author, 9 January 2014.
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changes something directly. What’s important is that art gives us a platform 
for joining together, to try to understand issues from an alternative angle, 
in a sustainable, intimate and subversive way.’69
In a more recent trip to Hong Kong, I learnt of a performance organised 
by Wooferten in the months after this conversation. With the space’s 
fate apparently sealed, Lee and colleagues had nevertheless continued 
their work, combining their art and politics with the context of the 
community they had nurtured. In May and June 2014, they held two 
street performances near the Shanghai Street space that exemplify the 
complicated way in which informal life politics can affect history, identity 
and community. The performances were based on documentary research 
into a largely unknown incident forming a historical link between the 
Beijing protests of June 1989 and Hong Kong. Titled ‘Back to 6.7.89: 
Pitt Street Riot—Rolling Theatre of Tiananmen Massacre’, the event 
comprised reenactments and scripted reminiscences of 7 June 1989, just 
days after the news from Beijing had rocked Hong Kong. That night, 
on Pitt Street in Yau Ma Tei—barely 100 metres from the Wooferten 
space—a ‘riot’ had erupted; more than 7,000 people gathered, projectiles 
were thrown, cars were torched and looting occurred. Police bused into the 
scene fired 19 rounds of tear gas. One effect of this public disturbance was 
the cancellation of a massive rally commemorating the Beijing massacre, 
planned for the following day, which organisers estimated would have 
attracted 1.5 million people to the streets. Through this combination of 
street theatre and citizen history, Lee and others sought to unearth and 
reconnect to these missing memories and ask (as Rancière might put it), 
what if: What if the protest had taken place? What if we knew more 
about  this riot, as a direct consequence of the Tiananmen protests in 
Hong Kong? How would the course of Hong Kong’s history change? How 
does this change the history and possibility of protest in Hong Kong?70
69  Lee, email correspondence with author, January 2014.
70  A booklet and DVD have been produced documenting the event and this history, including short 
reminiscences from Yau Ma Tei locals. See Pitt Street Riot – Rolling Theatre of Tiananmen Massacre Video 
& Documents [碧街事件－六四滾動街頭劇場行動紀錄 Bijie shijian - liusi gundong jietou juchang 
xingdong jilu], edited by Lee Chun Fung (Hong Kong: Wooferten Kai Fong Wui, 2015). A selection of 
film clips and essays have also been collected on the project’s website, to allow wider access to history of 
this incident: pittstreetriot.blogspot.com.au/2015_05_01_archive.html.
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Figure 11: Performance still of the ‘Back to 6.7.89 Pitt Street Riot – Rolling 
Theatre of Tiananmen Massacre’, staged in Yau Ma Tei, Hong Kong, 
on 31 May and 7 June 2014.
Source: Image by Pak Chai; courtesy Lee Chung Fung .
In Lee’s essay for the project titled ‘Yesterday is Today but Also Tomorrow’, 
he writes that the subject of this theatre was a ‘missing’ history, the story 
of this dramatic episode in Hong Kong’s history of collective public action 
that has never been retold. Beyond immediate questions of social and 
economic injustice, many cases in which informal life politics take place 
similarly deal with missing or belated histories being sought out and 
retold. Given the proximity to Wooferten, and their relationships in the 
neighbourhood, Lee and his colleagues’ ‘research’ consisted of interviews 
with neighbours, most of whom had not had the chance to discuss these 
events for over 20 years. Lee’s own reflection on this unearthed history, 
then, is not only for the incident itself but rather its dormant and still 
potent legacy: the way it has sat silently in the hearts of a community 
until now.71 Lee has actually noted how an experienced social worker 
friend of his once quipped that Wooferten, in its community centre 
approach, hadn’t discovered anything, it was merely recreating the sort 
of community space in which their grandparents’ generation would have 
71  Lee Chun Fung, ‘Yesterday is Today but also Tomorrow’, in Pitt Street Riot (2015), 22–3.
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once congregated.72 Ideally, these were spaces in which the community 
was enacted, confirmed and reconstituted, acting as meeting places and 
forums to share concerns, histories and resources. 
Wooferten’s work has been an experiment in art and politics, but also 
many related facets of the community that the original members could 
not have foreseen—local history, identity, urbanisation, gentrification, 
labour rights, migrant workers and regional activism. In this chapter, 
I have situated creative social activism in Hong Kong in a broader history 
of social actions and cultural politics in Hong Kong. Melucci’s work also 
alerted us to the need to recognise the limitations of existing discourse, 
and this remains vital if we are to recognise the kind of ‘action networks’ in 
which Wooferten work. The pressure of existing discourses always has the 
potential to radically redefine events. For example, just months after the 
Pitt Street Riot theatre piece, from late September to December 2014, the 
Umbrella movement occupied the streets of Hong Kong. Yet even before 
the last defiant occupiers had been evicted one last time from the streets, 
popular discussion turned immediately to the old dichotomy of success 
and failure. Had the movement been a success for mobilising so many 
diverse groups into direct, generally coordinated and incredibly sustained 
action? Or was it all ultimately a failure, since C. Y. Leung’s government 
had managed to weather the storm, refusing to meet the movement’s core 
demand of universal suffrage and, perhaps more importantly, since the 
movement had seemingly failed to maintain public support? 
This chapter argues that the very nature of politics is to transgress such 
dichotomies, and this is typical of the examples of informal life politics 
we see practised here. Rancière’s notion of creative transgressions is also 
useful in considering the relationship of art and politics in Wooferten. A 
final anecdote from Wooferten’s ‘Small Small Prize! Big Big Pride!’ project 
succinctly intervenes in the question of art or politics. Lee Chun Fung 
recalls an episode in which one of the Yau Ma Tei locals, reflecting on 
the rapid changes in the community, suddenly burst into tears. Lee later 
observed:
72  Lee Chun Fung 李俊峰, ‘Cong bashihou de guandian kan huohuating’ [Wooferten, seen from a 
Post-80s Perspective], 222.
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The reason she was crying was, on the one hand, the community was 
changing so quickly she couldn’t help but forget; but on the other hand, 
because we were actively caring about this old district’s past, it prompted 
her to suddenly reminisce. At that moment, it didn’t really seem to matter 





Informal Life Politics of 
Marketisation in North Korea
Eun Jeong Soh
Introduction
Observers of today’s North Korea recognise that marketisation is a 
widespread phenomenon there. While the state-planned economic 
sector continues to persist, changsa1 (a general term referring to various 
types of trade and business activities, on a private economic level) 
has become a necessity for survival. One’s capacity to engage in trade 
activities has become  a determinant of the survival and wealth of the 
household. Market as a mechanism of exchange is still limited to goods 
and services, and monetary and financial markets do not yet exist on a 
significant scale.2 Nevertheless, in the everyday life of North Koreans, 
trade, both in marketplaces and in the underground economy, has 
become an absolutely crucial and fundamental means for survival and 
livelihood. The significance  of the market not only holds for ordinary 
North Koreans but also for state officials at all levels, as well as for the 
1  Lankov and Kim (2008) define changsa as ‘dealings in the marketplace’. But in fact, changsa in 
North Korea also includes long-distance bartering and selling of goods outside of the marketplace: 
Andrei Lankov and Kim Seok-hyang, ‘North Korean Market Vendors: The Rise of Grassroots 
Capitalists in a Post-Stalinist Society’, Pacific Affairs 81–1 (2008): 53–72.
2  Lee Suk-ki, ‘Change and Prospect for North Korea’s Market’, Unification Media Group 
Conference (14 September 2015), www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhVroKIUo88. 
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maintenance of  public institutions and enterprises.3 The market has 
become an essential backbone for the life of individual households as well 
as the entire North Korean political and economic system and thus has 
the potential to cause the current long-lasting regime either to fall, to 
muddle through, to transform, or even to thrive.
What is puzzling about the spread of changsa and the resultant 
marketisation of goods and services in North Korea is that they occurred 
in the absence of decisive and consistent institutional reforms necessary to 
facilitate marketisation. Marketisation in North Korea took place under 
the continued presence of state suppression of basic freedom of movement 
and association and the absence of property rights.4 How have North 
Koreans continued to expand their private economic activities despite 
state authorities’ persistent social controls and the selective punishments 
of market traders carried out in an effort to inhibit private economic 
activities? What social mechanisms have enabled such a formation and 
expansion of marketisation from below without the presence of market-
inducing or market-permitting reforms?
On the phenomenon of marketisation in North Korea, Haggard and 
Noland most notably distinguish North Korea’s form of marketisation 
as a ‘marketisation from below’. Whereas other cases of marketisation 
occurred, initiated through top-down policy responses resulting from 
a bargaining process among elites, changes from below dominated 
the North Korean process and pushed the state to make incremental 
concessions. Marketisation in North Korea was ‘a by-product of state 
failure’, actualised by the decline of the state socialist economy in general 
and a more acute absence of wages and rations, which led to the full-blown 
famine of the 1990s.5 Despite the central Party’s efforts to crack down 
on market forces, state officials’ corruption and exploitation of office for 
private gain facilitated the spiralling growth of markets.6 
3  Kim Young-hwan, ‘Change and Prospect for North Korea’s Market’, Unification Media Group 
Conference (14 September 2015), www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xq1SJ5nhTh0. 
4  On this, see editor’s remark on Andrei Lankov, ‘The Limits to Marketisation: State and Private 
in Kimist North Korea’, (14 June 2013), Sino-NK, sinonk.com/2013/06/14/marketization-and-its-
limits-state-private-enterprises-in-north-korea/.
5  Haggard and Noland, ‘Reform from Below: Behavioral and Institutional Change in North 
Korea’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 83 (2010): 133–4. 
6  ibid., 133.
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But seeing marketisation in North Korea simply as a phenomenon of 
state failure devalues the agency of people driven by a desire for survival. 
Was the private response to state failure indeed ‘unintended’?7 This 
conceptualisation overlooks the presence of tight state controls on freedom 
of movement and information and organised social life, despite which 
marketisation in North Korea occurred. Multiple agencies including the 
Public Security Bureau, the police, the Army and other ad hoc bodies 
created by the Centre implemented measures against anti-socialist 
activities including the market trade of various prohibited items. On top 
of these social control mechanisms, frequent ideological education and 
work mobilisation were supposed to divert people from fully engaging in 
private economic activities. In terms of policy inconsistencies, the central 
state swung between reluctant limited liberalisation measures in 2002 and 
counter-measures in 2005, followed by the disastrous currency reform 
in 2009. Given the state’s efforts to deter and limit the growth of the 
market, grassroots marketisation in North Korea can more accurately be 
understood when the agency of individuals conducting market activities 
under such circumstances is taken into consideration in conjunction with 
the phenomenon of state failure. In fact, state failure, in the case of North 
Korea, did not simply occur from the top. Rather, people have helped 
to erode the state from below. 
To highlight the dynamics of the process, this study pays attention to 
micro-dynamic mechanisms of the formation of collaborative relationships 
between law-implementing officials of the state apparatus and those who 
engage in trade. While distinguishing the two for analytical purposes, 
officials of the state apparatus, in reality, if not directly and openly, are 
most actively involved in trade. The relationship between the two is a 
dualistic one, cooperative as well as contentious. This chapter identifies 
practical strategies, cultural factors and normative justifications that 
constitute this relationship and facilitate the marketisation process under 
control. 
Due to practical limitations on observing everyday life in North Korea, 
the evidence presented in this chapter comes from narratives of refugee 
informants in South Korea. I conducted two rounds of interviews—the 
first round from October to December 2013 and the second round from 
April to June 2015. Each round consisted of 25 interviews, in  which 
7  ibid.
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interviewees spoke about their own experiences and observation of 
private economic activities in North Korea. The refugee informants 
came from a diverse range of backgrounds in terms of age, gender, 
hometown, occupation, and the year of defection. Inevitably, however, 
the pool of refugee informants who participated in this study may not be 
representative of the population in North Korea as a whole. The majority 
of informants were women and come from North Hamkyung and 
Ryanggang provinces, where marketisation began and spread most 
extensively. Therefore, allowance must be made for possible regional and 
gender biases in the material presented here.
Figure 12: Hyesan Market, 22 July 2015.
Source: Courtesy of Cho Chun-hyun .
Background: Conducting Private Economic 
Activities under Collectivism in North Korea
The single most important feature of life in North Korea is the high 
degree of collectivism. North Koreanists have utilised a range of political 
science concepts to characterise the North Korean state. The state is often 
defined as being highly personalistic due to the supreme importance 
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of the leader,8 and totalitarian due to the extent of the state control of 
the society  through ideology and organisation. It is also often seen, on 
the one hand, as a corporatist organic entity and, on the other, as neo-
Confucian in its uniquely East Asian features where the family serves as 
a model of the state. The extent to which each of these characterisations 
is emphasised depends on the period of North Korea’s history being 
examined.9 No one model correctly represents North Korea, but rather 
all emphasise various features that make the North Korean society 
uniquely collective. The deified leader, layers of bureaucracies and social 
organisations, extensive surveillance, the system of social stratification, 
and the unifying ideology of chuch’e (self-reliance) all facilitate, strengthen 
and reinforce collective ways of life in North Korea.
Scholars describe North Korea as one of the most intensely organised 
societies in the world and in history.10 This collectivism was fostered 
initially through its efforts to restructure society in the postcolonial 
period of socialist revolution from 1945, leading up to the founding 
of the government in 1948.11 Suzy Kim’s recent book, Everyday life in 
the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950, describes the experience of 
the North Korean Revolution (1945–50) as the realisation of a socialist 
modernity shared with its Chinese and Soviet neighbours, but unique in 
its exceptionally high level of mobilisation in everyday life spaces.12 It was 
understood that the well-being of the individual was achieved only through 
the well-being of the collective. The collectivism of North Korean society 
strengthened after the Korean War with Kim Il-Sung’s consolidation of 
his unitary power by eliminating all countervailing factions. Collectivism 
as envisioned in North Korea was an imaginary wartime solidarity against 
powerful external enemies that Wada Haruki calls a guerrilla state.13
8  Linz and Stepan briefly mention North Korea as an extreme form of the patrimonialism defined 
by Max Weber: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press), 51–2.
9  Charles K. Armstrong, ‘The Nature, Origins, and Development of the North Korean State’, in 
Samuel S. Kim ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Kim Il Sung Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 
39–64.
10  Michael E. Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey: A Short History (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 2007), 150. 
11  ibid.
12  Suzy Kim, Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2013), Kindle Version, 2257(7410).
13  On the use of the term ‘guerrilla state’, see Armstrong, ‘The Nature, Origins, and Development 
of the North Korean State’, 23–4.
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Collectivism continued to be a foundation for the country’s postwar 
recovery and socialist construction based on mass mobilisation campaigns. 
Most representatively, the Chollima movement initiated in 1958 resembled 
the Soviet Union’s Stakhanovite movement and was also influenced by the 
Chinese Great Leap Forward. Mass mobilisation campaigns, along with 
aid from Chinese and Soviet allies, achieved a decade of initial success. 
Bruce Cumings notes Immanuel Wallerstein’s regard for North Korea 
(the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) as a model for the 
periphery: ‘The DPRK shows the way in the periphery … it never idled 
but always raced’.14 
Life in the workplace, social organisations, and neighbourhood units were 
at the core of everyday life in North Korea. Every individual belonged to 
groups of youths, workers, women and peasants. The percentage of the 
population who are members of the state Party was higher in North Korea 
than in any other communist state in the 1980s.15 Organisational life 
was value-ridden: recognition and advancement in the Party and related 
political structures was considered more precious than material gains. As 
one North Korean defector scholar humorously puts it, ‘we were closer 
to our work colleagues than to our husband’.16 In this everyday collective 
life, people lived simple, hardworking lives and felt generally content and 
secure about their livelihoods. A level of shortage existed in households 
under the state rations system but relative egalitarianism prevented the fear 
that is caused by a sense of relative deprivation. Cumings notes that the 
success of the leadership in cultivating communal collective life was the 
most striking thing about North Korea to Americans. A British diplomat 
described North Korea as ‘one big kibbutz’.17
The tight culture of collectivism shaped by the North Korean state 
socialist revolution began to lose its almost total embrace of society with 
the decline of its state-planned economy. The North Korean economy was 
already showing signs of strain in the late 1970s. Shortage of consumer 
goods and deterioration in the quality and the quantity of food supplies 
14  Wallerstein quoted in Bruce Cumings, ‘Corporatism in North Korea’, Journal of Korean Studies 
4 (1983): 293.
15  Bruce Cumings, ‘Corporatism in North Korea’, 291–2. 
16  Hyun In-ae, ‘Pukhansahoe net’ŭwŏk’ŭ: sijang esŏui chuminsaenghwal’ [Network in North 
Korean Society: Life of Residents in the Marketplace], paper presented at The 2015 Soongsil Institute 
for Peace and Unification Spring Seminar, Seoul, 22 May 2015, 27–46. 
17  Andrew Holloway quoted in Bruce Cumings, Everyday Life in North Korea (New York and 
London: The New Press, 2004), 139–40.
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were already evident from the mid-1980s.18 Households, especially those 
with many growing children, supplemented food through informal 
coping strategies. Seven hundred grams of grain per day for office workers, 
800 grams per day for manual labourers, and 300 grams for children were 
never adequate. Households supplemented consumption of vegetables 
and protein by picking and gathering greens (namul) in the mountains, 
cultivating kitchen plots, and breeding pigs and rabbits at home to sell 
through informal networks to gain additional income. Elderly persons in 
rural areas cultivated additional plots of unused land to contribute to the 
household food supply. Andrei Lankov notes that private space in North 
Korea was much smaller than that in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, these 
minuscule private spaces existed and became foundational and habitual 
bases for coping strategies in the 1990s.19
As much as North Korea’s collectivisation experience demonstrated 
totality in the unity between state authority and the people, the people’s 
demand for private economic spaces, as it grew in scale, inflicted 
significant  and irreversible damage on the state authority’s ability to 
exert control over its people. The demand occurred at the margins and 
at the bottom of society where women and elderly and labourers and 
farmers, out of sheer concern for survival of their households, resorted to 
various private economic activities as coping strategies despite knowing 
that such activities were transgressive of socialist ideals. The state’s easing 
of the spaces for private market economic activities occurred reluctantly 
in response to the unsettling demands for space for market trade. 
The  following three policies demonstrate that the state yielded to the 
growing grassroots demands for private economic activities even prior to 
the full-blown crisis that began in 1995.
In the 1980s, government policies intended to co-opt informal and 
illegal economic activities resulted in the further opening up of spaces 
for private economic activities. In 1984, the state launched an ‘August 
3rd Movement’ in an attempt to ameliorate the shortage of consumer 
goods that was apparent in the 1980s, by having factories and enterprises 
18  Ch’oe Pong-dae and Ku Kap-u, ‘Pukhan ŭi tosi ‘changmadang’ hwalsŏnghwa ŭi tonghak – 
1990nyŏndae sinŭiju, ch’ŏngjin, hyesan ŭl chungsimŭro’ [Changes in Vitalization of Marketplace 
in North Korean Cities – With a Focus on the 1990s Sinuichu, Chongchin, and Hyesan], 
Hyŏntaepukhanyŏnku 8, no. 3 (2005). 
19  Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 36.
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source their own inputs to produce consumer goods.20 According to Choi 
and Koo, this was also a policy to ameliorate growing pilfering and illegal 
side work by factory workers who could not feed their family and obtain 
household necessities by relying solely on their wages and food rations.21 
As the authorities allowed marketisation of some products to provide 
incentives for people to produce these goods and voluntarily supply them 
to the state, this resulted in the spread of markets. People demonstrated 
creativity.22 Home-manufactured products flowed into farmers’ markets 
and invigorated market trade from the mid-1980s onwards. As a result, 
by 1999, over 300 farmers’ markets had been formed.23 
Another policy was the resumption in 1984 of permission for ethnic 
Korean residents from China to visit family in the DPRK.24 Border trade 
between North Korea and China had existed in the 1940s, ceased during 
the 1970s, and was then revived after the normalisation of DPRK–China 
relations in 1982. Ethnic Korean petty traders brought in food and 
manufactured goods to their relatives residing in the border areas of North 
Korea. These goods were quietly sold to neighbours and acquaintances. 
They became an important source of consumer goods for residents of the 
border area and had a major influence on the lives of these people. Those 
who were exposed to the border trade in the earlier period became ‘early 
birds’ in trade, and this helped them survive the famine in the 1990s 
by advancing in the border trade. Though legalisation of this trade was 
permitted only in the border areas, merchants from inner cities came 
to the border cities and brought China-manufactured consumer goods 
inland, subsequently leading to the emergence of underground trade and 
market networks across North Korea. 
20  Ch’a Munsŏk, ‘Konan ŭi haenggun gwa pukhan kyŏngje ŭi sŏnggyŏk pyŏnhwa’, 
Hyŏntaepukhanyŏnku 8, no. 1 (2005): 43.
21  Ch’oe and Ku, ‘Pukhan ŭi tosi ‘jangmadang’ hwalsŏnghwa ŭi tonghak’, 166–7.
22  Yi Sŏnu, ‘Sŏnkunchŏngch’iwa pukhansik kyŏngchekaehyŏk’ [Military First Policy and North 
Korean Style Economic Reform], Hyŏntaepukhanyŏnku 12, no. 1 (2009): 140; Ch’oe Pong-dae and Ku 
Kap-u, ‘Pukhan tosi nongminsichang hyŏngsŏng kwachŏngŭi ihaenglonchŏk hamŭi: 1950-1980nyŏntae 
sinŭichu, ch’ŏngchin, hyesanŭi sarerŭl chungsimŭro’ [Formation Process of Farmers’ Markets in North 
Korean Cities: in the Cases of Sinŭichu, Ch’ŏngchin, Hyesan, 1950–1980], Hyŏntaepukhanyŏnku 6, 
no. 2 (2003): 172.
23  Andrew Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine (Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press, 
2001), 100.
24  Ch’oe and Ku, ‘Pukhan ŭi tosi ‘jangmadang’ hwalsŏnghwa ŭi tonghak’, 170.
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As the food situation deteriorated in the early 1990s, another important 
institutional change facilitated the spread of private economic activities; 
the Central Party delegated the responsibility to manage matters of 
livelihood to provincial authorities. By 1957, all residents except 
cooperative farmers (who were instead given an annual distribution from 
the harvest) had become entitled to food rations.25 Buying and selling of 
food was prohibited. Under this state-managed food distribution system, 
the moral consensus on the accessibility, availability and the price of food 
was essentially a relationship between the ruler (one ruler) and the rest. 
This consensus was withdrawn by the state in response to the food crisis. 
Kim Jong-il ordered city and county party and committees to resolve food 
matters on their own between 1992 and 1993. Between 1995 and 1996, 
state enterprises were also ordered to resolve their food situation on their 
own.26 City and county offices then allowed their residents to engage in 
market and border trades and private farming as a response to the decline 
and the eventual disappearance of the state rations. Farming and trade 
became morally justified and even necessary for people as they endured 
the hardship of the non-ration period and struggled to survive on their 
own. By promoting the slogan ‘the Arduous March’, from the beginning 
of 1996, thereby recalling the country’s historical memory of guerrilla 
fighting in Manchuria in the colonial era, the state Party demanded of 
the people a spirit of endurance, perseverance and revolution. The state 
conducted internal war mobilisation against the external enemy and, by 
doing so, the sense of expectation that the state ensures food security was 
no longer held during the height of the famine.
During the Arduous March period, the state tried to maintain its 
control over the people while reluctantly turning a blind eye to market 
and other private economic activities. During the height of the famine, 
propaganda vans with loudspeakers continued to make pronouncements 
not to engage in anti-socialist activities.27 The heads of household, 
officials, health workers and teachers were obligated to remain in their 
workplace during the Arduous March, although all tried to negotiate 
with the state authorities  to obtain time to devote to their families’ 
survival by conducting difficult private economic activities in the form of 
25  Kim Yang-hui, ‘Ch’echeyujirŭl wihan pukhanŭi sikryangchŏngch’i’ [North Korea’s Food Politics 
for Regime Maintenance], T’ongilmuncheyŏnku, 16.
26  Yang Mun-su, Pukhan ŭi kyehoekkyŏngje wa sijanghwa hyŏnsang [North Korea’s Planned 
Economy and Marketisation Phenomenon] (Seoul: Institute for Unification Education, 2013), 30.
27  Lee Young-ok, interview by author, Seoul, 23 October 2013. 
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farming and trade. By declaring the ideologically infused struggle against 
hardship over in 1998, the state reinvigorated its control over non-legal 
economic activities. In February 1999, Kim Jong-il attempted to shut all 
marketplaces and exhorted people to return to factories.28 The reimposition 
of control occurred through the creation of special groups to inspect and 
enforce the eradication of anti-socialist activities and conducting anti-
market campaigns. Having already seen the spread of markets and the 
weakening of the ideology’s effectiveness as a tool of social control, Kim 
Jong-il tried to constrain the market through ‘regulatory harassment’, 
creating ‘economic police’, and increasing the role of the military in social 
control and surveillance.29 Eventually, by the time of the 1 July 2002 
reform, the state normalised the operations of major marketplaces and 
made price adjustments. This reform path was reversed from August 2005 
with counter-reforms banning grain trade and some other businesses and 
resumption of the public distribution system. In subsequent years, the 
counter-reform path was reinvigorated through new restrictions on the 
farming of private plots, the imposition of age and item restrictions on 
market trades, and crackdowns on corruption.30 
Despite the state’s swing between reform and counter-reform, the 
marketisation process that began during the Arduous March period was 
never effectively reversed. Haggard and Noland’s 2012 report of survey 
data of North Korean refugees collected in both South Korea and China 
demonstrates that neither reforms nor retrenchments had much impact 
on the significance of the market in household economy, and this reflects 
the state’s incapacity to control the marketisation process.31 Today, the 
market has become the most vital and central part of life in North Korea. 
It has gradually pushed the state to adopt the market as a fact of life. 
The market has eroded the state.
28  Ch’a, ‘Konan ŭi haenggun gwa’, 57.
29  Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine, 100; Yi, ‘Sŏn’gunjŏngch’i wa pukhansik 
kyŏngjegyehyŏk’, 145.
30  Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North 
Korea, (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 9.
31  ibid., 79.
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Mechanisms for the Emergence and the 
Spread of the Market—Cooperation and 
Conflict among Officials and Non-Officials
Let us look more closely at this process of erosion as it takes place in 
everyday life. A common pathway is to start by engaging in petty trade by 
selling what one can in pursuit of one’s own survival. Selling off existing 
marketable items from home to secure seed money for petty trade or simply 
to buy grains or medicine for the family was a desperate strategy for survival 
during the period when state rations were non-existent. Among the lowest 
strata of market traders, people buy flour to make bread and sell it at the 
edge of the marketplace. Prohibited items, most commonly alcohol, are 
sold at home quietly to neighbours. A much more physically demanding 
form of trade is itinerant trading. The long-distance bartering of certain 
foods and manufactured goods between urban and rural areas, between 
coastal or inland cities and border cities, or across the North Korea–China 
border is an unimaginably arduous but nevertheless widespread practice. 
Though these petty traders do not have sophisticated management skills 
and structures, trading in North Korea essentially demands some level of 
entrepreneurial skill because of various barriers imposed on the traders. 
As capital accumulates, petty traders move on to more profitable items and 
trading that demand more sophisticated ways of managing and building 
relationships, acquiring modes of transportation, procuring resources, 
and accessing the market. 
Those who started as petty traders often make enough money to obtain 
official connections to make their businesses more profitable and secure. 
Individual traders, in the course of trading, make a shift in the items 
and modes of exchange and in the relationships they develop to facilitate 
their trade activities so as to earn more profit and obtain a secure source 
of income. Most trade activities develop as the result of collaboration 
and mutual dependency between officials and marketeers. The bribery 
relationship develops either through the initiative of the officials who are 
responsible for implementing laws against market activities, or through 
the initiative of residents who want to embark on non-legal activities 
under conditions of uncertainty. Thus, the more entrepreneurial one 
becomes, the more risks one has to take, and the more dependent one’s 
business becomes on individuals in the state apparatus, in the absence 
of market-facilitating and market-protecting institutions. The larger the 
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scale of trade, the more essential it is to establish official connections, 
often with multiple law enforcement authorities. As a result, privately run 
businesses in North Korea almost always form state agency affiliations 
and the businesses make payoffs to relevant government agencies.32 State 
officials often initiate the process of developing enterprises, using their 
status and connections to access state resources and information. In other 
words, one’s access to material and social resources depends on access 
to power. 
The division between officials (kanbu) and non-officials in North Korea 
was clear even before the 1990s crisis. This was because the division 
aligned with one’s songbun, the social stratification category based on 
family background. Of the three main categories, ‘core’, ‘wavering’ and 
‘hostile’, only those who belong to the core class could qualify to fill 
official positions that are considered important in the state apparatus. 
Wavering class members of various sorts could become kanbu only when 
the individuals faithfully proved their loyalty to the Party. The  songbun 
division, which is passed on from generation to generation, clearly 
reinforced the division between officials and non-officials, and the 
discrimination and resentment were clearly recognised and internalised. 
Yet, because of North Korea’s centrally controlled ration and wage system, 
as well as the egalitarianism embedded in its communist ideology, the 
division had never been a socioeconomic one. Only after the 1990s did 
the political–social cleavage became an economic and contentious one.33
Officials in North Korea constitute those who hold various offices in 
the state apparatus. Refugee informants say that in an ordinary rural 
city or town, around 10 per cent of the town are officials of various 
sorts.34 The number of kanbu had expanded since the postwar period in 
the 1950s as the state’s policy increased the number to implement its 
postwar reconstruction policies and consolidate the state power through 
entrenchment and mobilisation. With the decline of the state-planned 
economy and the emerging vitality of farmers’ markets, corruption of the 
kanbu was already growing by the early 1990s. When the ration system 
32  On such dynamics of state–business relations, see Andrei Lankov, ‘Limits to Marketisation: State 
and Private in Kimist North Korea’, Sino NK, 14 June 2013, sinonk.com/2013/06/14/marketization-
and-its-limits-state-private-enterprises-in-north-korea/.
33  Adopted from Hahn Soon-young, interview by author, Suwon, 15 May 2015.
34  It is estimated that the core class constituted 28 per cent of the population in the mid-1990s 
and the Korean Workers’ Party membership as high as 15 per cent of the population: Haggard and 
Noland, Witness to Transformation, 55.
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collapsed, officials and their families, exploiting their access to state 
resources, diverted food, stripped enterprise assets, and conducted various 
forms of trade.35 Officials who belonged to various law enforcement 
agencies were given incentives to remain loyal to the state through the 
provision of rations.36 Regulations became beneficial to them, in the sense 
that they could take bribes using their authority to turn a blind eye to 
those who flouted the regulations.37 Under Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, 
law enforcement officials and the army have become the most powerful 
actors. Law enforcement officials are today referred to as ‘those who hold 
the swords’.38
Despite the clear differentiation that developed between officials and 
non-officials, collaboration occurs extensively. At the local level, the 
majority of state officials, including those in the lower levels of the legal 
apparatus, are poor. One informant said, ‘if the town’s people are poor, 
so are the officials of the town’.39 The continued existence of regulations 
against market activities provides the officials continued opportunities 
for bribery. Law enforcement officials foresee a greater long-term benefit 
from collaboration with those who ignore the regulations than from 
implementation of legal punishments against marketeers. It is also a 
matter of survival. Because officials are prohibited from conducting 
market activities, only in collusion with marketeers can they maintain 
their livelihoods. The collaborative relationship becomes widespread and 
normalised. 
This collaboration in stealing state resources brought about a hollowing-
out of the state-planned economy. The widespread stealing in North Korea 
since the 1990s is not only a result but also a constituting phenomenon of 
the hollowing-out of the state. Since the supply of resources and electricity 
virtually stopped even to top priority national enterprises at some points 
in the 1990s, workers and guards, out of desperation in the absence of 
the state rations and wages, began pilfering parts of idle factory facilities. 
Stealing occurred rather quietly at all levels of the society: opportunistic 
large-scale stealing by officials in managerial positions and small-scale 
35  ibid., 52.
36  Kim Sung-Chull (1997), ‘Pukhan kanbujŏngch’aek ŭi jisok kwa byŏnhwa’ [Continuities and 
Changes in North Korea’s ‘Policy of Cultivating Officials’], Korea Institute for National Unification, 
1–89. DBpia access.
37  Cha Kyungsook, interview by author, Seoul, 13 May 2015.
38  Choi Seungmin, interview by author, Seoul, 13 May 2015.
39  Ahn Chong-han, interview by author, Seoul, 6 June 2015.
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pilfering by ordinary labourers and farmers occurring simultaneously and 
in collaboration. In this way, this state hollowing-out occurred quietly 
without the violent outbreaks of contention between the state and the 
people trying to survive. 
What resulted from this collaboration between the officials and non-
officials through bribery is the institutionalisation of illegal private 
economic practices. Pilfering, for example, has become so widespread 
that it is considered a common and morally acceptable practice despite 
the state’s repressive control against it through the terror of imprisonment 
and ad hoc public execution. Refugee informants describe the act of 
stealing as ‘deducting’ or ‘taking a part’ of a public asset.40 Stealing and 
the collusive relations through which stealing occurs are regularised and 
systematised. Ways of diverting state resources by selling them in a market 
become institutionalised. Often these informally systematised practices 
demonstrate similar patterns across different institutions, i.e.  state 
enterprises, cooperative farms, schools and hospitals.
The Role of Communal Culture
The collaboration between local officials and marketeers does not 
only depend on bribery and the sharing of profits. A cultural factor, 
traditionalism, also contributes to the formation of corrupt relationships 
and shaping the officials’ orientation to long-term benefit. The culture 
of close personal relationships facilitates the formation of collaboration. 
The personal connections include family and acquaintances as well as 
new relationships formed for the sake of convenience and mutual benefit. 
Women who became successful marketeers ‘buy’ official positions in the 
state apparatus for their husbands by ‘paying for’ their higher education 
in order to create potential for their career advancement. Marital 
relationships thus become a space where a marriage between the market 
and the state occurs.41 It is often the wives of officials who conduct larger-
scale trade activities because they are given a greater level of protection in 
conducting non-legal activities. Often State Security officers are school 
40  Kim Bun-nyu, interview by author, Seoul, 6 June 2015. 
41  Park Hwa-sook, interview by author, Seoul, 20 December 2013. 
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friends or family members. Depending on the circumstances, personal 
affection and friendship overcome the official obligation to implement 
rules, especially when material benefits follow.42 
The North Korean regime has fostered a culture of a family state in which 
constituent members of society care for one another like family members. 
The culture of the family state has facilitated the development and 
sustenance of smuggling in the border regions. Collaborative relationships 
formed between border control officials and female marketeers in Hyesan 
are facilitated by filial sentiments between son-like border control guards 
and motherly marketeers. Since the Arduous March period, ‘mothers’ 
have become the dominant agents of smuggling, collecting all kinds of 
available goods ranging from medicinal herbs to metal scraps. Border 
control officials are young males of their sons’ age. This collaboration 
between the young border control officials and middle-aged women 
helped the border smuggling to continue in Hyesan.43 The culture of the 
family state not only had the effect of strengthening the bond between the 
leader and the people but also of engendering filial respect and motherly 
care outside of the nuclear family.44 
The culture of close communal and interpersonal relationships nullifies 
the highly complicated ad hoc regulations of the Centre. One effect of 
the existence of multiple layers of enforcement agencies is that all become 
complicit. For instance, a refugee informant from North Hamkyung 
Province recounted that she had to bribe ‘10 strong individuals’ to safely 
conduct her trade business in North Hamkyung Province.45 Individuals 
cannot own automobiles, thus to conduct long-distance trade using 
a motor vehicle, one has to borrow the vehicle from a state enterprise for 
a cost. But pay-offs themselves do not guarantee protection from possibly 
being subjected to regulations by law enforcement agencies. To protect 
oneself and one’s business, one has to build connections with powerful 
individuals, including three security authorities—the Public Security, the 
State Security, the Army Security—as well as other authorities such as 
North Korean Democratic Youth League officials, the Party cell official 
and the prosecutor. All become complicit. For a retired army officer who 
42  Kang Seung, interview by author, Incheon, 10 December 2013; Ahn Chong-han, interview by 
author, Seoul, 6 June 2015.
43  Lee Ki-wol, interview by author, Suwon, 15 May 2015. 
44  On an anthropology of the family state, see Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: 
Beyond Charismatic Politics (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2012), 18–33.
45  Park Kyung-sook, interview by author, Seoul, 5 May 2015.
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conducted illegal border smuggling through his connections with multiple 
legal authorities, his response to the news of a special inspection force 
coming down to his town was to defect. By disappearing, he could save 
all the officials who were involved.46 Thanks to these adaptive strategies 
developed at the local level, the Centre’s enforcement strategies have not 
worked effectively. There is a popular saying, ‘the Centre’s policy does not 
last more than three days’.47 
The Development of Contention 
within Hegemony 
Refugee informants justify their private economic activities in terms of the 
hegemonic ideology of self-reliance. Under this encompassing ideology 
of self-reliance, North Korean people gradually negotiated their private 
use of time, space and labour away from extensively collective ways of 
life. North Korea first used the slogan of self-reliance in the early 1960s 
when the Sino-Soviet dispute and a resultant decline of aid from both 
allies jeopardised the first Five Year Economic Plan (1957–61). Self-
reliance was not a motto invented by the North Korean regime. It was 
in fact China’s guiding policy around the 1960s.48 The slogan had a 
dual usage. For the nation as a whole, it delineated North Korea’s basic 
principle of national economic reconstruction as an autonomous process 
with little dependence on aid from its allies. The slogan was reinforced as 
the economy deteriorated and when the regime took a counter-reform 
isolationist path since the mid-2000s.49 
Internally, the slogan mobilised people to proactively seek ways to 
contribute to national economic development and socialist revolution. 
As observed by Suzy Kim, this theme of the individual as a proactive 
agent of revolution is consistent from the beginning of North Korea’s 
socialist revolution in 1945.50 Cheehyung Kim’s work on Chuch’e Sasang 
(the ideology of self-reliance) elaborates this dynamic of the socialist 
economy’s essential dependence on the workers’ spontaneous innovations 
46  Ahn Chong-han, interview by author, Seoul, 6 June 2015.
47  Kim Mirae, interview by author, Seoul, 15 May 2015. 
48  Lankov, The Real North Korea, 72.
49  Cho Tongho, ‘Kidae wa bigwansog ŭi charyŏkkaengsaeng chŏnryak’ [Strategy of Self-Reliance 
in Hope and Despair], Kukkachŏnryak 14, no. 2 (2008): 87–114.
50  Kim, Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution.
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and labour heroism. Through an analysis of literary works of the 1970s, 
Kim concludes: ‘the moments when the North Korean people are assumed 
to be under the greatest control may actually be the moments of agency’.51 
The flip-side of this dynamic of ownership and totality is that individual 
ownership of the revolution is entirely subject to the totality of the state. 
Individual ownership and creativity existed in essence for the cause of the 
nation as a whole. 
The value of labour, diligence and self-reliance involve paternalistic 
thinking. Changsa (selling goods or trading) for the majority of the 
population had initially developed only to the extent of earning residual 
income through the making of bread or noodles out of flour and selling 
them in the marketplace. Conducting market trade, if performed to an 
unnoticeable and unexceptional degree, is regarded as a self-reliant effort 
to survive on one’s own in times of hardship, and therefore does not 
contradict the official ideology. An informant describing everyday life in 
North Korea reflects in her narratives what is seemingly the state-guided 
discourse on the value of labour: ‘the harder your physical body works, 
the stronger your mental facilities become. There is neither dementia 
nor cancer in North Korea’.52 Private economic activities of trade and 
farming, in aggregate, echo the themes of collective labour, diligence and 
self-reliance that have long been promoted throughout the history of the 
country. While factories and cooperative farms are emptied out in the 
absence of resources, labour takes place in houses, marketplaces and in 
the mountains. In fact, ordinary-scale market trades and private farming 
are so widespread that even those who had other unconventional and 
non-legal sources of income conduct these activities to hide such illicit 
sources. One elderly refugee informant told me that while she had no 
need to do changsa nor farming because her daughter who had defected 
to South Korea was sending her money, she engaged in both activities on 
a daily basis in order to disguise her other source of income and pretend 
that it was her sole source of survival. Changsa was justified as a self-reliant 
coping strategy and was even promoted through peer-pressure as a form of 
diligence. Many informants said that those who did not engage in either 
51  Kim Cheehyung, ‘Total, Thus Broken: Chuch’e Sasang and North Korea’s Terrain of Subjectivity’, 
Journal of Korean Studies 17 (2012). 
52  Park Hwa-sook, interview by author, Seoul, 20 December 2013.
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changsa or farming were lazy people. Fahy observes from the narratives 
of defectors, ‘the proper response was not depression or melancholia but 
action’.53 
People strategically negotiated and acquired a greater right to conduct 
trade activities by distancing themselves from politics. One way to distance 
oneself from politics is to use one’s social identity position. As we have 
seen, the North Korean state imposes the songbun system, which stratifies 
the entire population into categories based on family lineage background 
and differentiated people’s access and possibilities for political careers. 
In return, however, officials were more restricted in conducting private 
economic activities than non-officials. Conversely, the more marginal one’s 
position is in the system, the greater freedom one has. While minorities, 
for example, Chinese residents in North Korea and ethnic Koreans from 
Japan who migrated to North Korea (mostly in the 1960s) have been 
from time to time subject to political purges, these groups have also been 
selectively allowed a greater level of economic freedom, and allowed to 
utilise their economic resources and connections abroad to supply goods 
necessary, useful and desirable to officials. 
For instance, returnees from Japan gained an entitlement to greater 
freedom in conducting market activities. Those who ‘returned’ from Japan 
faced much discrimination in the system; having come from a capitalist 
world, they were closely watched, often scapegoated and many perished 
in political prisons. While readily integrated into local communities in 
everyday life through work and education, they were excluded from certain 
duties as well as rights. Returnees or children from a returnee family in 
general could not expect to advance far in a political career, though 
exceptions existed. As a result, many pursued careers in professions such 
as medicine. Interestingly, they were also given a greater level of leniency 
in conducting non-legal activities such as trading. To borrow the words of 
one interviewee, ‘we had more freedom in economic activities as long as 
we did not do anything political’. Some lived off luxury goods and money 
sent from their relatives, and the demand for the luxury goods came from 
local officials. Some returnees had household businesses, selling second-
hand clothes and electronics smuggled in from Japan long before the 
economic crisis in the 1990s, and such businesses only increased with 
53  Sandra Fahy, Marching through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014), 51.
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the crisis.54 When rations stopped, these groups of individuals conducted 
trade activities using their connections abroad, while supplying payments 
to law enforcement officials. 
The logic of the freedom of marginalisation applies within the household 
too. The heads of households were obligated to remain in the workplace. 
Thus, it was the elderly and married women who first explored the 
possibilities of private economic activities, because they had a greater 
capacity to evade labour mobilisation by the state, and to use their time in 
their own way. This flexibility in carving out time and labour away from 
collective uses differs according to enterprise and agency units, regions 
and time periods.55
Active resistance often took place on the streets at the local level. 
This often involved fierce protest in the form of continuing market trade. 
In smaller towns, markets were kept open as a result of ongoing resistance 
by women. Eventually, designated market places opened. The hometown 
of one refugee informant had less than 1,000 households, and thus 
was excluded from permission to open up the marketplace. Residents 
protested to local officials, ‘don’t you have to allow us simply to live?’ 
In May 2004 everyone went out to the streets spontaneously and formed 
an informal marketplace with their items on the street. It looked as 
though the authority would soon crush the protest, but they did not dare 
to do so. The county officials then ran around in efforts to persuade higher 
administrative levels to authorise the market. In my refugee informant’s 
words, because the state could not provide for the people, it eventually 
had to permit market trade with a state-controllable boundary.56 
There is a moral dimension to the fact that petty traders are often left 
to their own devices. There are implicit norms about the way the laws 
should be enforced. The norms depend on the scale of trade. A refugee 
informant said, ‘there is no justification for enforcing the law upon petty 
traders. They are not afraid of dying’. Only when businesses become 
visibly significant in size do security officials appear and demand bribes. 
Small traders are left to grow bigger.57 The perception that there is no 
justification for suppressing petty trade indicates that there is a certain 
54  Kang Seung, interview by author, Incheon, 10 December 2013; Kim Taekyun, interview by 
author, Incheon, 10 December 2013.
55  Lee Young-ok, interview by author, Seoul, 23 October 2013.
56  Han Soon-young, interview by author, Suwon, 15 May 2015.
57  Park Kyung-sook, interview by author, Seoul, 5 May 2015.
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shared moral consensus about leaving these petty trades unregulated. 
An informant metaphorically remarked, ‘a backpack becomes a hand 
cart and a hand cart becomes an ox cart, and an ox cart becomes an 
automobile. Then the trader has to start worrying about potential risks of 
confiscation’.58 Trading on a significant scale becomes a risky and nerve-
racking experience. The richer one becomes, the more regulations one 
risks violating and the more bribes one has to pay. 
Conclusion
Marketisation in North Korea is a bottom-up phenomenon that occurred 
under the continued regulation of market trade activities. Market trade 
emerged as a survival strategy in the absence of state rations, and quietly 
but rapidly encroached on the state sector economy. The hollowing-out 
of the centralised planned economy was not only a result of the greater 
structural change of the end of the Cold War but also of a redistribution 
of social goods and attainment of autonomy achieved by people’s everyday 
moves to conduct market trade for the simple purpose of survival.
The few attempts by the state to re-control and suppress the market force 
since 2005 have ended in failure. Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 
2012, such efforts ceased due to the state’s perceived fear of unsettling 
of people if market trades are restricted and oppressed. The market has 
become the way of life in North Korea. Demands for private economic 
spaces existed prior to the economic crisis. Under the guise of collectivism 
as the only way of life, people quietly conducted very small-scale private 
economic activities as a means of acquiring minimal subsistence security 
for their household. As the crisis deepened, the activities expanded rapidly 
in scale and number despite the state’s continued efforts to control such 
bottom-up movements. This indicates that even a totalitarian state like 
North Korea does not have total control of the society. 
Shared interests, communal culture and a collective sense of morality all 
become important factors contributing to the emergence of the market. 
Private space is demanded and is actively negotiated from continued 
imposition of the collective. But in the narratives of refugee informants, 
private economic activities are also justified as collective self-reliance 
actions. Continuities and changes in the North Korean state–society 
58  Park Hwa-sook, interview by author, Seoul, 20 December 2013.
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relations in everyday life spaces occur in the precarious balance between 
the collective management of hardship, group demands for private spaces 
and resources, and collaborative and contentious relations between 
officials and non-officials.
What is striking about the emergence and expansion of market in 
North Korea is the sheer scale and significance it has attained today. 
As much as the North Korean state building was a process of collective 
mass mobilisation, the people’s resort to the market put an end to the 
revival of the state-planned economic system. This demonstrates that the 
totalitarian state depends on the compliance of people. The North Korean 
people have turned the totalitarian system upside-down. Marketisation in 
North Korea demonstrates the agency of ordinary people even in the total 
absence of institutionally guaranteed economic freedom and even under 
the presence of control by fear and terror implemented through selective 
punishment. To this extent, the authorities indeed are ‘the prisoners 
of people’.59 
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Social Innovation in Asia: Trends 
and Characteristics in China, 
Korea, India, Japan and Thailand
The Hope Institute1
Introduction
Social innovation is often defined as ‘the process of inventing, securing 
support for, and implementing novel solutions to social needs and 
problems’.2 Since the practice of social innovation usually tackles unmet 
social needs that cannot be solved solely by the government or certain 
stakeholders in a given society, the concept implies a unique approach to 
solve the social problem. As an activity or a specific case, social innovation 
often takes the form of collaboration across public, private and citizen 
1  This chapter is based on The Social Innovation Landscape in Asia, the final report of the 
research that  was conducted by the research team of The Hope Institute, based in Seoul, in 
2013–14. The  research was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation for a better and systematic 
understanding of social innovation practices in Asia. This chapter was presented at the conference 
‘Grassroots Regionalisation and the Frontiers of the Humanities in East Asia: Korea as a Hub’, 
held by The Australian National University and was revised by one of the principal investigators, 
Dr EunKyung Lee, a research fellow in The Hope Institute. 
2  James A. Phills Jr, Kriss Deiglmeier, and Dale T. Miller, ‘Rediscovering Social Innovation’, Stanford 
Social Innovation Review Fall (2008), ssir.org/articles/entry/rediscovering_social_innovation#sthash.
LuXlirzX.fjh2JKLM.dpuf. Accessed 20 March 2016.
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sectors, dissolving traditional boundaries.3 Implicit in the concept is the 
notion that its impact should be good for society and enhance society’s 
capacity to act.4
In various parts of Asia, there has been growing interest in the processes of 
European and North American social innovation. Many successful social 
innovation cases and practices in those areas are well known. Such cases have 
been shared in our region—for instance, Charter Schools as an alternative 
educational avenue, the fair-trade movement to address indigenous 
farmers’ labour conditions and create a sustainable environment, micro-
finance to include those who are unable to gain access to major financial 
services, and so on. However, few studies have explored the ways in which 
the transcultural adaptation of social innovation practices has taken 
place. The Hope Institute research team, with the support of Rockefeller 
Foundation, has investigated how social innovation practices have been 
put into effect in Asian countries and how they have influenced Asian 
societies. 
In the process of compressed industrialisation after World War II, many 
Asian societies adopted Western-style capitalism, usually in a top-down 
way. Many industrialised Western social and economic practices were 
imposed on Asian countries. Transplanted democratic systems and 
unsettled civil societies characterise many Asian countries. This has led 
to socioeconomic malfunctioning, the underdevelopment of civil sectors, 
a lack of government legitimacy, and unequal access to information and 
technology. Given these distinct underlying conditions, it is necessary to 
redefine social innovation from an Asian perspective. Our task has been 
to collect significant cases from the Asian experience, and to analyse 
the characteristics of social innovation practices in Asia. In this sense, 
this research strongly supports the core principle that social innovation 
is neither context-free nor value-neutral.5 
3  Geoff Mulgan, Tucker, S., Ali, R., and Sanders, B., Social Innovation: What it is, why it matters 
and how it can be accelerated, working paper of the Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship 
(Oxford  Said  Business School, 2007) eureka.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/761/1/Social_Innovation.pdf. 
Accessed 30 March 2015.
4  The Young Foundation, Social Innovation Overview: A Deliverable of the Project. The Theoretical, 
Empirical and Policy Foundations for Building Social Innovation in Europe (TEPSIE), European 
Commission – 7th Framework Programme (Brussels: European Commission, DG Research, 2012), 
www.tepsie.eu/images/documents/TEPSIE.D1.1.Report.DefiningSocialInnovation.Part%201%20
-%20defining%20social%20innovation.pdf. Accessed 30 March 2015.
5  The Young Foundation, Social Innovation Overview, 2012.
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This chapter presents some of the results of our research, which began with 
the question: Social innovation practices have had considerable success 
in the West. What about Asia? This seemingly simple question actually 
requires the demanding work of establishing a context for Asia as a region 
where social innovative practices are performed, as well as redefining social 
innovation in developing or less-developed countries. The complexity is 
two-fold: social innovation is a multilayered, practice-led field; and, more 
importantly, Asia is not a homogeneous region. Asia’s diverse paths to 
democratisation and industrialisation add to the complexity.
Considering the context-specificity of social innovation, the research 
had three aims: (1) to conduct country background surveys on political, 
economic and social dimensions; (2) to identify social needs for such 
innovations, examine social innovation cases and identify their innovative 
features; and (3) to define common characteristics of the selected cases 
and identify features distinctive to Asia. This chapter focuses particularly 
on the third task, and so considers the following question: What are the 
common characteristics found in the social innovation cases in Asia?
Given the variety of social innovation ecosystems in Asia, this chapter 
examines whether common characteristics exist across Asian countries 
and how they are distinct from the Western models, which have been 
the main focus of international research to date. Answering this question 
will contribute to understanding the big picture of Asian countries’ social 
innovation ecosystems and to examining the applicability of pre-existing 
projects, which mainly originated from the West, in an Asian context.
Understanding Social Innovation in Asia
This chapter begins with a review of existing definitions of social innovation. 
It delineates core elements and features of social innovation for research 
purposes. We then go on to explore how the core elements and features 
are adopted in Asian social innovation cases. Social innovation discussed 
in the Asia NGO Innovation Summit (ANIS)6 is particularly emphasised, 
because it has a foundational impact on the diffusion of social innovation 
across Asia.
6  Asia NGO Innovation Summit (ANIS) is a platform for sharing and exchanging the social 
innovation practices and accomplishments among social innovators in Asia. It has held annual 
conferences since launched in 2010 by The Hope Institute with the partnership of Intel Asia-Pacific.
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Various definitions of social innovation have been suggested and discussed 
by researchers, activists, policy makers and academic institutions. 
No  commonly shared definition exists, and any search for a clear-cut, 
specific definition of social innovation is quickly overwhelmed by a 
multiplicity of contending interpretations. The diversity among social 
innovation definitions shows that social innovation is a practice-led, field-
specific phenomenon. In addition, social innovation is multidimensional 
from the outset and covers many sectors and fields.7 The richness and 
openness of definitions of social innovation, however, make the debate 
about it hard to regulate, and it tends to fall into circular discussions. 
Thus, instead of attempting to pinpoint a singular definition of social 
innovation, for the purpose of the research, it is more appropriate to draw 
upon existing definitions and then to use core elements of our working 
definition for our selection of Asian social innovation cases presented in 
later sections.
Among the many definitions of social innovation, our research 
team particularly focused on the one used by TEPSIE8 for this study. 
That definition is:
Social innovations are new solutions (products, services, models, markets, 
processes etc.) that simultaneously meet a social need (more effectively 
than existing solutions) and lead to new or improved capabilities and 
relationships and better use of assets and resources. In other words, social 
innovations are both good for society and enhance society’s capacity 
to act.9 
We chose this definition for three reasons. First, while definitions used 
in most social innovation research are primarily drawn from academic 
perspectives, TEPSIE’s definition embraces many aspects of experiences 
and decisions of social innovators and their practices. Second, it takes into 
consideration multiple dimensions of social innovation: the core elements, 
the common features, the sectors and the processes.10 Third, the TEPSIE 
definition has been adopted by leading social innovation researchers in 
the most recent studies, and thus reflects current social innovation trends.
7  The Young Foundation, Social Innovation Overview, 2012.
8  TEPSIE is a project exploring the Theoretical, Empirical and Policy foundation for Social 
Innovation in Europe, and it is being carried by a consortium of six partners.
9  The Young Foundation, Social Innovation Overview, 2012.
10  ibid.
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Social Innovation: The Core Elements 
and Common Features
The core elements listed in TEPSIE’s social innovation definition are: 
(1) meeting a social need, (2) effectiveness, (3) novelty, (4) moving from 
ideas to implementation, and (5) enhancing society’s capacity to act.11 
In other words, social innovations are something new to the field, sector, 
region, market or user, and are to be applied in a new way. There should 
be an implementation or application of the new ideas. Such processes 
are explicitly designed to meet social needs in a more effective way than 
existing solutions for a measurable improved outcome.12 As a result, the 
innovation enhances society’s capacity to act by developing assets and 
capabilities.
According to TEPSIE’s study, social innovations defined by such core 
elements usually present the following common features. They tend to be 
cross-sectoral; they build new social relationships and capabilities; they are 
open, collaborative and experimental; they are grassroots and mutual in 
character; they make better use of resources; and they develop capabilities 
and assets.13
The core elements are defining factors of all social innovations, whereas 
common features of social innovations are the features found in most social 
innovation cases. Thus, common features are not the prerequisite elements 
of social innovations, but they represent the summation of various trends 
and approaches in social innovations practised. Distinguishing the core 
elements from the often-found common features of social innovations gave 
the research team a useful perspective. It allowed us to focus on what makes 
the social innovation, rather than how to implement it. In the following 
paragraphs, TEPSIE’s five elements are presented in an Asian context, 
recontextualised according to the Asian social innovation environment. 
We applied these elements as our criteria for the selection of our Asian 
social innovation cases, which will be presented in a later section.
11  ibid., 18–21. 
12  Jürgen Howaldt and Michael Schwarz, Social Innovation: Concepts, Research Fields and 
International Trends (Universitat de Barcelona, 2012), www.ub.edu/emprenedoriasocial/ca/social-
innovation-concepts-research-fields-and-international-trends. Accessed 30 June 2016.
13  The Young Foundation, Social Innovation Overview, 2012, 24.
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Meeting a Social Need
This element clarifies the goal of social innovation in any given case. 
We  prioritised how well the social innovation case met a social need. 
In  order to do so, we also examined each society in Asia to identify 
what kinds of social needs exist and which ones are urgent unmet needs. 
We then selected cases of social innovation that address such needs.
Effectiveness
This element focuses on the idea that social innovation should be more 
effective in terms of outcomes (such as quality, satisfaction, costs or 
impact) than existing solutions. We examined various outcomes of the 
selected cases in the given society or region. If the case met a social need 
and was an effective outcome, then the case was marked as an initial 
candidate in the group of Asian social innovations. As part of this process, 
we conducted a basic literature review, on-site and online interviews, 
and field visits.
Novelty
The element of novelty does not mean universal or absolute newness. 
It is rather the ‘perceived novelty to the unit of adoption’.14 We thus 
tried to decide if an innovation is new in the political, social or cultural 
context in which the social innovation cases arise. For instance, some 
Asian countries in our research project are not full-fledged democratic 
societies, so traditional or old-fashioned Western democratic methods 
can be perceived as innovative or new to the people there. Thus, even if 
some methods are already diffused or fully adopted outside the nation or 
region concerned, these methods can be regarded as new or reimagined 
on a local level. 
Moving from Ideas to Implementation
This element entails practical implementation of the idea of social 
innovation. Hence, even though an idea is created and experimented 
with, it should be applied to the field to qualify as a social innovation. 
This also implies that such application has to be sustainable. Adopting this 
14  The Young Foundation, Social Innovation Overview, 2012. 
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element, we distinguished the sustained implementation cases from one-
time or temporary events or experimental cases when selecting Asian 
social innovation cases.
Enhancing Society’s Capacity to Act
Social innovation is accomplished not only by fulfilling unmet social 
needs in an effective way, but also by applying the innovative process 
throughout society. Indeed, social innovation concerns inclusive processes 
involving users, beneficiaries, minorities and marginalised people in 
order to improve the society’s capacity as a whole. Because it ultimately 
relates to the empowerment dimension of social innovation and societal 
resilience,15 this element becomes an important point, especially in the 
Asian context. 
Understanding Asia
Asia is not a homogenous region; it includes many countries, cultures, 
religions and sociopolitical systems. Around 50 countries are located 
in Asia, and its diversity of social environment spans a greater range 
than any other continent in the world. While Asian nations share some 
common history, the level of economic and democratic advancement in 
the region varies dramatically, as is particularly clear when we examine 
Asia by subregion. There are economically advanced countries (e.g. Japan, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea), but at the same 
time many other countries are still suffering from severe poverty and 
an underdeveloped political or social system, such as dictatorship or 
hereditary classes.16 The diversity of the region is also reflected in both the 
social problems and their possible solutions. 
Despite the variety of social landscapes throughout the Asian continent, 
some similarities emerge in the region in terms of social development 
and its side effects. For instance, rapid economic growth strategies, based 
on imported capitalism and led by a central government, are commonly 
found in many nations of the Asian region. This typical Asian strategy 
15  Frances Westley, The Social Innovation Dynamic (University of Waterloo, 2008), sig.uwaterloo.
ca/sites/default/files/documents/TheSocialInnovationDynamic_001.pdf. Accessed 14 May 2012.
16  IMF, International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook: Transitions and Tensions 
(IMF, 2013), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/pdf/text.pdf. Accessed 5 December 2014.
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causes a number of social problems in the region, such as a wide economic 
gap between the rich and the poor, oppressed civic freedom, dependency 
on foreign capital and political instability, etc. These problems are often 
addressed in Asian social innovation programs, in ways that would be less 
likely to be found in regions where the transitions of societal modes were 
relatively steady and smooth. 
Some problems can be solved by applying the existing programs or 
models that have been successful in other regions, such as Europe or other 
Western countries. However, social problems that appear to be similar in 
nature could have very different cultural, political and social backgrounds 
depending on the country where the problem occurs. As a result, the 
replication of social innovation models that have worked successfully in 
other nations may be ineffective in handling social problems in an Asian 
country. For instance, many social innovation programs of developed 
countries in Europe or North America have flourished based on 
collaboration between the public sector and civil sector. Many nations in 
Asia, however, are experiencing political turmoil in the transition period, 
and it is not uncommon to see that Asian governments become major 
barriers to adopting innovative models. It is not always expected that the 
simple replication of successful social innovation models from Western 
societies would efficiently and effectively work in solving social problems 
in Asian countries.
Social innovation in Asia has emerged as a response to growing challenges 
often resulting from the ‘failure’ of modern welfare states and free market 
capitalism, and to numerous other problems beyond the current problem-
solving capacity of existing institutions.17 These challenges exceed 
existing problem-solving capacity because they are complex, multifaceted 
and appear to be impossible to solve by conventional means.18 Such 
problems typically involve a range of stakeholders, so they must be 
addressed collaboratively amongst previously independent sectors such as 
government, civil society or private enterprises. Thus, the notion of ‘social 
innovation’ was introduced as a new way to address the challenges facing 
contemporary capitalist economies.
17  Example of such problems can be resource scarcity, climate change, an ageing population, 
impact of globalisation, impact of mass urbanisation, and so on.
18  A. Nicholls and A. Murdock eds, Social Innovation: Blurring Boundaries to Reconfigure Markets 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
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Social Innovation Initiatives in Asia 
Social innovation is still an unfamiliar concept in Asia. Until a few years 
ago, there had been neither a leading government nor a civil organisation 
that had a social innovation vision or sought to diffuse the social innovation 
movement in Asia. Serious interest in Asian social entrepreneurs’ activities 
arose partly due to the success of Grameen Bank. In addition, countless 
social entrepreneurs throughout the world have been learning lessons 
from such Asian innovators.19 But apart from these few conspicuous 
social enterprise models, other types of social innovation programs in Asia 
have not been sufficiently promoted, and little effort has been made to 
comprehend the landscape of Asian social innovation and its distinctive 
features. 
It is well known that social innovation flourishes best when there is 
effective partnership among grassroots organisations, social innovators 
(who are fast, mobile, creative and practical) and sponsoring organisations 
(which can strategically and financially support innovative models to 
scale up).20 It is obvious that new initiatives are needed to foster social 
innovation in Asia, but it is not clear what strategy would be appropriate 
to achieve this. In order to define pragmatic visions and strategies in such 
a challenging environment, there is a need to understand similarities and 
differences among the diverse nations in Asia in terms of cultural, political 
and social background and the overall landscape of social innovation. 
Our study aims to address this gap in knowledge and expertise, and build 
a base to understand the social innovation ecosystem in Asia. To this end, 
The  Hope Institute in South Korea actively sought social innovation 
networks in Asia, by founding ANIS in 2010.
ANIS was organised to share examples and experiences among Asian social 
innovators. It aims to solve the social issues and problems of each nation 
in the region through solidarity and cooperation. In practical terms, 
the innovative and creative projects in the region are showcased, and the 
ideas and feedback from Asian social innovators are actively exchanged, 
while new trends in Asian social innovation are presented, discussed and 
forecasted through ANIS. Throughout the four years of its existence 
19  The Young Foundation, Social Innovation Overview, 2012.
20  Mulgan et al., Social Innovation, 2007.
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(see Table 1), the work of ANIS has demonstrated that social innovators 
in Asia are groundbreakers, creating new solutions in spite of a lack of 
serious support from public and private sectors in a very weak civil society. 
Table 1: ANIS Annual Meetings from 2009 to 2013.
Stage Annual Meeting Theme Participation
Beginning Nov . 2009
(Hope Inst . 
& Intel Asia 
Agreement)




The Hope Institute, 
Intel Asia










Promotion Oct . 2011
(2nd, Jeju Island, 
South Korea)
Promoting Social 









& Co-create Asia: 
Collaboration across 










Social Innovation Meets 
Technology: Scaling 














from  7 countries
Source: The Hope Institute research team .
The Hope Institute research team conducted a series of literature searches 
to gather  information for country overviews and about numerous 
potential social innovation cases in selected Asian countries (China, 
India, Japan, South Korea and Thailand). Based on this, the research team 
drew up an overview of the five countries. These five countries—China, 
India, Thailand, South Korea and Japan—were selected based on in-
depth analysis of the conditions and potential of their social innovation 
environments. The  main criteria for this selection were regional 
representativeness, potential for social innovation and the existence of 
visible social innovation cases. The team’s in-depth literature searches were 
used to assess the preconditions for and potential of social innovation 
in each country, and to identify potential social innovation cases from 
those countries. More specific reasons for selecting each country include 
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richness of cases found in a country, importance of the social innovation 
in a given society, and convenience to access the information and the 
actual fields. For instance, India was selected for having relatively rich 
examples of and studies on its social innovation in addition to its leading 
role in the region in terms of social innovation. China demonstrates high 
potential for social innovation but also increasing need for the role of civil 
society. Thailand has various social innovation projects and movements, 
information about which came to light at the ANIS conferences. South 
Korea and Japan were selected since the research team had considerable 
understanding of the cases of both countries, and also because a variety of 
cases were visible in both countries, but had so far received little attention 
from researchers.
For a more extensive and systematic case selection, The Hope Institute 
research team created the Asian social innovation case bank and clustered 
social innovation programs in Asia according to nations or subregions and 
the social issues addressed. The ANIS network was used for the case bank 
collection as well. The research team collected the social innovation cases 
through the ANIS 2012 conference meeting and conducted case surveys 
among the attending members. Additional Asian social innovation cases 
were also collected through the surveys conducted during the conference. 
The research team then defined the key features and the core elements of 
social innovation in Asia. Using them as criteria, this study selected a total 
of 46 cases (China 15, India 10, Japan 6, South Korea 6, and Thailand 9) 
of social innovation from the five countries. 
Key aspects that this research focuses on when selecting cases from each 
country are: 1) the case should focus less on ideological and/or theoretical 
issues than on practical ways of satisfying the unmet social needs in 
citizens’ daily life; 2) the innovation should be led by citizens (in other 
words, by the local people who live in the region), not by social activists or 
politicians; and 3) cases should actually be implemented and have yielded 
substantial result. Key examples of social innovation in Asia include new 
approaches of civic participation to achieve democracy in countries with a 
low level of democracy and cases driven by internal forces without much 
external support (e.g. without the help of or direction from global non-
profit organisations or outside experts). In the case of social enterprise 
and government–business collaborative projects, the benefits should go 
to local residents and citizens at large. Other important examples are 
innovative projects using new technology to secure people’s participation, 
which has been difficult to encourage otherwise. 
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Data analysis was conducted through comparison, grouping and thematic 
categorisation, which are based on the grounded theory technique. 
Drawing on this analysis, we identified key elements and factors for 
understanding social innovation in Asia, and then identified the shared 
characteristics in Asian social innovations. Acknowledging that the 
driving force behind meaningful social change and sustainable innovation 
is voluntary citizen participation that bridges different sectors, the analysis 
focused on how different groups of people participate in the efforts to 
create new models for addressing social issues. 
The research team conducted a series of interviews with primary players 
in the identified cases. A total of 45 interviews were carried out, most 
of them face-to-face interviews through field visits and ANIS meetings, 
in addition to some phone and email interviews. Interview participants 
were mostly social innovators, academics, organisation-based researchers 
(e.g. the branch offices of Ashoka Foundation, Intel China, etc.) or civic 
activists. The participants were recruited through the ANIS network, and 
additional interviews for the cases of China and India were held at the 
International Conference on Creativity and Innovation at Grassroots 
(ICCIG).
The Hope Institute research team conducted field visits to the selected 
countries. The field visit was one of the most important methods in this 
study. The main purpose was to visit the relevant organisations and collect 
the field information and experiences of the cases and the countries as 
well. During the field visits, interviews were also conducted with experts 
who have insights on the various countries’ social issues, sectoral relations 
(government, business and civil society) and the role of civil society in 
social innovation. The networks of ANIS and Rockefeller Foundation as 
well as SIX (Social Innovation Exchange) served as useful initial contact 
points to prepare the field visits and conduct follow-up. Expert advisory 
conferences aimed at assessment of the social, political and economic 
environments of each country and the suitability of the selected cases. 
Advisory meetings were held either through conferencing or interview 
visits. The specific information on the field visits are shown in Table 2.
Many interesting innovation cases were explored in this research. 
Relatively successful and characteristic cases were included such as Honey 
Bee Network of India, focusing on small-scale technology and knowledge 
sharing solutions for ordinary people; Carepro, which offers an innovative 
approach to health services for poor and marginalised citizens in Japan; 
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Hongsung Pulmu cooperative movement and the Wonju community for 
sustainable village development in South Korea. An interesting online 
‘1kg More’ campaign, which carries stationery to school children in 
remote villages in China, was found and many active implementations of 
innovative social ideas by Seoul City in South Korea were included as well. 
Some cases are distinguished by their cross-sectoral and local government 
leaders’ initiatives for social innovation. Information and communication 
technology have also become particularly important elements in social 
innovation, as shown in the cases of alternative political podcasts in South 
Korea and an online candidacy movement in China, which we studied.
Table 2: Field visits by The Hope Institute research team.
Country Field visits  Dates 
China 7 26 November–5 December 2012
Hong Kong 8 1–7 November 2012 
India 11 6–12 December 2012
Thailand 13 13–24 May 2013
South Korea 6 1–30 August 2013 
Source: Compiled by The Hope Institute research team . 
Seven Characteristics of Social Innovation 
in Asia
The social innovation cases from the five selected countries were categorised 
according to trends that reflect the overall landscape and ecosystems of 
social innovations of the nations in Asia. The research team identified 
keywords from each country’s social innovation trends and listed those 
key words based on how frequently they appeared. A word cloud tool 
showed ‘development’, ‘community’, ‘engagement’ and ‘cross-sector 
collaboration’ as the most frequent keywords (see Figure 13). This shows 
that social innovations in Asia revolve around the development of urban 
and local areas, and sustainable development in those areas, community 
building and citizen engagement and cross-sector collaboration to enact 
effective innovative approaches.
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Figure 13: Keyword cloud of social innovation.
Source: The Hope Institute research team .
As another way of characterising social innovations in Asia, this study 
listed all the key themes and key words drawn from the country analyses, 
and then categorised them, using two steps. In the first step, the themes 
and key words were sorted according to their relevancy, and then the 
resulting themes were categorised into three groups—Goals, Agents and 
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Figure 14: Two-step categorisation of keywords and themes of social 
innovation in Asia.
Source: The Hope Institute research team .
This figure shows that social innovation in Asia is carried out by the 
people directly encountering the social problems, and by governments, 
intermediary organisations and funders. The goals of the social innovations 
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in Asia have in general targeted the tasks of increasing earnings, solving 
local issues, expanding social welfare services and reforming undemocratic 
social systems. The parties to the social innovation projects often try to 
achieve these goals by directly tackling such social problems and adopting 
technologies in an innovative way. They use cross-sectoral collaboration as 
a working method and apply social economy models so that the problem-
solving processes can gain sustainability.
Finally, this study goes on to present seven characteristics of social 
innovation in Asia, as follows. 
People-centred Development 
One of the major characteristics of social innovation in Asia is that Asian 
societies face problems resulting from rapid and compressed sociopolitical 
development, and there is growing awareness that these problems need 
to be solved by the citizens by themselves. Most Asian countries have 
achieved some degree of economic development and democratisation. 
Capitalist development models and the rules of procedural democracy 
have been implemented. But the autonomous formation of nation-states, 
independent capital accumulation, the historical appearance of bourgeois 
and citizenry and people’s awareness of citizenship have often been 
delayed or distorted. Though there has been considerable development 
through industrialisation and modernisation, the benefits have not been 
socially shared for sustainable development, and thus the gap between the 
rich and poor has deepened. According to the Asian Development Bank, 
the Asia and the Pacific regions remain home to the largest number of the 
world’s poor.21 In 2008, around 63 per cent of the poor worldwide lived in 
the region. The number of poor people in developing member countries 
of Asia is 658.07 million.22 Most of them are engaged in low-waged 
manual labouring and lacking access to education. In particular, rural 
areas experience low productivity and slow technological advancement. 
These people also lack social welfare services, and especially suffer from 
poor health care.
21  Asian Development Bank (ADB), Overview of Civil Society Organisations: India (Manila: Asian 
Development Bank, 2009).
22  Guanghua Wan and Iva Sebastian, Poverty in Asia and the Pacific: An Update, Asian Development 
Bank Economics Working Paper (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011), 22–5.
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Such unbalanced economic and social development produces marginalised 
people who are excluded from the mainstream. This becomes the starting 
point for Asian innovators to share knowledge, information, financial 
resources and technology, and so to create a self-reliant economic 
ecosystem, which enables people to improve their social conditions for 
themselves. People-centred development expresses the ways in which 
socially aware citizens identify their own social issues and create their 
own solutions by actively participating in social planning and decision-
making processes. Innovative strategies for alternative development ‘of 
the people, by the people, and for the people’ further have an impact on 
local and central policies. In identifying the significance of people-centred 
development in Asia we found two key points. 
First, marginalised people themselves help to achieve their own 
empowerment. This is done by redefining their knowledge, creativity 
and the value of their experience. Networking plays a crucial role here. 
Through redefinition, recognition and sharing, people invent occupational 
or survival solutions with little reliance on official or professional expert 
systems. Under these circumstances, marginalised people build up 
an informal knowledge network connecting like-minded individuals, 
innovators, farmers, scholars, policy makers, entrepreneurs and NGOs to 
nurture creativity. For instance, India’s Honey Bee Network has emphasised 
people-to-people learning, the ‘small technology’ solutions of ordinary 
people, and new collaborative ways to solve problems. The activities of 
the Honey Bee Network are connected to other organisations such as 
the Society for Research and Initiatives for Sustainable Technologies and 
Institutions (SRISTI). SRISTI is a registered charitable organisation in 
India, founded in 1993 in response to the need to provide systematic 
support to knowledge-rich but economically poor people by adding value 
to their creative activities. One of the interesting activities carried out 
by SRISTI is Shodh Yatras, which is a traditional method of learning by 
walking together. The practice aims to seek knowledge, creativity and 
innovations at grassroots through seven to 10 days of journey on foot to 
reach remote areas of the country. It is a journey of mutual exchange and 
sharing of knowledge.
Second, people-centred development focuses on the building of self-reliant 
alternative economic communities. While pre-existing Asian development 
strategies have heavily concentrated on industrialisation and urbanisation, 
rural areas have been degraded to become a mere source of supply of low-
waged labourers and basic food. The population and incomes of rural 
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areas have rapidly shrunk. Some areas have been left devastated. In order 
to address such issues, farmers and local residents have created farmers’ 
cooperatives. The cooperatives make efforts to increase members’ income 
by setting up direct trading, adding values to products. They also make 
sure that part of the profits are reinvested in local improvement.23 This 
approach is well demonstrated in the cases of Wonju Social Economy 
Network and Hongsung Pulmu Village in South Korea.24 
Community Empowerment
Community empowerment refers to the process of enabling communities 
to increase control over their lives. Community empowerment, therefore, 
is more than the involvement, participation or engagement of communities 
in developing social programs. It implies community ownership and 
action that explicitly aims at social and political changes.25 Community 
empowerment is the process of building a stronger community through 
skills training, capital and logistics availability and capability. In this 
way, the community is able to sustain livelihood or similar projects that 
tend to benefit the community and its constituent members. As a social 
innovation trend in Asia, community empowerment comes in two forms.
First, community empowerment has been carried out mainly through 
urban projects for slum upgrading and community rebuilding activities. 
Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation have resulted in the collapse of 
traditional communities in many places. Many Southeast Asian countries 
are in the course of a development process led by mega-capital investment 
and industrialisation. Agricultural workers are forced to become low-
waged workers in cities, and they often end up amongst the urban poor in 
slum areas. They frequently suffer from problems of insecure residential 
status. When government plans for these people proved ineffective, groups 
of people took the issue as their own task and came up with innovative 
solutions. The Bann Mankong Community Upgrade Program in Thailand 
23  Kwon Seong-moon, ‘A Study on Development Case in Rural Area: Focusing on Hongdong 
village, Hongsung County, Chungcheongnam-do’[Nongch’onjiyŏk ŭi paljŏn sarye e kwanhan yŏn’gu: 
Ch’ungnam Hongsŏnggun Hongdongmyŏn ŭl chungsim ŭro 농촌지역의 발전 사례에 관한 연구 : 
충남 홍성군 홍동면을 중심으로] (Master’s diss., Sungkonghoe University, 2011), 5–7.
24  Kim Heung-ju, ‘A Study on Socio-economic Characteristic of Pulmu Co-op Farmers’ 
[P’ulmusaenghyŏp saengsanja ŭi sahoegyŏngjejŏk sŏnggyŏk e kwanhan yŏn’gu 풀무생협 생산자의 
사회경제적 성격에 관한 연구], Korean Agricultural Society 18 (2008): 45. 
25  Fran Baum, ‘Foreword’, in Ronald Labonte and Glenn Laverack, Health Promotion in Action: 
From Local to Global Empowerment (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), xiii–xv.
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is a good example. In this project, slum dwellers called for a forum among 
themselves, community groups, civil activists, community networks, civic 
group entrepreneurs and government officials to discuss their residential 
issues and potential solutions. This project was not only focused on 
upgrading their living conditions, but also on engaging the slum dwellers 
and other residents in the process. They became aware of their role and 
power as members of a community. In that way, this project exemplifies 
people-driven community development and community empowerment 
projects.
Second, community empowerment has been achieved by implementing 
self-reliant local economic ecosystems. As mentioned in the previous 
section, farmers’ cooperatives have been promoted to create earning 
routes and constant reinvestment, and this has contributed to enhancing 
sustainability for local economies. Such autonomous systems have helped 
local people to raise their voices on other issues so that they can actively 
pursue innovative solutions. Their innovative programs for community 
empowerment often encounter the challenges of dominant capital. For 
instance, local farmers’ cooperatives in South Korea often challenge the 
big corporations’ unfair trading or interference practices. The case of 
consumer cooperatives in Japan, which we also examined, is somewhat 
different from the case of South Korea’s cooperatives in that the goal of the 
Japanese co-ops focuses on securing everyday foodstuffs for consumers, 
and so does not directly target the task of raising members’ income, but it 
does also entail activities that empower the local community. The work of 
these Japanese cooperatives has been centrally concerned with problems of 
consumers’ loss of control over their own well-being, including the safety 
of foodstuffs. The cooperatives especially challenge big conglomerates’ 
monopoly over the market for food and other essentials.
Most of all, community empowerment is closely connected to community 
rebuilding, because ‘community’ does not just mean the group of residents 
living in a region. Rebuilding community ultimately relates to building up 
social capital such as trust, solidarity and cooperation among members. 
By doing this, residents and neighbours create their own community, 
where their everyday concerns and economic life are shared, supported 
and developed. This transformation cannot be taken for granted: the 
residents of urban areas, members of cooperatives, local small merchants, 
and others people in the community are required to identify the issues 
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and find out the best way to solve them. Only by such participation 
and struggle can the transformation of dwelling place to community be 
achieved.
ICT-based Civic Engagement
Information and communications technology (ICT) provides useful 
tools for efficient public participation in the democratic process and 
the dissemination of opinions and ideas. It is also frequently utilised for 
rallying social action about issues of concern to citizens. The technological 
advantages can easily be shared in societies where technological 
infrastructure is well established.26 In Asia, many countries are on the 
path to democratic transition, which has been delayed at the expense 
of economic development. Thus, many Asian activists adopt ICT as a 
strategic tool for social innovation in an environment where civil rights 
and civic services are severely suppressed. 
ICT-based civic engagement has been made easier by advances in the ICT 
industry in Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, 
South Korea and Thailand. In Asia, the internet user growth rate was 
841.9 per cent for the period from 2000 to 2012. This is much faster 
than Europe’s 393.4 per cent or North America’s 153.3 per cent growth 
rate.27 Mobile technology has also been also rapidly popularised in Asia: 
the number of mobile phones per 100 citizens is 89.2 in China, 70.96 
in India, 108.1 in South Korea, 95.1 in Japan and 105 in Thailand, as 
compared to the world average of 87.28 ICT-based civic engagement 
appears in two ways in Asian social innovation cases. 
First, many ICT-based social innovations in Asia are related to citizens’ 
political participation, which often encounters an authoritarian regime 
and/or undemocratic government policies. Some countries in this study 
are considered as low-ranked countries in terms of level of democracy 
realisation (e.g. China as an authoritarian regime; India and Thailand 
26  Hong Hyojin, IT rǔl t’onghan sahoe hyŏksin sarye: Pin’gon, hwan’gyŏng, chaenan, pup’ae, chŏgaebal 
kukka chiwŏn, illyu ǔi nanche haegyŏl [IT를 통한 사회혁신 사례 - 빈곤·환경·재난·부패·
저개발 국가 지원·인류의 난제 해결 Social Innovation Cases through IT: Approach for 
Poverty, Environment, Disaster, Corruption, International Support, Global Issues] (Seoul: National 
Information Society Agency, 2012).
27  www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Accessed 5 December 2014.
28  en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_countries_by_number_of_mobile_phones_in_use.  
Accessed 5 December 2014.
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as flawed democracies). These nations are still suffering from political 
oppression, strict censorship and other limitations of civil rights. 
Countries such as Japan and South Korea are regarded as relatively highly 
democratised; however, there are still some oppressive political practices 
and limitations to civic freedom. In this social environment, ICT was 
actively adopted by citizen groups in order to challenge the dominant 
communication systems and to disseminate counter arguments and 
alternatives.
For example, the online candidacy movement for local elections in China 
from 2011 onwards was mainly carried out via SNS. The movement 
was initiated online to break the government’s suppression of the non-
communist party members’ candidacy. This case demonstrates that ICT 
can enable citizens to develop potential ways to promote democratic 
elections. Another case in South Korea, the alternative podcast broadcaster 
Nakomsu exemplifies the successful use of ICT for social innovation. 
Nakomsu effectively utilised podcast technology in order to tackle 
mainstream media power. It successfully played the role of a political critic 
of the existing regime’s unethical and unjust conduct. Such cases imply 
that democratic improvement and enhancement of civic society are still 
pressing needs for many Asian societies, and that ICT can become a useful 
strategic tool for social innovators to address these issues.
Second, the handy and accessible features of ICT facilitate people’s 
participation and civic awareness. The fast speed of internet and/or 
mobile communications prompts the dissemination of civic discourse, 
argument and discussion. It helps to lead less-informed people, or those 
who are reluctant to express their opinions in public, into more active 
civic engagement. Cases like ‘1kg More’ in China are well promoted by 
the ICT-based strategies, which disseminate information about their 
practices nationwide.
Public Sector Leadership and Local Governance
A major economic crisis beset Asia in the late 1990s. Beginning in 
Thailand with the collapse of the Thai baht, the financial contagion 
critically affected Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and 
the Philippines. Though China, Taiwan, Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam 
were less affected, most countries experienced recession and government 
financial deficits. On the other hand, citizen awareness in those countries 
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kept growing, while the governments faced various civic challenges 
including questioning of the legitimacy of regimes and of inequality, and 
demands for democracy and the expansion of social welfare. 
Under these circumstances, Asian countries have made efforts to improve 
governance and to bring efficiency to governmental activities. These 
efforts are linked to social innovation, which is becoming a kind of global 
trend, as was shown by the Obama administration’s establishment of an 
Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation in 2009. However, 
few Asian countries have made such full-scale moves. Instead, the idea 
of ‘innovation’ in Asia has been approached mainly in the context of 
economic restructuring or goal setting. Thus ‘social innovation’ has 
not been energetically pursued as a governmental policy. However, it is 
acknowledged by many Asian governments as a meaningful practice that 
requires cross-sectoral collaboration embracing industry, civil society, and 
government. 
Thus, many Asian governments recognise the necessity of collaboration 
with the civic sector. They have gradually expanded support for 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and developed policies and other 
institutional support for these organisations. For instance, the Japanese 
Government enacted a Non-Profit Organisation (NPO) Law in 1998, 
which promotes NPOs’ activities and programs. Since then, more 
grassroots groups have been able to establish their legal status, and many 
local administrations have set up NPO support centres and/or various 
intermediaries to facilitate the provision of staff, funds and information 
for social innovation. China, where many civic organisations were 
controlled and censored, also reformed social welfare service systems 
so that local governments took on a greater role relative to the central 
government. As a result, CSOs’ participation in the social welfare sector 
is increasing. Thailand’s government set up a National Social Enterprise 
Committee (NSEC) under the Prime Minister’s Office. The NSEC created 
a Social Enterprise Master Plan to support social enterprise and facilitate 
the incubation of various social enterprise ideas. India also established 
National Innovation Council and set up a National Innovation Fund in 
order to promote grassroots level innovations.
In addition to these supportive policy initiatives and efforts by central 
governments to create a favourable environment, local administrations 
have taken more specific actions to adopt practical social innovation 
policies. This reflects the fact that many Asian countries are in the course 
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of decentralisation. So local governments welcome social enterprise 
and related innovation activities because these eventually contribute 
to strengthening local financial independence and effective policies, as 
well as promoting citizens’ participation at the local level. Therefore, 
local governments in Asia try to seize opportunities to collaborate with 
civic sectors by establishing various supportive measures for community 
business. They also become more active in adopting participatory decision-
making processes. The City of Seoul, South Korea, provides a good 
example of such engagement. In Japan, some local governments have also 
implemented municipal ordinances for community making to encourage 
local citizens’ participation. Chinese governments too are putting forward 
social innovative programs under the banner of ‘Social Management 
Innovation’, to reinforce transparency and citizen participation. 
Social Entrepreneurship
Most Asian countries have experienced rapid industrialisation and other 
social transformations in the short period of less than a century, or in some 
cases even in a few decades. This rapid industrialisation has caused many 
sociopolitical problems. Social innovation in Asia necessarily confronts 
such problems and seeks to address them through innovative programs. 
One salient approach to this is social entrepreneurship. The emergence 
of social entrepreneurs is, in general, seen as a consequence of the failure 
of the modern welfare state and/or of flaws in conventional market 
capitalism. In other words, social entrepreneurs have emerged to provide 
solutions to the issues that lie beyond the capacity of the government or 
market alone. However, in Asia, space for the birth of social entrepreneurs 
has yet to emerge. Japan and South Korea have to some extent experienced 
economic development followed by the introduction of social welfare 
measures, but there still exist unaddressed basic needs such poverty, 
malnutrition, disease and lack of educational opportunities in many Asian 
nations. In  such circumstances, the emergence of social entrepreneurs 
in Asia tends to fill gaps in the state social welfare system itself. Social 
entrepreneurs often take on the tasks that have been performed by the 
government in traditional welfare states. 
Another characteristic of Asian social innovation in relation to social 
entrepreneurs is that a business model is actively adopted as a means for 
NGOs’ profit-making, or for profit-driven enterprises to promote public 
values. An example for this appears in the case of social enterprise in India, 
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where almost 40 per cent of the population live below the national poverty 
line.29 In fact, approximately three-quarters of Indian social enterprises 
target the base of the pyramid (BOP) as consumers of critical goods and 
services. Those new business models rely on multitiered pricing or cross-
subsidisation, which means (for example) that paying patients subsidise 
those who cannot afford the cost. Another example of this trend can be 
found in the Japanese health initiative Carepro, which provides self check-
up services at low cost—about $5. This shows how a social welfare service 
(health care) was taken over by a combination of the market approach 
and a ‘public good’ business model. In Japan it was possible for such a 
business model to appear in social services mainly as a result of social 
welfare system reform: a long-term care insurance scheme was created, 
and this allowed NPOs and other cooperatives to enter service areas such 
as human care and long-term care service for the elderly people.
The proliferation of social enterprise in Asia is also related to the ups and 
downs of CSOs. Gradual democratisation and the growth of the middle 
class contributed to an increase of CSOs as well. However, those civic 
organisations soon faced hard times in terms of financial sustainability 
when economic recession arrived. Many non-profit organisations changed 
into social enterprises to find better opportunities for self-financing, and 
this change was also encouraged by government policies to support social 
enterprise. In China, almost 20 per cent of social enterprises are actually 
registered as CSOs and thus there is no clear distinguishing line between 
the two forms of program. It should also be noted that the global rise of 
social enterprise, particularly successful examples such as Grameen Bank, 
influenced many young entrepreneurs to move in this direction. Young 
professionals who have experience of working in industries also often 
move into social venture and related areas (e.g. social impact investment).
29  Melissa Ip, ‘Exploring India’s Social Enterprise Landscape’, Social Enterprise Buzz, 
19  April  2012,  www.socialenterprisebuzz.com/2012/04/19/exploring-indias-social-enterprise-
landscape/. Accessed 1 December 2014.
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Intermediary Organisations
Intermediary organisations30 provide support financially and policy-
wise. Thus, they help to create the environment for social innovation. 
In fact, many cases selected for this study displayed the importance of 
the intermediaries. The Honey Bee Network in India is a good example 
in that the network has led many grassroots innovations. It successfully 
created various projects to facilitate indigenous knowledge, experience 
and creativity. 
In the cases of China and Thailand, intermediaries played a crucial role in 
the development of social enterprise. In particular, intermediaries such as 
the British Council and the Ashoka Foundation introduced the concept of 
social enterprise and actively spread its outcome by holding competitions 
and forums.31 They also connected social enterprises to funding bodies 
and expanded opportunities for various social enterprises to implement 
their ideas. Moreover, intermediaries have played an important role when 
Asian governments embarked on supporting social innovations. The case 
of City of Seoul in South Korea illustrates this: the city promoted social 
innovation more effectively by utilising various intermediary organisations 
(e.g. a hub for young job-seekers, a creativity lab, a centre for local 
community support, centres for youth like the innovative Haja Center, 
also mentioned in Chapter Seven, which provides education for young 
people seeking an alternative from the standard school system, and so on). 
When civil society is sufficiently developed to stand alone as a partner in 
collaboration with government in Asia, intermediaries play an important 
role to connect the two sectors. This has been done by way of education, 
enhancement programs, grassroots empowerment, etc.
30  Intermediary organisations play a fundamental role in encouraging, promoting and facilitating 
linkage between state/local governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs, NOPs, 
community groups, civic groups, academic institutions and private corporations). Infrastructure 
organisation, umbrella organisation, local development agency, intermediary support organisation 
are the terms to identify such role and actitivity in the countries like the US, UK and Japan.
31  Ashoka Foundation. Ashoka innovators for the public: Prayong Doklamyai, 2012, www.ashoka.
org/fellow/prayong-doklamyai. Accessed 30 October 2012.
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10 . SOCIAL INNOVATION IN ASIA
Cross-sectoral Partnership
Social innovation is cross-sectoral by nature; it is often achieved through 
partnerships and collaborations among four sectors: the non-profit, public, 
private and informal sectors. Asian social innovations too display ‘more 
than one sector’ collaboration, though there are variations in the role of 
the various sectors. However, as pointed out in the previous section, the 
civic or non-profit sector in Asia has not been strong enough to lead the 
partnership. In addition, some governments too lack strong governance. 
Under these circumstances, Asian social innovation is characterised by 
the active role of informal participants and their leading contribution 
to cross-sectoral collaboration. Notably, professional experts (professors, 
scientists, engineers, architects, medical doctor, etc.) made up much 
of this informal sector, and their participation has contributed to the 
success of many social innovation cases. For instance, architects played an 
important role in the Residential Innovation Project in Thailand. These 
architects were closely connected to the project and held housing design 
workshops in addition to their consulting tasks. Most of the grassroots 
innovations in India have been based on the participation of scientists, 
engineers and IT professionals, who provide practical support such as the 
enhancement of farm equipment and agricultural production processes. 
Their contributions are not limited to simple volunteering; they become 
a kind of pro bono work, in that their professional abilities serve social 
goals and contribute to public services. This kind of informal sector plays 
a crucial role in enabling social innovation to come up with practical 
solutions and to sustain social innovation practices in Asian context where 
the number of social innovators is still small. 
Conclusion
Social innovation is defined as a process whereby all sectors in a society, 
namely, the government, business and citizen, join in collaborative efforts 
to address issues facing the society. The mainstream discourse of social 
innovation that emerged from Western society stresses the importance 
of innovative ways of cooperation among different social sectors to meet 
social needs. In addition, it emphasises the sustainability of society and 
voluntary citizen participation. However, the contexts of Asia are quite 
different. Many countries in Asia demonstrate ‘weak governance’ with a 
low level of government transparency and accountability, which means 
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that the government has a lack of capacity to deal with social problems 
in trusted and transparent ways. This is often coupled with a shortage of 
available finance. The majority of Asian countries suffer from a democracy 
deficit, which is clearly one of the key barriers to citizen participation 
in addressing pressing social challenges. Asian citizens are still struggling 
with poverty, public health, problems of a wide gap between rich and 
poor, restricted civil rights and dictatorship. Compressed development 
and top-down industrialisation through government-driven strategies 
have caused many of the existing problems. Asian countries have to cope 
in their own way with crucial social needs in order to improve daily lives 
and promote democratisation and civil liberty.
However, this does not mean that Asian societies are not ready for 
social innovation. Rather, because of these multilayered problems, social 
innovation projects are crucial in Asian societies. Many cases from the 
five countries we studied demonstrate how effectively social innovation 
projects contribute to citizen awareness, bottom-up action, self-reliant 
business, the pursuit of civil liberty and community rebuilding. Asian 
social innovation often overlaps with social movements and/or democratic 
reform. Social innovation in Asia on the one hand presents ‘continuity’ 
from sociopolitical democratisation movements, which are based on 
grassroots, bottom-up civic action. On the other hand, the innovation 
movement implies ‘discontinuity’ from the conventional movements, 
such as class-based political struggles, hierarchical forms of resource 
mobilisation or ideology-centred activism. It is problematic to identify the 
social innovation movement of Asia simply in terms either of continuity 
or of discontinuity from earlier social movements. There is much scope 





We are mad, of course. From the point of view of those who defend their 
armchairs and discuss the arrangement of the furniture in the run-up to 
the next election, we are undoubtedly mad, we who run about seeing 
cracks that are invisible to the eyes of those who sit in armchairs (or which 
appear to them, if at all, as changes in the wallpaper, to which they give 
the name of ‘new social movements’). The worst of it is that they may be 
right: perhaps we are mad, perhaps there is no way out, perhaps the cracks 
we see exist only in our fantasy. The old revolutionary certainty can no 
longer stand. There is absolutely no guarantee of a happy ending.1 
The small and diverse experiments in informal life politics that we have 
explored in this volume might seem, from a more conventional political 
perspective, to be mad, or at least marginal, irrelevant and doomed to 
failure. They are idealistic efforts to change very small corners of the world, 
driven often by sheer pressures of circumstance, but also sometimes by 
a belief that minor autonomous actions can ultimately flow into wider 
processes of social and political change.
The stories we have encountered here are very varied, but placing them 
side-by-side has also helped to make certain common threads more 
visible. In all of these stories, it proves remarkably difficult to define 
the participants  in terms of conventional identity categories: class, 
status, gender or even ideology. Though the groups are small and often 
community  based, they almost invariably consist of networks bringing 
together both ‘locals’ and ‘outsiders’, as well as people with differing 
social backgrounds and life experiences. It might be tempting to see these 
groups as practising middle-class ‘lifestyle politics’, and certainly some 
participants might be called ‘middle class’, and some might be labelled 
1  John Holloway, Crack Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 8–9.
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‘intellectuals’. But the clearest motif is diversity. Farmers and fishers were 
active protagonists in the informal life politics described by Sho Konishi’s 
account of early 20th-century Japan (Chapter One), in the life of the 
Bishan commune (Chapter Two), the Nagano Prefecture endogenous 
development projects (Chapter Three) and grassroots responses to the 
disasters of Minamata and Fukushima (Chapters Five and Six). Factory 
workers engaged in the cooperatives of 1920s Japan and in the reactions 
to the 2011 nuclear disaster (Chapters One and Six). Shopkeepers 
and traditional craftsmen cooperated with professional artists and 
others in the  Hong Kong art activism described by Olivier Krischer 
(Chapter Eight). People from all walks of life shared in the search for a 
response to the Sewol disaster (Chapter Seven), and have taken part in 
groups like India’s Honey Bee Network and Thailand’s Bann Mankong 
Program (Chapter Ten).
The potential to bring together the talents and experience of diverse 
people is clearly important to the practices of informal life politics. At the 
same time, though, this diversity suggests a need to explore new ways to 
observe and understand these actions. Like the forms of politics discussed 
by John Holloway, these are ways of ‘doing’ rather than ways of ‘being’. 
People engaged in informal life politics develop their sense of self in the 
process of ‘doing’, rather than being impelled to take political action by 
a pre-existing sense of identity. The creation of skills for observing and 
understanding improvisatory ‘doing’ remains an important frontier for 
future research.
A further common thread that emerges from the chapters in this book 
is a desire to ‘push back’ against the seemingly endless expansion of a 
commercial system that reduces all life to a matter of economic value 
and profit. These forms of informal life politics can be seen as one side of 
the ‘double movement’ described by Karl Polanyi in his classic The Great 
Transformation. According to Polanyi the apparently relentless expansion 
of the market provokes a countermovement to protect parts of human 
life from the invasive forces of commercialisation and commodification: 
‘the market expanded continuously, but this movement was met by 
a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions’. This 
countermovement is not just ‘the usual defensive behaviour of a society 
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faced with change’, but is rather ‘a reaction against a dislocation which 
attacked the fabric of society, and which would have destroyed the very 
organisation of production that the market had called into being’.2 
As early as the 1920s, as we have seen, the Japanese villagers of Arishima 
Farm and of the New Village Movement were experimenting with 
practices of shared ownership and communal living, and Chinese rural 
reformers were rediscovering the agrarianist visions of their forebears as 
a response to the inroads of commercial modernity into rural life. This 
push back continues in responses to disasters generated by unbridled 
commercialism, examined in Chapters Four to Seven, and in the search 
for autonomous forms of community building explored in Chapters Eight 
and Ten. For, as Polanyi also observed, the expansion of the market is 
always underpinned and made possible by the action of the state: ‘the road 
to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous, centrally organised and controlled interventionism’.3 So too 
today, those who confront the damage to daily life done by corporate 
development schemes, industrial pollution, nuclear radiation and human-
generated ‘accidents’ confront the power of the state as well as the power 
of the market. 
The case of North Korea, discussed in Chapter Nine, seems to be an 
intriguing counter-example. Here, instead of people pushing back against 
the intrusive power of the market economy in their lives, ordinary people 
use the power of the market to push back against the intrusions of a 
repressive state. But this counter-example helps to highlight an important 
point. The central issue is not the practice of market exchange itself. 
Markets can take many forms and serve many purposes. Rather, as this 
case reminds us, we need to re-politicise our understanding of the market, 
and to re-examine its diversity of forms. The expansionary and invasive 
nature of an ever-expanding system of commodification, intertwined as 
it always is with the ‘continuous, centrally organised’ workings of state 
power may threaten the foundations of life. Yet small-scale exchange 
systems controlled by groups of local traders may be socially empowering 
for participants while also contributing to longer-term processes 
of nationwide change.
2  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001) (original published in 1944).
3  ibid., 145–6.
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How can we judge the success or failure of the stories we have encountered 
here. None, of course, has transformed national or international society. 
Some (like the Bishan commune) have faced state repression. Others 
(like the actions of the Sewol families) have faced fierce counterattacks 
from ideologically opposed sections of society. In an age of the emptying 
of democracy, the forces stacked against small actions to restore human 
autonomy and agency seem almost insurmountable. Yet, as we saw in 
Chapter Three, even groups that seem to wither in the face of repression 
may prove to have sowed the seeds for future informal political action. 
By placing these stories together, we hope that we have been able to bring 
them into dialogue with one another, and with some of the many other 
minor actions of people around the world who seek to shape their lives 
according to their own hopes and visions. Informal life politics, as we have 
seen, has a long history. In a world without promises of happy endings, 
its future is also uncertain. The only certainty is that this future lies in the 
hands and actions of the people who enact—who live—this quiet and 
often invisible form of politics: and those people include ourselves.
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